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Abstract 
Corruption as a phenomenon, today presents a serious danger on state 
law. This means that instead of rule of law and its legal norms govern 
individuals, guided by self interested purposes and in accordance with the 
interests. Corruption is contrary to the principle of the rule of law and poses a 
direct threat to democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society. 
The media play a huge role in the way of informing citizens about corruption, 
but also in discovering function. If we talk about unbiased media in order to 
objectively inform citizens about what happened on a democratic society, in 
this case a huge role of the media in shaping public opinion about the dangers 
of certain socially negative phenomena such as corruption, but also and the 
enormous role of the media in the same revealing function. The question for 
the viability and functioning of media beyond sorts influences their 
susceptibility to the influence of political parties, individuals, organized 
criminal groups, government institutions, etc. If the percentage of the 
subjectivity of the media is higher, the greater is the possibility of corruption 
through influence by individuals and groups for the perception of corruption 
in the public in a manner suitable to the customers and financiers of articles 
on corruption broadcast of the media. Partiality and biased journalism goes 
back in addition to furthering the interests of the customers who use corruption 
as one of the modalities for achieving your goals. 
Key words: corruption, media influences, partiality, informing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
"Corrupt journalists are a danger to society as well as the corrupt 
politician or businessman. Through corrupt information, or through 
concealment, inflicts severe damage to public life, almost the same as that of 
bad politics” 
Krsto Cvijic 
 
Today life modern’s man cannot do without the presence of the 
information presented by mass media. Media always had its influences in 
creating public opinion of citizens. This paper asks several questions that we 
are trying to answer. What is the relationship of media and society? Are media 
accelerated, improved or set back the social change. How society reacts to the 
media? The way the media affect the creation of public opinion? What is the 
role of the media to create public opinion on corruption as a negative social 
phenomenon? What is the role of the media in the detection and prevention of 
corruption? Media and society is multifaceted and complex. Without free, 
independent and critical media it is unthinkable to develop 
democracy. Journalists express and indicate open and critical of any defects in 
the development of society in order to be corrected in a parliamentary 
democracy media corrective power. In the development of society continually 
shifted potential risks and hazards. As society evolved and evolved socially 
negative phenomena that threaten society. The main task of the seventh power 
to investigate phenomena related to the threats on social development and 
objectively inform citizens would have a realistic picture of the causes and 
factors that lead to the emergence and development of socially negative 
phenomena. The media is a very important ally in the timely detection of 
adverse events and highlighting the individuals or groups that support and hide 
them. The problem occurs when media objectively will present some 
information about the involvement of individuals in government who are 
involved in negative social phenomena. No one, especially not the ruling 
government wants to be criticized by the media, because thus soda 
involvements realistic picture of the individuals from the ruling government 
in the negative phenomena which creates public opinion that could have an 
impact in the wider constituency of the following elections to oust the criminal 
political structures. The media, in some way, performing the function of 
monitoring that warn society of the scheduled hazards. According 
Lasvel1 media have a duty to explain and interpret the information society in 
order to understand that what is contained in them. So the media do not only 
simply conveying information but also explain how members of society 
understand what they speak. You can say to the media have a role as a 
corrective of power depending on their immunity to the impact of power on 
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them in addition to displaying objective reality. Thus seen their true role in the 
creation of objective truth about events in society includes social negative 
phenomena that destroy the system of society such as corruption. If 
individuals from institutions involved in negative social phenomena, on the 
other hand have an impact on the media, then the media can affect biased 
information or create a public opinion which is biased in favor of concealing 
their criminal activity. 
 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MEDIA AND SOCIETY 
 
Relations in a society determine the relations of media and society. The 
media cannot observe us out nor over society. What will be the media depends 
on the society itself, or in other words, "what kind of society we are such 
media." The media in every society known as the Fourth Estate, they are very 
glam strength and can affect society and the individual. Society itself should 
provide conditions for journalists to act professionally, individually and 
independently, and achieving the impact of such notification is no longer the 
journalists but also other parts of the public and civil society. Journalists 
would definitely be a function of judges, prosecutors, police officers, they just 
need to perform their journalistic work that indicate what is happening, and 
the rest is the other social instruments. 
Today it is known to the public communication is part of the cultural 
Industry and act towards the market laws, and their derivatives (newspapers, 
internet, TV, radio, books, movies, etc.) are key to create impressions, 
experiences and feelings that we prevent understanding of the world.2 What 
citizens expect public-media is:3 
 Informing citizens they could act; 
 Highlighting the responsibility of citizens for corruption; 
 Familiarize citizens with the consequences of corruption; 
 Controlling government programs to tackle corruption; 
 Preventive action: creating the environment in which corruption is not 
welcome 
According to the same author one of the main features of modern 
media should be the transparency - media must be transparent and "free" of 
corruption. The ownership of the media, the methods of collecting information 
and journalistic ethics must be subject to public inspection, if you expect to 
believe their reports of corruption in society. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO 
CORRUPTION AND MEDIA 
 
According to the indications of the European Union that success in 
dealing with corruption is one of the key conditions for entry into the European 
family. That's significant interest in the countries in transition, to effectively 
prevent, detect and fight corruption. It is not an isolated phenomenon which is 
unique to them. Daily are published worldwide about international corruption 
scandals, the involvement of politicians, media executive and administrative 
functions of the highest rank of the individual countries. The fight against 
organized crime and corruption recently placed high on the agenda of the 
Member States of the European Union, where the claim and the Republic of 
Macedonia. The School Safety Skopje third year corruption constitutes the 
subject matter of the research team determined in a survey of the perceptions 
of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia for corruption. Scientific research 
team had in mind that in recent years, in the country underwent some 
organized activity of society to deal with various forms of corruption. Such 
activity affects Macedonia to improve its position on the ranking – list 
Transparency international. So in 2013 in Macedonia and Montenegro was 
ranked 67-th place with index 44, after Saudi Arabia and Jordan, especially 
Italy. 4 issues covered in the survey include more segments in the area of 
corruption, in particular for the way information about them, knowledge of 
what is corruption, perceptions of corruption and how we found out (models) 
for dealing with it and the role of media in exposing the corruption 
offenses. Interesting results of the survey indicate that the media are highly 
ranked by the opinions of citizens in the way of information and creating a 
perception of corruption as among their major role in the discovery and 
clarifying of corruption offenses. In the research are applied the analytical – 
synthetic method, the comparative, dogmatic and statistical method as 
instruments is used a written questionnaire. Covered 1210 respondents from 
across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia structured in 8 regions 
according to official territorial division. 
One of the main questions that were asked to citizens is: a way of 
informing citizens about corruption. 
Regarding the data to inform about corruption, the highest percentage 
reported that corruption is informed through the media or 469 respondents, 
or 59% of the total number of respondents, one of the ways of informing on 
corruption and friends or a combination media and friends participate with 136 
respondents, or 19%, followed by friends 76 respondents or 9%, educational 
institutions with 68 respondents, or 8%, 42 subjects with family or 7%. 5 The 
 5 
Family; 42
School; 68
Friends; 
76
Media; 
469
workplace; 
52
friends 
and media; 
136
Other; 358
Not 
reported; 9
actual research indicates the relationship between the media and corruption as 
negative social phenomenon. 
  
Table. One way of informing the     citizens about 
corruption 
    Graph. One way of informing the citizens 
about corruption 
Corruption learned from: 
Number of 
respondents 
Family 42 
School 68 
Friends 76 
Media 469 
workplace 52 
friends and media 136 
Other 358 
Not reported 9 
Total 1210 
 
 
  
 
From the analysis of the table for information on how corruption can 
be concluded that more than half of respondents are informed about corruption 
and learned from the media. From here you can see the importance of the 
media in informing citizens and their impact in creating of the public opinion 
of social phenomena even corruption as one of most common socially negative 
phenomena that deeply penetrated into the pores of the system. The study 
results indicate that the percentage of information from multiple media is far 
greater than other methods of information, such as educational institutions, 
family, business, jobs and so on. Given the fact that the media plays a huge 
role in informing citizens and influence in the creation of their opinion on 
certain phenomena in society is a question of the objectivity of the media and 
their susceptibility to influence by political parties, individuals, organized 
criminal groups and so on. If the percentage of the subjectivity of the media is 
greater, greater is the possibility through corruption influenced by individuals 
or groups of understanding of corruption in the public in a manner suitable to 
the customers and financiers of articles on corruption, which broadcast media. 
Biased journalism, which is immune to various influences in society, going 
back in addition to furthering the interests of the criminal organizations that 
use corruption as one of the modalities for achieving their goals. 
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CITIZENS' PERCEPTION OF THE WAY IN EXPOSING 
CORRUPTION 
 
According to the research impact of media in both segments is as 
follows: in the way of information about corruption and the second segment 
that is influenced by the media and clarifying detection of corruption 
offenses. When we talk about reducing the level of corruption in the country, 
the emphasis is on prevention or prevention of committing criminal acts of 
corruption. Other questions asked is the question: In your opinion how can 
detect corruption. (Rates of answers from 1 to 7). In a response indicating the 
least impact on the prevention of corruption while 7 signifies answer that most 
affect the Prevention of Corruption). The analysis of the results, we can 
conclude that, in the opinion of the citizens, to effectively prevent corruption 
a major role the media have an average 5.67 out of 7, followed by the 
revelation of corruption crimes by using special investigative measures 
average 4 62, with operational tactical measures and investigations of the 
authorities who enforce the law with an average of 4.13, other measures and 
activities (work with the authorities and institutions dealing with the fight 
against corruption, the inspection of administrative authorities by anonymous 
reporting of corruption acts (acts) by the individual (citizen), as well as 
reporting of corruption acts (acts) by the individual (citizen) with known 
identity beneath the average 50%, Actually beneath 3.5 the total 7th 
 
Table. 2 
In your opinion how can be open (uncovered) corruption? 
(Rate the following: 1 - at least 7 - the most. In each row is a rounded number. 
Rounded number may end up only once in any order.) At least most average 
   average   
4. Work with the authorities and institutions dealing 
with the fight against corruption 
397 813 4.76   
6. By entering the corruption acts (acts) by the 
individual (citizen) with known identity 
439 771 4.73   
5. inspection of administrative authorities 440 771 4.65   
3. operational tactical measures and investigative 
activities of the bodies enforcement 
275 747 4.54   
2. special investigative measures to detect corruption 550 661 4.29   
1. using the media 647 563 3.84   
7. By entering the corruption acts (acts) by the 
individual (citizen) Anonymous 
648 563 3.81   
 
It is noteworthy that the vast influence of the media in the detection of 
corruption offenses. With a score of 3.84 percentages EUT is more than half 
 7 
of respondents. The question of objective journalism in countries with high 
corruption: If government and institutions are involved in controlling the 
media (and later you see the huge percentage of corrupt politicians and public 
officials), it means weakening the power of the media in corruption crimes 
involving powerful individuals from politics or high positions in state 
institutions. That means one of the reasons for reduced efficiency Seen in 
tackling corruption is vast influence of the state apparatus on the objectivity 
of the media is a strong tool in initiating and clarifying criminal acts of 
corruption. The mark is the findings of the opinion of citizens on the 
willingness of the media to combat corruption. The question please Include 
your assessment of the readiness (determination) of the media in the fight 
against corruption. 39.7% of citizen’s ups count that there is a positive rate or 
willingness of the media to give their contribution to dealing corruption. 
 
Table 3 Please Include your assessment of the readiness (determination) of the 
media in the fight against corruption. 
 Question no. 46 
Reply Valid Percent 
1 Totally ready 8.7 
2 Prepare 31.0 
3 Neither nor reluctant 28.2 
4 Not ready 18.3 
5 Totally unprepared 8.9 
6 I do not want to declare 4.9 
 
If these answers of respondents into four categories (positive 
evaluation, negative evaluation, neutral attitude, no declaring), then the scale 
is as follows: 
 The first category is "positive assessment" or 39.7% of the respondents 
think that the media is fully prepared (8.7%), i.e. they are ready 
(31.0%), 
 Second category is "neutral position" or 28.2% of the respondents 
think that neither media nor reluctant, 
 Third category is "negative evaluation" or 27.2% of the respondents 
think that the media is not ready (18.3%), i.e. that completely 
unprepared (8.9%) and 
 Fourth category is "no declaring" or 4.9% of respondents did not want 
to comment. 
The prevailing opinion among the citizens of the readiness and ability 
of the media to give a high contribution to the overall strategy for dealing with 
corruption, but their willingness and certainly does not mean their active 
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contribution to tackling corruption. Their specific activity depends primarily 
on their immunity to external interference in their editorial policy. It is one of 
the issues concerning the media and their contribution to the development of 
systems to combat corruption. 
 
Table 4. What is the contribution of the media in the 
development of systems to combat corruption? 
TO NO 
1. By consistently providing the political independence 
of the media 
79.6 20.4 
2. educating journalists in terms of access, research and 
reporting on corruption and anti-corruption measures and 
activities 
77.3 22.7 
3. systematic stimulation of investigative journalism in 
the field of corruption and anti-corruption fight 
76.2 23.8 
4. willingness to participate in the discovery and proof of 
corruption 
81.6 18.4 
5. The development of regular content for corruption and 
anti-corruption activities, with specialized educational 
and informative 
79.7 20.3 
6. within the regular informative content, providing 
information for corruption and anticorruption measures 
81.1 18.9 
 
As it is evident from Table 4, the media can also make a meaningful 
contribution to the development of systems to combat corruption. It can do so 
in several ways, especially with the willingness to participate in the discovery 
and proof of corruption (81.6%) and in the regular informative content, 
providing information for corruption and anticorruption measures (81.1% 
). Consistent securing the political independence of the media also contributes 
to the development of systems to combat corruption in the affirmative answer 
was given by 79.6% of respondents. No less important is the education of 
journalists in terms of access, research and reporting on corruption and anti-
corruption measures and activities (77.3%), as well as systematic stimulating 
investigative journalism in the field of corruption and anti-corruption fight 
(76.2%). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From the analysis of the survey results can be concluded that the most 
common way of informing citizens about corruption in the media. The media 
play an important role in informing citizens about events in society and in the 
creation of public opinion in the same. More than half of the polled said that 
corruption was informed by the Medias and so the media have an important 
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role in the detection of this negative social phenomenon. The question is the 
objectivity of the media and their susceptibility to influence by political 
parties, individuals or organized criminal groups. If the percentage of the 
subjectivity of the media is great, then so is also the possibility through 
corruption to influence the perception of corruption the general public in a way 
that will suit the customers and funders of articles on corruption. 
Unfortunately in the annual reports of several international organizations put 
remarks regarding the objectivity of the media and freedom of journalists in 
the country, as witnessed by the numerous reports, on this occasion I would 
mention the latest report, Reporters without Borders where Macedonia fell to 
new 7 seats of total energy intake for 2014. 6 Macedonian citizen much of their 
free time she spends on television. The media is a powerful tool in creating 
public opinion. Of particular concern is the construction of objective and 
impartial media, which would serve the real information for all occurrences in 
society which would have an objective picture of the socio-negative 
phenomena such as corruption. In that case, the media can be a powerful 
chemical for detecting hotspots of corruption, disclosure of the modalities of 
the emergence of new forms of corruption, public display of segments of the 
system that are most susceptible to corruption, the media would have been 
completely put towards finding and prevention of corruption crimes are 
increasingly threaten all spheres of social life. 
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Abstract 
This paper deals with behavior treatments of criminal behavior and 
reduction of recidivism among convicts. Apart from this, the focus is put on 
the cognitive-behavioral approach and there is a good amount of empirical 
evidence regarding its efficiency. Corrective programs dedicated to this 
approach focus on the convicts weaknesses in respect to solving problems, 
social interactions, behavior management skills, anti-social attitudes, and 
interventions directed towards these factors have the most consistent and 
positive influence on changing the models of anti-social behavior, including 
recidivism. The efficiency of this treatment starts with precise selection and 
implementation of the suitable correlation between the risk and the needs of a 
specific individual in a certain program (Risk – Need - Responsiveness Model 
of Andrews and Bonta). The success of this program can be found in the 
connections between the program and criminality. Namely, when a certain 
intervention that is suitable to the risk and needs is conducted, it can 
reasonably be expected that the behavior leading to recidivism will reduce. 
Key terms: psychotherapeutic treatment, convicts, crime, criminal 
behavior, cognitive-behavioral therapy  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Crime has always been present in the every society throughout the 
centuries. It is well known that up to now, no society could ever completely 
solve this problem. A question emerges, and that is: How to reduce the crime 
to a minimum? We will not elaborate in details the theory of penal treatment; 
instead, we will only mention that in the second half of the 19 century the 
positivists (Garofalo, Ferri), for the first time systematically publicized the 
thesis that the goal of the sanctions for perpetrators, regardless juveniles or 
adults, is the fact that it would lead to re-socialization, and the way to 
 12 
accomplish this goal would be with the help of a specifically composed 
treatment. 
Unlike the representatives of the more classical approaches, in this case 
the focus is put on the perpetrator’s personality. The perpetrator is described 
as a sick person who should be treated medically. Even though this theory was 
not very applicable in practice at the beginning, the positivistic concepts have 
become the dominant scientific theory in this area after the World War II. 
Experts were asked many unanswered questions: How should this treatment 
be? How should perpetrators be treated in order to change? In the decades that 
followed, many treatment models that tried to answer these questions were 
developed.  
The establishment of a school for new social defense focuses on two 
goals: prevention and treatment. An individual treatment is proposed, that is 
supposed to be established after analyzing the perpetrator’s personality. The 
basic principles become an anti-repressive orientation and humanization of 
serving the sentence. 
 
TREATMENT AND RECIDIVISM  
 
During the 1950s of the previous century, a clinical or psychodynamic 
approach emerged in the area of penology as an attempt to answer the above 
mentioned questions. This approach was already affirmed for treating 
individuals with emotional problems or neurotic individuals. “The 
psychodynamic model originates from Freud’s psychoanalysis and the basic 
assumption is that disturbing behavior is a symptom of a more serious 
disorder. In order to prevent this type of behavior, the conflict / problem should 
be solved”1.The therapy focuses on the past, in other words, on finding the 
unconscious motives, and the goal is becoming aware of these motives. 
It is supposed that when the individual will have an insight2 in the 
unconscious conflicts, he / she will stop with his / her disturbing behavior 
“Precondition of a successful treatment is the relationship between the 
delinquent and the therapist, good verbal intelligence, as well as making the 
perpetrator feel bad, in a subjective manner, which would boost his / her 
                                                 
1 Brendtro, L. K. and Ness, A. E. (1983) Reeducating troubled Youth. New York: 
Hawthorne. 
2 Insight is a term that refers to identification and perceiving the essence, character and nature 
of things, seeing from within and it is one of the pillars of the theory and praxis of 
psychoanalysis, psychoanalytical psychotherapy and the dynamic therapies in common. The 
psychotherapeutic process, its organization and intervention focus on and help the patient to 
gain insight into his / her difficulties / problems and to understand the nature and origins of 
his / her difficulties / problems.  
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motivation to participate in the treatment”3. This model of treatment was 
exposed to severe criticism and did not give the desired results. As a basic 
disadvantage is considered the supposition that perpetrators are individuals 
with psychological problems, given that many criminals consider crime as a 
source of satisfaction, advantage and benefits.  Perpetrators do not consider 
their behavior as a disorder, suffering, or inconvenience; they consider it as an 
exciting lifestyle which contributes to the absence of their need for change. 
Because of this, “approaches based on psychological insights and 
interpretations, emotional expressions and ventilation, psychological support 
etc., are often inefficient, even counterproductive, especially for the high-risk 
groups”4. 
This treatment, including the prison treatments in general, were mostly 
disputed in the middle of the 1970s when the sociologist Martinson in 1974 
published his work: “What works? Questions and answers about the prison 
reform” in which he negatively evaluates a treatment based on analysis on 
most of the researches that focused on the treatment’s evaluation. Since then, 
experts in that area started using the syntagma “nothing works” more 
frequently; as a result of this, the focus on the Penalty Policy, mostly in USA 
was shifted from treatment towards punishing. Nevertheless, five years later, 
Martinson published a new work where he states that certain treatment 
programs show efficiency, but a long time was needed to shift towards the 
punishing treatment. 
The biggest contributors to the returning of treatment concepts were 
the meta-analyses5. The basic efficiency variable of the treatment is the 
recidivism. Namely, it is believed that the treatment is efficient if it reduces 
recidivism. The statistical analysis is based on the comparison between 
treatment (experimental) groups and control groups in the recidivism. The 
lower the level of recidivism in treatment and the higher in the control groups, 
the treatment is more efficient. In this regard, the selection of the treatment’s 
individual evaluations was rigorous which means that only methodologically 
well studies research were taken into consideration. The majority of the meta-
analyses showed that the most successful were the cognitive behavioral 
treatments (focused on behavioral control, developing good behavior manners, 
developing social skills, communication skills as well as changing the wrong 
manner of thinking which are main source of problems), in cases when they 
                                                 
3 Andrews, D. and Bonta, J. (1998) The psychology of criminal conduct. New York: 
Anderson PublishingCompany. 
4The same 
5 The Meta-Analysis consists of synthesis of the results of larger number of respondents of 
individual research about the treatment’s efficiency. With this type of analysis the number of 
respondents increases to a great size which influences the statistical tests of importance. 
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are applied on perpetrators of more severe crimes (with high risk level). The 
best programs show effects that cause circa 30% reduction of recidivism.  
 
RISK – NEED - RESPONSIVITY MODEL 
 
After the publication of Martinson’s famous paper, in USA less 
attention is paid to the treatment and more to the punishing, which leads to a 
bigger gap between convicts treatment and their reintegration. This situation 
motivates the penologists to focus on developing a theory concerned with the 
question why some treatments are more successful than others. And this 
resulted in the establishment of RNR (Risk – Need - Responsiveness)6 model 
for efficiency assessment of the treatment program. Andrews, Bonta, and 
associates believe that their colleagues consider that the efforts made to stop 
the criminals who refuse or are unaware of human behavior psychology, and 
in most of the cases these efforts fail. Namely, the psychology has an 
enormous contribution in the efficiency of the punishment. Although not 
ignoring the justice principles, the laws and the social sciences such as 
sociology, anthropology, and political economy, their attitude is that focusing 
only on these principles will not lead to reduction of the criminal, if they are 
not applied in accordance to the practically examined psychological influence 
principles for changing the behavior. In 1990 they called all those involved in 
the area of penology “to reveal psychology again”7 in order to make the 
treatment of prisoners more efficient. The RNR model is nowadays probably 
the most efficient assessment model and a model for treatment of convicts. It 
was established in the 1980s and made official in the 1990s with the main 
purpose to promote risk reduction of repeating a criminal behavior and to 
protect the community of a further damage. The model includes three basic 
theoretical principles crucial for efficient treatment and those are: the risk 
principle, the need principle and the responsiveness principle. Two important 
aspects of the risk principle are: the ability to predict criminal behavior based 
on the risk level, and then, in accordance to this, subjugating the perpetrator 
to the most suitable treatment method. The risk factors are divided in two 
groups: static and dynamic. Static factors are those factors that cannot be 
altered (e.g. criminal history, disadvantageous family conditions in childhood, 
gender, etc). Dynamic factors are those that can be altered, and for this reason, 
they are especially important for the treatment (low educational level, pro-
criminal attitudes, friendship with asocial people, alcohol / drugs 
consumption). 
                                                 
6 Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., & Hoge, R. D. (1990), Classification for effective rehabilitation: 
Rediscovering psychology. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17, p. 19 - 52 
7 The same 
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Until now, eight risk factors, known as the central eight have been 
identified. Those are: history of criminal behavior; anti-social personality 
(quick temper, search for excitement), anti-social behavior, values, beliefs, 
thinking and identity; friendship with anti-social people; misuse of narcotics; 
unsatisfying marital and family situation (dysfunctional relations or 
supporting crime); lack of education and unemployment; no participation in 
and dissatisfaction from the social and recreational activities. 
The needs principle emphasizes the importance of satisfying the 
perpetrator’s needs. According to Andrews and Bonta, the needs can be 
divided in those that are common to all people and in needs for crime that 
represent an obstacle for a successful integration in society. Needs for crime 
are dynamic attributes of the perpetrator that can be identified as a dynamic 
risk factors and that direct perpetrators towards the crime. “Because of this, 
the needs for crime are goals of the treatment and they need to be neutralized 
and at the same time, anti-crime needs shall be developed and which are 
common for all people, mostly needs of higher ranks, in accordance to 
Maslov’s needs hierarchy“8. Introducing needs for crime is a novelty in regard 
to the former treatment programs that focused on psychological / psychiatric 
needs, and which assumed that this would improve the adaptive behavior and 
would reduce the reappearance of criminal behavior. 
The responsiveness principle points out on the fact that the treatment 
must be adapted to the individual traits of the convicts so they can positively 
react to the treatment. The most important traits are: the intellectual status, the 
education status and conation traits, and above all the perpetrator’s motivation 
for which purpose, a motivational interview is conducted at the beginning. It 
is shown that most efficient are those active programs conducted by qualified, 
educated and monitored staff, with strict, but fair and just behavior that 
develop therapeutic alliance with the perpetrators. The treatment’s efficiency 
(measured with recidivism) depends on the interaction between the convict’s 
traits (relative empathy, cognitive ability, maturity) and the traits of everything 
referring to the treatment (location, structure, skills and interest of the 
performers). Traits such as gender and ethnicity also influence the treatment. 
“The application of the risk principle helps to identify who needs a 
treatment, the principle of needs for crime focuses on what should be treated, 
and the responsiveness principle focuses on how the treatment should be 
performed“9. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Mejovšek M,: Introduction into penological psychology, Naklada Slap, Zagreb, 2001 
9 Gendreau, P. & Andrews, D. A., 1990, Tertiary prevention: What meta-analyses of the 
offender treatment tell us about what works, Canadian Journal of Criminology, 32 (1), p. 173 
- 184 
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RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
A basis for every successful treatment is a good selection of 
perpetrators that should be subjected to an effective treatment. There are 
different classifications categorized by Bonta in three “generations”. 
First generation, the so called professional assessment, represents a 
subjective assessment of the risk level of committing a crime again. Prison 
experts, as well as medical experts (psychologists, psychiatrists, and social 
workers) make a decision about a treatment based on the unstructured 
interview and documentation and their professional experience. As a matter of 
fact, this type of classification is not precise and valid enough. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the awareness about the fact that the risk 
assessment should not be based only on assessment but also on scientifically 
based instruments started to grow. The second generation includes assessment 
scales that help to sum up the items results: the higher score, the higher 
recidivism level. The second generation of classification of perpetrators 
treatment showed satisfactory results; it helped in distinguishing perpetrators 
with a lower from perpetrators with a higher level of recidivism. However, 
disadvantages of these instruments are: first, they were not based on certain 
theory, in other words, the items were not selected due to their theoretic 
relevance, and second, they measured only statistical risk factors, such as the 
criminal history. 
Taking into consideration the limitations of the second generation of 
instruments, in the early 1980s, the dynamic factors were also included in the 
assessment instruments10. The third generation instruments cover issues that 
refer to the dynamic risk factors such as current employment, friends with 
criminal behavior, family relations (supporting and non-supporting). The third 
instruments generation examine the factor “risk – need“, and some of them are 
theoretically based such as the LSI-R (Level of Service Inventory - Revised, 
Andrews & Bonta, 1995). This generation of instruments is delicate to the 
changes that occur among convicts and informs the re-socialization staff on 
which needs should be used in the treatment. Successful direction towards 
these factors contributes to reduction of the risk of recidivism. During the last 
years, the fourth generation of instruments for risk assessment that includes 
wider spectrum of risk factors that were not measured until now and other 
personal factors important for the treatment was developed. An example for 
such instrument is the Level of Service / Case Management Inventory 
(LS/CMI; Andrews & Bonta & Wormith, 2004). Both the third and fourth 
                                                 
10 Bonta, J., & Wormith, S. J. (2007), Risk and need assessment. In G. McIvor & P. Raynor 
(Eds.), Developments in social work with offenders (pp. 131 - 152), Philadelphia, PA: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers. 
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instrument generation for risk assessment are narrowly connected to the risk – 
need - responsiveness model for assessment and treatment, in other words, 
they are theoretically based. 
 
PROCESS OF CHANGE: COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL 
PSYCHOTHERAPY  
 
After a suitable selection of convicts is made, a treatment should start 
and it is supposed to lead to a process of change. We already mentioned that 
most of the meta-analyses showed that most successful are cognitive 
behavioral programs of treatment that cause circa 30% reduction of the 
recidivism. We will try to explain in which way this psychotherapy type causes 
positive changes among the convicts. 
 
WHAT IS PSYCHOTHERAPY? 
 
Psychotherapy is an old discipline that has its origins from ancient 
times, when men first started to show interest about themselves and their 
psychological world. This phenomenon is considered to be universal, 
considering the fact that it exists in modern, as well as in traditional cultures 
nowadays, and it used to exist in the past and most probably, it will continue 
to exist. “The psychotherapy helps us to identify the spirituality of the magic 
and religion, the wisdom of the philosophy, the exactness of the science, the 
creativity of the art, and the skills of the vocation”11. However, psychotherapy 
is mostly based on psychological knowledge about the person, emotions, 
cognition, behavior, as well as, knowledge about social and developmental 
psychology and mental health and psychopathology. “The psychotherapy can 
be defined as several groups of scientific and well-studied procedures and 
methods aiming to treat psychological disorders that are considered not to be 
caused by organic causes”12. “The psychotherapy is a vocational intervention 
based on valid approval of the therapist and the patient, aiming to provide 
psychological support of the client in accordance to professional, scientific, 
legal and ethical criteria. The psychotherapy is justifiable if the client seeks 
help for solving personal, and obstacles that can be solved with the help of 
psychotherapy and if he / she is in a condition of psychological, as well as 
somatic and existential dysfunctionality, provided that he / she agrees 
adequately that the therapy should include more than one session”13. 
                                                 
11 Srna J: Psychotherapy and Advising, Institute for Schoolbooks and Didactical Means, 
Belgrade, 2012 
12 Erić, Lj.: Psychotherapy, Psihopolis, Novi Sad, 2011 
13 Berger J.: Psychotherapy from cure to utopia, Center for applied psychology, Belgrade, 
2000  
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The psychotherapy is always applied with evident and defined goals 
that depend on the type of the psychotherapy14. Some of these goals are 
supportive, and others are aiming to remove the symptoms of unadjusted 
behavior, and others to solve intra-psychic and intrapersonal conflicts, 
personality deficits evolved during the personal development, family, or 
marital dysfunctionality. However, all of these have common goals, and those 
are:  
 Relief from the intolerable tensions and internal pressure; 
 Removing obstacles, avoiding suffering, psychological degradation 
and regressive processes; 
 Readjustment of disturbed psychic functions, feelings and opinion, as 
well as unadjusted behavior; 
 The development of personal abilities and capacities, awareness of 
oneself and the others and having the ability to solve traumatic life 
problems, fear reduction, feeling guilt, truculence, and stressful life; 
 Self-actualization and fulfillment of potentials of one’s nature; 
 Treatment: diminishing or eliminating the symptoms, reducing 
suffering and building self-control; 
 Transformation: different ways of reducing stress and pressure, 
burdens or delusions;  
 Strengthening and increasing readiness for future life experiences and 
challenges”15. 
 
The above mentioned implies that the psychotherapy involves positive 
changes that will lead to a better, superior and life with better quality. 
 
WHAT IS COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY?  
 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) originates from different areas – 
cognitive and behavioral theory. Behaviorism focuses on human behavior, 
since it can be observed, neglecting internal mental processes, considering that 
they cannot objectively be observed; in other words - they cannot be a subject 
of science. “Behavioral therapy, simply said, focuses on behavioral change, in 
order to improve the health”16. 
                                                 
14There are several types of psychotherapy: psychoanalysis and related psychotherapies; 
behavioral therapies, varieties and cognitive psychotherapy; therapies that focus on the client 
and its varieties; existential phenomenological therapy; humanistic therapies, “new 
tendencies“(ТА, GТ, BЕ); family therapy; socio-therapy; psychotherapies with specific 
pathology (depression, alcoholism, schizophrenia, personality disorders).  
15Erić, Lj.: Psychotherapy, Psihopolis, Novi Sad, 2011  
16 Erić, Lj.: Psychotherapy, Psihopolis, Novi Sad, 2011 
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Unlike the behaviorism, the cognitive approach emphasizes the 
importance of the internal intellectual processes, and it appears in modern 
psychology, as a reaction of a limited view of the behavioral psychology. 
Namely, Bandura emphasized the importance of the internal mental processes 
in the regulation and modification of the behavior in his classics “Principles 
of behavior modification”17. 
Albert Ellis developed the Rational Emotive Therapy (RET), which is 
based on the idea that thoughts control emotions. He is the father of the famous 
psycho-pathology model known as the A-B-C model, where A is the activating 
event, B includes beliefs and certain cognitive processes, and C includes 
emotional reactions and disorders. Ellis is believed to be an important 
antecedent of Aaron Beck, who developed the cognitive therapy, applying it 
to depressive patients. Beck studied the thought samples of depressive patients 
and announced that they manifest negative feelings about their personality, the 
environment, and their own future. Furthermore, he developed a cognitive 
therapy treatment for depression, using original concepts, cognitive schemes, 
cognitive distortions and automatic thoughts. In the period that followed, 
behavioral therapists started to include more and more cognitive elements, and 
cognitive therapists behavioral elements, and as a result of that, in the 
following years, the cognitive therapy became more and more behavioral, 
while behavioral therapy became more and more cognitive, which led to the 
formation of Cognitive-behavioral therapy. Nowadays, pure cognitive 
psychologists or pure behaviorists are rarely found. “Literature review does 
not lead to the conclusion that by the combination of the elements of cognitive 
and behavioral approach they support each other. Thus, cognitive changes 
cause behavioral changes, a fact that causes a sense of wellbeing, and this 
causes changes in the way of thinking that influences changes in behavior. 
This self-supporting feedback process is a crucial element in the Cognitive-
behavioral approach”18. 
The psychotherapy as a process includes CHANGE, that despite of its 
dynamics, includes a progress that is developed gradually, through certain 
stages and phases that are common for all clients, but specific for every 
individual. The CBT makes use of two basic approaches that lead to change: 
restructuring of cognitive events and practice of social and interpersonal skills.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17Bandura, A. Principles of behavior modification, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1969 
18 Milkman, H, Wanberg K., Cognitive-behavioral treatment, A Review and Discussion for 
Corrections Professionals, 2007, 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021657.pdf 
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WHY COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL THERAPY FOR 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR?  
 
Convicts (perpetrators / delinquents) usually manifest antisocial way 
of thinking, which implies avoiding of responsibilities and social norms. Many 
of them feel mistreated and manifest deviant, hostile attitude towards other 
people as a part of their life orientation. The hostility and the victim attitude 
are acquired types of cognitive behavior. Considering themselves victims, 
gives criminals a feeling of anger, power and self-satisfaction, while admitting 
mistakes is seen as weakness and vulnerability. The fight for power dominates 
in the relations with others, and the orientation winner / loser is dominant in 
the relations. Therefore, the victory is defined as forcing the other to lose. For 
some delinquents, the satisfaction that results from such a victory is the only 
satisfaction they know about. Many of them are facing a problem of how to 
behave in a socially acceptable manner. 
From this description of the delinquents we can conclude that, if we do 
not apply a treatment on them, which changes their way of thinking and 
behaving, they will leave prison unchanged. Or, as Zamble and Porporino 
state, criticizing the prisons for not conducting sufficient activities for 
improving the facing strategies among the convicts: “Nothing important 
happens in the prisons regarding prisoners’ behavior, so prisons represent a 
“deep freeze”19. The psychotherapy is a fight against the “deep freeze”, in 
other words, giving delinquents a chance to change, and the society to protect 
itself from crime. 
  
COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF THE TREATMENT  
 
The basic premise of the cognitive theory and therapy is that the ways 
of reasoning, or more precisely the way of interpretation, assessment, data 
elaboration and conclusion determines emotional reactions and leads towards 
behavior. “The Cognitive-behavioral approach, regarding the treatment with 
prisoners, uses two basic approaches of change: recombination of cognitive 
events and practice of social and interpersonal skills. Both of these approaches 
are mutually interchangeable and reinforce each other: stimulating positive 
reasoning causes positive behavior and improving the behavior is a result of 
the positive consequences of that behavior”20. 
                                                 
19 Zamble and Porporino ,(1990): Coping, imprisonment, and rehabilitation, Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour, 17, p. 53 - 70 
20 Milkman, H, Wanberg K., Cognitive-behavioral treatment, A Review and Discussion for 
Corrections Professionals, 2007 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/021657.pdf 
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According to this approach, cognitive phenomena that lead to 
disturbing behavior are: automatic thoughts, cognitive distortions and 
cognitive schemes. 
Automatic thoughts are called so because they appear spontaneously 
and the person is unaware of them. Even if the person is aware of them, he / 
she do not oppose them. Practically, automatic thoughts are allowed to 
influence the feelings and manage the behavior. They are closest to the surface 
and they are first identified in the process of change. Thus, automatic thoughts 
that appear among depressive people are: I am worthless, there is no future for 
me, and those appearing among delinquents are: I am a victim of the society 
and I have the right to violate the social norms. The goal is to identify these 
thoughts and to replace them with alternative thoughts. By asking questions, 
the therapist leads the convict to realize that automatic thoughts are logically 
untenable. 
Cognitive distortions refer to mistakes that appear in the interpretation 
of the data elaboration process, that lead to negative, unfavorable and false 
conclusions. And those are: 
 Dichotomization: Thinking about everything or nothing (black and 
white reasoning, for example, if certain situation results unsuccessful 
it is experienced as a complete failure); 
 Generalization (one negative event is generalized as a defeat with the 
words: “always”, “never”, and such event can be love disappointment, 
or a job rejection, etc.); 
 Selective focusing (one negative detail is taken among many positive 
comments, for example, some paper received many positive 
comments, but we focus on one small critic and we think about it for 
days ignoring the positive remarks); 
 Withdrawal of the positive (many positive events that occur are not 
taken into consideration, and this leads towards dissatisfaction and 
makes the person feel incompetent and unrewarded); 
 Making conclusions on one’s own (events are negatively interpreted 
before they are being analyzed and no facts are taken into 
consideration, for example: before we make sure, we conclude that 
someone has negative attitudes towards us); 
 Exaggeration (the problems are over-exaggerated, and the qualities 
which are favorable are minimized); 
 Emotional reasoning (a person supposes that his / hers negative 
emotions reflect on the course of the events, for example: I feel 
hopeless, in other words, I am hopeless); 
 22 
 Sentences with “Need”: I need…..sentences lead to blame and 
frustrations. This does not work, since every “I need” should make the 
person feel rebellious;  
 Labeling - this is an extreme way of black and white reasoning. For 
example, we label negatively ourselves – I am a loser; 
 Blaming ourselves – we blame ourselves for an event that is 
completely out of our control.  
 
Cognitive schemes are thought schemes, the way we think about us and 
about the world, and these schemes determine the way we interpret, assess, 
and make conclusions. These schemes are believed to be developed during the 
evolution, and are influenced by the parents. Here are some of them: Everyone 
must love me, and if someone does not love me something is wrong with me, 
etc. Generally, they are divided in unconditional beliefs and conditional 
suppositions. Cognitive schemes lead to emotional disturbances or behavioral 
disturbances, and they influence negatively the way in which certain events 
are interpreted. The most important goal of the treatment regarding the above 
mentioned cognitive phenomena is changing the way in which perpetrators 
interpret, assess, and understand the manifestations and events in the world, 
their own behavior and the behavior of other people. Furthermore, changing 
the cognitive schemes means changing the basic attitudes, beliefs, and 
suppositions that are stimulants for distorted, wrong interpretations, 
assessments, understandings and conclusions which lead to criminal behavior. 
Briefly, the goal of the treatment is to identify, reevaluate and change the 
automatic thoughts, cognitive distortions and cognitive schemes. To succeed 
in this, despite therapy sessions, the treatment includes homework and tasks 
which aim to collect information about the way of thinking, behavior, and 
feelings of the convicts between the sessions, as well as practicing the newly 
acquired cognitive skills. The convicts are asked to write a diary about their 
“problematic” thoughts that are discussed later in the group. In the prisons, the 
cognitive-behavioral group psychotherapy includes groups of 8 to 12 convicts, 
and the program is highly structured. The group has a positive influence on 
the members. “Belonging and protection, stimulation and cooperation, the 
awareness of the fact that others have the same (even more serious problems) 
are considered therapeutic group experiences”21. The group is a system of 
support which continues to exist after the end of the treatment.  An important 
aspect of the treatment is the understanding of the relations between the 
feelings (effective component), attitudes and beliefs (cognitive component) 
                                                 
21 Srna J: Psychotherapy and Advising, Institute for Schoolbooks and Didactical Means, 
Belgrade, 2012 
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and the behavior (behavioral component), which helps in accomplishing the 
goal and that is – changing the criminal behavior.  
  
BEHAVIORAL COMPONENT OF THE TREATMENT 
 
The basis of the behavioral therapy is a theory of studying, according 
to which, criminal behavior is an acquired type of behavior that can change. 
The goal of the therapy is to stop this wrongly acquired inappropriate behavior, 
and it focuses on the inappropriate behavior that should be changed and on the 
alternative behavior that should be acquired. The facing skills and the social 
skills were introduced in the last two decades of the previous century, and they 
turned into the essential components of the cognitive-behavioral therapy. The 
basic supposition is that delinquents lack skills for facing everyday problems. 
It includes acquiring communication skills, practicing assertiveness, 
improving interpersonal relations, practicing how to solve conflicts and 
manage aggression. 
Acquiring social includes: empathy, encouraging non authoritative, 
non incriminating assertive manner of interaction with other people and 
promotion of self-efficacy. Techniques such as playing roles that are suitable 
for work in groups are helpful in the process of acquiring these skills through 
the practice of new manners of behavior. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The Cognitive-behavioral therapy is a psychologically and 
scientifically based approach that is efficient for wider spectrum of problems, 
such as the criminal behavior. This approach usually focuses on the problems 
and difficulties ‘now and here’ and it relies on the process of developing 
mutual understanding between the therapist and the client regarding the 
problems of the clients. There are many things that need to be analyzes and 
studied about what is really efficient in the psychotherapy change process, 
especially among people who manifest criminal behavior, and when they are 
treated in prison. It is important that this approach focuses on the individual, 
his / her way of reasoning, feeling and acting, and both the therapist and the 
group help him / her to behave and think pro-socially, to take responsibility 
for his / her actions, and to take into consideration the needs of other people 
and the society. This could be achieved by asking sequence of questions 
regarding criminal behavior, such as, where would this lead if he / she continue 
to follow them, how they keep him a prisoner in one lifestyle, what would help 
him / her to accomplish his / her goals that are not connected to crime and so 
on. Answering these questions may help delinquents to change their lifestyle. 
The therapy is conducted by an active therapist who has the role of a teacher 
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and trainer and who gives participants structured instructions, using a 
spectrum of methods, such as playing roles, acting pro-social situations, 
intensive feedback, writing exercises and homework, and this therapist 
communicates assertively and morally, and at the same time, he / she becomes 
a model for those who want to change.  
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Abstract 
In this paper the author in the form of a preliminary communication, 
presents data from a survey conducted in late 2014 and in January 2015, on a 
sample of 413 respondents, related to the perception of drug addiction and 
drug criminal threats to the society in Serbia. There was a talk about causes of 
drug addiction, factors that influence its reduction, as well as the causes of 
narcotics related crimes, current trends and essential factors for its control, 
with special reference to the police as active participants in this process. The 
correlation between the presented attitudes and gender, age, education level 
and geographic origin of the respondents has been investigated. The sample 
was structured so that it includes the attitudes of 166 respondents under the 
age of 30, and 165 subjects older than 30, with the aim to determine whether 
there are differences in the perception of the aforementioned phenomenon 
among the younger and older population. In addition, the explored sample 
includes attitudes of 82 students of the Academy of Criminalistic and Police 
Studies in Belgrade, in order to compare possible differences in attitudes 
within the general population and those who have chosen to be police officers 
in the future. 
Keywords: narcotics, drug-crimes, police, prevention, suppression, 
attitudes 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is almost no society in the modern world that is not affected by 
the problem of drug addiction and narcotic-based crimes. These are global and 
national phenomena. The latest UN estimations show that in 2012 about 243 
million people (about 0.52% of the world population aged 18 to 65) have used 
some of the illegal psychoactive substances, mainly from the group of 
cannabinoids, opioids, cocaine or amphetamine stimulants from among (UN, 
2014: 1). Apart from the harmful effects of drugs abuse and the activities 
organized criminal groups perform at the national level which are reflected in 
the destabilization of governments and financial markets, corruption of public 
officials and increase of social costs of health (Council of Europe, 2006: 21), 
because of the enormous economic potential of drugs trade it represents a 
global threat, often associated with terrorism, the greatest challenge of our 
time in terms of global stability and security. It is estimated by foreign experts 
that 95% of income, which is at the global level achieved by illegal drug 
trafficking, has been used to the financing of terrorist organizations and 
networks (Government of Republic of Croatia, 2005: 149). Crime is nearly 
always mentioned in the context of the drugs. The profitability of illicit drug 
trafficking is one of the key factors for the lure of persons from criminal 
milieu. The illegal drug trade is the activity of well-equipped and organized 
criminal groups with transnational character, which daily perfects methods of 
action and follow technical and technological development, using its facilities 
and adopting them into their own methods of criminal activity. (Lajić, 
Ivanović, 2009: 170). It's hard to talk about the global trend regarding the 
smuggling of drugs, since it depends on the type of drug in question and 
established channels of supply in certain regions (UN, 2014: XII), but it is 
evident that in 2012 at the global level noted an increasing trend in the number 
of crimes related to drug trafficking, after a relatively quiet period from 2003 
to 2007, the growth trend from 2008 to 2010 and a decrease in the number of 
offenses in 2011 (UN, 2014: 20). In any case, as already mentioned, this is a 
huge illegal profit, considering that at the beginning of this millennium, it has 
been talked about profits in the amount of 300 to 500 billion US dollars per 
year. These data put international narcotics trade in second place by profits, 
right behind the international arms trade (Mc Conville, 2000: 76). On the other 
hand, there is a ‘’secondary’’ type of crimes, done by addicts, whereby studies 
conducted on relationship between drug abuse and crime generally confirm 
significant correlation. Correlation between drug abuse and crimes 
undoubtedly stems from the nature and complexity of the drug addiction, 
which is both a disease of person and socio-pathological phenomena expressed 
with huge criminogenic effects (Marinković, 2004: 313-314). The main 
conclusion of the research that lasted nearly three decades, about the 
relationship between drug use and crime, was that there is an obvious 
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significant relationship between these two phenomena (McBride et al., 2002: 
5). The aforementioned studies indicate increased drug use among arrestees, a 
high level of criminal behavior among drug users, and a large correlation 
between drug use and crime in the general population, with significant 
differences depending on the types of drugs and crime. 
All the above mentioned circumstances only partially illustrate the 
undoubted damage that drug addiction and drug-related crimes cause in all 
societies, even in Serbian. Because of the fact that this is a problem that has 
repercussions in many areas of social life, the approach to the prevention of 
these phenomena must be multidisciplinary. The authors of the research has 
endeavored to find out the attitudes of the population in Serbia when it comes 
to these phenomena, as well as their seeing the relevant causes, factors which 
can influence its reduction and the factors that influence the development and 
combating drug trafficking. Special emphasis was given to the perception of 
the role of the police, as an important subject that finds its involvement in the 
drug fight. This paper presents the preliminary results of the study, with a 
desire to indicate the possible directions of further research and practical 
action for the professionals and scientific community, as well as decision 
makers in relevant institutions. 
 
THE SAMPLE AND THE METHODS OF EXPLORATION 
 
This survey, conducted in late 2014 and in January 2015, comprised a 
sample of 413 adult respondents from the territory of the Republic of Serbia. 
In structuring the sample it has been used snowball technique. The initial 
sample has been made of 82 students of Academy of Criminalistics and Police 
Studies (hereinafter ACPS), and all of them interviewed four more participants 
from their towns, by their own choice, but according to certain criteria related 
to age and education.1 So, the sample has been structured that included 82 
participants from among third year students of ACPS, 83 respondents from 
among the students of other higher education institutions, as well as the 83 
respondents who were aged up to 30 years, but had no ambitions to acquire 
more education than high school. Thus, we sought to create some balance in 
terms of factors of education within the younger age groups. On the other 
hand, the sample includes 165 respondents and older than 30 years, so that the 
average age of the participant was just over 30 years (30, 71). The youngest 
participant was 19 years old, the oldest 68. The survey was conducted in the 
form of a structured questionnaire, with multiple-choice and open questions. 
In addition to data on gender, education level, age and place of residence, the 
                                                 
1 The rest of participants had to be: one student younger than 30, one person younger than 30 
with no higher education and two persons older than 30, regardless of their education level 
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survey included five questions related to attitudes toward drug abuse, 
understood as socially harmful phenomenon which, in the long run, lead to 
deterioration in the physical personality, health and social issues, and therefore 
these harms society. The next six questions related to attitudes about the 
perception of drug trafficking in the territory of Serbia, understood as the 
activities of criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking for the purpose of 
material gain. During the processing of data we used descriptive statistics and 
correlation methods. 
 
RESULTS 
In terms of gender, the sample is almost equally distributed between 
men and women (49.2% and 50.8%), while in the educational structure there 
were the most represented participants with high school education (78, 5%). 
By number they are followed by respondents with higher education (7.7%), 
high education (6.3%), craft (4.1%) and elementary education (0.2%). 
 
Graph 1. – Age of the participants 
 
Graph 2 – Structure of participants by sex and education 
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PERCEPTION OF DRUG ADDICTION IN SERBIA 
 
One of the first questions to which respondents answered has been 
related to the perception of drug abuse threat to society, on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 1 meant score extremely bad condition and 5 extremely well. In general, 
the sample mean value is 2.66, from which it could be concluded that the 
perception of drug abuse threat to society is neutral, with a slight deviation to 
describe the situation as bad. It is interesting to note that students ACPS 
brightest perceive this condition, the mean score of 2.78 (+0.12 compared to 
the overall average). The rest of the young population gives the same average 
mark in both categories,2 for one prom above average (2.67), while the 
population of older than thirty years is the harshest in description of the 
situation, with a mean score of 2.59 (-0.7 compared to general average).  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3. – Perception of drug addiction treat to the Serbian society, expressed 
by marks 1 to 5 (where 1 is very bad and 5 is very good) 
 
Closely related vulnerability of society are factors that contribute to 
drug addiction development. In this regard, the respondents were offered 
seven factors, and they had choice to opt for one or more of factors which are 
considered to contribute significantly to the occurrence of this phenomenon in 
Serbian society. They had possibility, as well, to write it down another factor 
who they think is important if it was not mentioned in the list. In the overall 
sample most of the respondents have chosen dysfunctional family (66.6%) and 
inadequate work with children in the education system (52.1%) as key factors 
for the development of drug addiction. The following tendency towards 
propensity to vice (43.1%): the negative social impact of the media (39.7%), 
inadequate criminal law norms (35.4%), inadequate activity of the competent 
services for crime detection and prosecution of criminal offenders 
                                                 
2 Both the students of other faculties and population who has not been studied 
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(prosecution, police and court, 31.7%) and inadequate functioning of the 
health system (18.2%). Approximately one-seventh of the respondents 
(15.7%) opted for all of these factors, while only 1.9% of respondents marked 
another factor that is considered to have an impact in this sense, and it has not 
offered in the survey list. Respondents, on average, circled around 4 responses 
(3.98). On the other hand, when asked to state which are the most important 
factors that can help to prevent drug abuse, respondents in three quarters of 
cases identified to better inform young people about the harmful effects of 
psychoactive substances (74.1%). And when answering this question, there 
was a possibility of circling multiple answers. Next by percentage is the work 
with children in the education system (56.2%), followed alongside more 
efficient activity of the competent services for crime investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offenders (47.7%), corresponding influence of the 
media (46.7%) and informing parents about the harmful effects of 
psychoactive substances (46.2%). Slightly less than half of the respondents 
opted for improving the criminal justice framework (42.6%) and improving 
the general financial situation in the society (39.5%), while at the rear was 
adequate functioning of the health system (26.2%). 
As with the previous plea, a similar number of participants circled all 
the above mentioned factors on the list (18.2%) and written some others which 
were not offered (1.2%). On average, respondents circled a little more than 
five responses (5.26). For comparative view of perception causes of drug 
abuse and prevention factors can be seen that the respondents in this area most 
''blame'', but most expect from the family, the educational system, law 
enforcement and judicial system and media, which is the logical order of 
priorities in action against this social evil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. – Perception of the factors relevant to prevent drug addiction 
 
 
The next two questions pertained to a bit more direct contact with drug 
addiction. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they personally know 
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
74,10%
56,20%
47,70%
46,70%
46,20%
42,60%
39,50%
26,20%
To inform young
people - harmful
effects of drugs
Educational system
Law enforcement and
judical system
Media
 31 
someone who uses drugs or had used them in the past, and then to state 
whether they have ever been in the company of a person who they know to be 
under the effect of some of drugs. Affirmative response to the first question 
gave two thirds of respondents (65.4%) and to the other slightly less than half 
(46.7%), which is in any case an alarming rate. This, in fact, best illustrates 
the claim that drug addiction is not the evil that happens to others, but that is 
present always and everywhere, even in our environment. In order to illustrate 
this phenomenon it should be noted that ten years ago it was assessed that there 
are 80,000 drug addicts on the territory of Serbia, of which 35,000 on the 
territory of Belgrade (Ilić, 2004: 74), while the use of drugs in older primary 
and secondary school population is at a level of 8% to 15% (Popović - Citić, 
Bukvić, 2014: 196). In both of those cases, it could be assumed that the 
positive responses have been given by younger respondents, there was 
performed the analysis using Pearson linear correlation between the age of the 
participants and the positive responses. However, when it comes to the 
relationship between a) the age of the respondents and knowledge of the 
people who use or have used any of the drugs, and b) the age of the respondents 
and being in company with a person for whom the respondent knew that he 
was under the effects of drugs, the correlation is relatively low (r = 0.254 and 
r = 0.196). On the other hand, quite logically, the value of the linear correlation 
between the knowledge of the person who consumes or has consumed any of 
the drugs and to spend time with such a person while he was under the effects 
of the drugs is statistically highly significant (r = 0.529). 
Table 1. – Correlation between age of the participants, awareness of the fact somebody 
uses drugs, and the presence in a company of a person while he was under effects of 
drugs 
  
age 
I know an 
addict I was there 
age Pearson Correlation 1 ,254** ,196** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  ,000 ,000 
N 413 413 413 
I know an addict Pearson Correlation ,254** 1 ,529** 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000  ,000 
N 413 413 413 
I was there Pearson Correlation ,196** ,529** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 413 413 413 
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PERCEPTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING IN SERBIA 
 
The first in a series of questions regarding to drug trafficking has been 
related to the attitude of participants of concerning the situation in this area in 
Serbia. Respondents expressed their attitude score of 1 to 5. If it is taken to a 
3 describes a neutral stance, we could say that the respondents described the 
state of drug trafficking threat as slightly negative. The average rating given 
by the respondents on this occasion was 2.49, which is 0.17 lower compared 
to the perception of vulnerability of society in Serbia of drug addiction. Broken 
down by categories of respondents, the results look like this: a) students ACPS 
2.65, b) students of other higher education institutions 2.43 c) youth 
population under 30 years who do not opt for higher education and 2.43 d) 
older than 30 years 2.47. 
Based on the presented results, now we can give some conclusions 
related to the categories of respondents. Namely, it shows that the younger age 
groups, regardless of whether they are studying, they give almost identical 
results, with the exception of students ACPS. Moreover, in this case only the 
students ACPS average mark is higher than the average estimates of the 
general sample, while all other categories of respondents 'dragged' down this 
assessment. In the aforementioned case estimate given by the rest of the 
younger population was a prom higher than the average given in general 
example. Compared with the perception of drug addiction, presented data look 
like this: 
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Graph 5 – Perception of drug addiction compared to perception of drug 
trafficking in general example, marked 1 to 5 
 
When asked to mark three of the following factors that are crucially 
contribute to the current state of the field drug trafficking, respondents in 
mostly opted for the profitability of this kind of crime (86%), i.e. the 
relationship between realized profits and risk of criminal prosecution or 
punishment imposed, which indirectly speaks about how the role of these 
entities has been seen. However, this issue will be explained later on. In second 
place is the demand for drugs on the market (55.7%). These attitudes clearly 
testifies to the fact that the drug-crimes have been seen as a kind of ''business'', 
as it really is, because its perpetrators are usually opportunists who seek to use 
the weaknesses of the criminal justice system and market opportunities to 
achieve profits as higher as possible. 
Next in the series is the (inadequate) activity of the police (32.7%) and 
courts (31%), and then abuse of technological advances used by criminal 
organizations3 (27.8%), abuse of freedom of movement4 (27.4%) and 
inadequate criminal law regulations (25.2%). According to attitude of 21.3% 
of respondents, an important role in the current situation in the area of drug 
trafficking belongs to inadequate prosecution activity, while slightly less than 
one-tenth (9.4%) declared that all these factors play an equally important role 
in this regard. Only 0.5% of respondents offered some of the factors which 
have not been offered in the list. 
  
                                                 
3 E.g. mobile communication, fast means of transport to easy transporting goods over long 
distances, cashless transfer of money etc. 
4 E.g. the visa-free regime, the lack of border controls at the borders of countries within the 
EU, etc. 
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Graph 6 – Perception of relevant factors related to persistence and uprising of 
drug trafficking 
 
When respondents were supposed to evaluate the activity of certain 
entities in combating drug trafficking, convincing primacy brought the police. 
In fact, more than three-quarters of respondents (75.1%) rated the police as the 
most active subject in the suppression drug trafficking. Other participants in 
this process are valued far less. In fact, 9.3% of respondents gave this attribute 
to the prosecutor’s office, to the court 10.4% and 5.6% of respondents thought 
that the most active in this field is some other entity that is not listed in the 
questionnaire. During the research, as in the previous cases, there have no 
observed large fluctuations among the categories of respondents, i.e. the order 
of ranking is the same, with approximately the same percentage of 
representation, with a slight favouring of the police by the younger population 
(+ 0.8% of the students, + 3.2% by other younger than 30 years and + 5.5% 
by the students of ACPS). In contrast, older than 30 years have influenced this 
average in negative way, given that in this group the percentage is 70.3%, 
which is by 4.8% lower, compared to the overall average. 
When asked to give their opinion about trends in drug trafficking in 
Serbia, more than 2/5 of the respondents (43.1%) stated that this phenomenon 
recorded growth in our society over the past ten years, while 28.8% think that 
this type of crime is at approximately the same level. Only 4.4% of 
respondents believe that the drug trafficking decline, while less than a quarter 
of respondents (23.7%) said they had no idea about this issue. As in other 
matters, this is a subjective attitude of the respondents. However, the number 
of detected offenses of drug trafficking and quantity of narcotics seized are the 
exact categories, and we could, theoretically, comparing the statistical 
indicators of detected offenses in this area and seizures of narcotics, check if 
presented perceptions correspond to the real situation. 
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Graph 7 – Perceptions of the role relevant subjects in fighting drug trafficking 
and perception of current state in this area 
 
However, we should bear in mind the specific of drug trafficking as a 
‘’victimless’’ offenses, in which there is no person affected by the commission 
of the offence, in the classical sense of the criminal law and that, consequently, 
none of the participants does not need to report an offence. Bukelić says that 
this fact makes this type of crime rich, inexhaustible and creative model of 
criminal behaviour (Bukelić, 1998: 295). Offences stay away from the public 
view, and a statistical increase in the number may be a result of the increase 
repressive activities, the fact that the phenomena has been discussed in public, 
or that the investigative focus has been placed on this area, mostly under 
pressure from the public and the political elite, executive structures in the 
police and judiciary. So, increase the number of offenses and seizures of 
narcotics per se does not necessarily mean that such acts are committed more, 
than just to more detecting crimes. Of course, the repressive activity has 
retroactive effect, in terms of preventive operation due to the increased risk, 
which, in turn, has been reflected in lower supply of drugs on the market, 
hence the higher price and so on. In the introductory part it has been already 
mentioned that in 2012, globally seen, there was a trend of increase in the 
number of offenses related to drug trafficking, after a relatively quiet period 
from 2003 to 2007, the growth trend from 2008 to 2010 and a decrease in the 
number of offenses in 2011 (UN, 2014: 20). When it comes to the national 
level, it can be noted that the number of seizures in the last twenty years, first 
showed steady growth, and then, in the last 10 years, the relative stabilization 
of the number of about 5,000 to 6,000 per annum, with fluctuations in the 
amount of narcotics seized (Vukosavljević, 2014). However, the amount of 
narcotics seized in 2012 has been over 70% higher than in 2011 (Ministry of 
the Interior, 2013: 1), and in 2013 more than two times higher than the amount 
seized in 2011 (see Vukosavljević, 2014). Hence, we would, in some way, 
claim that the perception of respondents about increase of drug trafficking or 
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its persistence at the same level (over 70% of respondents) could be assessed 
as based on real facts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Preliminary results of processing the collected data testify that citizens 
in Serbia, in assessing the state of vulnerability of society by drug addiction 
and drug trafficking, have not seen as convenient. On a scale of 1 to 5, grades 
are below the neutral, or average rating was 2.66 in the first case, and 2.49 
when talking about the drug trafficking. The younger generation assesses 
about average while the population of older than thirty years has been more 
critical in this regard. However, a kind of counterweight to the older 
respondents consisted of students of ACPS, with a slightly more positive 
assessments (2.78), so that the average score remained at a level that gave the 
younger population of respondents in the general sample. But it is still below 
the median. 
As the most important causes of drug abuse have been identified 
dysfunctional families (nearly 2/3 of respondents) and inadequate working 
with children in the education system (more than ½ of respondents). The 
following is a set of factors related to social media influence, criminal 
legislation and the repressive state apparatus, and at the bottom, the health 
system. On the other hand, when we are talking about the preventing factors, 
by far the most respondents (almost ¾), according to the authors rightly stated 
that better informing of young people about the harmful effects of 
psychoactive substances is as a key factor of prevention. On the comparative 
view of perception of causes of drug abuse and prevention factors, we could 
see that respondents in this area most ''blame'', but, in the same time, they most 
expect from the family, then the education system, law enforcements, judicial 
system and media, which is the logical order of priorities in action against this 
social evil. Analysis performed using Pearson linear correlation found that 
there is no statistically significant link between respondents' age and 
knowledge of the people who use or have used any of the drugs or the age of 
the respondents and being in company with the person of which the respondent 
knew that he was under the influence of drugs. On the other hand, quite 
logically, the value of the linear correlation between the knowledge of the 
person who consumes or has consumed any of the drugs and being with that 
person while he has been under the influence of drugs was statistically highly 
significant (r = 0.529). 
As a key factor in the persisting of the drug trafficking, citizens in 
Serbia have seen primarily its profitability (86% of respondents) and the 
demand for drugs on the market (55.7%). These attitudes clearly testifies to 
the fact that the drug trafficking has been seen as a kind of ''business'', as it 
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really is, given that its perpetrators are usually opportunists, who seek to use 
the weaknesses of the criminal justice system and drug market opportunities, 
to achieve higher profits as much as possible. Other mentioned factors have 
been identified as crucial in less than one-third of respondents. Respondents 
gave the most support of the all of above mentioned entities involved in 
combating drug trafficking to the police, given the fact that three-quarters of 
the respondents marked police as the most active factor in the suppression drug 
trafficking. Police is followed by Public Prosecutor’s office (9.3%), and the 
court (10.4%). In this case, younger respondents gave more support to the 
police. However, after researching the impact of age on the perception of the 
role of the police in combating drug trafficking, it was found that there is 
negative correlation, with statistically little significance, (r = -0.132). More 
than two thirds of respondents believe that the drug trafficking tended to 
increase in the last ten years or stayed at nearly the same level. Globally, drug 
trafficking is generally on a rising trend or persistence of the same level, while 
reducing the parameters in some years are more incidental. Also, in the 
territory of the Republic of Serbia drug trafficking has, statistically speaking, 
recorded a constant growth since the early nineties to the early years of the 
new millennium. After that, the number of seizures has usually held on the 
same level, but there have changed drugs that have had primacy in the mass 
of total seizures. If we take into account the mentioned parameters, it would 
be said that the respondents' attitudes about increasing of drug trafficking or 
its persistence at the same level could be considered as based on realistic 
parameters. 
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Abstract 
Deviant behavior among youth in the Republic of Macedonia has 
significantly increased in the last two decades, a fact that can be both 
statistically observed and seen in everyday life experience. The 
phenomenology of deviant behavior varies from amoral and asocial behavior 
through socio-pathological phenomena and crimes. In spite of some research 
that has been done in this field, the risk factors of deviant behavior have not 
been extensively researched nor discussed in the Macedonian science of social 
pathology. In this context, this paper attempts to determine the risk factors of 
deviant behavior among youth seen through the survey done by the author. 
The author has done a survey of students’ value attitudes in relation to risk 
factors of deviant behavior among youth in the Republic of Macedonia. The 
survey was conducted in the last three years with students at the Faculty of 
Security-Skopje and it used a semi-structured questionnaire. The findings of 
the primary data were compared with other studies in order to analyze the 
relevance of results and prove some of the basic claims of the author, namely, 
the relation between deviant behavior of the youth as dependent variable on 
one hand, and value ambivalence and moral relativizing as independent 
variables on the other hand. In terms of theoretical underpinnings, the author 
sees the value ambivalence and moral relativizing in relation to the theory of 
anomie, i.e., within the broader theories of socio-structural disorganization. 
Consequently, the study could be helpful in the scientific determination of 
etiology of deviant behavior among youth in the Republic of Macedonia and 
in establishing comprehensive and sustainable preventive policies and 
measures in dealing with deviant behavior among youth. The paper itself also 
offers some useful recommendations and conclusions that could be 
implemented in the future by the state and civilian policy makers and 
practitioners in the field of societal reaction, control and prevention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world is becoming riskier place to live in with each passing day. 
We are living in an era that is rightfully called the risk society by some of the 
greatest scientists of nowadays, which proves to be true simply from our 
everyday experience (Bek, 2001). The risk society, eo ipso, has created the so 
called risk culture, that is culture in which risk preoccupies our everyday way 
of life, whether manifestly or latently (Giddens, 1991: 3-4). Another crucial 
feature of our contemporary living is the very fact of elusiveness of the risk. 
Today’s risks are harder to grasp, to detect and define than the risks that 
accompanied human societies throughout the history of mankind. Nowadays’ 
risks tend to mask and hide, both from our everyday taken-for-granted 
knowledge, as well as from other epistemological views, even from science. 
All things considered, it is becoming pretty difficult to determine the nature of 
contemporary risks considering their dynamic change, omnipresence and, 
above all, elusiveness.  
The conditions which we live in are particularly frightening for the 
younger generations who seem partly lost in this enormous flow of risks, 
finding themselves almost defenseless, as even their older generations are not 
able to effectively cope with the new risks and contradictions which go on 
being socially produced (Bauman, 2000, 34). The risks to which younger 
generations are being constantly subjugated seem to appear in numerous 
combinations, with new ones constantly emerging. If we add the special trait 
of contemporary times in which risk-taking has become part of youngsters’ 
subculture or even fad between young generations to which some of the youth 
are attracted and practice, then we get one huge mosaic of risks, risk factors 
and risky behavior which young generations are flooded with. 
Deviant behavior has always been correlated with the risk factors as 
one had to determine the risk factors that were likely to produce that behavior 
in the first place in order to adopt successful way of coping with deviant 
behavior among youth. Having in mind the previously said, it is not an easy 
job at all. Moreover, the risk factors could significantly vary in the same 
societal setting in different periods of time, let alone different ss; determining 
the risk factors of deviant behavior among the youth in the Republic of 
Macedonia, as the topic we are elaborating in this paper, puts us in front of a 
very perplexing and demanding task - to determine, prioritize and find the risk 
factors’ correlations with nowadays’ deviant behavior among the youth. The 
author of the paper is tryimg to answer this complex questions by 
implementing the general theory of anomie by Emile Durkheim, which we find 
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suitable for theoretical explanations of the present societal and cultural 
condition, complemented by the risk society theory of Ulrich Beck, the risk 
culture concept by Anthony Giddens and some postmodern theoretical 
attitudes by Zygmunt Bauman (Milisavljević, 2003: 322; Špadijer-Džinić, 
1988: 35-36). The determination of risk factors of deviant behavior among 
youth has been eased by the application of the well-known strategic preventive 
model of risk vs protective factors of behavior, although we only assume and 
give an allusion of protective factors in preventing deviant behavior, since our 
main focus stays within risk factors determination. The determination of risk 
factors of deviant behavior among youth in the Republic of Macedonia proved 
to be very painstaking task, mostly because of the fast-changing societal 
conditions, not only domestic ones, but also the borrowed ones. In the case of 
the Republic of Macedonia, we can also see some value ambivalence and 
moral relativization, which we believe are caused by numerous factors, but 
above all, by the state of anomie which, in fact, produces moral and value 
confusion to a greater extent, combined with the value conflict between 
traditional, modern and postmodern values as well as with some external 
influences from the risk society era and culture of risk, the contours of which 
are being drawn with every passing day (Герасимоски, 2011b: 311; 
Герасимоски, 2011a: 361-370).     
RISK VS PROTECTIVE FACTORS 
For the purposes of this paper, we will refer to the theoretical 
development of the science of prevention, particularly the strategic models of 
prevention, which have proved to be highly inspirational and useful in 
determining the risk factors of deviant behavior. One of such strategic models 
of prevention is the risk vs protective factors strategic model or the concept of 
prevention to which we will refer to in the following lines. In addition to this 
strategic model of determination and prevention of deviant behavior, 
specifically applied to the deviant behavior amongst youth, we could mention 
a few more such models, as follows: the concept of positive development, the 
model of developmental advantages, the concept of resilience and risk and the 
concept of promotion of mental health. There is a widely accepted stance 
among sociologists, social pathologists and criminologists that the model of 
risk vs protective factors is among the most extensively used, very often with 
a combination of some of the above mentioned strategies, models and concepts 
of social reaction and prevention. The most widely used combination is the 
one of the model of risk vs protective factors and the concept of positive 
behavior, where the first one aims at reducing the risk behavior, while the latter 
aims at preventing the first occurrence of risk behavior (Bašić, Ferić, 
Kranţelić, 2001:1, 2). Since the model (concept) of risk vs protective factors 
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is the most relevant to our study, we will use it to determine the risk factors of 
deviant behavior amongst youth in the Republic of Macedonia and to give 
some hints on the protective factors of deviant behavior, as well as some 
recommendations on what to do with regard to the prevention of deviant 
behavior amongst youth.  
The model of risk vs protective factors is one of the latest theoretical 
developments in the prevention of risky behavior and it provides us with 
scientifically based explanation of the probability of occurrence and 
development of risky behavior (Popović-Ćitić, Ţunić-Pavlović, 2005: 29). 
This concept starts from the assumption that the increase or decrease in 
probability of deviant behavior is conditioned by the existence and mutual 
interaction of various risk and protective factors, which could vary 
considerably even in the same socio-cultural setting in different periods of 
time. Therefore, this model is a multifactorial model that needs constant 
research of the dynamic change and interplay between risk and protective 
factors of deviant behavior.  
Nevertheless, before we start determining the risk and protective 
factors of deviant behavior amongst youth in the Republic of Macedonia, we 
will provide the definition of risk and protective factors. Namely, risk factors 
refer to the factors of societal development for which science has determined 
that they are related to some risky behavior in a way that they increase the 
probability of such behavior, irrespectively of their biological, psychological 
or social nature and their consideration as causes, conditions or incentives. It 
has also been scientifically determined, quite convincingly, that the risk 
factors of behavior, particularly deviant behavior, have often been found 
between the youth. However, it is crucial to understand that the presence of 
risk factors amongst youth does not mean by itself that they will produce a 
deviant kind of behaviour, but it implies that the presence of risk factors only 
points to the higher probability of occurrence of deviant behavior amongst 
youth.  
On the other hand, the protective factors refer to the factors of social 
development for which science has determined that they act in creating 
favorable conditions for social development of the youth, thus reducing the 
probability of occurrence and development of risky behavior and 
consequently, deviant behavior. In fact, the protective factors counteract the 
risky factors, thus preventing the risky behavior or making the consequences 
of the risky behavior lesser. It means that the more and stronger protective 
factors are present in comparison with the risky factors, the less there is 
probability that a young person could find itself in a risky type of behavior that 
would produce deviant behavior. In fact, the newest theoretical and empirical 
findings in social pathology and prevention have concluded that young people 
possess a kind of mix of risk and protective factors which determine the 
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probability of occurrence and development of risky and deviant behavior 
(Bašić, Ferić, Kranţelić, 2001: 5, 9). Risk factors are often determined as 
something that lacks during the process of youth socialization, and, therefore, 
over time they become risk factors of deviant behavior. At the same time, the 
protective factors represent the presence of socialization factors which act as 
a barrier against risk factors, preventing deviant behavior. Therefore, the risk 
factors and protective factors are often viewed as opposite, negative vs 
positive factors, and, as such, they have also been construed (УНИЦЕФ, 
2010: 21). 
For the purpose of our study, we have singled out a list of risk factors 
of deviant behavior amongst youth, made according to some previous, mostly 
theoretical insights of the author of this paper. At the same time, we do not 
claim exhaustiveness of the list, but believe, according to some considerable 
scientific effort made so far in this field in the Republic of Macedonia, that 
this list represents the most widely present risky factors of deviant behavior 
amongst youth on this territory in the last two decades. The list of risk factors 
of deviant behavior amongst youth in the Republic of Macedonia according to 
our study is the following: 
 Inherited deviant potential 
 Distorted family relations 
 Societal setting labelling 
 Inappropriate close societal setting (peers, friends, colleagues) 
 Unfavorable media influence 
 Distorted system of societal values 
 Structural socio-economic changes 
 Frustrations caused by non-perspectiveness 
 Flaws in socialization within the schools 
 Conscious self-exposure to deviant phenomena (victimization) 
 Physical and psychological vulnerability of the youth population1. 
                                                 
1For more information about previous research of the author on similar topics, see also Saše 
Gerasimoski & Arsiola Dyrmishi (2014), “Violence Among Youth in Post-transitional 
Countries: Comparative Experiences of the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of 
Albania”, Зборник радова са Научно-стручног скупа са међунадорним учешћем, Тара 
2014 Насиље у Србији-Узроци, облици, последице и друштвене реакције, 
Криминалистичко-полициска академија и Фондација Ханс Зајдел, Београд, Том 2, сс. 
165-175 and Saše Gerasimoski (2013), “Risk factors of violent behaviour among the youth in 
the Republic of Macedonia with emphasis on peer group violence“, Zbornik radova 
Međunarodne naučno-stručne Konferencije Vršnjačko nasilje (etiologija, fenomenologija, 
načini prevazilaženja, komparativna iskustva), Visoka škola unutrašjnih poslova, Banja Luka, 
pp. 157-170. 
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ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
The empirical part of this paper rests on the survey conducted by the 
author in three consecutive years, 2013, 2014 and 2015, referring to the 
students’ value attitudes in relation to risk factors of deviant behavior in the 
Republic of Macedonia. The students at Faculty of Security in Skopje were 
given a semi-structured survey questionnaire consisting of 10 questions, 5 of 
them of interest for this topic. The number of students surveyed was 82, all 
students that attended lectures in Social pathology as elective subject at the 
Faculty of Security-Skopje at three different study programs: Criminalistics, 
Security and Criminology and Criminal Policy. The aim of this empirical part 
is to give an empirical support of the author’s presumptions of risk factors of 
deviant behavior amongst youth in the Republic of Macedonia, particularly in 
determining the state of anomie, moral relativizing and value ambivalence. 
The research will continue in the following years by surveying other youth 
categories (pupils and youth below 30 years), thus forming a more complete 
picture of youth’s attitudes towards the risk factors of deviant behavior among 
youth. In this sense, the results from the current survey could be interpreted in 
narrower terms, having in mind that they do not claim ideal representation of 
the youth, particularly student population, but, nevertheless, they are 
undoubtedly indicative in determining the risk factors of deviant behavior 
among youth.  
Regarding the sample structure, out of total of 82 students who 
participated in the survey, most of them, 54 or 66% were female students, 
while 28 of 34% were male students. Most of the students were full time 
students from first and second year of studies, with 19-20 years of age, and 
only a few part-time students with over 20 years of age, or precisely, 6 
students. 16 out of 82 or 20% of students originated from rural areas, while 
the other 66 students or 80% originated from towns. Only 28 students or about 
the third of the sample originated from the capital city of Skopje, while other 
two thirds from the rest of the towns throughout the country. As far as the 
ethnic affiliation is concerned, they were mostly Macedonians - 71 out of 82 
or 87%, and 11 were from other nationalities (Serbs 4, Vlachs 3, Albanians 2, 
Turks 1, Roma 1), while regarding religious affiliation, they were 
predominantly Orthodox Christians, 77 out of 82, or 94 %, while 4 or 5 % 
were Muslims, and 1 declared as Atheist or 1%.  
We are going to give the results from the five most important questions 
from the survey, presenting the results in tables and graphs, followed by 
interpretation of the results with comments provided after each question of the 
survey. 
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1. Have you studied the risk factors of deviant behavior amongst youth 
throughout the educational process (attaining lectures)? 
Question 
Answers Answers 
Yes No 
f % f % 
78 96 3 4 
 
Interpretation and comment: The answer to this question indicates 
clearly that 78 out of 81 respondents or 96% of the respondents have studied 
risk factors of deviant behavior throughout the educational process through 
attaining lectures. The data is compelling, although we have not required the 
students to explain where this education was obtained, either elementary or 
secondary school, or at faculty. For the purpose of this study, it is of concern 
to know that the students also based their answers on the education acquired 
on risk factors, irrespective of whether this knowledge was provided through 
the socialization process within schools and education units about 
socialization and prevention or it was separately studied as knowledge of risk 
factors of deviant behavior. The answers to the following questions will 
confirm this, as it seems that the students have determined the risk factors 
considering not only their experience, but their knowledge on this matter as 
well.   
 
 
 
78
Have you studied the risk factors of deviant behavior 
amongst youth throughout the education process 
(attaining lectures)?
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2. Which way do you acquire knowledge about the risk factors of 
deviant behavior amongst youth? 
 
 
Interpretation and comment: The answers to this question 
unmistakably confirm the previous observation. Namely, even 71 out of 82 
respondents or high 87% of the students have acquired their knowledge about 
the risk factors of deviant behavior amongst youth through upbringing and 
education process (schools). That means that our respondents have in fact 
received necessary information on risk factors primarily through socialization 
43
71
54
29
4 2 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
a
n
sw
er
s
Answers
Which way do you acquire with knowledge about the risk 
factors of deviant behavior amongst youth?
Question Answers 
f % 
Through family 43 52 
Through upbringing 
and educational 
process (schools) 
 
71 
 
87 
Through media  54 66 
Through friends 
(peers) 
29 35 
Through 
participation in a 
civil association  
4 5 
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within the schools. However, it is to some extent surprising that 54 out of 82 
respondents, or even 66% of the students have acquired this knowledge 
through media, while 43 out of 82 respondents, or 52% through family. As the 
matter of truth, this is not to be surprising in general, since it could be 
explained with the strong role that media have in today’s socialization of the 
youth. Nevertheless, the third place of the family in this question suggests that 
the family has lost its primate as primary social setting (agency) where the 
contemporary Macedonian youth could get the necessary knowledge about the 
risk factors of deviant behavior. This study could not answer why this is the 
case, but it only assumes that there are a lot of possible reasons, such as the 
decrease of the general role of the family as primary socialization setting, lack 
of knowledge by the parents concerning the risk factors of deviant behavior, 
strong competing influence of media and peer groups in gaining knowledge 
on this issue etc.   
3. In your opinion, which item in the list of risk factors of deviant 
behavior amongst youth influences deviant behavior the most? 
Question 
Answers 
f % 
Inherited deviant potential 26 32 
Distorted family relations 76 93 
Societal setting labelling 38 53 
Inappropriate close societal setting 
(peers, friends, colleagues) 
 
64 
 
78 
Unfavorable media influence 35 43 
Distorted system of societal values 45 55 
Structural socio-economic changes 29 35 
Frustrations caused by non-
prosperity 
17 21 
Flaws in socialization within the 
schools 
37 45 
Aware self-exposure to deviant 
phenomena (victimization) 
26 32 
Physical and psychological 
vulnerability of the youth population 
40 49 
Other, use of drugs, alcohol 1 1 
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Interpretation and comment: Although, as John Adams adamantly and 
to some extent rightfully remarks that “everyone is a true risk expert”, we are 
nonetheless almost certain that, in fact, there are risks, at least amongst the 
youth, that are too elusive to be recognized on time and that are too dangerous 
and out of capability of youth to be dealt with successfully and to prevent 
deviant-type of behavior on time (Adams, 1995: 1)2. Considering the answers 
given by the students in the study, these interpretations are simply compelling 
enough. The answers to this question vary from micro, mezzo to macro level, 
at least by looking the first three items with the most number of answers. Thus, 
our students responded that 76 out of 82, or 93% think that distorted family 
relations is the number one risk factor of deviant behavior amongst youth in 
Republic of Macedonia. This suggests that the students have pointed out to 
this crucial micro-societal factor as key risk factor of deviant behavior. It 
means that the students are aware and fully recognize the significance of 
distorted societal relations as the leading factor of deviant behavior, as much 
as we could presume that having this factor being appropriate, it could be seen 
as crucial protective factor against deviant behavior. Next, the second risk 
factor is inappropriate close societal setting (peers, friends, colleagues), which 
is mezzo-societal risk factor, for which 64 out of 82, or 78% believe it to be 
                                                 
2This finding, which asserts the possibility of successful dealing with risks in everyday life, 
has been claimed amongst the grown-ups. It is supported with another claim by Paul Slovic, 
who advocates that every grown-up person deals successfully with everyday risks on the basis 
of the so called street-calculus, constantly estimating and re-estimating the risk vs protective 
factors and by that successfully dealing with everyday risks; more at Paul Slovic (1987), 
“Perception of risk”, Science, Vol. 236, pp. 280–285.  
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factors of deviant behavior amongst youth influences the most on the 
deviant behavior?
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of high significance in forming and sustaining the deviant behavior amongst 
youth. The third place goes for distorted system of societal values, which is 
macro-societal risk factor for deviant behavior. 45 out of 82 students, or 55% 
believe that this is very important risk factor for deviant behavior. The whole 
structure of the answers in this question lead us to the conclusion that the 
students as young people are well informed and have rightful picture of what 
the risk factors of deviant behavior include. They rightly assume that distorted 
family relations and inappropriate close societal setting are to be viewed as 
most significant risk factors, while the distorted system of societal values 
occupies the third place. The only thing that stands out here is that the 
respondents are not that much convinced in the influence of this factor, since 
the percentage is 55, although, in reality, this is taken to be one of the 
triggering factors of deviant behavior. It seems that the young think within this 
formula: “as long as the risk factors are to be found in family or peers, they 
are part of their everyday experience and tend to be seen as detrimental and 
wrongful, while as long as it happens to all, in general societal level, that is 
not seen as detrimental and as wrongful as the previous, since it has been 
masked and even justified to some extent under the moto of ‘everybody is 
doing it’”.      
4. Prioritize the risk factors of deviant behavior amongst the youth in 
your opinion, starting from the most towards the least important? 
No. Risk Factor Answers (total answers) 
  f % 
1. Distorted family relations 48 (79) 61 
2. Inappropriate close societal setting 
(peers, friends, colleagues) 
26 (79) 33 
3. Flaws in socialization within the 
schools 
13 (79) 16 
4. Distorted system of societal values 16 (76) 21 
5. Unfavorable media influence 13 (70) 19 
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Interpretation and comment: The findings of this question match the 
findings of the previous question in terms of number of answers. Distorted 
family relations with 48 answers out of 79, or 61% is seen as number one risk 
factor, close societal setting (peers, friends, colleagues) with 26 out of 79 
answered, or 33% is number 2 risk factor, while distorted system of societal 
values with 16 out of 79 answered, or 21% is the third risk factor. The 
difference here is that the respondents were asked to give the list of factors of 
deviant behavior amongst youth by priority, and the first three answers 
completely match the answers of the previous question. The match of answers 
refers to the integrity and solidity of opinions, shows that the respondents are 
highly focused on the questions, which all in all, gives the survey a high level 
of relevance.  
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Answers
Prioritize the risk factors of deviant behavior amongst the youth according to 
your opinion, starting from the most towards the least important?
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5. In your opinion, what is the intensity with which the risk factors 
influence the deviant behavior of youth? 
Risk factor 
Number of answers 
Outstanding 
influence 
Very 
important 
influence 
Relative 
influence 
Less 
important 
influence 
Insignificant 
influence 
Inherited deviant 
potential 
9 7 33 23 7 
Distorted family 
relations 
47 24 6 2 2 
Societal setting 
labelling 
10 25 31 13 1 
Inappropriate close 
societal setting (peers, 
friends, colleagues) 
33 33 12 2 1 
Unfavorable media 
influence 
3 29 29 16 2 
Distorted system of 
societal values 
9 29 32 8 2 
Structural socio-
economic changes 
6 25 33 11 5 
Frustrations caused by 
non-prosperity 
6 14 35 18 5 
Flaws in socialization 
within the schools 
25 20 23 6 6 
Aware self-exposure to 
deviant phenomena 
(victimization) 
 
14 
 
19 
 
29 
 
15 
 
2 
Physical and 
psychological 
vulnerability of the 
youth population 
20 23 22 13 1 
 
Interpretation and comment: The last question in the survey 
questionnaire that we elaborate here is the one concerning the intensity with 
which the risk factors influence the deviant behavior of youth. To this end, we 
have applied the standard Likert scale for attitudes measurement, containing 5 
levels of intensity in attitude (outstanding influence, very important influence, 
relative influence, less important influence and insignificant influence). The 
findings show the intensity of attitude towards answered questions for each 
risk factor. What is interesting here is that we found the strongest intensity in 
attitudes concerning three risk factors (distorted family relations with 47 
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highest intensity answers, inappropriate close societal setting (peers, friends, 
colleagues) with 33 highest intensity answers and flaws in socialization within 
the schools with 25 highest intensity answers). This means that not only that 
the students think that these risk factors are important, but that they are 
outstandingly important as factors taken separately. It is interesting to notice 
that the students gave the highest intensity attitude to the risk factor of flaws 
in socialization within the schools, which referred that, although this factor 
was not prioritized between the first three, viewed separately, it received 
highest degree of importance, which is an ethically respectful answer.  The 
students also gave very important reference to unfavorable media influence 
with 29 and physical and psychological vulnerability of the youth population 
with 23 answers. The other risk factors were given relative significance in 
terms of impact on the deviant behavior amongst the youth.       
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several conclusions and recommendations could be extracted from the 
survey. They are the following: 
 It is quite certain that the whole situation of societal anomie, risk 
society and culture of risk in the current Macedonian society contribute 
towards the present number and definition of risk factors of deviant 
behavior amongst youth; 
 The findings of the survey suggest that distorted family relations is 
considered the most important risk factor of deviant behavior amongst 
the youth and should be paid the most attention and effort to minimize 
its negative influence and to transform it into protective factor of 
socialization; 
 The presence of distorted system of societal values is very high on the 
scale of risk factors, which also tells us more on the value ambivalence 
and moral relativizing that stand behind this risk factor and determine 
its appearance; 
 The presence of risk factors on different societal levels between the 
first three factors only confirms that the risk factors are found at all 
levels of societal structure and the strategies of primary prevention 
should be designed on wide societal basis, including all societal levels 
of structure; 
 We also find the risk vs protective factors of deviant behavior amongst 
youth to be very useful and instructive model (concept), not only for 
determination and explanation of risk factors, but also for 
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determination of appropriate protective factors and preventive 
strategies and measures; 
 There is a clear tendency among the youth to slightly disregard the 
influence of general risk factors in comparison to micro and mezzo-
societal risk factors of deviant behavior; this could be seen as part of 
the process of intensive individualization and reflexivity of 
contemporary society, which, in turn, means that the youth have to be 
drawn more attention to recognizing and fully understanding the 
meaning of these risk factors to deviant behavior and the manner to 
transform them into protective factors through the process of 
socialization.  
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Abstract 
The crime issue necessarily takes part and place in the daily media 
because crime is a casual and easy way for media coverage. Reading crime 
news immediately raises questions such as, whether criminal news is a 
reflection of the real situation not only with the total crime in the country, but 
also with a specific criminal event described and shown in a particular media, 
what is the role and the meaning of the media to cover crime, i.e. how can we 
explain the relationship between media and crime. Those concerns are the 
main topics to be elaborated in the article. In the manuscript, in a systematic 
way are presented the findings reached out from many studies and current 
theoretical debates in the criminological literature about the 
interconnectedness among media and crime. Special attention is paid to the 
role of media in the construction of the dominant definitions of crime and 
offenders that have a great impact on the public attitudes and perceptions of 
citizens about crime. 
Key words: media, crime, discourse, crime news 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The term of mass media often refers to electronic and printed media 
(television, radio, daily newspapers and internet). These types of media are a 
subject of special scientific interest within the specific scientific area – 
communication and mass media, which deals with all questions and issues 
connected to the role of mass media in the society. Taking into consideration 
that there are different standpoints or aspects regarding the explanation of this 
term, the first question that the science should clarify is to make a distinction 
between the different definitions of the term mass media. We can recognize 
technological, sociological, conventional, common and other definitions of 
mass media. Making distinction between the different aspects is not a subject 
of this paper and therefore we accept the common explanation of the term, 
according to which, media are tools for mass communication that transfer, 
spread and announce information to unlimited number of people. Moreover, 
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they create the reality, including all phenomena, such as crime as an individual 
and general social phenomena. For that reason, the way in which the media 
portray the crime is of a special interest within the criminology. Considering 
the fact that there are several types of mass media and each type has its own 
features and rules on how to present the material, all these types, more or less, 
have their own distinct features that are a subject of a special debate among 
the professionals and the general public. Their role as agents of social life and 
as the fourth power in the country generally depend on the time, space, values, 
the process of democracy and the political system of the society. The media 
represent certain interests, they inform about certain events, stimulate critical 
reasoning and specific actions, they control, entertain, educate, and advertise. 
Considering that, they have several functions, such as informative, 
educational, entertaining and social functions. On the other side, the basis 
classification of mass media includes the radio, television, press and internet. 
A distinct feature of the press in regard to other mass media is the fact that its 
information is fixed, integrally preserved and available, and in that way it 
enables us to follow and explore the social communication continually for a 
long period of time. Within the framework of the printed media, the daily 
newspapers have a special place, and due to their informative and politic 
character and the function to inform about the daily news in the area of politics, 
culture, economy, society, as well as about the attitudes, opinions and 
comments regarding current events, this type of media is more frequently 
analyzed by the scientific community. 
Featuring the daily news, the topic of crime is a common and a crucial 
part of the daily newspapers and depending on many elements of the criminal 
event it can be on the front page, on the popular political section, on the 
economic section, or on the black chronic page. As a result of this, the 
questions that rise are: whether the crime news are a reflection of the reality 
not only regarding the crime figures in the country, but also regarding the 
specific criminal event described and depicted in the newspaper?, what is the 
role and importance of the media in regard to crime presentation and how the 
connection between crime and media can be explained? 
Those questions are elaborated in this article through review of the 
scientific literature and undertaken studies in that area and through short 
analysis of the recognized theoretical approaches about relation between 
media and crime.  
 
STUDIES FOR CRIME NEWS 
 
The studies listed in the expert literature (mostly within criminology 
has been consulted), depending on the subject, can be classified into three 
main groups. They refer first, to the role of the media (as a sender of the 
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message) in crime reporting, second, to the contents of the text and to the 
manner of its presentation, and third, to the effects of how the media present 
the crime to the readers (as receivers of the message). Therefore, considering 
the three elements of the media, as a system of communication: media- text- 
audience (sender- message- receiver), all circumstances and factors connected 
to these elements should be analyzed distinctively and together, because they 
are a trio of interdependent variables and factors that should be examined and 
analyzed interdisciplinary and in mutual correlation. Or as Reiner (2007) 
highlights, in order to see the connection between the media and the crime, 
further research is needed about the production of crime news, i.e. about the 
reasons of their production and presentation, about the contents, the effects 
and the consequences that crime news have on the readers.1 They result from 
their mutual influence, according to which, the effects of the content depend 
on how the content is interpreted by the readers. More precisely, the three 
groups of research refer to the following:  
First, to the role of the media as an institution (as a physical or legal 
entity); they produce and send messages to the public that are important for 
analysis from more aspects. Those studies refer to the reasons for portraying 
the crime in the media, to the goals and regulation policy, to the source of the 
information and to the criteria according to which the media text can be used 
as crime news. Second, regarding to the content of the crime news, important 
for the research are the manner and the style of presentation, the place of the 
text in the media, the number of crime news, the features of the crime, the 
penal policy, the language construction of crime news, etc. Regarding to the 
third aspect that refers to the effects that crime news have on readers, usually 
the scholars are focused on the following research questions: the changes of 
the attitudes and the perceptions of readers about crime, their behavior, their 
sense of fear (this part of the research refers to the cognitive, behavioral, and 
emotional aspect of the readers). Apart from this, series of studies have been 
conducted about the media as a criminal factor, which verify certain 
theoretical approaches or establish new ones that explain the connection 
between them. Taking into consideration the above mentioned, and 
considering the wide range of theories that can be researched, in the text that 
follows, I am going to mention some research results about the representation, 
contents and the style of the crime news in the daily press, in order to find out 
whether the media portrays real or false picture of crime, which is the primary 
subject of this paper.  
 
                                                 
1 Reiner, R. (2007). Media made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass 
media. In: Maguire, M, Morgan, R and Reiner, Robert, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, р. 302 - 337 
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Some research results  
Most of the studies on this subject show that violent crime in the media 
is disproportionately represented compared to the property crime, and the ratio 
is eight as opposed to two (8/2), while according to the official statistics the 
property crime rate is nine (9) as opposed to one (1) for the violent crime. This 
presentation gives a distorted image about the representation of certain 
criminal activities within the total crime rate.2 
Ditton and Duffy (1983) have also analyzed the crime representation 
in Scotland in March 1981 and came to the conclusion that both, violent and 
sex crime are dominant in the media.3 The research of Jacobs (1980) also 
asserts their over-representation in the daily newspapers, according to which 
70% of the crime news are related to violent crimes4. Yamamoto, M. (2011) 
explains that those criminal offences that occur more frequently (for example, 
thefts) are seldom covered by the media, while homicides and brutal physical 
attacks more frequently. A reason for this media coverage is the fact that 
according to the public perception, the term crime mostly implies to violent 
crime.5 
Faucher (2009), explored the way in which juvenile violence is 
portrayed in three Canadian daily newspapers and concluded that juvenile 
delinquency is often portrayed in a sensational manner. According to him, the 
media portray juvenile crime as a big and serious problem, while other social 
problems are neglected.6 In his research, Dowler (2007) discusses about the 
disproportional violence representation, mostly about homicides and 
burglaries, contrasted with the property offences. Regarding the traits of the 
victim and the offender, the media frequently develop profiles of ideal 
offenders and ideal victims. Depending on the offence, the perpetrators are 
psychopaths, violent, businessmen or professionals, while victims are labeled 
as passive, defenseless and fragile.7 Alheide (2007) speaks that the media 
create legitimate victims, which covers children, women, old and defenseless 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p. 384 
3 Peelo, M., Francis, B., Soothil, K., Pearson, J., Ackerley, E. (2004). Newspaper reporting 
and the public construction of homicide, British Journal of criminology 44 (2), Center for 
crime and justice studies, p. 256 - 275, р. 258. 
4 Katz, J. (1987). What makes crime news?, Media, culture and society, SAGE Publication, p. 
46-75., р. 58-59 
5 Yamamoto, M. (2011). Mass Media as a Macro-level source of social control: A new 
direction in the community structure model, in Mass communication and society. 
6 Cannon, M. (2011). Deviant youth in the news: a critical discourse analysis of media and 
participant social constructions of a contemporary moral panic, Mancester Metropolian 
University, p. 1 - 19. р. 12 
7 Dowler, K. (2003). Media consumption and public attitude toward crime and justice: the 
relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes and perceived police effectiveness, 
Journal of criminal justice and popular culture, vol. 10, issue 2, p. 109 - 126 
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citizens, while other victims, such as drug addicts, the homeless and sexual 
workers, according to the discourse that presents them, more difficulty gain a 
status of legitimate victims in the eyes of the public. Hereinafter, considering 
the language and style used in describing the crime victims, there is a danger 
in the media of creating hierarchy regarding the victimization scale. In fact, 
there is a danger of certain marginalized groups to be less covered than other 
victims that would lead to the conclusion that the ones are more important than 
the others. For example, the homosexuals and the spouses as homicide victims 
are minimally covered, compared to the foreigners who are over-presented in 
the media. This manner of selective presentation creates distorted image about 
the victims, in which certain categories are more visible compared to other 
categories.8 During the analysis of the presented victims and offenders in 
several studies, Reiner (2007) recognized that in the media, older offenders of 
higher social and economic status are more covered, compared to the traits of 
the offenders registered in the official statistics. Similar data are obtained 
about the victims, too. In the media, the victims are usually older women of 
higher social status, mostly from the white race, while according to the official 
data they are poor, young Afro-American mothers.9 The above mentioned data 
show us that with the selective presentation of the offenders and victims, the 
media unrealistically rank and stereotype both parties of the criminal event. 
The research about the criminal offences committed by “wall street” and the 
Latino immigrants in the USA also supports the fact that the race and the social 
and economic status of the victims and offenders have a big influence on how 
crime news are presented. The victims are positively portrayed and the 
negative influence and consequences caused by the white collar crimes are 
minimized. On the other hand, the crime committed by the Latino immigrants 
is negatively portrayed and it has a negative influence on the perception of the 
Latino community that increases the demand for harsher immigration policy.10 
Furthermore, regarding the manner in which the offences were 
committed, the research show that criminal offences which occur rarely and 
in an unusual manner are more frequently covered by the media, because it 
causes emotional reactions and shock among the readers. In spite of this, these 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Reiner, R. (2007). Media made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass 
media. In: Maguire, M, Morgan, R and Reiner, Robert, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, р. 302 - 337 
10 Catalano, T. и Waugh, L. (2013). The ideologies behind newspaper crime reports of Latinos 
and Wall street / CEOS: A critical analysis of metonymy in text and image, in Critical 
discourse studies, p. 406 - 426., р. 407 
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criminal offences can be presented in the media for days and weeks, which 
increase their deviance, condemnation, and wish for revenge.11 
Based on the above mentioned and other results, we can conclude that 
the media generally create distorted image about the crime, which is also 
influenced by other factors.  
 
WHAT INFLUENCES THE “ILLUSORY” OBJECTIVITY OF 
THE CRIME PORTRAYED BY THE MEDIA?  
 
The comparison between the portrayed and the real crime is an 
indicator for the objectivity in the presentation of the crime according to both 
the rate and types. Furthermore, the selection of criminal offences, which 
offences are followed in their further criminal proceeding, and which crime 
situations are analyzed in more details, depends on many factors, among 
which are: the administrative policy of the media and the certain criteria and 
values that should be taken into consideration in order to publish the story (to 
be newsworthy for publishing). 
Because the central thesis of the paper supports the idea that the 
selection process creates distorted image of the real crime figures, we rise the 
questions about the extent of that distortion not only quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively (in terms of the manner in which the crime is portrayed in the 
media) and about the contribution and influence of the media on the social 
institutions regarding the crime and criminal problems. 
One thing is clear. The news is not a neutral reflection of the social 
reality, but they are a subject of different processes that influence on their 
production and publication. As Fairclough (1989) states, the thing that exists 
is “the power to disguise the power”. It is a power to choose certain 
mechanisms for denominating and portraying the events, and to reject other 
mechanisms, and consequently, to favor specific interpretations and to 
disfavor others.12 Those interpretations, according to Mayers, are mostly based 
on the opinions and perspectives of the educated, white-colored men who 
belong to the more prominent social status.13 They are usually experts and 
scholars from certain areas who have more connections with the powerful 
individuals and easier approach to the public discourse. 
                                                 
11 Alheide L. David (2003). Mass Media, crime and the discourse of fear, Hedgehog Review; 
Vol. 5 Issue 3, p. 9 - 25., р. 17 
12 Adampa, V. (1999). Reporting of a violent crime in three newspaper articles. The 
representation of the female victim and the male perpetrator and their actions: a critical news 
analysis, Working paper N0. 108, Centre for language in social life, р. 18 
13 Turkewitz, R. Ripley (2010). All the news that fits to print? A content analysis of 
newspapers’ Portrayal of rape and sexual assault, р. 14 
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Regardless of whose interests they serve, the mass media should 
respect certain values connected to the criminal story that lead the authors to 
decide whether an event is worthy to be placed in the news. Main factors are 
the offence frequency, its importance, unexpectedness and un-ambiguity.14 
Despite these, Roscho (1975) lists additional features of the event which 
should be explained: presence of conflicts, unexpectedness, and routine 
classifications, presence of “big names” of celebrities, deadlines and 
objectivity15. Another group of experts consider that there are two reasons why 
the crime is portrayed on the American television. First, because the crime is 
connected to fear, and second, it can be easily camouflaged. As some local 
news editor in USA would say, crime is the easiest, fastest, cheapest and most 
effective way to cover the TV news. From economic point of view, it is said 
that the role of the newspapers is neither to educate, nor to inform. The goal 
of the newspaper editor is to sell it, while the shock, revenge and the fear of 
the audience are the elements that trigger off the selling of the newspaper16. 
The famous motto of the media industry is: ‘If it bleeds, it leads’. 
The following dilemma that is discussed in this paper refers to the 
manner in which the authors frame and shape the story, because, how they 
produce the text is one thing, but how the audience interpret that text is a 
completely different thing. In that context, the authors and readers are subject 
of discourse practices that influence and are influenced by the dominant social 
and cultural norms. Therefore, it is very important how the social and cultural 
matrix in which the author writes and produces effects the selection of certain 
expressions and stories which are shaping the text17. On the other hand, the 
readers as a consumers with different level of knowledge and different 
perspectives and based on their identity sense, experience, family and social 
relations they interpret that expressions and stories. 
The thesis that the content of the text influence its interpretation by 
causing shock or calling for revenge is true, and it serves to mobilize the 
readers’ response and reaction. According to Katz, J. (1987), the crime news 
is classified as hot news that stimulate readers to react against the insecurity.18 
Therefore, within the frames of several scientific studies (linguistics, 
communication, criminology), special disciplines which study: 1. the 
                                                 
14 Oenbring, R. (2011). Framing Violence: A content/Discourse Analysis of representations 
of violence in Bahamian Newspapers, Violence symposium 3rd November, 2011, р. 32 
15 ibid 
16 Jewkes, Y. (2004). Theorizing media and crime, Media and crime, SAGE Publication, 
достапно на: http://www.sagepub.com/upm 
data/36583_02_Jewkes_Ch_01.pdf, р. 32 
17 enbring, R. (2011). Framing Violence: A content/Discourse Analysis of representations of 
violence in Bahamian Newspapers, Violence symposium 3rd November, 2011, р. 54 
18 Katz, J. (1987). What makes crime news?, Media, culture and society, SAGE Publication, 
p. 46 - 75. р. 70 
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connection between words and meaning (linguistics), 2. the meaning of 
language in certain context and which messages are sent through the language 
(communication and 3. the manner in which language creates the reality 
(constitutive criminology and postmodernism) are developed. The discourse 
analysis is the tool that analyses the language, and as methodological 
procedure, it includes more approaches of content analysis in order to reveal 
to which socio-political functions the discourse serves19. 
Regarding the crime news, Turkewitz (2013) believes that the 
newspapers standardize the stories and lose the complexity of the current 
news.20 They narrow the public narratives which limits the public perception 
and understanding of crime. According to Dowler the stories are created in 
accordance to certain frame that supports the dominant governmental structure 
and promotes gender, race, sexuality, and class stereotypes. As a matter of 
fact, these stories are becoming stereotypes that help readers to interpret 
“stereotypically” their experiences. 
For example, regarding the rape cases, Dowler considers that the media 
use a framework which helps the selection of the cases and the discussions 
about them. The authors shape the stories based on already existing narratives 
about rape as a criminal offence and describe the victims, also based on 
previously existing definitions about the rape victims. This type of story 
simplification helps the community to easily absorb and understand it21. 
Mayers (1997), concerning the portrayed domestic violence, says that 
the crime news expand the idea and thesis that the violence is a result of an 
individual psychopathology, i.e. it is a case of isolated pathology or deviance. 
Therefore, the media do not relate domestic violence to the social roots that 
refer to both, the patriarchy and the control over the women.22 Similarly, 
Jewkes (2004) argues that the crime in media is portrayed as a result of an 
individual pathology, and the crime among powerful people is ignored or 
misrepresented. Regarding the perpetrators, Greg Barak (2004), a 
representative of news-making criminology considers that the label, 
                                                 
19 Tuneva, M. (2013), Reporting on the differences, Trajkovska, Z. (ed.) Report on the inter-
religious and inter-ethnical conflicts: The meaning behind the titles, High school for 
journalism and public relations, Institute for communicational studies - Skopje, p. 11 - 18, р. 
12  
20 Turkewitz, R. Ripley (2010). All the news that fits to print? A content analysis of 
newspapers’ Portrayal of rape and sexual assault, р. 3 
21 Ibid, p.11 
22 Adampa, V. (1999). Reporting of a violent crime in three newspaper articles. The 
representation of the female victim and the male perpetrator and their actions: a critical news 
analysis, Working paper N0. 108, Centre for language in social life, р. 22 
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stereotypes, and criminalization of certain groups, mostly based on class, 
gender and race are still present.23 
 
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN CREATING THE CRIME 
 
In conditions of social mobility, channel expansion and open 
competition among the media, we can often meet the attitude that the 
objectivity in the media is illusory.24 Based on a pluralistic model for 
ideological war, these conditions are subject of debate, and consciously or 
unconsciously they are used or misused for manipulation of what is true and 
what is false, with the facts and interpretations25. For this reason, Jewkes 
(2004) ascertains that during the examination of the stories in the media, 
reversed questions are being asked. It is not about what media do for people, 
but what people do with the media in an era of democratic and interactive 
communications led by technology26. For this question, I will try to elaborate 
certain attitudes related to the thesis that the media frame the reality and that 
there is a strong bond between the choice of language and values, promises, 
practices, and power relations in the society. 
The media are a main source for information about the crime. The 
media portray crime news that can be differently based on the topics: current 
events, discussion on criminal offences, analysis of certain crime conditions, 
comments and opinions of experts, activities in the penal and judicial system 
or activities in the community related to crime. Regardless of the information 
topic, the citizens in every society are informed by the media about the crime, 
and based on that knowledge they develop their attitudes. Therefore, the data 
analysis on current criminal offences, penal policy, place and manner on how 
the crime was committed and about how the offenders and victims are profiled 
in the media are extremely important to determine whether the media give a 
real or distorted image about the crime and the level of its disproportion. 
Taking into consideration that the media inform the general public, supposing 
that people believe them, they expect from the media objectively and neutrally 
to portray the crime. 
The media frame the reality. The media exist and their function is to 
portray the reality in an objective and unbiased manner and for that reason, the 
media are creators of the reality. However, Allan (1998) believes that there is 
                                                 
23 Jewkes, Y. (2004). Theorizing media and crime, Media and crime, SAGE Publication, 
available at: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/36583_02_Jewkes_Ch_01.pdf, р. 24. 
24 Ibid, p.25 
25 Turkewitz, R. Ripley (2010). All the news that fits to print? A content analysis of 
newspapers’ Portrayal of rape and sexual assault, р. 14 
26 Jewkes, Y. (2004) Theorizing media and crime, Media and crime, SAGE Publication, 
достапно на: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/36583_02_Jewkes_Ch_01.pdf, р. 29 
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no objective truth and that the truth is “a subject of debate between different 
opinions”. Claiming that the doctrine of the objectivity is in their hands, 
journalists simply deceive the readers and their prejudices that, for example, 
the violent crime that has been portrayed is a frequent phenomenon in reality. 
According to the postmodernists, the media are a source of reality from a 
second hand.27 In that context, regardless of whether they represent someone 
interests, “the reality” of the crime in the stories which has been portrayed is 
a reflection of the policy of each media and of those who are in powerful and 
privileged institutional positions and who have regular access to the public 
discourse. According to Chamberlain (2013), most of them belong to the 
political and cultural elite, who through their discourse they have power to 
influence and control the citizens28, or as Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) points 
out, “the opinion of the powerful is privileged”. This type of discourse 
provides reproduction and maintenance of the official and dominant 
ideology.29 
The ruling class uses the media to obtain public support.30 
According to the Marxists and the radical criminology representatives, the 
media are capitalist institutions supported and under the auspices of the ruling 
class which has the power to distribute information and to legitimate the 
already divided society. In one-party systems, when there was no pluralism in 
the media, they were used to gain the middle class, to control them, and to 
approve the social values and interests imposed by the already existing 
hegemony. In a state of contemporary capitalism (or liberal democracy), the 
ruling class uses the media to gain the community’s trust and support with 
consent, instead of force. In that way, the dominant interests and values are 
approved and accepted, because, as Jewkes (2004) emphasizes, the people 
passively and completely adopt the ideas of the ruling class. Furthermore, he 
states that the relationship between the media and the powerful has important 
consequences for the manner in which crime and criminals are portrayed, 
mostly if their behavior does not correspond to the norms imposed by the 
                                                 
27 Turkewitz, R. Ripley (2010). All the news that fits to print? A content analysis of 
newspapers’ Portrayal of rape and sexual assault, р. 14 
28 Chamberlain, J. Martin (2013). Understanding criminological research, SAGE publication, 
2013, р. 152 
29 Adampa, V. (1999). Reporting of a violent crime in three newspaper articles. The 
representation of the female victim and the male perpetrator and their actions: a critical news 
analysis, Working paper N0. 108, Centre for language in social life, р. 17 
30 Jewkes, Y. (2004). Theorizing media and crime, Media and crime, SAGE Publication, 
достапно на: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/36583_02_Jewkes_Ch_01.pdf. р. 19 
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ruling class31. In other words, the crime information in the media is related to 
the dominant cultural values and beliefs in the society.32 
The media construct the dominant definitions about the crime. 
This thesis is widely accepted and advocated by the representatives of the 
constitutive criminology. Explaining the crime, they especially emphasize the 
role of the media in the modern society, which influences the theories of crime 
i.e. the manner in which crime is portrayed in the media. According to them, 
the language is an ideological instrument that creates the things, more than it 
simply describes them. The language plays an active and constitutive role, and 
it is a tool for achieving certain goals and we use it to present ourselves in 
certain manner. In that context, Henry and Milovanovic (1996) consider that 
crime is a co-product designed by crime presentation, crime drama, crime 
documentaries, crime news, criminal systems, etc.33 
In this regard, Faucault, believes that the language frames the social 
institutions, the penal and legal systems and the individuals, by hierarchical 
and ideological operation of the discourse statements that situate individuals 
in a certain manner as special social actors, so they could observe and develop 
a better social control.34 This means that, even the media, with the help of the 
crime news, support, reform or make the most dominant crime definitions. In 
this way, they have the power to design the public perception of the crime, in 
a manner that is true or distorted. In that context, the media and politicians 
often assign conventional and cultural meaning to those who break the law 
and by doing that, they reject the possibility to present another, alternative or 
opposite explanation about the crime, criminal behavior and the criminal 
law.35 This is properly elaborated by Chamberlain (2013) in his publication 
“Understanding Criminological Research”, where he states that certain 
discourse practices and sources (those launched by the media) introduce 
“certain subject-positions and social identities, while at the same time, they 
close, marginalize or silence others”. This means that the media can increase 
the deviance of certain categories of offenders and offences, and to 
camouflage, relativize or even to exclude the deviance of other negative 
behaviors. Therefore, the criminology, with the help of the discourse analysis 
should describe how certain styles of portraying and explaining the crime are 
                                                 
31 Ibid, p.21 
32 Turkewitz, R. Ripley (2010). All the news that fits to print? A content analysis of 
newspapers’ Portrayal of rape and sexual assault. 
33 Stefanovska, V. (2014). Constitutive criminology: Product of postmodern society, 
Proceedings of the International scientific conference “Macedonia and the Balkans, a hundred 
years after world war, Faculty of security-Skopje, p. 398 - 409 
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more stable and more privileged than others. Researchers are motivated to 
apply the discourse analysis because it deals with social inequality and it 
implies that the language of the criminal justice overemphasizes and 
institutionalizes the individuality as a main factor that causes crime and often 
increases the limited, punitive and one-sided viewpoints about the offenders.36 
The media have an influence on the individual attitudes and 
perceptions about the crime. The crime stories affect, shape, or alter our 
attitude about the crime. They cause a fear sensation, insecurity, panic, 
emotional feelings, stimulate the stigmatization and can increase 
condemnatory attitude, stereotypes, intolerance, and demands for harsher 
penal policies. Nils Christy (2003) shares the similar opinion, and according 
to him, in the modern capitalist society, the information about the crime 
offered by the media is increasing and in that way people rely on the media 
when they describe and give importance to what happens, including the 
crime,37 which can be explained with the theory of symbolic interactionism 
(Mead, 1976, Blumer (1972).38 The immediate criminal influence which the 
media have on the individuals can also be explained with the Social learning 
theory of Albert Bandura (1977). In the 1950s and 1960s Bandura (1977) 
conducted series of experiments in which he displayed violent movies to 
children. After watching that, they were given bobo dolls to play with, so he 
could observe how the children handled and treated these dolls. He ascertained 
that there was a direct bond between the violence portrayed by the media and 
the aggressive behavior of the children compared to those children who were 
not exposed to this type of violence39. Even though Bandura’s thesis is often 
criticized, further elaboration of the above mentioned theories is not a subject 
of this research.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The media, as a means of communication are part of the everyday life 
of people. No social segment could function without the mediation of the 
media. Therefore, a few crucial questions rise: how media affect us to think 
and to act in a certain manner from one side, and how media create our identity 
and situate us in the society from the other side. The research results indicate 
                                                 
36 Ibid, p. 141 
37 Stefanovska, V. (2014). Constitutive criminology: Product of postmodern society, 
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that the media has the power to create categories, offences and offenders and 
to determine the limits and definitions for deviations and crime. For example, 
the discourse used to describe certain criminal activities has an influence on 
the social construction of these criminal activities, as well as on the public 
discourse used to describe them40. In that context, if we accept Noam 
Chomsky’s (2001) theory according to which “the media refuses to write 
about what they should write in order to distort people’s perception about what 
really happens” it follows that there are discrepancies between the portrayed 
and real crime. However, with the development of the pluralism and the 
circulation of the private media channels, the media get new dimensions they 
have developed critical reasoning and became the fourth power in the country 
(watchdog of the government). The media can frame the crime, and in the 
same way they can deconstruct it, throughout deconstruction of the popular 
crime image in the media. This is a subject of further research in the frame of 
the News-making criminology, according to which, criminologists, with the 
help of the mass media can influence and design the perceptions about certain 
crime issues. Therefore, as criminologists we should critically deconstruct and 
demystify the ideologies and crime definitions, which is the first step, as 
Catalano and Waugh (2013) say, to cause social changes that would lead to 
better social justice41.  
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Abstract 
The main task of the psychology of terrorism is to explain the 
psychological aspects of terrorism, trying to provide answers about the 
behavior of the persons involved in terrorist activities. The literature suggests 
that there is no a single theory that explains the reasons and the way of "making 
the terrorists." While the first generation of research have viewed on terrorism 
as a pathology, explaining it predominantly through mental illness and 
psychopathic personality, the second generation is based on a behavioral 
approach that sets operationalization as a precondition for existing of scientific 
research. It achieved agreement for the inability of separation of the 
psychological factors from the others, especially the social, in an attempt to 
explain this phenomenon. It is not found a single psychological profile of 
terrorist, but what unites this sample is the existence of vulnerability for 
terrorism and particular ideology. However, the deepest in this phenomenon 
is the word "psychology", which unfortunately still remains undiscovered. 
Even more complicated is the attempt to describe those who are ahead to be 
chosen to lead this psychology. 
While some theoretical approaches exist, there are very few empirical 
studies about detection of the psychological aspects of terrorism, especially in 
the case of personality traits. Basically, these studies came to unclear 
conclusions, first due to the lack of unique definition of terrorism as 
phenomena, classified research results, and then due to unavailability of 
testing subjects, especially in case of an unknown enemy. On the other hand, 
recent methodological approaches are facing with uncertain validity. 
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This paper will attempt to answer the question whether there is a 
personality profile typical to terrorists, whether there are differences among 
leaders and followers, and what are the possible ways of measurement. The 
findings will be used to improve the psychological contra-terrorism strategy, 
with the main goal to upgrade the practical psychology knowledge in the 
security forces, responsible for dealing with this phenomenon, by setting 
global terms aimed at detection of offenders before making a decision to 
perform such an offence.  
Key words: personality, terrorist leader, terrorism, measuring 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature abounds with confusion in the question of defining 
terrorism. Studies have found more than 200 definitions and no one is 
universally agreed or totally accepted. The dilemma is in the side of labeling 
or "one person's terrorists is another person's freedom fighters". One of the 
definitions describes it as a strategic political and primarily a rational vehicle 
of achieving political goals, the reasons from which terrorists attract public 
attention as the main motive, by inducing fear and terror (Norris, et al., 2013). 
The identification of terrorist events is not a simple task, which requires clear 
indicators for attempts to clarify the range of issues that arise. Hudson defines 
the terrorist acts as planned application of unexpected, shocking and illegal 
violence against non-combat personnel and other symbolic targets prepared 
by clandestine members of sub-national groups or clandestine agents for the 
psychological purpose – publicizing political or religious cause and / or 
intimidating or coercing a government or civilian population into accepting 
demands that determine the cause (Hudson, 1999 pp. 12). Richardson notes 
seven characteristics that any act should possess to be considered as a terrorist: 
to be politically inspired, to contain violence or the threat of it, to send a 
message, the act and the victim to have a symbolic meaning, to be conducted 
by certain sub-groups within the state, the victim should be distinguished from 
the audience for which the act or message is intended, and civilians to be 
deliberately targeted (Richardson, 2006). The perpetrators of the acts in their 
homelands can be characterized as freedom fighters and heroes, i.e. the acts 
are performed for some and on specific way assigned, well thought ideology, 
led by a terrorist leader in well organized groups against clearly defined 
negative reference groups and with the purpose of "revolution" against the 
"perceived" unjust state or leading party. The dominant aim differs across four 
historical periods (Dean, 2007). 
It is considered that the nature of terrorism is fundamentally 
psychological, but more socially than individually oriented. Despite political 
scientists and sociologists dealing with political and social contexts in which 
the terrorist groups exist, there are few psychologists who study terrorism by 
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the characteristics of individual terrorists and the terrorist groups, the process 
of recruitment and acceptance of terrorist ideologies, personality, beliefs, 
attitudes, motives, their development as an individual process, behavior, etc, 
trying to answer the questions why someone decides to become a terrorist, 
which are the specifics that tell terrorists from non-terrorists, which are the 
predictors for terrorism, which are the reasons for leaving the organization, 
and so on. 
This paper will focus on the terrorist personality, in an attempt to 
determine the specific personality dimensions or traits as relatively permanent 
dispositions that largely determine the behavior, given the existence of a 
certain degree of genetic structure (Hall, Gardner, 1970), that are reinforced 
by specific family, social, economic, and political development context and 
the ability for measuring, taking into account the specifics of this phenomena. 
 
TERRORIST PERSONALITY 
The literature suggests several conducted trials to determine the 
personality traits that distinguish active terrorists from non-terrorists, but such 
a distinction is not empirically confirmed. While the existence of some latent 
dimensions that contribute to decision on accession to violence is proved, a 
specific set of traits which contribute to choose terrorist behavior option is not 
defined. On the other hand, it is known that the personality traits alone are not 
the best predictors of one's behavior. In short, the science empirical has not 
confirmed any universal terrorist personality profile (Borum, 2004). 
The first researches were focused on the hypothesis that terrorism is 
the result of pathology or psychopathic personality structure. These 
assumptions derive from the monstrous way of conducting terrorist acts, 
which seems associated with a lack of empathy, antisocial and irresponsible 
behavior, sadism, etc., but on the other hand clear indicators are determined 
that deny this hypothesis (Horgan, 2003). Other researches confirms the lack 
of abnormality in terrorists, even its lower existence than in all other 
populations, while the violent behavior is explained by the impact of specific 
situational factors (Silke, 1998). In short, it was determined that the terrorists 
are characterized with "normality". The positive psychological qualities of 
terrorists are equated with most of the main characteristics that describe secret 
police officers, state secret agents, organized crime operatives, witnesses 
protection program client and other people who live their lives in shadow, 
which requires coping with the pressure of the underground or double life, 
disrupting of the normal life needs’ gratification, to remain confidential and 
loyal to the group ideology in enduring prison, interrogation, torture, great 
financial rewards deceptions, and even sacrifice their lives (Miller, 2006). This 
is confirmed by the Post, which explains terrorists like action-oriented, 
aggressive, stimulus-hungry and seek excitement, that largely overlap with the 
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feature of members of the military, security, and emergency services, which 
selection criteria are the highest, indicating high personality qualities (Walter, 
1990). O'Balance however, lists several characteristics that a "successful" 
terrorist or one that is not caught by the law enforcement must possess: 
commitment to the organization and its leader, perseverance and sacrifice; 
personal courage, taking into account the possibility of death, injury, torture 
or imprisonment; without emotions of pity and remorse - killings carried out 
on innocent victims, cold blood, without anger; fairly high intelligence - the 
abilities for information management, planning and avoiding security forces; 
with a high level of sophistication, education and knowledge in general. As 
high standards they do not apply to everyone, but to the leaders, planners, 
couriers, liaison officers and activists, who in turn are the base of the 
organization (Combs, 2013). 
However, it was determined that the terrorists are somehow 
psychologically "different" or "special", but not "abnormal", although the 
pathology is considered as an inevitable consequence of such activities. 
According to several authors, three main hypotheses for explaining the reasons 
for violent terrorist behavior are distinguished, in which certain dimensions 
take place: 
 Frustration - aggression - it is the result of dissatisfaction with the 
system and frustration of being unable to realize specific political, 
economic, or personal goals. Specifically, it is explained as minority 
groups’ movement against social and political conflicts that is not 
necessarily accompanied by violence - the result of real or imagined 
injustice, marginalized status and aggressive response to the failure in 
resolving their grievances. 
 Narcissism - aggression - the reasons are seen in narcissism as a way 
of making relationships with the environment, which occurs through 
appropriate ego reinforcement, satisfaction or compensation, as intra-
psychic regulatory tool which the person uses as an ego-protection. 
Thus, if the psychological form of "idealized parental ego" is not 
neutralized by reality testing, it may be a condition for narcissistic 
defeat and it can lead to reactions of anger in desire to destroy the 
source of narcissistic injury. 
 Psychodynamic profiles and negative identity – in basis are 
unconscious motives as a result of Freud's unresolved conflicts from 
childhood - Edipus and Electra complexes, which contribute to fight 
against authority; or Erickson’s acceptance of negative identity in the 
event of failure in resolving development crises in childhood and the 
ideology of the terrorist group becomes the protector of his identity 
(Hudson, 1999, Horgan, 2003). 
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Post suggests a special logic on which terrorists act, which does not 
mean they resonate logically, but that logic forces them to choose terrorism 
from all options and afterwards to justify violent act. He considers that the 
achieved uniformity is due to the disproportionate presence of the defense 
mechanisms "outsourcing" and "splitting" on terrorists, which is a result of 
identity search and damaged ego and explains the impressive strike and need 
for external enemy, with the motto “they, not we, are the cause of the problem" 
(Walter, 1990). 
Other authors, however, talk about the vulnerability factors as sources 
of motivation or mechanisms of strengthening of militant ideology, which 
often occur: perceived injustice, need for identity and need for affiliation 
(Borum, 2004). But all this comes down to the attempts by clinical 
psychologists to provide an explanation for terrorism, which has no empirical 
confirmation, so the question remains open for future research. 
 
Types of terrorists 
Regardless of the poor evidence of the personality profile of the 
terrorist, many surveys confirm certain similarities or specific psychological 
characteristics, formulated in several typologies. An older classification of 
Hacker (1976) distinguishes three types of terrorists, calling for different 
profiles: 1. Crusaders - strategists of the group operation plan, most 
ideologically moved and dedicated to the reasons for the group existence; 2. 
Criminals - perform the dirty work of the group, led by aggressive and 
impulsive drives they find justified realization, as the least ideological 
dedication; 3. Crazy – they found support in the group, unstable in behavior 
and loyalty, useful for the group if they successfully channeled their mental 
illness and pathology. The typology of Strentz (1988) contains similar types: 
1. Leaders - egocentric personalities with a dose of paranoia, veiled by 
charismatic confidence and command, as background players and "brains" of 
the organization; 2. Activists - operators - with antisocial, psychopathic 
personality structure, mostly mercenary soldiers or with a long criminal 
history, derived from the imprisonment by the leaders to be prominent players 
or the "muscle" of the organization, where they can realize their violent and 
hedonistic lifestyle; 3. Idealists - disappointed, dependent young people who 
are searching for the truth and philosophy for a better world, becoming a 
faithful "servant" of the organization and victims of the leaders, with the 
routine tasks waiting to prove for difficult and dangerous operations. (Miller, 
2006) Hamden however, gives four types of terrorists with different motives 
and dominant defense mechanisms, suggesting an appropriate approach to 
negotiations: 1. Psychopaths – with narcissistic need for control, they do not 
care about the cause of the "task" or for the needs of other people but only for 
their own benefit, kill without consideration; 2. Ethnic-geographic or 
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fundamentalists (religious or political) - both with similar dynamics but for 
different reasons, passive-aggressive personality, acting as a part of the group, 
dying for the purpose is considered as an honor; they are critical to authorities, 
become angry of proposals for their performance, ask for help but do not 
respect the advice, nor confirm cooperation; 3. Retributive – without history 
of psychopathology, no membership in political or religious group, victims of 
war, crisis or terror as innocent civilians, whose homes and families are 
destroyed, suffering from PTSD, lost sense of life, the hostage is a tool for 
negotiations, without the intent to injure (Hamden, 2002). 
 
Differences leader - follower and how to identify each of them 
The organization itself has its own hierarchy and different role in each 
of the levels, which varies depending on the type and size of the group. Within 
these roles or functions, members are selected and deployed naturally, on 
which influences the personality traits as personal factors. Hierarchical levels 
include: sponsors, leaders, the executive committee (preparers of political and 
military policy), middle management (planners, recruiters, trainers, and 
suppliers), followers (foot soldiers or action perpetrators, technicians, 
researchers, errand runners, transporters, and sympathizers) and the Lone 
wolf. Roles are not so strong in the application. Padhye also states theoretical 
classification and hierarchy of leaders: 1. Self-imagined idealists - devote their 
life to a goal that they imagine as a moral need, for whom strategic victory is 
altruistic; 2. Self-imagined messianic - considers himself as a guru, with the 
destiny to take his place in history, for strategic victory equated with personal 
mastery, 3. Leaders primary driven from ethnic or religious animus, that 
override idealistic or messianic aims, and 4. Entrepreneurs – justify their 
actions by some of the previous types, but basically led by material motives 
(Victoroff, 2005). All these functions have different degrees of danger and 
importance for the security forces, and therefore their dispositions. According 
to the roles and motivations, Padhye distinguishes types as: 1. Ideologists - 
create ideology as a theoretical construct, with religious or political revolt 
against the state oppression, as an excuse for violence, mentors and leaders; 2. 
Perpetrators - indoctrinated that violence is justified; 3. Crime Syndicates - 
logistics for transportation and information gathering; 4. Opportunistic 
criminals - criminals with anti-social personality, which in the group found 
opportunities: money, fame, support; 5. State-sponsored Terrorists; 6. 
Outsourcing terrorists - hired for money; 7. Slipping cells - activated in the 
need for cover; 8. Soft supporters - support the organization and ideology 
without direct involvement (Padhye, 2013). 
Literature tries to distinguish personality of leaders vs. followers as 
behavioral profiles, which are considered to be important for their recognition. 
Leaders are described as naturally charismatic, with hypnotic capabilities, 
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external appearance, quite modest and noticeable, but come to the fore when 
speaking to groups, megalomaniacs who are perceived as superior rooted, 
identified with the great revolutionary figures, spend a lot of time alone and 
enjoy intriguing fantasy life, brought up to control anger and not to show 
emotion, they look very calm and deliberate, live a clean life without vices as 
it would not alter the organizational structure of the group at risk, keep the 
word to subordinates, military interested in which they see power, have 
unrelenting beliefs. The formula for potential terrorist leaders is the sum of 
rage, speaking skills and cunning. Followers are mostly young but also old 
women are not excluded, they feel lost and seek meaning in life, they can 
achieve high status but internally feel inadequate, feel neglected, considered 
as unconformity by themselves, they project their fantasies in the leader 
greatness for which they are magnet. (Schurman - Kauflin, 2008) 
Sullwold (1981) in his study of German terrorist leaders recognizes 
two classes of personality traits: 1. Extroverts - unstable, uninhibited, self-
interested, not emotional thrill seeker with little concern for the consequences 
of their activities, and 2. Hostile neurotics - intolerant on critics, suspicious, 
aggressive, defensive, extremely sensitive to external hostility. This is 
confirmed by the research of Ferracuti (1982) on the Italian terrorist leaders 
(Hudson, 1999), and look like the dichotomy of Miller which includes: 1. 
Narcissistic personality - dictatorial extremist cult type of leader, grandiose, 
arrogant, with no empathy for the feelings and thoughts of others, confident in 
its power to assess and infallibility in absolute truth, consider himself above 
the law and charismatic firmly incur followers, and 2. Paranoid personality - 
a second group of cult leader, which can be combined with the first, with a 
strong distrust and suspicion towards the motives and actions of others, with 
racial or religious exclusive focus and dark conspiracy line; they are 
considered as the most dangerous leaders because with the holy mission they 
justify violence towards maintaining its philosophy, strongly fixed in their 
beliefs, that at the end achieved delusions, they would easier give up of fame 
than of principles. In the group of followers are cited borderline, antisocial, 
avoiding, depending, histrionic and schizoid personality profiles, connected 
with their own roles in the hierarchy (Miller, 2006). 
 
MEASURING OF TERRORIST PERSONALITY TRAITS - 
LIMITATIONS AND VALIDITY 
Unlike the existence of some theories that explain the terrorist 
behavior, rear are empirical studies concerning terrorism from psychological 
aspects, especially defining some universal psychological profile, or 
personality traits at least. According to the analysis, as methodological 
methods the content analysis, interviews or surveys, and very rarely some 
rigour approach are commonly used. Namely, analyzes are conducted on 
 76 
records and biographies of former radicals, members of their families, 
acquaintances, friends, or supporters; interviews with these people; case 
studies of people directly involved or closely associated with extremist 
activities (MI5, 2008); analysis of the collected books, printed or web 
materials from militant extremist individuals and groups, in order to detect the 
dominant themes in the unveiling of their mind (Saucier, et al., 2009); analysis 
of the personality traits from the statements of members of the security 
services; coming to some terrorist profiles by the secret services findings; 
interviews with informant ex terrorists with changed perceptions or who were 
caught; measurement of the traits by the e-mail traffic analyzing systems, etc. 
In addition, studies of the psychological aspects of terrorism have 
unclear conclusions, fragmented content and lack of rigor, which diminished 
their validity. Problems and limitations in measuring mainly derive from: 
 absence of the unique definition of terrorism in the literature; 
 the inability for a direct contact with the perpetrators, but only with 
those caught without realizing the goals, which is not representative as 
"the successful" one; but even otherwise, the information they give for 
the security services is confidential, and those given to the very small 
number of researchers are distorted under the influence of failure and 
the condition that they are in prison during the interview. 
 the possible danger of direct involvement in the assessment of persons 
which are in some way connected to terrorism minimizes the number 
of researchers who will be addressed on such a step, refocusing on the 
secondary sources. (Canter, 2009) 
 no reliability of the researches - most of them are not empirical or not 
based on direct data, but on thoughts derived from secondary and 
tertiary sources such as biographies, letters to judges, government and 
news reports, etc., while the messages after committing the act or the 
terrorist leaders statements are part of the strategy itself. 
 the empirical psychological research loses focus on observing behavior 
of terrorists or unrelated with the questions from practitioners - there 
is a need for rigor social - behavioral research of terrorism as a process, 
to provide useful information about the psychology of counter-
terrorism. 
 heterogeneity and the ever-changing roles in terrorist activities, which 
reflects the different personalities. (Borum, 2004) 
 the complexity of the concept in need of several levels of analysis 
(individual, group, organization, government, state, society) and the 
integration of the personal traits with the context (economic, social, 
political). 
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 heterogeneity of terrorism and the inability to generalize the 
psychological findings within or outside the group, or findings of the 
same type in a different place and time – observing historical and 
biographical moments within the psychological context is 
recommended. (Horgan, 2003) 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING FOR THE PRACTICAL 
NEEDS OF SECURITY SERVICES 
In the absence of personality traits, profiling is important for the 
combat strategy, although some believe that it is not the most adequate method 
for this type of criminal activities. Given that as a concept in the literature it is 
applied in several meanings, in function of the operational security is the 
ability to determine the profile of those who are prone or plan to commit a 
terrorist act before its execution, despite the defining of the terrorist profile 
when the act is already performed. Moreover, in case of profiling terrorists 
defined as offenders against society, this process becomes maximum 
complicated (Rae, 2012). 
Profiling is most commonly applied to identify the suspect in many 
sensitive cases that occur in series, serial murder, rape, or arsons. Terrorism is 
considered as an "unusual" crime, considering a well-organized group with 
strong beliefs, who are masters of secrecy and cover-up, with the support of 
another group of people, and because most of them do not have a criminal 
history their representation in the police record is poor (Sahito, et al., 2013). 
Three main obstacles are listed, arising from: the problems with the definition 
of both of these terms; which profiling approach is used, where, when and on 
what type of terrorists should be applied; and the lack of psychological 
dysfunction in the terrorists’ biographies despite the fact that profiling is based 
on some forms of psychological disorders present in the criminal scene, so it 
loses the sense in the case of terrorism (Dean, 2007). 
Although since long time ago, often sited has been the demographic 
prototype of Russell and Miller (1977), which is described by the terrorists 
from the 70's as a composite of several characteristics that have been shown 
as dominant in percentage. So, members are young (from 22 to 25), in 80% 
are led by men, residents of metropolis, from middle-class family for the 
members and leaders, with some university education, stronger moral 
imperatives from the personal interests and extremist political philosophy (at 
that time anarchism, Marxism-Leninism and nationalism). This does not imply 
that all who enter these general terms will become terrorists or commit a 
terrorist act, or there will not be someone from outside of this description 
indicating the limitations and practicing as a general framework. The United 
States secret services in a survey of interviews with perpetrators of terrorist 
acts brought two (until then unknown) conclusions: 1. to exclude stereotypes 
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of mental illness, social isolation, or male terrorist murderers, and 2. the threat 
is not carried out by one killer (Hudson, 1999). Thus, for the practical needs 
of profiling, they made a typology of different beliefs and motives: 1. 
Crusaders - motivated by their religious or political ideologies 2. Ultra-
conservative political terrorists – they are politically right oriented, with a 
quasi militant organization, deeply convinced in individual rights, and with an 
over-repressive ultra-liberal government. 3. Political anarchists - left oriented, 
attacking the government as racist, elitist and economically oppressive, 4. 
Religious terrorists – are responsible only to God, in whose name they kill and 
give their life for place in heaven, 5. Criminals - perform acts for personal gain 
rather than for ideology and reason (Miller, 2006). According to the 
dichotomy of the FBI (1970), terrorists are in an organized type of profile 
(Ressler, 1985), given that the organization plans the activities very carefully 
through several stages. On the other hand, in a lack of personality profile and 
pathology absence, security services use pathological personality types during 
interrogation strategies, taking into account their weaknesses (Sahito, et al., 
2013). The three above-mentioned philosophies are representatives of three 
(until then) terrorist waves as historical phases ("Anarchist" 1880 - 1920, 
"Anti-colonial" 1920 - 1960 and the "New-Left" wave 1960 - 1990), which do 
not include the last one, which has been active since 1979 - Religious wave, 
with terrorism which is based on religious grounds. This indicates the 
necessity to spread the focus of profiling on the terrorism as a process in which 
the terrorist exists as an individual, which includes a context that shapes the 
beliefs and values of the individual, where the resulting profile gets its 
meaning. This process is moving in a closed circle with more stages in three 
levels, starting with "perceived" injustice in the macro context as the main 
driver, which can be solved only with violence and is justified in that way; it 
continues in a quiet process of "identification" and "intensification" in a micro-
psychological context as a system of beliefs and ends in a process of beliefs, 
radicalization and making decision to join the terrorists, in a group organized 
network as an intermediate context systematically managed by some 
charismatic leader (Dean, 2007). 
All this calls for an analysis of the question why and how someone 
becomes a terrorist and points out that personality traits are even not detected 
as a single set, but are only one piece of the puzzle and cannot be good 
predictors by themselves; this does not mean that their knowledge will not be 
beneficial for a more successful dealing with this phenomenon, but indicates 
that the process of "change" does not happen under the influence of those 
"responsible" for recruitment, but may be initiated before, in the particular 
group of individuals from all the others that at the same time and place take 
part of the same system and state, besides the part where the process starts 
initiated by the terrorist group and passes the same stages, considering that it 
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is a circular process. The issue of the terrorist’s personality is towards 
determining those traits that are more likely, within the equalized contextual 
factors, to lead to a decision or a process of "identification" as a crucial stage, 
where scientific validation and verification have a range of barriers. Therefore, 
what is emphasized at this moment is the detection of vulnerability factors for 
the particular group. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The statements about the existence of a specific terrorist personality 
profile are based on unstable empirical, theoretical, and conceptual 
foundations. Although some specifics are determinate, they are not 
empirically validated personality traits that distinguish terrorists from non-
terrorists. However, no pathology existence is confirmed and universal 
terrorist personality profile is not found. The last comes from a variety of roles 
within the organization that change in the space and time. However some 
uniformity is determined; this is basically psychological. In the absence of 
empirical evidence, security services use the profiling method, whose 
reliability is questionable due to the lack of pathology. Application of a 
combined method is recommended, with consideration of the personality 
within the contextual factors or consideration of terrorists as a "process" rather 
like a "person", with an emphasis on the interaction between the person and 
the situation. Within that, a more rigor research methods with socio-behavioral 
approach are recommended to be applied. 
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Abstract 
A prison is an establishment controlled by the state in which inmates 
are forcibly confined and some of their rights are restricted with a legal court 
decision. But although the prison sentence is a type of punishment, the main 
purpose of imprisonment is not to punish the person for the crime that he / she 
committed. The main purpose of the prison sentence is to re-educate the 
prisoner, to make them understand the essence and the consequences of their 
act, and with a broad range of re-socialization measures to prepare them for 
returning in the social community, but as a completely changed and better 
person. To achieve that, the state organs have to apply many standards 
provided by the international organizations and conventions and also to apply 
the conditions prescribed in the national legislation. That minimal standard 
refers to the health care of the inmates, appropriate material conditions, 
sufficient size of cellular accommodation with high hygiene, adequate access 
to natural light and a purposeful regime for prisoners which will not be treated 
like the last stain in the society, but as equal human beings.  
Regardless to that, this paper attempts to show, through comprehensive 
analysis, whether the Republic of Macedonia strives to provide the best 
practices that are required by all legal regulations that refer to this matter. 
According to that, the focus of this paper is placed on the following questions: 
whether the conditions in the Macedonian prisons satisfy the minimum 
prescribed standards and whether the situation in the Macedonian prisons 
enables successful resettlement and rehabilitation of prisoners, or lead to their 
degradation and thus to increase the rate of recidivism? To give answers to the 
researched questions, this paper analyzes the national legislation, the relevant 
literature and the relevant international acts, reports, and proposals. 
Key words: prison, inmates, re-socialization, recidivism 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since ancient times, the theory was met with great controversies about 
the purpose of punishment. Many theorists have not been able to agree on their 
views. Therefore, we have witnessed several theories about the purpose of 
punishment. Most inhumane and oppressive is the absolute theory. As Kralev 
said, the purpose of punishment under the absolute theories is "fair revenge, 
retribution, or repression"1. That means that the prison is a goal for itself. From 
the experience of the countries where this theory was active, we can conclude 
that this goal is wrong. It is clear that evil and revenge is the essence of the 
sentence, but simply punishing the perpetrators without putting emphasize on 
their re-socialization and re-education, means only one thing, that the sentence 
has no goal. From the other side, according to the relative theories, a prison 
sentence is a kind of preventive measure, an instrument for protection of the 
society from the perpetrators. The point of this theory is to put the prison 
sentence in function of some utilitarian goals - protection from violation of the 
law. Within the relative theories are the theories of special and general 
prevention aimed to re-raise the offender in order to do not sin again, i.e. to 
affect educationally on all citizens to refrain from performing offenses. 
As a result of the unilateralism of both theories arose a third, mixed 
theory that is an eclectic set of affirmative notes contained in both previously 
mentioned theories. The mixed theory is widely accepted and in its substance 
coexist the retribution and prevention. According to Article 32 of the 
Macedonian Criminal Code “Besides the realization of justice, the aim of 
punishment is: 
1) to prevent the offender from committing crimes and their correction 
2) educational influence on others not to commit crimes.”2 
The first aim refers to re-socialization of the offender but we can 
conclude that the Macedonian legislator acknowledged both forms of 
prevention: special and general. The exercise of prevention measures depends 
on different factors. Of particular importance for the successful re-
socialization and rehabilitation, are the conditions in which people deprived 
of their freedom pursuing prison sentence. Whether they are appropriate or 
not, we will see below. 
 
THE FAIR IMAGE OF MACEDONIAN PRISONS  
 
“It is said that no one truly knows a nation 
until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not 
                                                 
1 Todor Kralev. Prison and re-socialization, (Studentski Zbor, Skopje, 2001), p. 45 
2 Macedonian Criminal Code Article 32 
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be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its 
lowest ones.”  
Nelson Mandela 
 
In the Republic of Macedonia there are eleven penitentiary institutions. 
Macedonian Ombudsman, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(Committee) and some other relevant national and international organizations 
for more than a decade periodically visit the Macedonian penitentiary. From 
their annual reports, we can see that the conditions in our prisons are far from 
satisfactory and they are hardly leading to re-socialize. Successful re-
socialization requires exercising of the principle of individualization of the 
convicted person and taking treatment that suits their personal characteristics. 
As Kralev noticed, it is not enough just to accept the concept of re-
socialization, it is necessary to make efforts to create conditions for its revival 
and realization.3 It is hard to achieve re-socialization in overcrowded prisons 
with a lack of prison staff and a lack of will among the few responsible for 
monitoring and realization of the re-socialization process. According to the 
latest annual report of Macedonian Ombudsman, “still accommodation 
conditions in most institutions are under the prescribed standards, and as in 
the previous years, once again the biggest problem is overcrowding, the 
frequent conflicts between inmates, as well as insufficient and inadequate 
health care”4. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (USA) came 
to similar conclusions - that Macedonian prisons failed to meet international 
standards. As they said “Problems included overcrowding, violence among 
prisoners, intimidation from guards, violence by staff, dilapidated and 
unhygienic conditions, lack of educational and recreational opportunities for 
juveniles, and some reports of sexual abuse of female prisoners”5. Neither of 
the Committee reports we can obtain a different picture. The last published 
report says “the conditions in much of the prison have deteriorated since the 
2010 visit and in certain units could be described as amounting to inhuman 
and degrading treatment”6. The reasons lie in the inadequate living conditions 
in prisons, bad food, poor hygiene and a lack of the heating system in winter 
conditions. The most common excuse of the national authorities is the lack of 
funds, but the European Prison Rules require that "prison conditions that 
                                                 
3 Todor Kralev. Prison and re-socialization, (Studentski Zbor, Skopje, 2001), p. 45 
4 Ombudsman, Annual report on the level of security, respect, promotion and protection of 
human rights and freedoms in 2013 (Skopje, 2014), p. 61 
5 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 
Macedonia 2013 Human Rights Report 
6 Council of Europe, Reports to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, after the visit 
conducted by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. (Strasbourg, 2012),  p. 15 
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infringe human rights cannot be justified by a lack of resources"7. With a 
sweeping reform of the prison system, some things have changed for the 
better, but we are still far from achieving the European standards. In their 
report “the CPT expressed its concern that the recently renovated semi-open 
unit would not be able to withstand the pressure of accommodating more than 
100 prisoners in such a confined space, especially given that much of the 
fittings and furnishings appeared rather fragile”8. In this respect we can hardly 
say that Macedonia fulfills the European standards. According to the European 
Prison Rules, the accommodation provided for prisoners, and in particular all 
sleeping facilities, shall respect human dignity and, as far as possible, privacy, 
and meet the requirements of health and hygiene9. Therefore, contemporary 
penological thought that the enforcement of criminal sanctions, especially of 
prison, based on humanity, respect for the dignity of the person and the 
elevation of the personal liability of the defendant, seeks in mentioned 
execution to eliminate, limit and reduce repression in higher level.10 
If we analyze the official reports we can conclude that we are still far 
from achieving that goal. Sleeping on the floor, in the hallways, and sometimes 
“18 persons in a dormitory of 40m²”11 is far from dignified. Maybe the biggest 
obstacle for enjoyment of the benefits of the reforms is the lack of attention 
and care by the prison management and staff. It is concerning that they are 
allowing recently renovated areas to deteriorate. This means that investment 
in building new prison accommodation will not in itself guarantee appropriate 
living conditions on long term. In regard of the poor care for new 
accommodation in the Macedonian prisons we must mention the quite new 
prison in Kumanovo. It was build in September 2013, but one year later, the 
first complaints from inmates arrived. As we can see from the report of 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights “in prison it often happens that there 
is no water for two or three days and they do not have hot water at all”12. 
Inmates say that prison is equipped with hall for religious rituals, classroom, 
and library and other rooms for relaxation but for some reason they are 
dysfunctional. In October 2014, the Helsinki Committee received a worrisome 
complain from inmates in Kumanovo prison about the drinking water. 
Allegedly, the water had strange color and some unknown materiel inside, so 
                                                 
7 European Prison Rules, Part I, Article 4 
8 Ibid. 
9 Marie Crétenot. From national practices to European guidelines: interesting incentives in 
the prison management (European Prison Observatory), p. 10 
10 M. Tкачевский. Советское исправительно-трудовое право. (Москва, 1971), p. 45 
11 Marie Crétenot. From national practices to European guidelines: interesting incentives in 
prison management (European Prison Observatory). p. 35 
12 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Monthly report on human rights in the Republic of 
Macedonia (Skopje 2014), p. 8 
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the Committee took a sample and sent it to further analyses. After the 
laboratory testing commissioned by the Committee, the Institute of Public 
Health of the Republic of Macedonia reported that “The tested sample of raw 
water is NOT LIABLE to the legal and professional regulations for 
bacteriological analysis because of the increased total number of bacteria”13. 
From the report it is clear that the water was fecal contaminated, there were 
indications of Escherichia coli and it was not safe for consumption by humans. 
This is not only inhuman and degrading, but the sloppiness of the prison and 
state institutions indicates on the possible violation of the criminal law in terms 
of the spread of infectious diseases. 
As for the opportunities for recreation and sports activities, the 
Ombudsman concluded that “inmates do not have enough opportunities for 
recreational activities”14. The main reason for these situation is the lack of 
equipment and indolent of the officials to organize additional activities. With 
the exception of certain prison (e.g. Stip CPA) in most of the Macedonian 
prisons there is no space for sport and recreation of the convicts. In some 
prisons there is no proper equipment, and where there is, for some reason it is 
not in use. This policy is not helping in re-socialization of the inmates but it is 
also violation of the law according to which “institutions must provide 
conditions for organization and development of sport, recreation and other 
leisure activities, important for maintenance of physical and mental health of 
the inmates”15. 
Also, the state must provide the prisoners with at least 2 hours daily 
walk in the open air, which in our country is rarely respected. The 
pronunciation of the Macedonian government is a lack of a sufficient number 
of staff, so prisoners often receive only 15 to 20 minutes per day. It certainly 
cannot “allow all prisoners to spend as many hours a day outside their cells as 
necessary for an adequate level of human and social interaction”16. Also, the 
re-socialization program should include work engagement of the prisoners, 
but as the former manager of Idrizovo prison said: “We believe that work in 
prison is a basic form of re-socialization, but we cannot provide it for everyone 
                                                 
13 Institute of Public Health of the Republic of Macedonia, Report of laboratory testing 
(Skopje, 2014) 
http://www.mhc.org.mk/system/uploads/redactor_assets/documents/829/Izvestaj_od_testiran
je_7404.pdf, accessed on February 15, 2015 
14 Ombudsman. Information of the situation on respect and protection of the rights of 
prisoners and detainees (Skopje, 2009), p. 6 
15 Law on Execution of Sanctions, (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 2 , 
09.01.2006) Article 138 
16 Marie Crétenot. From national practices to European guidelines: interesting incentives in 
the prison management (European Prison Observatory), p. 12 
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because we are lack of security for prisoners”17. This remark points to the 
problem of lack of prison officers who should guide the process of re-
socialization. Another significant problem is that most employees in the re-
socialization sectors have a relatively low level of knowledge of the processes 
of re- socialization. 
 
Chart 1: Level of knowledge of employees in the re- socialization sector 
 
Source: Analyses of the results of verification of the knowledge of staff in the penitentiary 
and correctional facilities, Ministry of Justice - Department for enforcement of sanctions 
 
From the chart below we can see the level of knowledge about 
legislation and professional knowledge of the employees in the re-
socialization sector in the penitentiary and correctional facilities in the 
Republic of Macedonia. The situation is worst in Idrizovo, the prison with 
largest number of prisoners whose re-socialization requires highly qualified 
staff. The data proves the fact that initial training is required for at least half 
employees in the re-socialization sector in the Macedonian prisons. According 
to Radovanovic "complementarity and complexity of the process of re-
socialization implies to the need for involvement of different professional 
profiles”.18 Unfortunately, the situation is such that most of the prison officers 
in Macedonia are unskilled and it seems that they do not want to change their 
bad habits. To this indicate the reports of the Committee and the Ombudsman 
of the Republic of Macedonia, which claim that in the Macedonian prisons 
torture is present and that officers often use excessive physical force.19 It is 
obvious that the problem is very serious and requires deep analysis and radical 
changes. Perhaps the most important and the most difficult to change is the 
attitude of those responsible for law enforcement who think and act 
repressively. They need to realize that pure repression does not bring 
solutions; on the contrary, it leads to degradation and increase the problem that 
                                                 
17 http://fellowship.birn.eu.com/en/fellowship-programme/topic (accessed on February 25, 
2015) 
18 Dobrivoje Radovanovic., Man and prison. (Belgrade, 1992), p. 9 
19 See more Ombudsman annual reports (from 2000 to 2013), CPT reports 
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has existed since distant times. Therefore, when we cannot learn from our it is 
better to learn from the positive experiences of countries that have the biggest 
success in resocialization. While Macedonian officer sees the prisoner as a 
stain in the society, guards in Norwegian prisons see the potential in each of 
them. In one such example, a prison officer in a Norwegian prison said: “There 
is so much to learn about the people who come to prison. We need to try to 
understand how they became criminals, and then help them to change.20” This 
should become a motto, a guiding idea to those who create and implement the 
prison system. 
 
HOW PRISON CONDITIONS AFFECT THE RATE OF 
RECIDIVISM?  
 
The most important indicator of the success of the process of re-
socialization in one country is the rate of penological recidivism. 
 
Chart 2: Display of the number of recidivists and primary convicts in 
penitentiary 
 
Source: Strategy for resocialization and social adaptation of convicted entities serving a 
prison sentence from 2010 to 2012 
 
The great number of recidivists is an “indicator that the existing regular 
and special measures applied in the process of re-socialization and social 
adaptation of inmates does not achieve the desired goal”21. It is clear that the 
major impact of the high rate of recidivism has a poor social reaction for 
former prisoners. When a person comes out of prison they face with rejection 
and isolation from their family and the wider community. They are rejected, 
can hardly find a job and there is no state institution that maintains relations 
with the former prisoners and helps them in their reintegration process. But 
beside that, “the penology analysis of recidivism speaks about two possible 
                                                 
20 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-like-
people (accessed on February 25, 2015) 
21 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Department for enforcement of sanctions. Strategy for 
resocialization and social adaptation of convicted entities serving a prison sentence from 
2010 to 2012, p. 13 
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1236
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types of causative factors, inadequate social reaction - inappropriate choice of 
sanction or the inadequate treatment and unsuccessful process of re-
socialization, i.e. the inadequate treatment in a penal correction facility in 
which the sentence is served”22. Andrew Nielsen, an assistant manager at the 
"Howard League for Penal Reform" in London, describes prisons generally as 
"universities of crime" that cost a lot of money and have little or no success in 
rehabilitating inmates23. 
Macedonian state authorities revealed that around 60% of the prison 
inmates had been to prison more than once. This means that if tomorrow, the 
state organs release all the prisoners from prison, more than a half of them will 
conduct some criminal act. This indicates that the prison sentence does not 
achieve its main goal. Thus, we conclude that Macedonia in this regard is not 
very far from the United States, the state with highest recidivism rates in the 
world (around 76%). 
The appropriate treatment of prisoners and re-socialization programs 
contribute to reducing the rate of recidivism. The overcrowded prisons and the 
strict prison regime reduce the chance of re-socialization. Overcrowding in 
prisons disables the realization of rehabilitation programs. In such conditions 
it is impossible to provide work for all prisoners who want to fill their free 
time with work engagement. Thus they are in a position not to do anything, 
but just to fill their time with depression, boredom and stress. All of this goes 
to the recidivism. Economists Chen and Shapiro studied how harsh prison 
conditions go in favor of recidivism. The results of their study showed that 
among prisoners serving a prison sentence in more lax conditions rate of 
recidivism is from 10 to 15 percent, while in those with more severe conditions 
recidivism goes up to 42%. Chen says “our estimates suggest that harsher 
prison conditions lead to more post-release crime”24. 
The experience of the Nordic countries, including Norway confirms 
this fact. Unlike the Macedonian, Norway’s criminal justice system focuses 
on rehabilitating prisoners rather than punish them. Norwegian prison system 
                                                 
22 Milo Boskovic., Criminology (University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Novi Sad, 2006), p. 512 
23http://fellowship.birn.eu.com/en/fellowship-programme/topic-2%C3%A5aa%C3%A5-
tabboo-
%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8
%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%BD%D0%B0-
%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0-
%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B0%
D1%82-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%B0%D1%82-
%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B4-
%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BA%D0%B8 (accessed on February 
25, 2015) 
24 Chen, M. Keith, and Jesse M. Shapiro. Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? 
A Discontinuity-based Approach (American Law and Economic Review, June 2007), p. 1 
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starts from the fact that prisoners are human beings and being punished by 
sending in prison does not mean that they should be kept in unbearable 
conditions that maximize their suffering. The very fact that they are losing 
their freedom is a sufficient punishment. If the guards treat prisoners like 
animals they are likely to behave like animals. This points to the fact that 
prison conditions determine recidivism of prisoners. If we deprive them of the 
benefits that are guaranteed by national and international legal acts, we will 
not influence over their re-socialization. If we leave them to reside in 
degrading and humiliating conditions, we will not make a better person from 
them. On the contrary, without taking measures in order to improve prison 
conditions, prisons are converted into schools of crime. So, not only that 
inmates will not be re-educated, but very likely some of them will advance 
their criminal craft with the new skills learned in prison. Towards that comes 
the attitude of Murton and Selke who “argue that poor prison conditions have 
a dehumanizing effect on inmates, arousing greater bitterness and hostility 
towards society, which manifest themselves as increased rates or severity of 
deviant behavior upon their release from prison.”25 
According to Kralev “the prison staff is obliged to adhere to the 
principles of humanity in dealing with prisoners and respect for their dignity 
and legality in repression.”26 And because of the inhuman treatment, prisoners 
become angry not only towards prison and its officers, but for the whole 
community, which allowed them to be affected by such injustice. And it is 
injustice because as Wilson said: “In the law, being sent to prison is nothing 
to do with putting you in a terrible prison to make you suffer”27. Removing 
people's freedom should be enough of a punishment. Therefore, in the 
Norwegian prisons, cells are equipped with TVs, computers, integrated 
showers, etc. Anyone can perform any work within the prison and they are 
offered further education, participation in various trainings as well as building 
skills programs. Opponents of the regime which pleases the prisoners will 
probably ask where the justice for the victim is. But as the psychologist 
Nielsen once said: “For the victim, the offender is in prison. That is justice. 
Here I give prisoners respect; this way we teach them to respect others. But 
we are watching them all the time. It is important that when they are released 
they are less likely to commit another crime. That is justice for the society”28. 
 
                                                 
25 Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt and Ellen Shustorovich. “Prison Conditions, Capital 
Punishment, and Deterrence” American Law and Economics Review V5 N2 (2003): 320 
26 Todor Kralev. Prison, (Studentski Zbor, Skopje, 2001), p. 166 
27 http://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful-2014-12 
(accessed on February 25, 2015) 
28 http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/feb/25/norwegian-prison-inmates-treated-like-
people (accessed on February 25, 2015) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the Macedonian penitentiary system, prison sentence has 3 goals, 
realization of justice, special prevention and general prevention. In the 
national legislation there is also a provided re-socialization program which is 
supposed to reduce the harmful effects of incarceration and to prepare inmates 
for an honest life in freedom. But although some standards are incriminated, 
there is still a lack of full implementation. Unfortunately, the general 
conclusion of the Macedonian Ombudsman is that in most penitentiary 
institutions in Macedonia, conditions are below the level of human dignity. 
Real picture of most penitentiary institutions is in contrary to the penological 
standards for the contemporary living conditions, proper hygienic conditions 
and protection of the health of prisoners. Although there is a progress in the 
recent years, it seems that there are still huge gaps in the implementation 
process that need to be tackled soon. 
The inhumane prison conditions and the unsuccessful process of re-
socialization lead to a high rate of recidivism, which further deepens the 
problems with the prison system. Perhaps we are not the worst on that issue, 
but we are certainly far from the best. Norway prisons may resemble some 3 
star hotels and the cells are more beautiful than the Macedonian student dorms, 
but only 17 to 20% of the prisoners in Norway return back to prison after being 
released. This makes Norway a country with the lowest rate of recidivism and 
indicates that the conditions in the prisons and the various job opportunities, 
education, trainings, etc. are prerequisites for successful re-socialization. 
Comparison with them does not mean that we should transform our prisons 
into hotel rooms (if we consider the Macedonian standard it is almost 
impossible), but of course it means to improve conditions in them, to expand 
capacity, to provide conditions for work engagement, education, and 
appropriate treatment, and to renovate the ruined cells that look like penal 
colonies of the past. This will reduce the rate of recidivism and create honest 
citizens, because if we trust the analysis, “strict incarceration actually 
increases the offender recidivism, while facilities that incorporate cognitive-
behavioral programs are the most effective at keeping ex-cons out of jail.”29 
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Abstract 
Citizens must have the capacity to trust their representing 
organizations, whereas governing institutions ought to give the security and 
the services that citizens need. At the point when corruption is widespread, 
there can be no trust, and security and services additionally suffer. Corruption 
has a tendency to be endemic and most inconvenient in countries that are 
transitioning from one form of administration to other or have become fragile 
from violent conflict. Trying to root it out too abruptly may lead to more 
violence and instability. Of course, if corruption is permitted to rot in those 
social orders, solid and viable administration can be hard to build and social 
and monetary improvement will be hindered. Concerning the effect of 
corruption on peacebuilding, practitioners wrestle with making troublesome 
decisions on when and where to tolerate corruption. As nations experiencing 
significant change battle with stability, the ties among corruption, governance 
and peaceful improvement have come into core interest. Developing 
comprehension of fragile states and these binds have prompted some new 
thoughts and methodologies in how outsiders can or should offer assistance. 
These approaches span from helping to establish good governance to 
incorporating the power of civic involvement into their work. However, 
application of these ideas and approaches continue to be challenging in as 
many ways as there are complex conflicts and fragile states. Peace developers-
foreign and domestic; people, associations, and governments - have essential 
parts to play in tending to corruption and securing good governance to avert 
conflict and fortify local and global security. One of the key factors in 
corruption control is the citizen’s support. This paper contributes to deeper 
understanding of the current issues regarding this question as well as 
encourages innovation and involvement. This paper will cover the issues of 
citizen participation in the process of corruption, how they can get involved in 
this process and the ways through which one can maximize their impact. The 
paper is divided into three parts - introduction, a theoretical part which deals 
with selected issues and conclusion summarizing the results. In the theoretical 
part, first, are identified the mechanisms through which the citizen’s support 
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can be strengthened. Then the areas in which they display their influence are 
reviewed. The final part is investigating the way their influence can be 
increased, as well as the limitations that exist in this process. Also, attention 
is given to the education of the citizens regarding to what message and through 
which sources should be sent to the public so that they could join in the anti – 
corruption battle. 
Keywords: corruption, conflict, governance, anti – corruption 
principle, citizen action 
 
INTRODUCTION  
What is corruption 
 
Practically everybody who studies the idea of corruption would concur 
that it is hard to characterize and almost as difficult to quantify it. Corruption 
exists at a wide range of levels. Furthermore, some would contend that the 
definition for what is corruption is incomprehensible in light of the fact that it 
is an idea that is socially decided and differs starting with one general public 
then onto the next. Corruption is generally seen as unethical practice and is 
progressively denounced as far and wide as possible. Corruption creates a 
system where money and connection determine who has access to public 
services and who receives favorable treatment. With the end goal of this paper, 
corruption includes the abuse of force by the individuals who hold it—
individuals who, in their position of authority, misuse the force with which 
they are endowed by looking for private increase.  
The international community has been giving careful consideration to 
corruption and how to control it. Not only can corruption keep nations in 
cycles of brutality by subsidizing outfitted gatherings and criminal systems, 
but it can likewise prevent the advancement of effective institutions and 
governance. There are numerous financial and social expenses connected with 
the corruption processes, and also connections to criminal operations and 
roughness. Taking into account the overall financial information, the World 
Bank (2004) assessed that the measure of cash paid in bribes globally was 
some $1 trillion. 
To some degree as a result of how it influences the access to public 
services, corruption especially affects poor people, “It siphons off scarce 
resources and diminishes a country’s prospects for development. In a country 
where corruption is endemic, the consequences are disproportionately borne 
by the poor who have no resources to compete with those able and willing to 
pay bribes. In the end, corruption tightens the shackles of poverty on countries 
that can least afford it, on societies that need every dollar to pay for important 
social and economic programs", demonstrates the UN Development Program 
(2004, 3). An alternate societal expense is that corruption is connected to the 
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improvement of organized crime, including the association of criminal 
syndicates in government evasion and trafficking in individuals and drugs.  
At last, corruption has links to conflict. Despite the fact that corruption 
is not liable to be the main variable in charge of the destabilization of a nation, 
it can have a noteworthy effect on undermining the legislature and open trust 
in representing organizations which, thusly, can turn into a driver of 
contention. The connections between corruption, governance, and conflict are 
perplexing and interrelated, and they are a reality in numerous nations. 
 
Where is corruption generally predominant?  
 
Transparency international – the worldwide coalition against crime 
yearly distributes a rundown with corruption recognition lists that measure the 
apparent levels of public sector corruption. More than two-thirds of the 
nation’s score beneath 50, on a scale from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (clean). The 
2014th file incorporated 175 nations, from which the most noteworthy scores 
fit in with Somalia, North Korea, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Iraq (TI, 
2014).  
Corruption has a tendency to be more pervasive in absolutist 
frameworks (where one individual tenets with boundless power), or 
oligarchies (rule by a small group of elites). The least corrupted nations, with 
a couple of exemptions, all happen to be democracies. While democracies 
derive their legitimacy and popular support through competitive elections and 
the rule of law, autocracies depend on the support of a small group of political 
and social elites, the military, the bureaucracy and the secret police. 
Corruption exists in all social orders and some would contend that you can 
minimize it, but never eliminate it anywhere. Despite this, a democratic system 
of government has some built-in mechanisms that keep corruption in check.  
In any case, even when a state has free and fair elections and calls itself a 
democracy, it may even now be rising up out of conflict, transitioning from 
authoritarian rule, or be guided by loyalties to one's own clan, tribe or interest 
group.  A state might likewise have a political society that fits corruption 
practices. 
 
Can citizens have any kind of effect?  
  
There is a wide range of organizations and laws that can be placed to 
battle corruption, yet the absolute most powerful projects happen at little 
scales. Citizens’ campaigns at local level can standout amongst the best 
approaches to battle corruption. Activities that give journalists and citizens 
more access to government data is especially vital to guarantee 
straightforwardness. Citizens can help from various perspectives: by 
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presenting anti-corruption strategies into the social dialog and creating 
corruption free business environment, by mobilizing the trade union’s 
collective voice and bargaining power against corruption, by informing 
themselves about the rule of law and what their Government has pledged to 
do to fight corruption, by reporting incidents of corruption to authorities, by 
refusing to pay or accept bribes, facilitation fees or gifts, by teaching children 
that corruption is unacceptable and so on. 
Now, after we concluded that citizens can, in fact, support in great deal 
the anti-corruption programme, we will discuss the ways in which they can 
join the fight against corruption and how to amplify their effect on this 
procedure. 
 
EXAMPLES OF MECHANISMS FOR STRENGTHENING CITIZEN 
SUPPORT IN ANTI – CORRUPTION PROCESS  
 
In numerous developing countries, the public sector is seen as far off, 
corrupt and unaccountable, prompting a crisis of legitimacy between citizens 
and the institutions that represent them. The connection between citizen voice, 
transparency and accountability has been perceived in this setting as the center 
of good governance and enhanced public sector performance.  
Therefore, assembling civic demand for controlling corruption covers 
an extensive variety of mediations aimed at involving citizens in governance 
methods and bringing policy makers closer to the individuals they represent 
with the perspective to connect "voice" and "accountability" in a significant 
way. These methodologies eventually look to expand citizens’ impact over 
policy improvement, public spending decisions and influences over policy 
development, public spending decisions, monitoring of public service 
performance and accounting for public expenditures with the view to 
demanding better public service outcomes. In doing so, mechanisms 
strengthening the demand for anti - corruption measures are intended to 
change people-particularly those from social gatherings that are customarily 
rejected from government choice making methodologies-into captivated and 
composed citizens that have the information and force to express requests and 
impact choices that specifically influence them through expanded cooperation 
in administration forms. 
Anti - corruption measures include a rich set of instruments such as 
awareness raising/ lobbying activities, organized protests, participatory 
budgeting and monitoring of public services and expenditures, citizens’ 
feedback mechanisms, capacity building initiatives, complaints mechanisms, 
etc. An extensive variety of channels can be utilized to help closer state/ 
citizens’ connections, including the media, parliaments, political gatherings 
and so forth. 
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Free press is needed to create good government. It is necessary to 
establish ways through which the media will be able to investigate and report 
on cases of corruption, and the press will provide free and accurate 
transmission of information to the people and by that will help them to freely 
and independently form an opinion about the corruption processes. 
Transparency of government techniques and public access to 
information are critical to trigger and help raise citizens’ interest in good 
governance and anti - corruption because it is impossible to mobilize for 
change without access to information. Only informed citizens can stand up for 
their rights and consider public authorities responsible for their activities and 
choices.  
Decentralization and/or devolution of public services has been 
utilized on the part of numerous nations as an approach to bring governments 
closer to the individuals and improve local governments by making them more 
accountable to ordinary individuals and by giving space for citizens’  
involvement in policy development and implementation. 
Participatory budgeting and planning constitute basic types of 
citizen engagement in decision making to guarantee more prominent 
responsibility and responsiveness of public policies. As “policies are only as 
important as the resources committed to them” (The World Bank, 2005), 
participatory budgeting courses of action guarantee that citizens' requirements 
and needs are reflected in plan assignments.  
Community participation in service delivery goes for enhancing 
technical and allocation related efficiency and advancing more prominent 
transparency and accountability of public service delivery.  
Citizens’ feedback and monitoring of public services give key 
observing information and data, empowering citizens to promote for change 
and request better public service results. Participatory monitoring mechanisms 
can take numerous structures, including citizen report cards, social audits or 
participatory expenditure tracking. 
There is deficient empirical proof of the direct effect and viability of 
anti-corruption interventions to strengthening voice and accountability in 
terms of reducing corruption. Nonetheless, there is a developing consensus 
about the capability of such mediations to control corruption and advance 
better manifestations of governance. A set of contextual analyses and 
circumstantial evidence support the supposition that such interventions may 
result in greater public accountability. The effect of specific anti-corruption 
interventions, including those reinforcing the anti–corruption reforms, is hard 
to establish because of the methodological difficulties included in measuring 
corruption, assessing patterns over the long run and securing a direct 
connection between the development of corruption levels and the policy 
intervention that may have upheld them. Notwithstanding these different 
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imperatives and difficulties, various studies have tried to exhibit the potential 
effect of citizens on corruption control.  
 
Impacts of citizen participation on the anti – corruption programmes  
 
Just few experimental studies affirm the direct effect of citizens on 
corruption. Most studies call attention to mediators, such as increased 
participation, access to information or level of awareness, all factors that will 
ultimately affect levels of corruption. 
More frequently, intermediate changes were specified as the essential 
advantages from these interventions, incorporating growing public interest in 
anti – corruption measures, better accessibility of public information, 
expanded interest of citizens in public governance, and so forth. The World 
Bank Institute (2005) likewise affirms the different benefits of interventions 
that add to reinforce the interest for greater accountability. The overview of 
the impact accomplished by these activities underscores their role in: 
 Exposing social problems; 
 Mobilizing public opinion against corruption; 
 Prosecuting corruption cases; 
 Increasing transparency of procurement processes, development 
projects, public budgets, etc. 
 Influencing laws and policies; 
 Realizing financial and welfare gains; 
 Increasing efficiency of public services. 
 
Various case studies and evaluations affirm that there are critical 
connections between citizen engagement in governance processes and 
allocative proficiency, viability, quantity and quality of service delivery and 
improved systems of accountability, bringing about better service results and 
pro-poor targeting. 
As early as 1997, World Bank Institute economist Daniel Kaufmann 
published research demonstrating the degree to which aid - financed projects 
in developing countries are more likely to succeed in environments that 
support civil rights and liberties.  Findings demonstrate solid observational 
connections between civil liberties and the performance of government 
projects. Countries enjoying the strongest civil liberties showed an economic 
rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with weaker civil 
liberties, suggesting a potential causal link between civil liberties, increased 
citizen voice and better project performance (Kaufmann, Isham and Pritchett, 
1997). 
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Civil society support in budgeting and public expenditure management 
is rising as another enclosure for political movement and a vital road to express 
interest for change, offering new chances to consider governments responsible 
to their duties in a key area of government operations. Pioneer activities in 
different nations show the immense capability of such methodologies in 
advancing more noteworthy government effectiveness, accountability and 
responsiveness. Experience also suggests that demand side approaches can 
contribute to increase allocative efficiency and government responsiveness to 
citizen needs. 
Different case analyses further underscore that civil society support in 
public auditing lead to more noteworthy budgetary oversight, highlighting the 
correlative part of audit institutions and civil society organizations. The 
International Budget Project created in-depth case studies of six established 
budget groups who have engaged in budget analysis and advocacy for a period 
of 5-10 years to assess the impact of civil society budget work. Emerging 
findings from the case study research identify impact of budget work in two 
major categories, namely changes in budget policy and changes in budget 
process. The most significant impact achieved by independent budget groups 
lies in improving budget transparency, awareness and civil society 
engagement on the one hand and enhancing budgetary resources for existing 
programmes and improvements in their utilization on the other (Simson, 
2014).  
 
EXPANDING THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS ON THE FIGHT 
AGAINST CORRUPTION   
 
In spite of the fact that mentioned methodologies can possibly diminish 
the corruption and improve governance as exhibited above, they don't 
consequently prompt more noteworthy accountability. While numerous 
effective results can be ascribed to request side approaches in the field of anti–
corruption, their usage confronts numerous difficulties and their effect may be 
restricted by various elements, risks and pitfalls that have been identified in 
literature. The question in this regard may be less whether these strategies have 
an impact on reducing corruption than the conditions that are likely to 
maximize their effectiveness. 
 
Limits of citizens participation 
 
Voice mechanisms don't generally lead to greater accountability and 
responsiveness. Interventions aimed at reinforcing the demand side don't 
systematically create increases in responsibility and reduction of corruption. 
In a review of both writing and projects concentrated on voice mechanisms, 
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Matthew Andrews (2003) challenges the assumption that increasing the voice 
of people in general leads to greater accountability and responsiveness to 
citizens. In some cases accountability is not enhanced; in some other cases, 
accountability is enhanced but governments are called to account only to 
narrow interest groups; and in other cases, accountability is enhanced with 
governments called to account to broad constituencies. According to the 
author, the variations in accountability effect are linked to the form of voice 
expression facilitated by the new mechanism, depending on voice influence 
(the degree to which such mechanisms impact on the governance process, 
agenda and outcomes) and voice focus (whose voice is expressed through a 
given mechanism), the extent to which such instruments have an effect on the 
administration process, plan and results) and voice center (whose voice is 
communicated through a given system).  
In some cases, it is also argued that demand side interventions such as 
user committees may have a damaging effect on decentralization and 
democratic participation. They are normally supported by donor agencies, 
work in a centered territory, for example, health or education and are not 
necessarily democratically selected. They may undermine democracy based 
procedures by usurping the capacities of elected bodies and denying them of 
potential incomes. Besides, participatory components are not consequently 
inclusive and demand side methodologies may overlook that groups are not 
homogeneous. They run the danger of being captured and controlled by 
governments or the local elite, bringing about further marginalization of poor 
people. There are power dynamics in each community that need to be taken 
into account to ensure that participatory mechanisms are truly inclusive and 
do not mirror or exacerbate already existing social divisions. 
Even when all stakeholders are committed to demand side approaches 
such as public participation, the impact of such interventions may be hampered 
by lack of resources and capacity to implement them. 
A study published in 2006 challenges further the expected adequacy of 
grassroots monitoring in reducing corruption. The study was commissioned 
by the World Bank to analyze innovative way to decreasing corruption. A 
randomized controlled examination of corruption in 600 Kecamatan 
Development Program (KDP) village road projects was conducted in East and 
Central Java. The study found that the declaration of a plausible government 
audit was more viable at reducing corruption than increasing grassroots 
participation in the monitoring process. Interestingly, in some villages, 
increased participation just changed the form of corruption, not its general 
level. The study further presumes that grassroots monitoring may be more 
viable in specific connections than in others, where villagers have good 
information and a strong personal stake in minimizing theft of funds (The 
World Bank, 2006). 
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Effectiveness of citizens participation 
 
In spite of all the imperatives and difficulties highlighted above, 
evidence drawn from the literature focuses towards affirming the capability of 
demand side approaches in improving the governance system and controlling 
corruption, if a set of key conditions are met. There is a developing accord 
among policy makers on the various conditions that are likely to promote 
meaningful forms of citizen participation and influence. 
The effectiveness of such interventions is likely to be enhanced when: 
 Broad, democratic and truly inclusive constituencies are built to 
avoid voice capture by narrow interest groups within the 
communities; 
 There is a legal standing or formal recognition for non-
governmental representatives in policy making institutions; 
 Ongoing presence of citizens is ensured throughout the 
institution’s work process; 
 There is structured access to the flow of official documentary 
information; 
 Citizens have the right to issue dissenting reports directly to 
authorities such as legislative bodies to challenge poor 
performances on controlling corruption; 
 Service users have the right to demand a formal investigation 
and/or seek legal redress for poor or non - delivery of services.  
 
There is additionally a growing awareness that strengthening citizen 
demand for governance and anti - corruption changes speaks to one and only 
side of the comparison. The responsiveness of the state including the political 
will and ability to answer residents requests matters also. There is a need to 
strengthen simultaneously both sides of the accountability equation to ensure 
effectiveness of demand side approaches.  
The effectiveness of demand side approaches may greatly depend on 
the presence of genuine political will to address citizens’ concerns.  
 
Public education and information campaigns  
 
No two societies are the same and the identification of both the 
message and audience will vary to some degree. Nonetheless, the focus ought 
to be on teaching individuals about the genuine nature and results of corruption 
in request to guarantee that it is perceived when it happens and to assemble 
general  restriction to it, and guaranteeing that the populace is kept educated 
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concerning particular cases, new advancements and patterns, and the 
endeavors to battle corruption. General messages about corruption may be 
distributed or showed in the overall population news media, while more 
concentrated measures, for example, seminars can be coordinated at those 
specifically included in procedures seen as helpless against corruption, 
utilizing media proper for that purpose.  
When essential standards have been figured, education and awareness 
can be actualized through a mixture of activities. Similarly as with the 
substantive content, the means of communication will fluctuate to some 
degree relying upon the target group. A strong national anti-corruption 
programme will incorporate a number of possible options, and a flexible 
approach to developing or modifying communication plans should the need 
arise. 
 Media or general distribution, such as, radio, TV and print media can 
be utilized to reach the general population. Information can be 
scattered not just utilizing publicizing and public service 
announcements, but also news coverage. Authorities who give data to 
the media should not control or twist the data; however they ought to 
guarantee that the media are decently advised about both successes and 
failures in the battle against corruption.  
 Where accessible, the Internet and other networking systems can be 
used, both to disperse messages about corruption and as a conceivable 
method for empowering and encouraging reports by the individuals 
who encounter it. A noteworthy point of interest is the adaptability of 
PCs in defining and storing information. 
 Seminars, gatherings or workshops can be directed for particular 
partners to talk about issues and propose activities. Though costly and 
time-consuming, that arrangement offers the points of interest of a 
detailed examination of any materials offered and two-path 
correspondence with members. Gatherings can be utilized to brief 
members on different matters, including anti – corruption projects, and 
to canvass their perspectives about what ought to be carried out and 
how to explain it best 
 Open enquiries or hearings can be led into corruption in general or to 
inspect particular corruption issues or cases. While analyzing 
corruption on a case-by-case premise is relatively inefficient, it can 
give an itemized and straightforward examination of problem areas 
and make determinations that may be relevant to different areas. 
 Surveys can be utilized to assemble, dissect and announce data about, 
for example, the rates or recurrence of corruption, open impressions of 
corruption, the effectiveness of anti - corruption measures and the 
general execution of public administration and its trustworthiness. 
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 Distribution of data about investigations, prosecutions and other 
processes, for example, disciplinary proceedings, in corruption cases 
can likewise send a prevention message. 
 The generation and dispersal of a national strategy for integrity and 
anti - corruption measures can likewise be utilized to communicate 
both to the general public and to the particular groups to which the 
measures will apply. 
 The criminal law is frequently overlooked as a communication 
medium. As noted above, in any case, the advancement, establishment 
and publication of criminal offenses and strategies concerning 
corruption set outright legitimate measures of conduct and, much of 
the time, moral standards as well. 
The accompanying general focuses will for the most part be secured in 
anti - corruption campaigns. As noted above, for particular target crowds, they 
will normally be supplemented by more definite remarks and additional 
messages. 
 The nature of corruption - worldwide talks have shown an extensive 
variety of attitudes about what constitutes "corruption". At the national 
level, policy - makers must have an agreeable idea of corruption, and 
must convey it successfully to different target groups of audiences. 
Resistance to corruption and backing for measures against it can't be 
activated until individuals have an agreeable comprehension of what it 
is. 
 The direct expenses of corruption - to enroll open support, it must be 
established that corruption is unsafe, both to social orders and the 
people who live in them. The direct cost of corruption incorporates 
unfair or irrational procedures for dispensing public assets. The 
individuals who work with Government can be recounted the extra 
expenses and instabilities of corruption offering techniques. More 
general groups can be told of the general increases in expenses and 
decreases in benefits.  
 The general or indirect costs of corruption - example of the roundabout 
expenses of corruption incorporate the failure of inner and external 
development projects and the corruption of crucial organizations, for 
example, the courts and political bodies. Populaces ought to be 
demonstrated that corruption empowers a couple of people to gain but 
the general community will lose much more if open administration is 
inadequate and organizations neglect to function appropriately, if at 
all. 
 Reasonable standards expected in public administration - essential 
guidelines for general application in every aspect of public 
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organizations, and in the connection of particular organizations or 
functions, ought to be set out. Standards of behavior can likewise be 
declared in the private sector, where suitable, especially in regions 
where business is completed with people in public areas. 
 Information about anti-corruption programmes - to enroll participation 
and supporting for both proactive and responsive projects, general data 
is required about what the projects are expected to achieve and why 
they ought to be supported and more particular information about what 
sort of participation is looked for and how it can be given. 
 Specific messages for specific audiences - the above components will 
generally apply over an expansive scope of public administration 
target audiences. The message that taking bribes causes individual and 
social damages and may subject the beneficiary to criminal liability 
ought to apply to practically any gathering of people. The particular 
application of general anti - corruption standards might be distinctive, 
nonetheless, depending upon the duties being performed and the 
"actuality circumstances" regularly experienced by the individuals 
who perform them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As concern about corruption has expanded, numerous established tools 
already known to criminal justice systems have been brought to manage 
against it. These devices incorporate measures to recognize and usurp 
financial and other returns of corruption. In distinctive lawful frameworks this 
is seen as a type of discipline, a method for guaranteeing that the motivator to 
submit to corruption in any case is eliminated, and a method for depriving 
guilty parties of monetary assets which may well be utilized to destabilize 
governments or submit further demonstrations of corruption or different 
criminal acts. In major, or "grand" corruption cases, further force has as of late 
been included by the way that, once a corrupted administration has been 
evacuated, its successor by and large tries to recuperate moves ahead on the 
premise that these have, basically, been stolen from the individuals, and that 
they would provide seriously required assets to the new government and State 
ruined by past corruption. 
The battle against corruption can't be won without citizens’ support, 
interest and vigilance. The media, municipal and business affiliations, 
exchange unions and other nongovernmental characters play a pivotal part in 
encouraging open discussions of corruption and expanding awareness about 
the negative effects of corruption. They also screen and examine governmental 
activity – both in their day by day life and through formal plans organized for 
this reason – thereby contributing to the discovery and avoidance of corruption 
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and the accumulation and directing of information from residents to the 
legislature's anti – corruption efforts. 
Civil society's commitment to a nation's battle against corruption can 
take different forms, from awareness raising and educational projects to 
dynamic and authoritatively perceived support in the investigation of existing 
legislation or institutional methodology. Concerning the latter, civil society 
can promote changes that are seen to be most significantly required. Civil 
society actors may in reality contribute a large share to monitoring and 
exploring government and business activities and along these deter corruption. 
Valuation for this imperative instrument for fighting corruption has not yet 
gained much ground among political leaders in some countries.  
It is for the most part considered that access to information goes past 
normal distribution of reports; effective control additionally obliges that 
governmental or administrative institutions uncover documents for 
investigation upon request. Governments and legislators have been hesitant in 
the past – some still are – to give this right, which is regularly ensured by the 
nation's constitution. In the later past, however, more nations' administrations 
have come to understanding that giving information is a part of their function 
and now allow access to certain records that were considered as private in the 
past. 
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Abstract 
Collective security has been referred to as “a system, regional or 
global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the 
concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats and 
breaches of peace”.1 The system of collective security under the UN Charter 
is reflected principally in the provisions concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security, especially those relating to the UN Security 
Council. The main provisions of the UN Charter on collective security are 
Article 2 (4) (prohibition of the threat or use of force); Article 51 (inherent 
right of individual or collective to self-defence); and Articles 39 - 42, 
concerning respectively the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression (Article 39); provisional measures (Article 40); 
measures not involving the use of armed force (Article 41); and measures 
involving the use of armed force (Article 42).2 
Before the Council can adopt measures related to the enforcement of 
world peace, Article 39 of the Charter requires that it must first “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”. 
This is the key to the collective security system. Once such a determination is 
made, the way is clear for the adoption of recommendations or decisions to 
deal with the situation. However, it depends upon the circumstances of the 
case and it also depends upon the relationship of the five permanent members 
of the Council (the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the 
Russian Federation, China and France) to the issue under consideration, for a 
                                                 
1 Vaughan Lowe and others (eds.) The United Nations Security Council and War: The 
Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 13 
2 See more in: Erika de Wet & Michael Wood, “Collective Security”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010 
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negative vote by any of the permanent members is sufficient to block all but 
procedural resolutions of the Council.3  
This paper deals with and comments on the evolution of the UN 
collective security system since its beginning, after the Second World War, 
and up to recent times.  
 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY  
 
The phrase “collective security”4 is frequently used to refer to the 
system of maintenance of international peace and security under the UN 
Charter and the relevant provisions of regional organizations. The collective 
security system under the UN Charter relates to the provisions on the 
maintenance of international peace and security, in particular with reference 
to the competences of the UN Security Council. Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the 
UN Charter contains the general provision on the prohibition of the threat of 
force or the use of force, except for the cases of the right to self-defence, 
recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter or the use of force by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The Security Council was granted primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24, Paragraph 1), and 
its decisions are binding upon all member states (Article 25). Matters 
concerning threats to, or breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, under 
Chapter VII, give rise to decision-making powers on the part of the Council. 
This emphasizes the priority accorded within the system to the preservation of 
peace and the degree of authority awarded to the Security Council to achieve 
this. Such measures can be measures not involving the use of force, such as 
economic sanctions according to Article 41 of the UN Charter, or can involve 
use of force, including use of armed forces, according to provisions of Article 
42 of UN Charter.5 In this way, the UN Charter is trying to realize its first 
purpose from Article 1, Paragraph 1: “to maintain international peace and 
security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts 
of aggression or other breaches of peace”. The system is completed by Article 
                                                 
3 See more in: Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Sixth edn., Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, p. 1235 - 1241 
4 A sizeable body of literature has been written on the issue of collective security. See, for 
example, in: Christina Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Prosvetno Delo, AD, 
Skopje, 2009, Chapter 7; C. Gray, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security 
System?’, 56 ICLQ, 2007, p. 157; Vojin Dimitrijevic, Concept of Security in the International 
Relations, Belgrade, 1973 
5 See: Jochen Abraham Frowein and Nico Krisch ‘Article 42’ in Bruno Simma (ed.) The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary vol 1, 2nd edn., Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 749 - 759 
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103, which declares that obligations under the Charter prevail over obligations 
contained in other international agreements.6 
The UN Charter system of collective security has undergone 
significant evolution since 1945. The General Assembly was empowered to 
exercise the emergency role, with the adoption of the “Uniting for Peace” 
Resolution, in 1950. Among other cases, this Resolution was implemented in 
the Korean War (1950-1953) and during Suez Crisis, in 1956. After the Cold 
War ended, in particular, the authorization of regional organizations and states 
willing and able to use military force on behalf of the UN has become a 
substitute for the Article 43 agreements foreseen in the UN Charter. In this 
paper we analysed whether the international law on the use of force as set out 
in the UN Charter is still relevant today, in the face of modern threats. In recent 
years, the concept of what threat means to international peace and security has 
been changing. It does not only refer to aggression from outside, but also to 
serious internal armed conflicts. Security Council’s actions, in accordance 
with Chapter VII, resulted in various UN missions and resolutions, including 
establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
 
VETO RULE AND “UNITING FOR PEACE” RESOLUTION  
 
The veto rule (Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the Charter) empowers the 
five permanent members of the Security Council to block the resolutions on 
issues crucial to this body: in determining the act of aggression; in identifying 
the guilty party; in taking the decision to implement sanction, military or non-
military, against the aggressor. Such decisions are crucial for the operation of 
the collective security system. The veto rule clearly grants to each of the five 
great powers the ability to prevent the actions of the UN enforcement system 
against itself, against any country it chooses to support and protect, or in any 
other case when it opts to not participate in the UN enforcement actions. 
Therefore, the veto rule renders collective security impossible in all the 
instances most vital to the preservation of world peace and rather problematic 
in cases of less importance. 
Relevant documents reflect that the San Francisco Conference 
participants were aware that the model then introduced meant giving up on the 
ambition to create a collective security system that may act in all cases of 
global war or peace. Some states were against the very idea of the veto rule, 
with Mexico and the Netherlands arguing that the UN system would be 
fundamentally flawed and unjust if one country were able to prevent the 
                                                 
6 On the UN collective security system see more in: Vladimir Ortakovski, Marija Milenkovska 
International Public Law, Faculty of Security - Skopje, 2014, p. 314 - 323 
 112 
Security Council from taking urgent action to maintain the peace.7 
Representative of New Zealand took the opinion that the veto rule makes the 
collective security impossible.8 However, the great powers were unprepared 
to compromise. The USA declared that the veto rule means that “if a major 
power became the aggressor, the Council had no power to prevent war”.9 The 
US State Secretary, Edward R. Stettinius, answering the question of what 
would happen if the Security Council used veto to prevent an action against 
itself, said that the implementation of an enforcement measure against the 
great powers would lead to a new world war.10 In order to avoid the possibility 
for the use of veto to paralyze the work of the Security Council, on 3 
November 1950 the UN adopted the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, giving 
General Assembly jurisdiction that was exclusively jurisdiction of the Security 
Council. This Resolution states that “if the Security Council, because of lack 
of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security … the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to the Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”.11 If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in an 
emergency session within twenty-four hours. This was “de facto” a revision 
of the UN Charter, when its provisions to maintain or restore international 
peace and security could not be executed. According to the “Uniting for 
Peace” Resolution, the General Assembly is able to determine the aggressor 
and to recommend collective action of member-states. The UN made a step 
forward toward the hypothetical possibility for collective security action in all 
cases of breaching the peace. This Resolution developed international system 
of enforcement applicable even when there is breaching of peace with direct 
or indirect involvement of the great powers. 
The “Uniting for Peace” Resolution was adopted after the triple 
aggression against Egypt in 1956. On 29 October 1956, Israeli armed forces 
attacked Egypt, and two days later British and French air forces attacked 
military targets in Egypt, which had failed to accept the Anglo-French 
                                                 
7 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (1945) UN 
Information Organization, New York, vol. XI: Commission III: Security Council, pp. 163 - 
164 (Netherlands), p. 333 (Mexico).  
8 Ibid, Vol. XII, p. 296, p. 307 - 308 
9 Cited from: UN Information Organizations and US Library of Congress, Documents of the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization, New York, 1945, Vol. XI, p. 514 
10 Cited from: The Charter of the United Nations, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, US Senate, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., p. 215 
11 Cited from: General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950 
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ultimatum. On 2 November 1956, Israel already took control over the entire 
Sinai Peninsula and on 4 and 5 November 1956, Israel established control at 
the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. Between 5 and 7 November 1956, Suez Canal 
was occupied by the United Kingdom and France. 
After the United Kingdom and France had used veto on 30 October 
1956 against the two separate resolutions proposed by the USA and USSR, 
with the Resolution Doc. SB UN S/3721 of 31 October 1956, Yugoslavia (then 
a non-permanent member in the Security Council) requested that the 
mechanism introduced with the “Uniting for Peace” resolution be used. At the 
emergency special session of the General Assembly, with the Resolutions 997 
(EC-I) and 1002 (EC-I) adopted on 2 and 7 November 1956, it was established 
that “the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory 
in violation of the General Armistice Agreement” between the two countries 
and that “armed forces of France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland were conducting military operations against Egyptian 
territory”. The General Assembly “urges the parties to the armistice 
agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to 
desist from raids across the armistice lines into the neighbouring territory, and 
to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements”, and “calls 
once again upon the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all 
their forces from Egyptian territory”. 
On 4 and 5 November 1956, the Resolutions 998 (EC-I) and 999 (EC-
I) were adopted, which set up the emergency United Nations Forces (UNEF) 
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.12 The United Kingdom and 
France finalized the withdrawal of their troops by 22 December 1956, whereas 
the withdrawal of Israel lasted until March 1957. What bears importance for 
the successful implementation of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution 
mechanism in this case was the specific constellation of the relations between 
the great powers with reference to the triple aggression against Egypt. Namely, 
Washington and Moscow found themselves to be on the same position, 
exerting great pressure for the withdrawal of the aggressors, but from all the 
different reasons. The USA regarded the Middle East as an area that they 
should conquer upon the departure of the United Kingdom and France from 
the region, whereas the USSR13 have already been effectuating this by 
supplying Egypt with modern weapons. 
                                                 
12 See: Official Records, Suppl. No. I/A (3354) 
13 The Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, on 5 November 1956 dispatched a letter to 
the UK Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, which was immediately published in the press 
worldwide. Asking the question, “In what position would Britain have found herself if she 
had been attacked by more powerful State possessing every kind of modern destructive 
weapon?”, Bulganin also added that, “We are fully determined to crush the aggressors and 
restore peace in the East through the use of force”. He concluded this rather unusually explicit 
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However, in practice, not all expectations from the “Uniting for Peace” 
Resolution were met. In addition to its successful application in the Suez Crisis 
of 1956, this resolution was also addressed during the crises in Hungary of the 
same year, in Lebanon and Jordan of 1958, in Congo of 1960, in the Israeli-
Arab war of 1967, in the Bangladesh-related conflicts of 1971, in Afghanistan 
of 1980, in Namibia of 1981, and in other instances. It cannot be claimed that 
the system established by the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution has made a 
greater impact on the maintenance of international peace and security. This 
resolution makes it possible for conflicts to be addressed by the General 
Assembly in a way that otherwise had not been possible, but it has failed to be 
particularly successful as a backup mechanism for the preservation and 
restoration of international peace.14 
 
CASES DETERMINED AS A THREAT TO THE PEACE AND 
BREACH OF THE PEACE 
 
The UN Charter refers to the concept of “force”, as opposed to “war”.15 
This is significant because force encompasses a much broader range of 
conduct, and there is no requirement for a state to make a formal declaration 
of war for it to be in breach of the prohibitions on the use of force. Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter prohibits the use and threat of force, except in specifically 
designated circumstances, and emphasizes the requirement for states to settle 
their differences by peaceful means.16 
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has been given 
the complex task to determine whether a particular situation is to be qualified 
as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression, so as to 
undertake further measures. However, before that, the Security Council may 
impose provisional measures so as to prevent aggravation of the situation 
(Article 40 of the UN Charter). These measures shall be without prejudice to 
the rights and claims of the parties concerned, but will be aiming at the 
stabilization of the crisis situation. The most frequent examples of provisional 
measures are the urges for ceasefire (as in the Middle East wars of 1967 and 
1973, with the Resolutions 234 (1967) and 338 (1973)), and the urges for 
                                                 
threat with the words, “We hope at this critical moment you will display due prudence and 
draw the corresponding conclusions from this”. For more on the 1956 triple aggression on 
Egypt see in: Vladimir Ortakovski, the Near-east Conflict and the Palestinian Question, 
Features of the Israeli-Arabian wars, NIP Magazine, Skopje, 1988, p. 108 - 124 
14 See in: Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Sixth edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p. 1272 - 1273 
15 Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4) 
16 See more in: Gideon Boas, Public International Law. Contemporary Principles and 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Massachusetts, 2012, p. 313 - 315 
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withdrawal of troops from a foreign territory (as was the Resolution 509 
(1982) relating to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon).  
The first ever qualification as “threat to peace” was made for the 
Middle East situation of 1948, with reference to the armed conflict between 
the newly-established state of Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. In 
its Resolution 54 (1948), the Security Council determined the situation as a 
“threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39” and called for a 
ceasefire. In 1966, with its Resolution 221 (1966), the Security Council 
decided that the situation with the white minority regime in Rhodesia 
constitutes a threat to the peace. 
With the end of the Cold War, the activities of the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter have increased significantly. In its Resolution 
713 (1991), the Security Council was “deeply concerned by the fighting in 
Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, 
and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the 
border areas of the neighbouring countries”, and qualified the situation as a 
threat to the peace. In its Resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council pointed 
out that “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution 
of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security”. This phrase has been used by the Security Council on a number of 
occasions. In its Resolution 788 (1992), the Security Council determines that 
the civil war in Liberia constitutes a threat to the international peace. In its 
Resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council points out that the genocide in 
Rwanda constitutes a threat to the international peace and security. For a 
conduct that constitutes a threat to the international peace and security, with 
its Resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, the Security Council imposed 
economic and diplomatic sanctions on Libya, for refusing to hand over the two 
Libyan nationals suspected for the crashing of the Pan Am Flight 103.17 
With regards to the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia (with the 
Resolution 808 (1993) and Rwanda (with the Resolution 955 (1994), the 
Security Council uses the qualification that the “widespread violations of 
international humanitarian law” constitute a threat to the peace. For these two 
cases specifically the Security Council established the ad hoc tribunals, with 
resolutions arising from Chapter VII of the Charter. With its Resolution 827 
(1993) of 25 May 1993, the Security Council established the International 
                                                 
17 In the airplane explosion of the Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie all 
259 passengers and crew members on board were killed, and 11 more people on the ground 
where pieces of the wreckage had fallen (from the total 270 casualties, 189 were US nationals, 
and 43 were UK nationals). Two Libyan national, who were suspected of planting a bomb on 
board the plane, were handed over for trial in 1999, after Libya had to face UN-imposed 
sanctions 
 116 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting the persons responsible for the grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and of the laws and customs of war, for genocide, and for crimes 
against humanity. With its Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, the 
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
for the sole purpose of prosecuting the persons responsible for international 
crime and genocide. 
The Security Council uses the phrase “breach of peace” in very few 
instances. In 1950, with its Resolution S/1501, the Security Council qualified 
the North Korean invasion of South Korea as a breach of the peace and called 
upon the member states to help South Korea. The Argentinian invasion of the 
Falkland Islands in 1982 was qualified as a breach of the peace with the 
Resolution 502 (1982), and so was the war between Iraq and Iran in 1987 
(Resolution 598 (1987). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was qualified 
by the Security Council as a “breach of international peace and security” with 
the Resolution 660 (1990). 
In imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security 
Council almost never qualifies a given situation as being an “act of 
aggression”.18 After protracted debates, the UN General Assembly, with its 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, adopted the definition of 
aggression as being “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State”, with a 
provision of a list of possible acts of aggression in Article 3. The application 
of this Resolution as a recommendation by the UN General Assembly is not 
mandatory, although it may prove useful to the Security Council. However, 
the Security Council reserves the right to examine all the relevant 
circumstances, as well as the gravity of each individual case, before deciding 
on the qualification of a given situation and implementation of particular 
measures. 
 
MEASURES INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE  
 
A. The 1950-1953 UN enforcement action in Korea is the first such 
example in the UN practice. Before the World War II, Korea was ruled by 
Japan; after the defeat in the war, Japan had to surrender North Korea to the 
USSR, and South Korea (south of the 38th parallel) to the USA. On 25 June 
                                                 
18 Resolution 82 (1950) speaks about “armed attack” from North Korea; Resolution 660 (1990) 
uses the phrase “Iraqi invasion of Kuwait”; Resolution 248 (1968) says “military action” by 
Israel on Jordan. The phrases “acts of aggression” and “armed attack” are used for the 
intervention of South Africa in Angola in 1976 (Resolution 387 (1976)); in 1977 of Rhodesia 
in Mozambique (Resolution 411 (1977)); in 1985 for the Israeli military action against the 
PLO headquarters in Tunisia (Resolution 573 (1985)) 
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1950, the North Korean troops launched a military attack on South Korea and 
in just three days of fighting managed to take over its capital, Seoul.19 The 
Security Council, which back then was not represented by the USSR, adopted 
three resolutions. With the first one, Security Council Resolution 82 (1950), 
the Security Council determined that the armed actions in North Korea 
represent breach of peace and called for a momentary cessation of hostilities. 
With the second one, the Security Council Resolution 83 (1950), the Security 
Council recommends to all member-states to provide assistance to South 
Korea so as to fight back the military attacks and restore the international 
peace and security. With the third one, the Security Council Resolution 84 
(1950), the Security Council established the Joint UN Command, headed by 
the USA, and called upon the UN member-states to make their military and 
other assistance available to the Command. Contingents from 16 countries 
made an agreement with the USA, and the UN Security Council gave a general 
authorisation of military actions, appointing the US general, Douglas 
MacArthur at the post of Commander. It bears reminding that in those days 
the USSR representative to the Security Council was not attending the 
sessions, protesting against Taiwan holding the permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council, in place of the People’s Republic of China. This boycott was 
the reason why Moscow could not use veto to block the UN military actions. 
Early in August 1950, the USSR representative re-joined the Security Council 
sessions and could block possible further actions of this body in Korea, but 
could not revoke the already adopted resolutions and the actions arising from 
them. 
A true war escalated in the field between South Korea, supported by 
the UN (basically, the USA) and North Korea, supported by China. The US 
troops accounted for 88% of the 341,000-people UN army. The UN have 
suffered great losses in the first two months of the warfare, but in September 
and October 1950 the UN launched a large-scale counter-offensive, ultimately 
succeeding in pushing the North Korean troops north of the 38th parallel. On 
25 October 1950, China joined the war on the side of North Korea, dispatching 
an army of 180,000 regular soldiers and 100,000 reservists, successfully 
lunching three phase offensives (in October 1950, on 25 November 1950, and 
on 26 December 1950), which resulted in yet another capture of Seoul, in 
January 1951. In the period between January and June 1951, UN troops 
approached the 38th parallel once more. It was in this period, more specifically 
on 11 April 1951, that the US president, Harry Truman, recalled the general 
Douglas MacArthur, who was in favour of engaging in nuclear attacks on 
                                                 
19 See more in: Christina Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Prosvetno Delo, AD, 
Skopje, 2009, p. 258 - 259; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 4th edn, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 292 
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Manchuria and the peninsula of Shandong, from where the Chinese force 
launched its air strikes on his troops. After the protracted warfare, the fighting 
ceased on 27 July 1953, with the signing of a ceasefire agreement that returned 
the borderline back to the 38th parallel and created the 4 km wide buffer zone 
between the two Koreas. All participants in this war counted numerous losses: 
142,000 killed US soldiers; 17,000 killed soldiers from other countries 
participating in the UN troops; 900,000 casualties (dead and wounded) on the 
part of China; 1.3 million killed or wounded soldiers on the part of South 
Korea; 520,000 killed or wounded soldiers on the part of North Korea; and 
also anything between 3.5 and 4 million civilian casualties.  
B. The 1990 - 1991 UN enforcement action on Iraq followed the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The same day, the Security Council 
adopted the Resolution 660 (1990) where it qualified the situation as being a 
breach of the international peace and security, and called for an immediate 
withdrawal of Iraq. This failed, with the Resolution 661 (1990) economic 
sanctions were placed on Iraq, with the Resolution 665 (1990) on 25 August 
1990 a maritime embargo followed, and with the Resolution 677 (1990), Iraqi 
acts of aggression against diplomatic representations and their personnel in 
Kuwait were condemned, and Baghdad was urged to protect them. Once Iraq 
failed to answer positively to these resolutions and measures, with its 
Resolution 678 (1990) adopted on 29 November 1990, the Security Council 
authorized the member-states to use “all means necessary” in cooperation with 
the Kuwait government so as to make sure Resolution 660 (1990) is 
implemented and to restore the peace and security in the region, unless Iraq 
retreats before 15 January 1991. All member states were urged to provide 
assistance in actions arising from this Resolution. Similarly to the Korean war, 
in absence of an agreement referred to in Article 43, and in order to “bridge” 
the provisions of Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter, which require the 
enforcement measures to be undertaken and controlled by the Security 
Council, this body allowed for the military operations to be controlled by the 
USA. The USA and the coalition partners from 40-or-so countries, with an 
army of 956,600 soldiers in total, 73% of whom came from the USA, engaged 
in a large-scale military operation, named “Desert Storm”, in the night 
between 16 and 17 January 1991, by launching massive air bombardments on 
military targets. Initially, the priority of the coalition forces was to destroy the 
Iraqi air forces and their counter-air system, along with their command and 
telecommunication centres. In the following stages of the 40-day-long 
bombardments, the air raids were directed primarily towards the military and 
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other targets in Iraq and Kuwait.20 Unfortunately, the humanitarian law was 
not fully observed during the bombardments. There was an excessive use of 
power, which led to the destruction also of civilian facilities and the loss of 
many civilian lives. The weapons used, including the ones containing depleted 
uranium, gave rise to major environmental consequences. The civilian 
infrastructure and industry of Iraq was also destroyed, including electric power 
plants, oil refineries, petrochemical complexes, bridges, roads, railways, 
motorways, hundreds of train locomotives and coaches, and also factories that 
produced aluminium, textile, electrical appliances and medical products. 
The land offensive ensued between 24 and 28 February 1991. Coalition 
forces met with little resistance, and many of the Iraqi troops readily 
surrendered. The portion of the coalition forces comprising soldiers from the 
Arab countries took the course to Kuwait City, and the Kuwait forces were 
given the opportunity to free their town. The Iraqi forces put up little 
resistance, resulting in only one killed soldier and only one aircraft shot down 
on the Kuwait side. On 27 February 1991, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces 
to retreat from Kuwait. On 28 February 1991, Iraq was deprived of all of its 
benefits gained through the aggression.  
 
PROCEDURE FOR UN CHARTER REVISION  
 
The United Nations, established by the winning coalition of World 
War II, were grounded in the assumption that all great powers will stand united 
in their joint action. Instead, the Cold War ensued. Frequently, motions were 
put forward to amend or revise the UN Charter, which had been laid down as 
a procedure in Chapter XVII of the Charter. Any UN member-state can submit 
an incentive for Charter amendment to the UN Secretary General with a due 
explanation. Amendments to the Charter, according to Article 108, come into 
force “when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members 
of the General Assembly” and are “ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, 
including all the permanent members of the Security Council”. Alteration of 
the Charter by means of amendments was applied in 1965 to Articles 23, 26 
and 61 of the Charter. Article 109 lays down the possibility to convene an 
emergency conference of all member-states for the purposes of revision of the 
Charter, at the request by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly 
and any seven members of the Security Council. However, the conditions 
relating to voting and to coming into force of the revised Charter make this 
                                                 
20 For more on the Gulf War see in: Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 
1990 - 1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1993 
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procedure all the more difficult to implement. It requires that the revised 
Charter be voted by a two-thirds majority, and then ratified by two thirds of 
the members, including the permanent members of the Security Council. 
The revision procedure of the Charter has not been applied to date, 
although 70 years have passed since its adoption, and many changes have 
taken place in the social life and in the international community. Some 
provision of the UN Charter have undoubtedly become out-of-date, such as 
the ones in Article 53 and 107 on “enemy” states21, or Chapters XI, XII and 
XIII on “non-self-governing territories” and the “international trusteeship 
system”. The issue of UN Charter revision has been raised on a number of 
occasions – at the UN General Assembly session of 1955 and 1970; by 
individual states which made efforts to increase the number of Security 
Council permanent members by admitting the economically greater powers, 
such as Germany or Japan, etc. However, there has always been one of the 
great powers which would prefer the “status quo” and oppose such incentives.  
 
CONCLUSION – EVOLUTION OF THE UN COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY SYSTEM 
 
Over the past years, the UN have proven unable to act to a greater 
extent under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. They had to develop 
new mechanisms so as to bridge the gaps arising from the failure to conclude 
the agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter. One way to do this was 
for the Security Council to delegate its powers to individual member-states or 
to international organizations, which may and want to engage military force 
on behalf of the UN, as were the indicated examples of the Korean and Gulf 
wars. A military intervention is a complex operation that requires joint 
command and control. However, how far could the authorization have 
stretched in these two cases when it was delegated to the USA? Would it have 
been possible to endorse MacArthur’s plan to engage nuclear weapons in the 
warfare against China under the pretence that it were the United Nations that 
have actually resorted to the use of atomic bombs? In the second case, can the 
violation of the international humanitarian law in 1991 in Iraq – the excessive 
use of force, the use of depleted uranium weaponry, the major loss of Iraqi 
civilian lives and the ultimate destruction of the civilian infrastructure – be 
                                                 
21 According to Article 53, Paragraph 2 the term “enemy state” applies to “any state which 
during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter”. If 
this definition seemed logical in times when the UN Charter was being adopted, when the war 
was still not fully completed, this provision no longer makes sense now that all “enemy” states 
have been admitted to the UN membership (last among them were FR Germany and DR 
Germany in 1973), simply because a UN member-state is by definition a peaceful one and 
cannot become an “enemy” 
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acknowledged by the United Nations as their own war crimes? The UN have 
also developed the practice of deploying peacekeeping forces, whose mandate 
has traditionally been to physically separate the opposing forces under their 
own consent, as was the case, for example, in the aftermath of the Middle East 
wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973. However, with the end of the Cold War and the 
more and more frequent outbreaks of internal military conflicts, complex 
situations have arisen where fights have never stopped and there is no long-
lasting armistice in sight, so that the UN undertook “de facto” enforcement 
actions. If the consent given by the conflicting parties is the baseline for the 
traditional peacekeeping forces, it is completely irrelevant in the enforcement 
measures. 
Over the recent years, the very concept of what a threat to the 
international peace and security constitutes has changed. In addition to acts of 
aggression from outside, this may as well include the internal armed conflicts. 
The measures undertaken by the UN Security Council are reflected in various 
UN missions. The Security Council, under Chapter VII, established the 
international criminal tribunal to prosecute the suspects of war crimes 
committed in internal armed conflicts in particular states (former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda). The most dynamic and controversial area concerning the use of 
force is the concept of humanitarian intervention. The practice of forcibly 
intervening in the territory of another state without consent has been criticized 
as a fundamental breach of the principle of non-intervention contained in 
Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. However, there is a need to protect civilians 
of a foreign state from gross and systematic breaches of human rights, such as 
mass arbitrary killings and forced expulsions. As the Rwandan genocide of 
1994 clearly illustrates, the consequences of international inaction in response 
to a widespread internal crisis can be catastrophic. As outlined by the General 
Assembly and Security Council, an internal humanitarian crisis can be 
considered a threat to the international peace and security.22 The chiefs of 
states and governments at the UN General Assembly session in September 
2005 declared that “the relevant provisions of the UN Charter are sufficient to 
address the full range of threats to the international peace and security”.23 We 
are left with the impression that this statement bears more of a political, rather 
than international legal gravity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See in: Gideon Boas, Public International Law. Contemporary Principles and Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., Massachusetts, 2012, p. 340 - 342 
23 See in: Michael Wood, the Law on the Use of Force: Current Challenges, 11 SYBIL, 2007, 
p. 4 
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Abstract: The reforms in the security sector are a relatively new 
concept, which incorporates various political and professional ideas about 
what needs to be included and what actually needs to be reformed. The 
security sector reform comprises a broad platform for realization and 
concretization of certain tasks in order to improve the internal structure of the 
security sector. The main premise is that the reforms need to enable a 
comprehensive transformation of the security structures and, in order to adapt 
to the actual security challenges, respectively, the reforms are focused toward 
building capacities for efficient management of the potential risks and threats. 
The elaboration for the security sector reforms made in this paper consists of 
two elements: first, analysis is made on the conditions in which the reform 
process is conducted, and second, the analysis is made in order to determine 
which are the reform’s priorities in the security institutions in the Republic of 
Macedonia.   
Key words: reforms, reform process, reform priorities, security sector, 
transformation.  
  
1. INTRODUCTION - THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY 
SECTOR REFORM  
 
The security sector reform1 is a relatively new concept, which replaces 
the former, less comprehensive programs such as forces reduction, defense 
                                                 
1 The security sector is defined a s those state organizations which have the authorization to 
use or to ordain use of force, detention and arrest, to protect the country and its citizens, as 
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reforms and individual adaptation on the individual security; providing 
services for the perceived new threats according to the financial possibilities 
and, with large extent, without a firm element for domestic and international 
inter-agency cooperation (Fluri, Philipp and Shalamanov, Velizar. 2003: 242). 
It is a matter of interest to see that there are different political and 
professional ideas about what does “the reform” counterpoise, and what it 
should comprise. Additionally, going deeper with the analysis could prove that 
there are at least two different reform approaches. One which presupposes the 
reform is mostly the final result, and that is the most significant part, and the 
other, which proves that the reform is a process, which means that the quality 
of the process is what guaranties for the quality of the final result.  
A typical characteristic for the processes on one hand is that they are 
voluminous, profound and complex, and they are crucial for the complete 
transformation of the country. On the other hand, there is certain defiance 
toward changes, which are very difficult and expensive, and the success of the 
security sector reform is solely possible if the political management has clear 
vision, trust, will and capabilities.    
Having in mind the number of problems inherited from the past and 
the needs which accrue from the new, changed threats, there is little hope that 
a certain reform could be successful without the involvement in few crucial 
problems. One of the greatest problems is the disintegration of the sector and 
privatization of certain elements from the security sector, especially in the 
transition period, or keeping the bad habits from party control of certain 
elements in the sector. The organizational, the quantitative and the qualitative 
elements which affect the extent and the efficiency of the newly established or 
already existing, but modified security and defense structures should be 
highlighted. In order to achieve that, the political and the professional 
management in every country individually should find the way to answer 
several difficult questions which remain open. They need to achieve the most 
efficient transformation, and in the same time not to obstruct the structural 
everyday security and defense operations. They should reduce the personnel 
number in parallel with the amortization of outmoded equipment, in the same 
time preserving the existence of rational and justified capacity levels, as a 
response to the actual and the foreseen security threats, and simultaneously to 
discover the optimal politically publicly accepted alternative for 
accomplishing the modernization of the security and the defense institutions.  
The security sector reform does not only make the security apparatus 
more effective, but it also makes it more accountable for the democratic 
                                                 
well those civil structures which are responsible for management and oversight of the security 
sector. The definition also includes the military and paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, 
the police, border services, customs, the legal system, the parliamentary, legal and 
administrative management and the oversight organs. Available on: www.stabilitypact.org  
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standards and the rule of law. The security sector can be divided in three 
pillars:  
− Groups mandated to use violence instruments – military, 
paramilitary and police forces; 
− Institutions that have a managing and monitoring role over the 
security sector; 
− Civil ministries, parliaments and nongovernmental 
organizations; 
− Bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the 
judicial system, the penal system, human rights defenders; 
these bodies in the areas are especially weak, that role belongs 
to the international community (Hendrickson, Dylan. 1999: 
29). 
The overall goal of the “security sector reform” is a transformation of 
the security institutions in order to play an efficient, legitimate and 
democratically accountable role in the provision of the external and the 
internal security for its citizens. The transformation of the security sector 
demands numerous consultations and includes goals such as: strengthening the 
civil control and oversight of the security sector; professionalization of the 
security forces, demilitarization and peace building and strengthening the rule 
of law2.  
 
2. REASONS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
The Republic of Macedonia has been administering security sector 
reform for a while now in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.  
There are a number of reasons (external and internal) for the security 
sector reform and for parallel redefinition of the security demands. The 
subjects engaged in the reforms have different interests, motives and potential 
to conduct it, which affects over their result. Some of the reasons and the 
interests are public; others are hidden, and can be only estimated indirectly, 
through analysis of certain activities.  
The following reasons could be noted as external for the security sector 
reform in the Republic of Macedonia: the changes in the security surrounding 
which came on after the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the Soviet union and 
the former Yugoslavian community; the determination of the Republic of 
Macedonia for a NATO and EU membership where one of the conditions for 
                                                 
2 Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform, Broadening the debate, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Occasional SSR Paper No. 1 
August 2002, Clingendael – International Alert – Saferworld p 1. 
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membership is set to be the reformed security sector; the security risks for the 
countries’ safety (terrorism, organized crime, danger from and internal 
conflict etc.).  
The following could be emphasized as internal reasons for the security 
sector reforms in the country: the deep political shifts toward democratization 
of the society and the need for transformation of the possession of the security 
sector by the party (and the military leadership by the party itself) toward the 
democratically elected Parliament and Government, as representatives of the 
society; the fundamental economic changes and the installation of the market 
economy, as well as the respective economization of the security sector and 
the special care for the resource expenditure in this area; serious changes in 
the security perception in the society, which are more focused on the new 
kinds of risks; demographic issues (level of education, economic and health 
conditions), as well as the preparedness to participate in missions abroad, 
outside the borders; as well as negative experiences from the functioning of 
the security sector during the crisis from 2001.  
 
3. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA   
 
A characteristic for the security sector reform in the Republic of 
Macedonia is that they became a subject of talk very late. The issue became 
pupular even at the end of the 2001 conflict, in the context of the reforms 
which started with the enforcement of the Framework agreement, and gained 
more intensity after the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. These 
events served as a catalyst for the processes in which the domestic and the 
foreign actors agreed that the issue for the security sector reforms should get 
the proper attention. All the same, the overall preparedness did not go through 
without problems. It could be said that both involved sides of the process, the 
domestic and the foreign, had different, sometimes even contradictory views 
of what should be reformed and how it should be reformed (Biljana, 
Vankovska. 2006).  
In general, the reforms should fit into a broader social framework; in 
addition, the political context of the potential power of the state should not be 
forgotten. They should create a balance between the competitive demands of 
the functional and the social imperatives.  
Basically, the reforms are mainly focused on the state structures, most 
often the army and the police, while the rest of the system elements 
(intelligence and security agencies, the prison system etc.) are left for better 
days. The other problem refers to the fact that some agencies are acting like 
rivals (most common, the relation army-police, intelligence agency – direction 
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for security and counter-intelligence) from the aspect of portions from the state 
budget.  
The next problem is that the accent is put on the security forces in the 
system, while the role of the political structures which should realize the 
control over this sector (the Parliament, the Government, the President) is 
neglected. To that, these structures are seldom viewed as a part of the security 
system, and even less as part of the problem. Hence, a broader acceptance of 
the concept of the security sector reform is necessary, which will comprise the 
non state actors in the system (for example the private security sector etc.).  
When we refer to the reforms, we should have in mind that it is a notion 
implying a long term process in which all the above mentioned subjects from 
society should be included. For the reforms success, the surrounding in which 
they are conducted is very important, respectively, the same supports the 
reforms. Here, that would refer to the role of the Parliament, the President, and 
the Government, the academic community, the nongovernmental 
organizations, the media, the business sector and the international community. 
On the other hand, all of the components of the security sector should be active 
and respect the principle of democratic control and to achieve coordination 
under the guidance of the elected representatives and the rest of the society.  
The 2001 crisis imposed the need for a close cooperation and 
coordination between the army and the police for the first time, but the lack of 
experience and will to face the challenges was obvious. Primarily, it was 
because of the organizational mandate. Later, the competition was spinning 
around the question which institution is more efficient in action (Biljana, 
Vankovska. 2006: 25). 
As a result of these difficulties in the past years, particular steps were 
undertaken for the improvement of the cooperation and the coordination 
among the police and the army. So, in 2006, the Manual for operative and 
other procedures of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia was brought in 
support of the police in cases of crisis situations.  
The overall efforts and the practical steps for cooperation and 
coordination among the police and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia 
was manifested through the two joint exercises in 2007 – “Link-07” and 
“Vodno-07”. The common work was demonstrated on these exercises, which 
presupposed coordination of the measures and the activities, but also the 
ability for a common assistance and cooperation, with which the functionality 
of the security sector was confirmed. 
In the beginning of 2012, acting according to the plan for improvement 
of the coordination between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of 
Defense, a Memorandum for cooperation was signed by these two institutions. 
The fundamental conceptual framework is part of the framework of the 
Memorandum for cooperation, in which the needed mutual cooperation should 
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be achieved. The next step in the improvement of the coordination between 
the police and the army, especially in hostility, is made in the beginning of 
2013 when the Ministry of Interior prepared a Manual for operative and other 
procedures of the police in terms of war as a support for the Army of the 
Republic of Macedonia.  
Still, it has to be emphasized that regardless of the steps undertaken in 
the past years, the coordination between the police and the Army of the 
Republic of Macedonia further remains a great challenge. 
In the next period, the attention should be focused on the issue with the 
coalition governments. In the worst case, the two ministers who govern the 
two key departments in the security and in the defense could be from different 
political tabors and to represent two different interests. That would mean that 
everyone will act from their own authentic position during the eventual 
interior (political) crisis which will have direct repercussions over the coalition 
partners. The example from 2001 is the best narrative for the complexity and 
the seriousness of this issue, when it was evident in that period that there was 
a lack of political will of the ministers, which took a different point of view 
over the same issues. The following problem is in that direction, regarding the 
allocation of the key departments in the country among the coalition parties. 
The experience from the past years shows that the Macedonian political 
parties’ bloc hardly accepts the personnel policy for the highest ranks in the 
defense department, respectively, there is an impression that these decisions 
go through a lot of resistance which comes from the Albanian political parties 
which are chosen as coalition partners in forming a government. A question is 
raised; does this also contribute for the creation of a low political will of the 
ministers, which could be further manifested as bad, especially when certain 
common activities should be coordinated? In our terms of democracy practice, 
this issue counterpoises a so-called system risk, which is far more dangerous 
than the actual risk (natural disaster or other kind of risk with a martial or a 
political nature) for which the system is activated. Lately, this kind of risk (the 
systematic) within the framework of the process of assessments is specially 
elaborated by the authorized organs in order to create an 
emergency/contingency scenario from difficult situations.  
 
4. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN 
THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA  
 
There is an emphasized ongoing interest for the security condition in 
the Republic of Macedonia on a global level by all of the actors on the 
international scene (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and the USA) ever since the 
period of its gaining independence. That interest was manifested through the 
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preventive missions of the UN, as well as through the engagement of NATO, 
EU, OSCE and the US in the resolution of the conflict in 2001. In the post 
conflict period and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework agreement, 
EU played a special role through the Stabilization and Association Agreement.  
The presence and the interest of NATO for the security sector reforms 
are expressed through the Consultative team of NATO and the connections 
with KFOR for the issues about border security. On the other hand, the USA 
are actively involved through the engagement of private military companies 
which were supposed to advice the Ministry of defense (first, it was the 
company named “MPRI”, later “Booz Allen Hamilton” which is further on 
present in this country) and the activities of their embassy. Basically, the role 
of the international organizations is significant in the last stage of the reforms 
of this security sector, which along with the reforms of the other sectors should 
lead to the integration of the Republic of Macedonia in the Euro-Atlantic 
community.  
The strategy of the international community for finding a solution for 
the conflict in Macedonia emerges from the Framework agreement, in the 
annex C it is stated that the EU is called to facilitate, to monitor and to assist 
in the implementation of the text coordinating it with the signed Agreement 
for stabilization and association.  
The strategy locates eight areas of action. The first was disarmament 
and demobilization of the NLA (ONA), which was conducted by NATO. The 
second area was the political action, for which the High Representative for 
Common foreign and security policy of the EU, Mr. Javier Solana was 
appointed to coordinate, along with his special emissary in Macedonia. He was 
closely cooperating with the American envoy in the Republic of Macedonia 
and informed the EU about the development of the situation on a regular basis. 
The third point of action was the reconstruction and the Donors conference, 
which was organized after the adoption of the constitutional amendments. In 
this part the European Commission took the leading role in the expenditure of 
the international aid. The fourth area was the returning of the refugees, which 
was “the key element for building trust”, whereupon there was collaboration 
with the High Commissioner for Human rights from the UN. The monitoring 
was the fifth area, carried out by the EU and OSCE observers. The sixth field 
of action was the training of the police forces, on what the US, OSCE and the 
EU worked on (Trajan Gocevski, Oliver Bakreski, Stojan Slaveski, 2007: 145-
243).  
This part anticipated a reform of the police forces of the Republic of 
Macedonia. The legislature was the seventh area in the finalization of the 
package legal agreements for the local government, finances, police and 
education according to the criteria of the EU and the Council of Europe. The 
census and the elections were the eighth, in which the European commission 
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and the Council of Europe were in the role of observers (Stojan, Slaveski. 
2007: 75-237). 
The reforms continuity goes on even today. It could be ascertained that 
although certain steps are made in the security sector reform, the reforms still 
counterpoise a relatively new issue which opens up a space for further 
improvements and accomplishments.  
It is considered that the security sector is still connected with the bad 
habits of party control in certain segments in the security sector. It creates 
problems in the adaptation, which influences on the society and it reflects in 
various ways. The main purpose of the reforms in the Republic of Macedonia, 
(a country which does not have a democratic tradition), is the formation of 
strong security structures, enabling a better coordination of the security 
community and strengthening the democratic control of the security sector.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The reforms in the security sector will remain a politically sensitive 
area. In order to have their successful implementation, a complete engagement 
of all subjects of the country is necessary. That means that there are no 
conditions for reforms if during the process a transparent reform plan is not 
enabled, which would be a reflection of the overall efforts of the politicians, 
the administration, the civil society and the business community.  
The reforms are not only intended for the ministries of defense and 
internal affairs, but for several other ministries, agencies and departments, the 
academic and the educational institutions. By that, a transformation is made 
of the security sector, which should respond to an adequate manner of all the 
challenges which it faces.  
Hence, the security sector of the Republic of Macedonia should be 
transformed in order to completely respond to all kinds of threats for the 
internal and the external security of the country. In that notion, changes in all 
elements of the security sector are needed in order for the changes of the 
structure to enable better utilization of the human capacities, in accordance 
with the international standards. There should also not be any doubt that the 
country’s forces, which should respond to the challenges and to the 
endangerment of its internal security (which counterpoises a haven for the 
organized crime), have to be strong enough, in personnel and in material, in 
order to secure the fulfillment of its constitutional task. Permanent education, 
training and equipment with the most contemporary material and technical 
resources is needed for these forces, because of the fact that organized crime 
is always “one step ahead” regarding the security forces when it comes to the 
technique.  
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GLOBAL SECURITY AND USE OF FORCE: 
INTRODUCTIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Global security is a concept which concerns primarily the peaceful 
inter-state relations between the subjects of international law. It certainly 
refers to the preservation of an international balance among all members of 
the international community in full respect of the principles governing these 
relations, exactly the sovereign equality and the respect for territorial integrity 
of the States. Security among international subjects means, first of all, 
renounce from threat or use of illegitimate force in international relations, in 
full compliance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations1. In this 
sense, the fundamental text sanctioned an already known and respected 
principle of the international law: the general and absolute prohibition of use 
                                                 
1 «All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations». 
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of force2. Article 2 (4)3 of the Charter firmly rejects the use or threat of force 
against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State, which is 
not in conformity with the Charter itself4. The prohibition is absolute and does 
not admit any exception, beside the case of being the use of force is a 
countermeasure in event of an armed attack, perpetrated by an aggressor State: 
this is the case of the individual or collective self-defence provided for in 
Article 51 of the Charter5. The other exceptional circumstance, sanctioned in 
the Charter that justifies the use of force is represented in the faculty of the 
Security Council which, according to the dispositions of the Chapter VII, may 
authorize such an extraordinary act6. Outside of the legal «perimeter» of the 
UN Charter dispositions, according to the general international law, the use of 
force is «tolerated» in particular circumstances: fortuitous case, force majeure, 
distress or approval of the entitled subject7. Furthermore, in case when the 
                                                 
2 In general, with regard to the argument, see Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force. State Actions 
against Threats and Armed Attacks, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Howard 
M. Hensel (ed.), The Legitimate use of Military Force. The Just war tradition and Customary 
Law of Armed Conflict, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); Nikolas Stürchler, the Threat of Force 
in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Joel H. Westra, 
International Law and the Use of Armed Force. The UN Charter and the Major Powers, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Judith G. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of 
Force by States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004); Anne Orford, Reading 
Humanitarian Intervention. Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Charlotte Ku – Harold Jakobson (ed.), 
Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
3 «All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations». 
4 «For the first time, international law fully and formally embraced the Lauterpachtian ground-
norm:“there shall be no violence.” Article 2(4) obliges all member states to “refrain . . . from 
the threat or use of force”: not just to renounce war but all forms of interstate violence», 
(Thomas Franck, cit., 20). 
5 «Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security» 
6 Of primary interest is art. 42 of the Charter: «Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations». 
7 See, in particular, Augusto Sinagra and Paolo Bargiacchi, Lezioni di diritto internazionale 
pubblico, (Milano: Giuffrè, 2009), 335 and following; Sergio Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto and 
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Security Council of the UN is paralyzed due to the veto imposed by one (or 
more) of the permanent Members, blocking in this way its decision-making 
power on the authorization of the use of force in presence of fulfilled 
conditions, one or more States, acting on behalf (uti universi) of the 
fundamental interests of the whole International Community, could resort to 
the use of force against one or more States8, considered offender(s) of an 
international norm productive of erga omnes obligations9. In this case, the use 
of force should necessarily meet the required criteria as sanctioned in the UN 
Charter with regard to Chapter VII, besides the impossibility of the Security 
Council to authorize these measures due to the veto imposed by the permanent 
Member. 
Lastly, any consideration on the pre-emptive use of force, especially 
with regard to the usage of drones as military means, should necessarily 
address the question of the admissibility of such ius ad bellum doctrine. 
According to an extensive interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter10, the 
so-called accumulation doctrine rests on the grounds of the equalization of the 
pre-emptive intervention with the anticipatory one. The customary norm on 
self-defence, recalled directly in Article 51 of the UN Charter, permits the 
preventive use of force only in case the armed attack is imminent11; therefore, 
                                                 
Alberto Santa Maria (a cura di), Istituzioni di diritto internazionale, 4a ed., (Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2011), 270 ff.  
8 This particular theoretical and doctrinal position is sustained firmly by Paolo Picone, who 
talks about the «formation, starting from the Seventies, of the category of general international 
norms productive of ′erga omnes' obligations of the States, that is obligations binding States 
towards the same International Community, unitarily intended, collectively pursuable from 
the same States (mostly when their violation represents an international crime), since they act 
on behalf of interests of the same Community», (“La guerra contro l’Iraq e le degenerazioni 
dell’unilateralismo, in Rivista di diritto inernazionale, 2003, 333 ff); on this topic, frome the 
same Author, see also, Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati nel campo della 
protezione internazionale dell’ambiente marino dall’inquinamento, in Starace (a cura di), 
Diritto internazionale dell’ambiente marino, Milano: Giuffrè, 1983), 15 ff.; Id., “Obblighi 
erga omnes e codificazione della responsabilità degli Stati”, Rivista di diritto inernazionale, 
2005, 893–954; Id., La Comunità internazionale e gli obblighi «erga omnes», (Napoli: Jovene, 
2006); Id., “La distinzione tra norme internazionali di jus cogens e norme che producono 
obblighi erga omnes”, in Rivista di diritto inernazionale, 2008, 5–38.  
9 For the erga omnes obligations in general see, Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga 
Omnes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christian Tomuschat – Jean-Marc 
Thouvenin, The fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and 
obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006).  
10 «And “anticipatory self-defence,” too, is vulnerable to reductio ad absurdum. If every state 
were free to determine for itself when to initiate the use of force in “anticipation” of an attack, 
there would be nothing left of Articles 2(4) and 51, or of Lauterpacht’s “primordial duty” to 
eschew violence», (Thomas Franck, cit., 4). 
11 With regard to the Pearl Harbor event, Yoram Dinstein, [War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 
3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 172], states that: «Had the Japanese 
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there is no room for reaction to future and hypothetic armed attacks 
discretionally to be decided and evaluated by the States.12 
 
USE OF DRONES BETWEEN IUS AD BELLUM AND IUS IN BELLO 
 
There is a quite open debate whether drones, as unmanned aerial 
vehicles, constitute battlefield military weapons and, consequently, their use 
concerns international law or peacetime police operations. The history of 
traditional use of drones, as relevant commentators sustain13, goes back right 
in the aftermath of the Second World War14 but the modern use of these 
                                                 
carrier striking force been destroyed on its way to Pearl Harbor, this would have constituted 
not an act of preventive war but a miraculously early use of counter-force. To put it in another 
way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in response to an incipient armed attack) 
would have been not anticipatory but interceptive in nature. Interceptive, unlike anticipatory, 
self-defence takes place after the other side has committed itself to an armed attack in an 
ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike anticipates an armed attack that is 
merely ‘foreseeable’ (or even just ‘conceivable’), an interceptive strike counters an armed 
attack which is ‘imminent’ and practically ‘unavoidable’. It is the opinion of the present writer 
that interceptive, as distinct from anticipatory, self-defence is legitimate even under Article 
51 of the Charter». 
12 «Positions in the past were likely to advocate one of two possibilities: on the one hand was 
the view that Article 51 of the Charter has firmly shut the door on any possibility of 
anticipatory action, and that recourse to self-defence will only become available if an armed 
attack has occurred […] On the other hand was the opposing view that allowed for self-
defence in the face of imminent attacks […] A third position gained significant endorsement 
from the Bush administration following September 2001. This view advocated a form of pre-
emptive self-defence which would allow for forcible measures to be taken in order to prevent 
the materialisation of general threats […] However, apart from the Bush administration and a 
number of commentators, this notion of self-defence received scarce support. While there is 
still a debate between supporters of the original two positions stated above, recent years have 
seen increasing support for the view that the right to self-defence does exist in relation to 
manifestly imminent attacks […] This position has received further validation in the reports 
of the UN Secretary General, although it does not reflect a uniform approach amongst states» 
(INTERNATIONAL Law ASSOCIATION, Report on Aggression and Use of Force, Washington 
Conference 2014, § B.2.b ). 
13 May Ellen O’Connell, The International law of drones, in ASIL Insights, issue 37, vol. 14, 
of November 12, 2010. 
14 «Drones were probably invented during or right after the Second World War and were ready 
for use by the 1950s. During the Vietnam War, the United States fitted drones with cameras 
and deployed them for reconnaissance. The United States used drones for the same purpose 
during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s. Reportedly in 2000 
the United States was ready to employ drones for a dramatic new use: as a launch vehicle for 
missiles. Drones with missile launch capability were first used in early October 2001 in 
Afghanistan. On November 3, 2002, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in Djibouti 
fired laser-guided Hellfire missiles from a drone at a passenger vehicle in Yemen, killing all 
passengers on board, including an American citizen» (ibid., p. 1); «Drones were originally 
developed to gather intelligence and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance. More than 40 
 137 
unmanned military weapons became more intense and problematic after the 
90s15. The United States represent probably the most active Power16 in using 
remote means technology during international armed conflicts or facing 
terroristic threats in several countries17. The first element of consideration 
                                                 
countries now have such technology. Some, including Israel, Russia, Turkey, China, India, 
Iran, the United Kingdom and France either have or are seeking drones that also have the 
capability to shoot laser-guided missiles ranging in weight from 35 pounds to more than 100 
pounds. The appeal of armed drones is clear: especially in hostile terrain, they permit targeted 
killings at little to no risk to the State personnel carrying them out, and they can be operated 
remotely from the home State. It is also conceivable that non-state armed groups could obtain 
this technology» (United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, at 9 (May 28, 2010), § 27, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf) 
15 For further deepening on the history of use of drones and other aerial warfare means, see 
the interesting work of Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue (eds.), The American Way of 
Bombing. Changing Ethical and Legal Norm, from B 17s to Drones, (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2014); see also European Parliament. Directorate General for External 
Policies. Policy Department: «The use of drones as a means of warfare traces back to World 
War II and beyond, becoming increasingly significant in the course of the second half of the 
20th century. While initial generations of military drones were used primarily for aerial 
surveillance, their functions gradually expanded to areas such as search and rescue, 
communications systems relay, suppression of hostile air defense, and direct attacks against 
selected targets.3 In the course of the last decade, the use of armed drones has increased 
exponentially, beginning with the Second Intifada in the Israeli-occupied areas (since 2000), 
continuing in the Second Gulf War (2003 - 2011), and reaching its current peak in the course 
of the United States’ confrontation with Al-Qaeda and affiliate groups in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (since 2001). What is new today is the systematic use of armed 
drones for the targeted killing of pre-selected individuals in the territory of other States. 
Unprecedented is also the relative importance which this mode of operation has obtained in 
certain contexts compared to other, alternative means and methods of warfare», (Human 
Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare, Brussels, 2013, 
7).   
16 «The United States began remotely piloted Predator and Reaper drone strikes targeting Al 
Qaeda in Yemen in late 2002 and in Pakistan, targeting the military leadership of Taliban and 
Al Qaeda as an extension of the Afghanistan war, in late 2004. At first the United States 
refused to officially confirm or deny the drone strike program. Bush and Obama officials 
generally minimized or denied civilian casualties in the strikes, even as civilian deaths were 
described in local and global media. But as with other forms of bombing, concern for civilian 
casualties due to drone strikes gradually increased, and the Obama administration developed 
procedures for mitigating collateral damage» [Crawford N., Targeting Civilians and U.S. 
Strategic Bombing Norms in Mathew Evangelista – Henry Shue (eds.), cit., 84]. 
17 «Armed drones are proliferating (and developing in sophistication) rapidly beyond Europe. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for the EU to define a clearer position on drones and targeted 
killing is to prevent the expansive and opaque policies followed by the US until now from 
setting an unchallenged global precedent. Already Chinese state media have reported that the 
country’s Public Security Ministry developed a plan to carry out a drone strike against a 
Burmese drug trafficker implicated in the killing of several Chinese sailors, though the 
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concerning the use of drones is that, despite their fundamental characteristic 
of being unmanned, their usage in not expressively prohibited by the 
international law. Obviously, non-military drones or those used for civilian 
purposes are not a question of concern with regard to the international law in 
general and the use of force in particular.  
The most distinctive element of (military) drones, besides other means 
of warfare, resides not only in the fact that they are not physically guided by a 
human operator (unmanned weapons) but rather in the question of the 
typology of carried weapons. As practice and experience show, bombs and 
missiles are the most common weaponry launched or dropped by drones in 
combat areas. The use of these kind of weaponries and operations is for sure 
not governed by the law enforcement regime norms but, to the contrary, 
constitute a clear evidence of connection with the international humanitarian 
law: that is the law applied during armed conflicts. The question of whether 
their use concerns the law enforcement regime (and human rights law) or ius 
in bello is strictly related to the nature of the weaponry involved and the nature 
of the operations implicating the use of drones. Although considered a modern 
instrument of warfare18, drones are classified among other instruments of 
belligerent activity. Thus, if used in a context of peacetime operations and 
without a legitimate title, their use implicates an act of force prohibited by the 
international law. On the contrary, in case of wartime operations, the use of 
military drones constitutes one of the tolerated methods of warfare, though 
conditioned by the strict rules of humanitarian regime. This means that the 
lethal nature of the involved force necessarily requests the application of 
humanitarian law regime. The use of drones during armed conflicts implicates 
directly targeted killings of individuals participating (or not) in hostilities. So, 
the distinction of the military lawful targets from the civilian one is a 
                                                 
suggestion was apparently Overruled […] As well as China, which has an active drone 
programme, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are either developing or have announced an 
intention to purchase armed UAVs. The US assertion that it can lawfully target members of a 
group with whom it declares itself to be at war, even outside battlefield conditions, could 
become a reference point for these and other countries. It will be difficult for the EU to 
condemn such use of drones if it fails to define its own position more clearly at this point)» 
(Anthony Dworkin, Drones and targeted killing: defining a European position, London: 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013, 3) 
18 «Instead of a heroic encounter between equal combatants, we have a radically asymmetric 
situation where the drone operators, far from being combatants watched by an audience, have 
become the audience that observes the act of death; looking on from high in the sky, they have 
assumed the position of the gods who decide who will live and die. This encounter still has an 
intimate quality, but the intimacy has become one-sided and asymmetrical: while Mehsud 
does not even know he is being observed, the drone operators can see him close up, reclining 
on the roof of his house on a hot evening, his wife attending to his medical needs. Without 
even knowing he is in combat, he is killed as if by a god’s thunderbolt from the sky» (Matthew 
Evangelista and Henry Shue, cit., 193). 
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primordial requirement besides the precaution and proportionality principles. 
Geneva Conventions on ius in bello and the related Additional Protocols 
clearly distinguish between individuals who are directly participating in 
hostilities and civilians not taking part in the conflict19: Article 51 of the 
Additional Protocol I sanctions the obligation to exclude from armed attack in 
favor of the second category.20 As correctly sustained, in international armed 
conflicts, the principle of distinction is «relatively straightforward to apply»21 
as far as the members of the armed forces of the belligerent Parties are 
                                                 
19 «Direct participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity 
engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes 
place. However, it would be desirable for the various Parties to a conflict to inform each other 
completely regarding the composition of their respective armed forces, even if this were only 
done through the communication of the laws and regulations which they have had to adopt to 
ensure compliance with the Protocol, as provided in Article 84 (Rules of application)» 
(INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Commentary on the Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva 1987, § 1679, p. 516). 
20 «Article 51. PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. 1. The civilian population 
and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other 
applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances. 2. The civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited. 3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 4. Indiscriminate attacks are 
prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) Those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; (o) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at 
a specific military objective; or (c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the 
effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such 
case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction. 5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate: (a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a 
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located 
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian 
objects; and (b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 6. Attacks 
against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited. 7. The presence 
or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties 
to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians 
in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations. 
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their 
legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation 
to take the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57». 
21 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTEE, 
The Legality under International Law of Targeted Killings by Drones Launched by the United 
States, New York, 2014, p. 136. 
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considered legitimate target of capture and / or attack, including lethal force. 
The difficulties become more consistent in presence of a non-international 
armed conflict mostly because of the objective nature of these kinds of 
conflicts as well as for the lack of general consensus in the doctrine and case 
law concerning the status of the members of the non-state armed groups22. 
Considering that almost all cases where drone military technology is involved 
concern non-international armed conflicts, the behavior of the most active 
Powers in using this technology becomes object of reflection in a larger and 
general scale. The use of drones against civilian objectives could be 
considered in conformity with the humanitarian law regime only if the 
civilians participate directly in the hostilities23 or they fulfill the criteria of 
continuous combat function in a larger context of good faith and reasonable 
considerations. Probably, the use of drones in non-international armed 
conflicts, characterized by an asymmetrical nature of belligerence, is of 
particular «interest» for the State party in the conflict, considering the 
objective impossibility to face a similar counter-belligerent. In the same way, 
the principle of necessity concerns the equilibrium between military 
exigencies and elements of humanitarian principles. If the objective or the goal 
of any military action could be reached by means of a less lethal measure, the 
principle of necessity takes a primary role in terms of legality under the 
international humanitarian law. With regards to the principle of 
proportionality, according to a correct interpretation of the dispositions of 
Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, it is 
prohibited any attack which may cause excessive advantage in relation to the 
concrete military target. The debate becomes delicate in case of the use of 
drones where calculations over the proportionality deal with the impossibility 
of physical contact with the targeted object. Being managed at distance and 
entirely through computer screens, drones have favored the so-called «Play 
                                                 
22 «In its most extreme form, this approach suggests that lethal force only can be used against 
a member of an armed group essentially at the moment that this member is engaged in 
hostilities» (Ibid., p. 138). 
23 «In practice, civilian participation in hostilities occurs in various forms and degrees of 
intensity and in a wide variety of geographical, cultural, political, and military contexts. 
Therefore, in determining whether a particular conduct amounts to direct participation in 
hostilities, due consideration must be given to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant 
time and place […] Nevertheless, the importance of the circumstances surrounding each case 
should not divert attention from the fact that direct participation in hostilities remains a legal 
concept of limited elasticity that must be interpreted in a theoretically sound and coherent 
manner reflecting the fundamental principles of IHL» [Nils Mezler, Interpretative Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 
(Geneva: ICRC, 2009), 42-43]. 
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station mentality» to killing24. However, it is not a question of nature of 
warfare instrument that renders more or less proportionate the use of drones 
in armed conflicts: the question concerns rather the transparency and 
accountability of such operations involving the use of drone technologies25.  
 
LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLINGS BY USING DRONES IN 
RELATION WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The notion of targeted killing regards the intentional and premeditate 
killing of agents of the enemy in a context of armed conflict26. In fact, any 
targeted killing outside an armed conflict is to be considered a violation of the 
international norms on the protection of human life sanctioned in all the 
international instruments in the field of human rights. In some rarely 
exceptional cases, extrajudicial killings are tolerated only if this is the only, 
proportionate and necessary mean for the protection of other lives27. The 
question, however, concerns the possibility to involve drones outside armed 
conflict areas in order to commit extrajudicial killings. Targeted killings 
during any armed conflict between States or a State and a non-State actor are 
considered admissible if they are in accordance to the respective law 
governing such conflicts. International humanitarian law prevails in case of 
military operations during situations of armed conflicts and thus, the usage of 
                                                 
24 «because operators are based thousands of miles away from the battlefield, and undertake 
operations entirely through computer screens and remote audio-feed, there is a risk of 
developing a “Playstation” mentality to killing. States must ensure that training programs for 
drone operators who have never been subjected to the risks and rigors of battle instill respect 
for IHL and adequate safeguards for compliance with it» (Report of the Special Rapporteur, 
cit., § 84). 
25 «The failure of States to comply with their human rights law and IHL obligations to provide 
transparency and accountability for targeted killings is a matter of deep concern. To date, no 
State has disclosed the full legal basis for targeted killings, including its interpretation of the 
legal issues discussed above. Nor has any State disclosed the procedural and other safeguards 
in place to ensure that killings are lawful and justified, and the accountability mechanisms that 
ensure wrongful killings are investigated, prosecuted and punished. The refusal by States who 
conduct targeted killings to provide transparency about their policies violates the international 
legal framework that limits the unlawful use of lethal force against individuals», (Ibid., § 87). 
26 «A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by 
States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed 
conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator», 
(Report, cit., 3-5). 
27 «In a targeted killing, the specific goal of the operation is to use lethal force. This 
distinguishes targeted killings from unintentional, accidental, or reckless killings, or killings 
made without conscious choice. It also distinguishes them from law enforcement operations, 
e.g., against a suspected suicide bomber. Under such circumstances, it may be legal for law 
enforcement personnel to shoot to kill based on the imminence of the threat, but the goal of 
the operation, from its inception, should not be to kill», (Ibidem,  5) 
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drones for targeted killings is tolerated if the lethal force involved through 
their use is directed only against subjects qualified as legitimate fighters or 
combatants. In particular cases lethal force may be employed against civilians 
directly participating in belligerent hostilities, losing in this way their neutral 
status from the moment they engage directly in hostilities28. In situations 
concerning cases of non-international armed conflicts, international human 
rights rules apply and in these cases lethal force would be tolerated in case of 
full respect of the related criteria. 
The question of major concern regards the use of drones with the 
declared (or not) purpose of targeted killings. In a domestic context of law 
enforcement policy the question regards the engagement rules determined by 
the State through the national legislation in relation with the use of lethal force 
by proper authorized agents or organs during particular typologies of police 
operation. The appropriate law to be applied in these cases is the human rights 
law which imposes very strict rules and requirements to this purpose. 
Necessity, proportionality and extreme threat may only authorize such a kind 
of lethal force usage. The use of drones in cases of domestic law enforcement 
operations is thus less justifiable considering the individual or minor threat 
represented by the suspected criminal or criminals compared to the enormous 
and infinite means at disposition of the government authorities in order to face 
with the isolated problems of domestic criminality. To the extent of this 
survey, the targeted killings through the use of drones in situations of inter-
State relations, outside situations of armed conflicts among the involved States 
represent the main challenge. The use of force in the international law short of 
any UN Security Council authorization (Article 2, § 4 of the Charter) or right 
to self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter) is to be considered violation of the 
equal sovereignty of the States. Outside the mentioned exceptions on the use 
of force under the international law, the use of force (use of drones for targeted 
killings) may be justified if the territorial States grants also express a clear 
consent for the conduct of such military operations. Military use of force in 
areas where no international armed conflict is registered, where no right to 
self-defence is legally claimed or no SC authorization is endorsed asks for 
explicit consent by the territorial State in order to grant legality to targeted 
killings. 
The biggest problem with the use of drones for the purpose of targeted 
killings is represented by the fact that in several cases bombs or missiles 
launched by them cause indiscriminate civilian victims and thus, violate the 
international humanitarian law. The problem surely does not question the 
                                                 
28 «[…] regardless of the enemy’s tactics, in order to protect the vast majority of civilians, 
direct participation may only include conduct close to that of a fighter, or conduct that directly 
supports combat. More attenuated acts, such as providing financial support, advocacy, or other 
non-combat aid, does not constitute direct participation» (Ibidem, 19). 
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admissibility of such war instruments but rather their use in full conformity 
with the humanitarian rules. If an armed conflict has not occurred, the use of 
drones may be justified for the reason of self-defence; in cases of conflicts 
involving at least one non-State party, their use may constitute a clear violation 
of the international norms. For these reasons there is an enormous need for 
transparency and accountability in cases of use of drones for targeted killings. 
State practicing targeted killings through drone technology should guaranty 
the maximum of these both requirements in order to comply, in consideration 
of the particular nature of these weapons, with the international law. 
 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
 
The achievement of global security is better realized when the 
members of the International Community fully comply with the rules of ius ad 
bellum in inter-State relations. Thus, the use of drones in the international law 
as a form of use of force should necessarily meet the requested criteria of self-
defence or UN Security Council authorization. In these cases the Geneva 
humanitarian regime which imposes severe and strict rules for the conduct of 
hostile activities, whose main goal aims the reduction of the causalities is 
applied. The protection of the civilians and other subjects not participating 
directly in the hostilities is a cornerstone of international humanitarian norms. 
The use of drones during belligerent operations is not questioned but rather 
their use in conformity with the «laws of war». Any disproportionate use of 
drones during armed conflicts constitutes war crimes, punishable according to 
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and relative Protocols. 
Targeted killings are tolerated in case of express and explicit consent 
of the territorial State towards such kind of tactics in its territory. When a 
conflict occurs between a State and a non-State actor, the use of drones may 
be lawful only if the territorial State grants proper consent. Outside these 
cases, the use of remotely piloted aircrafts is severally prohibited causing in 
this way the international responsibility of the author State for unauthorized 
use of force in the territory of another State. Except the international 
responsibility of the State for illegitimate use of force human rights law is also 
applicable, in consideration of the fact that this kind of operations in time of 
peace are considered extrajudicial and, thus, arbitrary deprivation of life. 
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Abstract 
Many factors worldwide express interest in using intelligence or 
intelligence operations in realization of their interests. Intelligence practice is 
practiced by collective security systems, state and non-state elements, private 
agencies, business corporations, formal and informal armed groups, criminal 
and terrorist organizations and others. All of them implement different models 
and procedures of intelligence in support of their activities. The measures and 
activities of intelligence are not a simple matter. They represent a complex and 
orderly matter of covered procedures, behaviors, prevention, combating illegal 
activities and building policy of implementation of national security. 
This paper aims to convey the quality settings, ideas, theories and 
models to support the goals of national security, primarily the security of the 
state and the state institutions. The application of theories and models 
contribute to early warning and prevention of potential threats, dangers and 
risks and achieving success in operations against the challenges of present 
time. Key aspects of intelligence represent its content concerning the 
organization, functioning and positioning of services and authorities, media 
information security, intelligence analysis, operation of military intelligence, 
intelligence in countering irregular warfare and hybrid threats, the 
effectiveness of criminal intelligence and others. 
Theories, models and challenges are the basis for democratization of 
modern intelligence and maintaining the level of efficiency. This approach 
allows further understanding of intelligence as a tool of the state, the public 
and the private sector. 
Key words: intelligence, security, models, challenges 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Intelligence as one of the state trades is not a new phenomenon, on the 
contrary, it is one of the oldest professions in the world. In the modern world, 
the need for collecting information is extremely necessary for national 
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security1. It requires use of organized and structured process of planning, 
collection, processing, analysis, fabrication, delivery and management of 
important information, especially for security and defense of the state, the 
collective systems, the international factors and the global interests. According 
to another source, intelligence is information, which is systematically 
processed and evaluated and which justifies the needs of the decision makers2. 
Modern intelligence is based on systematic research on the risks, threats, 
dangers and security manifestations of global disorder of the modern world. 
Phenomenology of intelligence is a complex term and it is an attempt to map 
the disturbance of peace and security and prevention of daily activities and 
events. The goals of modern intelligence are to achieve preventive and 
repressive system performance and improve the products and the effects of its 
existence and implementation. Practice identifies a number of activities and 
challenges that support or limit the functioning of intelligence systems. 
Modern intelligence results in divergence, transformation and emergence of 
new forms of applied intelligence, such as positive intelligence, emotional 
intelligence, corrective intelligence, ambient intelligence, computer 
intelligence, criminal intelligence, collective intelligence, security 
intelligence, defense intelligence, pro-active intelligence. On the other hand, 
significant aspects of formation of modern intelligence are: leadership, 
strategy, marketing, finance, human resources, technology, manufacturing, 
logistics, career development, individual finance, confidence, ideas and 
monitoring trends. This approach shows that the needs for intelligence 
challenge time and it’s a challenging profession. But even more important 
aspect of illustrating modern intelligence is finding a balance between the 
spread of democracy on the one hand and the opposition of asymmetric threats 
from the other side3. Implementation of intelligence activities in order to 
achieve security is a conflict between democratic culture, human rights, 
transparency in society, the level of conspiracy and security oriented 
intelligence capability. There is no guarantee of full implementation of 
security from the lowest to the highest level, but for the establishment of the 
foundations for intelligence support of national security, scientific and 
practical theories, models and challenges are significant. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jones M. „Is ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms? In J. Goldman (eds.) Ethnics of 
spying: A reader for the intelligence professional“, Scarecrow Press, Portland USA, 2010 
2 Lowethal M., Intelligence: from Secrets to policy, third edition, Washington D.C. CQ Press, 
2006 
3 Valentin F. The Intelligence Phenomenon in a New Democratic Milieu. Romania–A Case 
Study, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006 
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Contemporary intelligence theories 
Science is a systemic and organized activity whose intended objective 
understands of the truths of certain phenomena, events, and reactions to the 
phenomena. Theories of science and disciplines are created to achieve the 
goals and objectives. The result of the research is scientific knowledge, 
obtained with appropriate methods. Intelligence is a systematic process of 
action of entities, forces, time and space, in order to obtain relevant 
information and results related to security. Given that intelligence uses its own 
findings and thoughts (gnosis) and has its own language, learning and science 
(logos), it is confirmed that it deals with the needs and practices of mankind. 
The theory of intelligence needs its claims to be repeated continuously without 
the need to prove them once and for all. Intelligence activity uses ability to 
determine human and natural knowledge, information sources, significant 
changes, events and reactions, the volume and the limits of expression of the 
actions, issues, relationships, relations, measures and activities and much 
more. There are situations where intelligence realizes scientific research and 
practice less, and is more based on the universal problems of logic and 
knowledge of natural laws. Besides gnoseology, intelligence activities 
massively apply epistemology as a narrow part of the theory of knowledge, 
using the speech, word and science and specific scientific knowledge, 
principles and methods. The entire aforementioned are associated with the 
boundaries of human knowledge4. Many theorists around the world say that 
it's almost impossible to determine the objective properties of the phenomena 
in the world, indicating irrelevance of knowledge to the extent of uncertain, 
incomplete or inadequate, causing skepticism and doubt to results. The effects 
of intelligence theories reflect the determination of the essence of the field 
activities, defining them as "knowledge and knowledge about the world 
around us" as a prelude to the implementation of appropriate decisions and 
actions5. The true picture of the applicability of theories is perceived at 
strategic level, as attempt on the leaders to understand the benefits of 
intelligence at national and global level. 
Human knowledge and capabilities in terms of intelligence possess 
barriers of objective restrictions relating to the limited human and intellectual 
power, historical limitations, incomplete experience, undefined low budget 
aspects and impacts (social, security, cultural, military, etc.) The success of 
intelligence theories is in the flexibility of the possibilities and conditions that 
are built up with the times. The last few decades enable the development of 
new knowledge, sciences, disciplines and areas of research, allowing one 
scientific revolution every seven years. Intelligence entered the areas of 
                                                 
4 Vance Stojcev, „Metologija na voeni igri“, 2-ri Avgust, Stip, 2004 
5 Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, „Fact book on Intelligence“, 1991 
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ecology, criminology, economy, politics, defense, and other parts of the social 
sector with unprecedented boom, allowing space for advanced scientific 
research and technologies, research findings and research results. Thus, the 
boundaries of human knowledge have become extremely volatile, vulnerable, 
and sensitive to the factor ignorance. Intelligence is different in terms of daily 
information that can be found anywhere (from open sources), which do not 
require the use of scientific methods and human knowledge. The difference is 
the existence of conspiracy and method of collecting and processing 
information, which require a „software" or procedure. Abram N. Shulsky, 
claims that intelligence often includes access to information which the 
opposite side wants to deny6. Practice shows that sometimes about 95% of 
information that make important decisions is based on open sources, while a 
small percentage is derived from intelligence operations that can indicate the 
plans of the opposing party7. 
You can often meet the claim that after the events of 2001, mostly 
called upon profession that has experienced radical change is intelligence. By 
gathering information and preventive intelligence-security, analysis includes 
not only public institutions but also the private and public sector. Many 
universities offer studies for security and intelligence in order to obtain 
essential analytical skills. Such studies help to supply intelligence theories, 
ideas and thoughts, which appropriately support the social, economic and 
social, environmental and other social spheres in which conspiracy 
intelligence is still unknown. 
But why society and common man needs intelligence? Intelligence is 
a humanistic discipline, security skill and social product, which helps in better 
understanding of the world in the true sense. Intelligence enables monitoring 
of events, occurrences, various forms of behavior, threats, risks, safety 
indicators, the surrounding, nature, people, countries, and even the totality of 
the world. Ira Cohen in one of his works highlights several theories, including 
the following: power is experience that without the use of safe measures and 
activities generally decreases; it has no ability to deter actions with possible 
consequences; most options available, provide improved security; the greater 
security, the more improved conditions for the achievements, life, achieving 
goals; greater security creates greater safety in private life8. The exactness of 
intelligence is able to find solutions and options that are seriously considered 
by the relevant authorities. The results of the intelligence activity do not 
                                                 
6 Abram  Shulsky, „Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence“, 2nd ed., 
revised by Gary J. Schmitt, New York, 1993 
7 US Government Printing Office, Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities 
of the US Intelligence Community, „Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US 
Intelligence“ , Washington, 1996 
8 Ira Cohen, „Realpolitik: Theory and Practice“, Dickenson Publishing, California, 1975 
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constitute absolute option of the problem, but they are based on a degree of 
certainty and probability. The degree of improbability or uncertainty in the 
implementation of intelligence operations can be supplemented by actions 
which over the intelligence process could not have been foreseen or realized. 
In all this an important role can have the experience of solving cases and 
practice under good feeling, belief, trust and other aspects. Intelligence in 
some degree is associated with the concepts and theories as instruments, but 
in practice intelligence implements methodology, under which information is 
converted into intelligence. The process is based on methods used in applied 
research, which many sciences possess. The subject of applied research and 
the basis of modern intelligence is information. Information is rough data of 
any kind, which can be used to create intelligence (knowledge) 9. There are 
many difficulties to define the term information, but it is not impossible. What 
is possible is observation and description, which improves the efficiency and 
implementation of accurate data processing and analytical approach to the 
problem. Thus, the lack of physical presence in the emergence process, event 
or challenge, is supplemented by producing intelligence, using everything that 
might be called information. The information is associated with everyday 
human activities, ranging from morning awakening, through acquaintance 
with the news and the news of the weather forecast and the conditions for 
transport to work, afternoon obligations and lying to bed. Thus, it can be 
concluded that human existence is a hostage of information, which is 
important for survival. The theory of the existence of community and society 
is the result of the ability to collect, store and exploit the information from the 
individual, the group to the legal entity and vice versa, while the complexity 
of the society is in the transformation of the information into intelligence and 
its use by the intelligence services10. 
In scientific theory intelligence is defined in different ways, including 
the following: intelligence is action or process used to create knowledge 
(information); body for producing information11; intelligence is organization 
that uses the information (agency, authority, institution); intelligence is 
analysis, report or briefing, created by specialized agencies12; intelligence is 
organized activity of a social group, movement, party and part of state 
                                                 
9 M. Dojcinovski, F. Odzakov, „Razuznavacki operacii“, Solaris Print, Skopje, 2010  
10 H. Prunckun, „Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis“, The 
scarecrow Press, Inc, Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2010 
11 T. Schroeder, „Intelligence Specialist 3 & 2“, vol. 1, Naval Education and Training Program 
Development Center, Washington DC, 1983 
12 C. Andrew, R. Aldrich, and W. Wark, „Secret Intelligence: A Reader“, Routledge, London, 
2009 
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apparatus13; intelligence is the process of organized collection and processing 
of information14; intelligence is a product of collection, evaluation, analysis, 
integration and interpretation of current information15; intelligence is a system 
of implementation of measures and activities for collecting, processing, 
analyzing and disseminating of information16, etc. The definition of 
intelligence in a way that was indicated creates efforts in order for the 
intelligence phenomenology to improve the ability of society and reduce 
uncertainty, which will allow the adoption of appropriate decisions and 
policies, and will reduce the control and knowledge of the "unknown". 
 
Applied Intelligence in modern theories 
Applied Intelligence in the contemporary theory pays particular 
attention to: the aims, objects, subjects, persons of interest, events and 
indicators, where the context of utilization of the laws, business context, 
defense context and national security context have been identified. Special 
aspects in the application of intelligence, have their place in the intelligence 
process: intelligence cycle, the categories of intelligence, anatomy of 
intelligence and typology of intelligence.  
Intelligence cycle is a process in which information is processed within 
logically placed 
security-intelligence 
procedures as a whole 
in the intelligence 
services. It is a tool for 
production of 
intelligence, in which 
intelligence operations 
and actions are 
implemented and 
operated in sequence. 
The decision makers in 
setting research 
questions or advice for 
action initiate the 
cycle. In military 
intelligence structures can be found as the so-called "Intelligence requirement" 
                                                 
13 Т. Batkovski, „Razuznavacka, bezbednosna i kontrarazuznavacka taktika“, Solaris print, 
Skopje, 2008 
14 M. Dojcinovski, „Sovremeno voeno razuznavanje“, Solaris Print, Skopje 2009 
15 T. Troy, „The Correct Definition of Intelligence“, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 5, no. 4, 1991 
16 M. Dojcinovski, F. Odzakov, „Razuznavacki operacii“, Solaris Print, Skopje, 2010 
Mission
1. Direction
2. Gathering
4. Processing
7. Delivering 
3. Comparing
5. Analysis
6. Producting
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or "significant elements intelligence" EEI17. Intelligence cycle has seven steps, 
of which the first five are fully focused on intelligence, while the last two on 
using products from the intelligence cycle18. These include the establishment 
of the problem (planning and direction); Collection of information; 
Comparing the information; Information processing and analysis. This process 
ends with two additional steps: Preparation of a report and submitting of a 
report to the relevant authorities in order to formulate a decision. Various 
intelligence services use different intelligence cycles and applied 
methodological approach and implementation of the intelligence cycle in 
practice depends on many factors, such as volume, the time-required, the 
number of people and resources, space, technology, cooperation, coordination, 
expertise and other.  
In practice and depending on the needs, intelligence is implemented on 
strategic, operational and tactical level. Strategic intelligence works in support 
of the existence, development and protection of the defense segment of the 
state, her whole space, using the joint intelligence committee or appropriate 
body19. It provides policy development and planning, and make decisions on 
the use of forces 
and means. The 
operational level of 
intelligence 
support is 
associated with the 
implementation of 
operations that use 
the space provided 
for combined 
strengths and 
resources of 
different strength 
and in the 
operations are used 
intelligence forces 
and assets with 
significant capacity. In the implementation of operational and intelligence 
                                                 
17 Еssential elements of intelligence—EEI 
18 There is a difference in the definition. More see: R.McNamara, "Memorandum for the 
President, Subject: The Establishment of a Defence Intelligence Agency", Washington, 1986; 
J. Richelson, "The US Intelligence Community", Ballinger Publishing Company, New York, 
1989 
19 H. Prunckun, „Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis“, The 
scarecrow Press, Inc, Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2010 
levels of intelligence support
Level of Intelligence
strategic
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Intelligence 
support of
Tactical level
Military space
Civillian space 
National 
strategic
national 
policy 
and 
strategy
battleground more 
earmarked 
campaigns
battleground individual 
campaign
s
Brigade individual 
operations
battalion
tactical 
operations
Intelligence 
support of
strategic level
Intelligence 
support of
Operational levet
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support necessary  implementation of appropriate cooperation and 
coordination is necessary. This level determins the direction of engagement of 
national (strategic) forces and means. Tactical level of intelligence support is 
implemented within the areas of responsibility of the occupied space marked 
as "space for performing potential operations." It implements activities with 
short-range or time limitations. 
In modern intelligence, specific intelligence has significant 
application, such as applied research intelligence, counterintelligence, 
espionage, conspiracy and counterintelligence activities. Applied Intelligence 
research uses the achievements of other scientific disciplines. Such content 
often has decisive influence on the adoption of political and military decisions. 
The achievements of other sciences are an important contribution to the 
modern intelligence, but doubts or irrelevance of the same do not contribute 
to the efficiency of operation. Intelligence is the basis for opposing rival 
intelligence systems and processes. Its aim is to act timely in order to prevent 
and to warn of danger, risk and threat, which can cause huge damage. In fact, 
the use of counterintelligence operations, helps in protection of one’s own 
facilities, critical infrastructure, planning and operations. It reveals actively 
and it hinders the methods of operation of foreign intelligence services. 
Espionage is a form of action of intelligence services using a person - spy. 
Spies are agents working for the opposing side20. The information that these 
people obtain can not be obtained otherwise. Counterespionage is a severe 
form of implementation of tasks relating to make the activities of spies futile. 
In the intelligence practice counterespionage is known as the "aristocratic 
sector of covert operations." It is a complex activity of counterintelligence 
departments by which spies are "fed" with misinformation, in order to delay 
or prevent intelligence actions. Conspiracy or covert activities, are a set of 
measures and activities of personnel engaged in the so-called "Gray zone" of 
modern intelligence activities. The conspiracy and adaptation in the 
surrounding allows collecting information about incriminating activities and 
preparing analyzes, supporting material and financial activities, as well as any 
other type of operational activity, in the interest of their own intelligence 
services. Through covert actions their own positions are strengthened and the 
impact and efforts of the potential enemy is weakened21. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 E.  Zacharias, „Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer“,  New York, 1946 
21 D. Fiery, „Out of Business: Force a Company, Business or Store to Close Its Doors . . . For 
Good! “,  Washington, 1999 
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SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE MODELS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Modern research of intelligence leads to identification and finding 
specific models and concepts of intelligence features and operation and 
support of national security. Finding solutions to social problems and 
challenges is a crucial method of scientific and practical cognition. 
Intelligence approach should provide an explanation for the etiological and 
phenomenological features of security events and to reflect the truth of the 
research problem. Validation of the truth is not fully possible, but with the help 
of the models similarity and familiarity can be represented, and an incentive 
for further research can be given. Intelligence is a tool in the hands of 
professionals, which by means of planned and organized usage of media 
information leads to the "original" and "truth", and not only that, but also finds 
information about them.  
The support of public policy is impossible to be realized only through 
the functioning of state institutions. Security challenges as well as the 
consequences of global change require active participation of all actors in the 
field of scientific research and achievements. The last two decades have 
created conditions for complete transformation of the national systems, by 
setting priorities in the realization of national interests, such as internal 
security, defense, economy, ecology, computer science, industry, private and 
public sector and many others. 
On the basis of intelligence support of intelligence models, according 
to which are identified the ways of action are based "National Intelligence," 
"Military Intelligence", "Security Intelligence", "Criminal intelligence", 
"Business Intelligence" and "Counterintelligence". Besides the already 
existing types of intelligence, for a longer period theory and practice has been 
realized on the basis of intelligence disciplines: HUMINT, OSINT22, 
MASINT, IMINT, SIGINT etc.23, as well as the intelligence components-
intelligence in terms of: biography, economy, science and technology, 
transport and communications, geography, military, political system and 
sociological aspects24. 
Modern Intelligence follows the development of national systems and 
the steady growth in terms of coverage of social areas estimated that could be 
basis for challenges, risks, threats or hazards. The paper describes several 
specific concepts of intelligence for which intelligence theory and the concepts 
                                                 
22 E. Jardines, „Open Source publishing“, JMITC, DIA, http//www.osint.org 
23 DIA, „National intelligence course“, textbook, Washington, 2000 
24 DIA, „Intelligence Analyst course“, textbook, Washington, 2001 
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of support of creation of national interests open space for development of new 
intelligence models and concepts. 
 
Information Intelligence and Security 
Information Intelligence and Security is a multidisciplinary action 
through an organized approach for protection of national security goals, with 
address to different scientific disciplines (information science, electro-
technical sciences, social sciences, law, public policy, psychology, economics, 
cyber and the like). The terrorist events in the United States in 2001, confirmed 
the action of the fourth generation of wars (asymmetric and hybrid) and the 
impact from the threats has affected the development of information security 
and intelligence. Information technology has made a remarkable 
transformation in providing significant areas in national security. Based on the 
three strategic objectives, the strategy for national security25, prevention from 
terrorist threats, reducing of national vulnerability and minimizing the damage 
and recovery from the effects, are defined missions where information security 
and intelligence need to complete the objectives of the national strategy. These 
are: intelligence and warning; border security and transportation; opposing 
domestic terrorism; protection of critical infrastructure and critical assets; 
defense against catastrophic terrorism; emergency preparedness and 
responses. All of the above aspects of violation of national security are 
associated with the need for prevention and early warning regarding the use of 
information and information technology, through appropriate measures and 
activities to protect critical infrastructure26. Diversity of information and 
techniques and their protection is a requirement for the development of the 
Information Intelligence and Security, the determination of the main goals to 
advanced information technologies, systems, algorithms, databases for 
national security, and innovative applications through an integrated 
technological and organizational approach27. 
 
 Analytical Intelligence 
Analytical intelligence is the process of using a variety of methods to 
collect information and answers to research questions and requests. The 
analytical process depends on the way of processing information and the 
                                                 
25 Office of Homeland Security, „National Strategy for Homeland Security“. Washington 
D.C. 2002 
26 Chen, H., Moore, R., Zeng, D., and Leavitt, J. Intelligence and Security Informatics: 
Proceedings of the Second Symposium on Intelligence and Security Informatics“. Berlin: 
Springer, 2004 
27 Chen, H., Miranda, R., Zeng, D., Demchak, C., Schroeder, J., and Madhusudan, T., 
„Intelligence and Security Informatics: Proceedings of the First NSF/NIJ Symposium on 
Intelligence and Security Informatics“,Berlin, 2003 
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opportunities for confirmation from multiple sources. Modern analytical 
processing systems can perform fast and automatic data processing. The basis 
for successful implementation of analytical intelligence is information, which 
is why most successful analytical intelligence can provide spaces where there 
is crisis or enforced security and humanitarian operations, as well as anti-
insurgent operations. Some important questions about the usefulness of 
analytical intelligence are: data collection; inadequacy of the notices; 
problems with multiplied bases of information; lack of standard dictionaries; 
"friendly" information is not hacked; exchange of information between 
intelligence agencies28. Some of the identified techniques and methods for 
conducting analytical intelligence in support of anti-rebel could be the 
following:  
 Using cognitive patterns (factors and indicators related to the 
occurrence of the event); 
 predictive analyses according to which can be verified the findings 
from the processed information (confirming non-coincidental rebel 
attacks, historical overview of the events, estimates of the enemy 
adaptations, benefit from hiring local commands, confirming the 
importance of the local analysis, improving the current conditions for 
use of the authorities); 
 Analyses of rebel communications (connection of the rebels in 
network organization in the primary structures, creating a common 
picture of insurgent networks using current intelligence estimates, 
access to bigger number of activities, easy update); 
 Interaction of friendly and rebel forces (the creation of game theories, 
change of possible detection) 
 Access and implementation of game theory (analysis of the effects of 
space, time, activities and other aspects, using the missions and 
strategies, simulated activities in a hall); 
 Friendly-hostile interaction analyses: detection of response (drawing 
maps of areas of interest, noting the significant changes and 
observations of changes). 
Analytical Intelligence aims to monitor changes in the stages of 
evolution from one to another, especially when it comes to forms of violation 
of national security. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Walter L. Perry, John Gordon, „Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies“, 
National defense research institute, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2008 
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Emotional Intelligence 
Emotional intelligence has been an important characteristic in 
determining organizational performance in the last 20 years. It explores the 
impact on a person, population, groups, in terms of experience, health, 
success, happiness and efficiency. Conflict and conflict positions, as well as 
personal and organizational capabilities are important for this kind of research. 
Emotional intelligence is important for implementation of activities in an 
organized environment, such as a business enterprise firm, major corporations, 
public enterprises and the like. Basis for application of emotional intelligence 
is the constant increase in the pace of life and change. The reasons for change 
relate to: the effects of globalization, development of technology, IT progress, 
education, cultural differences, conservativeness of the systems and many 
others. Emotional intelligence is related to leadership and leaders who are 
expected to be facilitators and able to cope with the challenges of today. 
It has been written about emotional intelligence in the past, the 
following papers being evidence:  in 1920 Edward Thorndike first spoke of 
„Social intelligence“; 1940 David Wechsler, discussed „Non intellective 
aspects“; in 1966 Leunen published his work „Emotional intelligence and 
emancipation“; in 1974, Claude Steiner first published „Emotional Literacy“; 
Howard Gardner in 1983 published his first paper on „Multiple Intelligences“, 
in 1986 Wayne Payne used the term „Emotional intelligence" in their theories; 
in 1990 Peter Salovey and Jack Mayer published the book "Emotional 
Intelligence theory"; while in 1995 Daniel Goleman published his first work 
"Emotional intelligence books"29. 
Emotion by definition means "movement". This confirms that 
emotions are the basis of people’s movement, but the working definition of 
emotional intelligence should refer to the application to the usual practice 
relating to: the use of emotional information, integration of emotional 
information with one’s own analyzes and assessments, using the previous for 
decision-making about the current state and condition of life. In order to better 
understand emotional intelligence, one needs to cover the aspects of diversity, 
prediction, measurement, and variability development. To emphasize this type 
of intelligence, one needs to pay attention to feelings, to think about them and 
keep in mind what causes them. 
 
  
  
                                                 
29 Tim Sparrow and Amanda Knight, „Applied Emotional Intelligence“,Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco, 2006 
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Artificial intelligence 
 
Artificial Intelligence holds the interest of experts and researchers 
more and more. Artificial intelligence is trying to understand people's 
intelligence. Thus, one reason for existence is finding out about the 
characteristics of people. Artificial intelligence tries to create intelligent 
people and to understand them. The basis for development of artificial 
intelligence is creating an instrument with a human level of intelligence that 
has a huge impact on civilization30. A question for research is: how can a "little 
brain", whether biological or electronic, perceives, understand, predict and 
manipulate with the outside world. Artificial Intelligence has connection with 
intelligent programs. Considering that "artificial intelligence" an abstract term, 
additional explanation could apply to the following: 
 It is an effort to make computer thoughts, in full and literal sense31; 
  Artificial Intelligence is the automation of activities associated with 
human thinking, such as adopting various decisions, solving problems, 
different types of learning and other32; 
  It is the art of creating electronic devices which distribute intelligence 
functions by the staff33; 
 Artificial Intelligence could be identified as a branch of computer 
science, preoccupied with automation and intelligent behavior34. 
There are numerous studies on understanding the subject of research 
of artificial intelligence, especially in the area of mental capacity through the 
use of information infrastructure, studies and calculations of findings, causes 
and actions, studies for setting requirements for explanation of intelligent 
behavior in terms of information processes and others35. Much research on 
artificial intelligence is focused on several categories, including: systems 
thinking as people, systems thinking rationally, systems that act like humans 
and systems that act rationally. 
Theories and models of modern intelligence give picture of the 
progress of the security services and agencies in terms of content and method 
                                                 
30 Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig „Artificial Intelligence“, A Modern Approach, New 
Jersey, 1995 
31 Haugeland, J., „ Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea“. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.1985 
32 Bellman, R. E. „An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence: Can Computers Think?“,  San 
Francisco, 1978 
33 Kurzweil, R.,  „The Age of Intelligent Machines“. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1990 
34 Luger, G. F. and Stubblefield, W. A., „ ArtificialIntelligence: Structures and Strategies for 
Complex Problem Solving“, California,  second edition, 1993. 
35 Види: Winston, P. H. „ Artificial Intelligence“,  Massachusetts, third edition, 1992; Rich, 
E. and Knight, K. „Artificial Intelligence“, Mc Graw-Hill, New York, second edition, 1991 
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of use of information. The application of methods and techniques in modern 
intelligence enable coordinated use of many different theories of science and 
disciplines. Limited space in the paper does not provide enough space for 
presentation of the theories and practice of modern intelligence which occupy 
an important place, such as the theory of collective intelligence, intelligence 
for development of the environment and the surroundings, corrective 
intelligence, analytical intelligence and others. The challenges of using 
theories and models are the basis for adoption of conceptual and doctrinal 
solutions designed for wide application and supported with adequate 
cooperation and coordination. The theory and practice of the various theories 
and models of intelligence is intended for further consideration by experts and 
the expert community with the ultimate goal of applied use in everyday 
activities of modern intelligence. 
 
 Challenges of modern intelligence 
The consequences of global change have resulted in the appearance of 
security challenges and asymmetric threats throughout the world. Terrorism 
has become a global threat that has found its way of achieving goals on a large 
scale. There is violation of the national security of states in many regions 
political, economic and military crises were created and some of them erupted 
into open hostilities. The transformation of the regions is one of the dangers 
and challenges of modern intelligence. Although changing the character of the 
states was a specific period of transition and change for society from one 
system to another, there is still the danger of changing the territories of states 
and their borders in the region of Southeast Europe, the Middle East and 
beyond. As a result of strong political crises, whole regions entered the process 
of transformation, and the states of communities of Eastern Europe suffered 
collapse. Such processes drag the regions backwards, which in turn generates 
crises on larger scale. Radical activities recruit global terrorism for achieving 
political goals, while national-separatist movements gain progress. As a 
consequence of this comes to disintegration of entire intelligence community. 
As a result of the widespread acceptance of democracy and creating 
obstructions of attempts to establish modern democratic systems with or 
without respecting the basic principles of civil society appears aristocratic 
behavior. Certain intelligence services lose their identity, and intelligence 
activity turns into daily instrumentalized political activity of the, loyal" staff. 
The basis for aristocratic behavior of the position and maintaining one’s own 
position, as well as boost of the radical behavior enabled the appearance of 
corruption and organized crime, resulting in reducing the power of the 
intelligence and security services, that in such conditions receive opposite 
directions, undefined roles, becoming the main culprits for producing affairs, 
spreading misinformation, making misjudgments, conspiracies against certain 
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persons or target groups, all the way to the creation of internal forms of 
endangering national security. 
Affected regions lead to disturbance in the behavior of religions, 
especially the massive acceptance of the model of extreme (traditional) 
behavior and culture. Part of the population of the pro-Western democratic 
societies is in a difficult and unenviable situation with "feelings of protrusion" 
by their presenters and their governments. Intelligence systems in such cases 
have discriminated, dual role, or they use the system of "adjustment". 
"The revolution of the military potential" and its expansion, gain 
importance and in some regions the level of information security is violated 
and the region rearms, security is reduced, and planned and organized action 
of the units in the field is confused. As a result of the traditional habits of 
certain regions in the trafficking and weapons possession, this situation is 
encouraged both by state and non-state factors. Thus, motivation for using 
asymmetric threats occurs. 
Religious and ethnic conflicts are one of the biggest challenges of the 
21st century. They occur as a result of the vulnerability of the groups involved 
in them. The endangerment comes from the desire for appropriation of 
territories. It seems that modern intelligence loses connection and cooperation 
with the limited possibilities of government institutions36. In all of this, the 
law of force gains momentum, weapons, the theory of groups, social and 
sociological syndrome and loss of consciousness, the degradation of state 
mechanisms, losing confidence, the need for survival, the maintenance of the 
status in the community or region often depends on smuggling weapons, 
drugs, trafficking in people, etc. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The development and performance of modern intelligence systems 
depend on the support of technical achievements in the world of computer 
technology, electronics, telecommunications, the use of services of satellites 
and drones, geo-information and navigation systems and the massive 
application of highly developed intelligence technology, which fully change 
the list of priority requirements and contents of intelligence. Many countries 
joined partnerships, alliances, regional unification, and some joined most 
developed collective security systems (EU, OSCE, NATO), and with that they 
embraced the transformation of the security apparatus, training of staff and 
improvement of infrastructure facilities. Changes of essential character by 
means of which intelligence gained a significant role are results of the high 
level of threats, risks, hazards and challenges. The approach to the problem of 
                                                 
36 Tom Moctaitis, ,,Al Qaeda: A global Insurgency?, De Paul University, 2005 
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intelligence theories, models and challenges is a priority which progressive 
social systems must improve, transform and improve. 
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Abstract 
The end of the Cold War brings to the fore a new, nontraditional 
security threats that have risen in prominence marking the emergence of a new 
context for the international order and security environment. This is 
particularly important in the post conflict areas such as the Balkans. Countries 
in the Balkan are struggling to find sustainable frameworks for dealing with 
the new security challenges more systematically. Through the capacity and 
state institutions building for the improvement of primarily public safety, 
stability, and the overall prosperity in Southeast Europe, the integration 
process is well advanced so that today many countries of Southeast Europe are 
fully integrated in the European Union. In this paper, the authors give an 
overview of existing of regional mechanisms in South East Europe, related to 
confidence building and creation of a more secure region in today's world, 
emphasizing the objectives of those initiatives.  
Key words: region, security, initiative, cooperation 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The post Cold War period has marked а new, nontraditional security 
threats that have risen in prominence, marking the emergence of a new context 
for the international order and security environment. Today’s major security 
challenges such as terrorism, trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, 
environmental and healthcare crises and natural disasters increasingly require 
regional cooperation due to their cross–border nature. While the countries in 
the Balkans are embarking on the process of institutionalizing patterns of 
regional cooperation, more attention needs to be paid to creating institutions 
that are able to address these nontraditional security issues. We have also seen 
the development of international partnerships to fight new security threats 
between and among nations that are not connected by an alliance. At the same 
time, the dividing line between military and nonmilitary has become 
increasingly blurred, and those “grey areas” where it is difficult to differentiate 
between times of conflict and times of peace, are expanding. Countries in the 
Balkan region are struggling to find sustainable frameworks for dealing with 
new security challenges more systematically. Doing so will require 
broadening of the way we think about security and looking at these security 
challenges from a wider range of perspectives. It will also require taking into 
consideration the role of new sets of actors, both as instigators and as potential 
agents in addressing these new challenges. 
As noted in this paper, while regional institutions in South East Europe 
(SEE) have made enormous progress over the past 15 years, they still do not 
have much of a track record for implementing effective policies in the region 
or addressing some of the most serious challenges with which the countries in 
the region are facing. 
 
MORPHO-GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
REGION 
 
The Balkan Peninsula, popularly referred to as the Balkans, is a 
geographical region of Southeast Europe. The region takes its name from 
the Balkan Mountains that stretch from the east of Bulgaria to the very east 
of Serbia. The region is inhabited by different nations. The largest religion on 
the Balkans is Orthodox Christianity, followed by Catholic 
Christianity and Islam. The total area of the Balkans is around 790.000 square 
km and the population is around 57 million.1 The Balkans meets the Adriatic 
Sea on the northwest, the Ionian Sea on the southwest, the Mediterranean and 
                                                 
1  The Balkan Nations, Chapter 13 section 4 at: http://mrparmele.com/notes-balkan.html, 
Retrieved 01 Oct 2014. 
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Aegean Sea on the south and southeast, and the Black Sea on the east and 
northeast. The highest point of the Balkans is the mount Musala 2,925 meters 
(9,596 ft) on the Rila mountain range in Bulgaria. The Balkans has been 
inhabited since the Paleolithic and is the route by which farming from 
the Middle East spread to Europe during the Neolithic.2 The first attested time 
the name "Balkan" was used in 1490 3 although the concept of the "Balkans" 
was created in 1808.4 As time passed, the term gradually acquired political 
connotations far from its initial geographic meaning, arising from political 
changes from the late 19th century. This political connotations are newer and 
to a large extent, due to oscillating political circumstances. After 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the term "Balkans" again received a negative 
meaning, even in casual usage (see Balkanization). 
Due to the historical and political connotations of the term 
"Balkans", especially since the military conflicts of the 1990s, the term 
"Southeast Europe" is becoming increasingly popular even though it literally 
refers to a much larger area and thus is not quite precise.5 The abstracted term 
"the Balkans" covers those countries which lie within the boundaries of the 
Balkan Peninsula (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Balkan Peninsula 
                                                 
2 In the 7th millennium BC, Borza, EN, 1992, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of 
Macedon, Princeton University Press p. 58; Perlès, Catherine 2001, The Early Neolithic in 
Greece: The First Farming Communities in Europe, Cambridge University Press, p. 1 
3  Todorova, Maria. (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University Press US. p. 22  
4  German geographer August Zeune, Pavic, Silvia; (2000), Some Thoughts about the Balkans 
5  Bideleux, Robert; Ian Jeffries (2007). A history of Eastern Europe. Taylor & Francis, p. 37  
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Broadly interpreted, the Balkans comprises the following territories: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia and Turkey.6 Recently, the region is 
sometimes designated as Western Balkans, which is today, more of a political 
than a geographic designation for the region of Southeast Europe that is not 
part of the European Union (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Albania). Each country has the objective to join the EU and 
reach transmission scores (except those to have already done so), but until then 
they will be strongly connected to the pre-EU waiting program as CEFTA.7 
 
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION INITIATIVES 
 
Regional cooperation in the security sphere, with all its mechanisms of 
cooperation, primarily promotes and raises the overall security and stability in 
the region to a higher level and in this sense, the distinctive importance of 
regional cooperation is recognized. This is why Balkan countries actively 
participate in many regional incentives, either as a full member or as an 
observer. At the beginning of the 20th century in South Eastern Europe were 
launched a number of political, economic and regional security incentives with 
the purpose to preserve peace and stability in South Eastern Europe. In the 
further text, the most prominent will be mentioned in some details. 
South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM). Тhis forum has 
had a role in strengthening peace and stability in the region of South Eastern 
Europe and importantly has contributed to peace efforts further afield. SEDM 
forum has been effective, with dialogues aimed at building a more secure and 
prosperous region through close regional cooperation and sharing common 
goals between member countries and observer nations.8 It has achieved an 
internationally recognized image, including being held as an excellent model 
of mutual cooperation among the States that are committed to strengthen 
international peace and stability: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia, 
Turkey, Ukraine and the US (14 countries). Within the SEDM incentive 
member countries actively participate in the implementation of the following 
activities: 
                                                 
6  Bideleux, Robert; Taylor, Richard (1996). European integration and disintegration: east 
and west. pg. 249 
7 Central European Free Trade Area. Perspectives on the Region 
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/ publications/ books/Unfinished%20Business%20Pdf / ch01 
Bieber.pdf, retrieved on 23 Sep 2014 
8  SEDM. http://www.mapn.ro/sedm/concept/MPFSEE-SEDM/index.php, retrieved 26th 
September 2014. 
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 SEESIM (the SEE Simulation) - networking of SE Europe countries in 
the event of natural disasters, 
 SEEDIRET (SEE Defence Industries, Research and Technology), 
South Eastern Europe countries cooperation in the military industry, 
research and technology, 
 SIMIHO (Satellite Interconnection of Military Hospitals of the SEDM 
countries), satellite linking of SEDM members military hospital, 
 CBSC (Counterproliferation, Border Security, Conterterrorism), 
includes cooperation in combating the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, security of borders and the fight against terrorism. 
 SEMEC (SEE Military Education Cooperation), cooperation in the 
field of military education. 
 
Within the incentive exists the Political Military Steering Committee 
(PMSC) with a purpose to track  implementation of MPFSEE (Agreement of 
the Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe). Full member nations 
of the Committee of the Multinational Peace Force are actively involved in the 
work and participation in SEEBRIG-in, i.e. active contribution (financial and 
manpower). SEEBRIG (Southeastern Europe Brigade) is a brigade composed 
of the units of the MPFSEE armed forces. According to this document, the 
purpose of SEEBRIG is a contribution to the regional stability and security 
and the expansion of good-neighborly relations among the countries of South 
Eastern Europe (currently 7 nations participate). Units assigned to SEEBRIG 
remain in their bases and will be subordinated to the exercises and operations 
following a decision by the participating countries and relevant guidance and 
coordination of PMSC. This incentive is seen as a comprehensive mechanism 
for regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe. 
Balkan countries Chiefs of the General staff Forum B9 was established 
at the incentive of Greece and Turkey in 2006. The purpose of the Forum is to 
review and strengthen the model of military cooperation of the Balkan 
countries, as well as the model of answer to all security challenges, risks and 
threats in the region. Most of the Forum activities are training and education 
or activities aimed to acquisition of the required level of interoperability that 
enables joint engagement in a variety of situations. This is primarily related to 
the implementation of joint military exercises, as well as making the annual 
estimates of asymmetric threats in the Balkans. Conference of the Forum has 
been implemented once a year for the purpose of its implementation. There 
are meetings of coordination groups, sub-groups for training, education and 
exercises (cooperation centers, joint exercises, networking of simulation 
centers, shared web sites, etc.), subgroups of asymmetric threats and team 
project configuration SEEETN, if necessary, and conferences for the 
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realization of joint exercises. So far there have been seven conferences of the 
Forum. 
US-Adriatic Charter (A-5) incentive was formally launched in 2003, 
when the foreign ministers of the USA, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in 
Tirana signed a document entitled "US - Adriatic Charter". The objective of 
this incentive is to strengthen security and stability as a prerequisite for faster 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic integration as well as strengthening of the 
democracy and minority rights. The main areas of cooperation are: combating 
terrorism, combating cross-border crime and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, corruption and drug trafficking. The incentive encourages the 
ongoing reform of the armed forces of the member states and their mutual 
military cooperation. In addition to the USA, five countries: Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia, take part as full 
members. Serbia and Slovenia have an observer status in this incentive. It is 
intended to be a supplement or an additional instrument for accelerating of the 
euro integration, but also a good mechanism to further strengthen the regional 
cooperation and stability, which will significantly support focus of security 
and defense institutions in the direction of creating relatively dimensioned, 
efficient, modern and affordable armed forces. As a concrete way of 
participation in the security cooperation, in 2011 and 2012, under the umbrella 
of A-5, states participated with a group of military instructors in ISAF in 
Afghanistan. 
The Center for Security Cooperation – RACVIAC. This Center was, as 
an idea and a project, created as part of the Stability Pact in 2000. It begins 
work as a multinational regional center for assistance in the implementation 
of arms control agreements to all SEE countries that have signed the same and 
initially dealt with arms control and application of confidence building 
measures and security. The role of the Centre is to strengthen the dialogue and 
cooperation through the partnership of the member states and the other 
international actors in order to contribute and support regional security and 
stability. The activities of the Centre are extended over time and focal areas of 
cooperation include: cooperative security with a focus on arms control, a 
security sector reform, international and regional cooperation aimed at 
European integration. The Center consists of permanent and associate 
members as well as the observers. Permanent member states (core) are: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia and Turkey. Affiliate members are: Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. States with observer status 
are: Canada, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the USA. The Center 
is financed by annual contributions of permanent and associate member 
countries. The most important and managing body of the Centre is the 
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Multinational Advisory Group – MAG, consisting of representatives of the 
Member States at the level of deputy ministers. Center cooperates with the 
UN, OSCE, NATO and other sub-regional, regional and global international 
organizations. RACVIAC is at the top of regional incentives with over 30 
activities on an annual basis in areas of importance to the region, faced with 
the same problems and obstacles and which are in the similar stages of the 
process of european integration. 
Since 2011, Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC)9 
inherit success of Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which 
was launched in 1996 at the inaugural conference in Geneva based on the 
understanding of the common issues of the EU and the US, as an alternative 
to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the innovative strategy to help South 
Eastern Europe out of the crisis after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The objective 
of SELEC, within the framework of cooperation among the Competent 
Authorities, is to provide support for the Member States and enhance 
coordination in preventing and combating crime, including serious and 
organized crime, where such crime involves or appears to involve an element 
of trans-border activity. The new Convention provides for SELEC to: 
Coordinate regional operations and support investigations and crime 
prevention activities of the Member States in trans-border cases; Provide the 
Member States with the opportunity to exchange information and criminal 
intelligence and offer operational assistance in a quick and timely manner; 
Collect, collate, analyze, process and disseminate information and criminal 
intelligence; Produce strategic analysis and threat assessments related to its 
objective; Establish, operate, and maintain a computerized information 
system, which implies also to ensure the protection of personal data. There are 
12 member states: the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, the Hellenic Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Turkey.10 
Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (ASAC). Following the 
signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Dayton, arms control in South Eastern Europe is intensifying. 
Annex 1B of the Agreement defines the elements of arms control between the 
warring parties. Based on the Article IV of the Annex 1B and under the 
auspices and with the assistance of the Personal Representative of the 
Chairman of the OSCE, the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control 
(ASAC) was signed in 1996. Parties to the Agreement were: the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, the Former Yugoslav 
                                                 
9 www. selec.org, Retrieved 06. April 2015 
10 Ibid 
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Republic of Macedonia, and Croatia. The aim of the Agreement is to establish 
a balance between the armed forces of the Parties in the Agreement defining 
the limitations in five categories of conventional weapons: battle tanks, 
armored combat vehicles, artillery caliber of 75 mm or more, combat aircraft 
and attack helicopters. The area of the application of the Agreement 
encompass today: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia. 
The application of this agreement is a significant effort in the way of 
confidence and security measures building and creation of good neighborhood 
relations in the region. 
South East Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC). Forum for cooperation of 
the Western Balkan countries in the field of defense - SEEC is a regional 
security incentive launched in 2004 at the suggestion of Slovenia and US 
Army in Europe. The aim of the SEEC was to achieve a better coordination of 
donors in providing assistance to countries in the South Eastern Europe region. 
Meetings at the level of Deputy Ministers of Defense of the region were 
introduced in 2007. They were intended as a mechanism to SEEC partner 
countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, 
Montenegro, and Slovenia) to identify and mutually agree on proposals for the 
establishment of regional centers and more effectively focus on donors’ 
assistance. Forum members agreed in 2009 on the establishment of three 
regional centers, namely NBC Center in Serbia, the Centre for Peacekeeping 
Operations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (PSOTC) and the Media Centre in 
Macedonia. As the project developed under the auspices of the SEEC, in 
accordance with the conclusions of the 1st Conference of Military Medicine of 
the South Eastern Europe countries, a group was formed to evaluate the 
capacity of the military medical services of the South Eastern Europe 
countries. Working groups are related to the development of a Concept of the 
Balkan Military Medical power and defining the need for training of medical 
personnel in the armed forces. On the 2nd Regional Conference on Military 
Medicine held in 2013, Serbia was nominated as a leading nation (framework 
nation) for Balkan Medical Task Force - BMTF. At the final meeting of the 
SEEC, which was held in 2014 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was concluded 
that the SEEC ceases to operate in the current format and that certain 
functionality SEEC to maintain to ensure the coordination of regional training 
centers, the future BMTF and possibly new projects. It was also agreed to 
continue with the meetings of the Political Directors of SEEC functionalities. 
Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The process of 
cooperation in South Eastern Europe was launched on Bulgaria's proposal at 
a meeting of foreign ministers of South Eastern Europe in 1996. The incentive 
was originally called "The process of good neighborly relations, stability, 
security, and cooperation among the countries of South Eastern Europe." It 
was launched with the purpose to transform the South Eastern Europe in a 
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region of stability, security, and cooperation through the promotion of a 
mutual dialogue and cooperation at all levels and in all areas of common 
interest. The aim of this incentive is to strengthen security and stability, 
development of democracy, judicially, and combating illegal activities as a 
precondition for faster inclusion in the Euro integration. The incentive 
encourages the ongoing reform of the armed forces of the member states and 
their mutual military cooperation. This incentive encompasses the eleven 
participating countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, and 
Turkey. Bosnia and Herzegovina is after active participation as an observer at 
full capacity involved in the activities of the SEECP in 2008. SEECP is the 
only authentic incentive that came from the countries of South Eastern Europe, 
as a sort of "voice of the region." SEECP activities taking place at summits of 
heads of state or government, meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, as well 
as at the level of political directors of the foreign ministries of the participating 
states, whose main role is to provide policy guidelines for the promotion of 
regional cooperation. Also, the Meetings of the Troika as a permanent 
coordinating body consisting of the current, former and the future President of 
the Forum. Meetings at the level of line ministries are held as needed to discuss 
some issues that are of interest to the member states. In the future work of 
SEECP it is expected a more active approach to issues such as education, the 
prospects for development of railway transport, the development of small and 
medium enterprises, women entrepreneurs, consular issues and engagement in 
further shaping of the relationship between the SEECP and the Regional 
Cooperation Council. Bosnia and Herzegovina expects more efficient 
coordination and synchronization of regional cooperation in South Eastern 
Europe. 
Southeast Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group – 
SEEGROUP. SEEGROUP is a regional incentive, which in addition to a 
regional support to individual countries supports the whole region, in the 
process of achieving common standards for membership in the broader 
security integration process. SEEGROUP objective is to help regional 
practical cooperation in the field of defense and security, and to promote the 
harmonization and coordination between the countries in the region. At the 
suggestion of NATO and as part of the Incentive of South Eastern Europe 
(Round Table of the Stability Pact for Security Affairs) SEEGROUP is 
established in 2000 and its objective is to help regional practical cooperation 
in the sphere of defense and security and to promote the harmonization and 
coordination between countries in the region, through the identification of 
gaps in existing security support as well as identification of potential areas and 
the need for additional assistance that could be used for regional cooperation. 
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SEEGROUP brings together 32 member countries (20 NATO member 
countries and 12 partner countries). 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Regional Cooperation Council 
(RCC) is the successor to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP), a 
regional incentive formed in 1999.11 The entire process of defining new 
concepts of regional cooperation took place in the framework of the Stability 
Pact and the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), with active 
participation of the European Commission and a number of interested donors. 
At the Summit of the SEECP in 2007 the Statute RCC was adopted and the 
two-year process of transformation of the Stability Pact in the RCC was 
finished in 2008. Through the establishment of the RCC the "structure" of 
regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe was formed, where the 
backbone of the new concept of cooperation makes the SEECP as the main 
political forum, and the RCC functionally associated with the process. The 
Regional Cooperation Council meets in full format once a year, in parallel 
with the Summit of the SEECP. The operational body, the RCC Board 
consisting of national coordinators of the participating institutions and funded 
by the RCC Secretariat meets quarterly. The RCC Secretariat has a Liaison 
Office to the EU in Brussels. The Regional Cooperation Council is comprised 
of eleven participating countries in South Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, 
Serbia, Turkey, and Montenegro, the UNMIK "on behalf of Kosovo in 
accordance with UNSCR 1244", the EU is represented by the Troika – the 
chairman of the EU Council, the Commission and the Council Secretariat, the 
European Parliament, as well as a number of countries and institutions. Since 
2013, representatives of the interim institutions in Pristina have been presented 
with a "Kosovo with a footnote“ in accordance with the agreement reached in 
the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The RCC is focused on the 
following priority groups: economic and social development, energy and 
infrastructure, justice and home affairs, cooperation in the security sector, as 
the "umbrella" theme, which is included in all of these priorities - 
strengthening human capital and parliamentary cooperation. South Eastern 
Europe region got the oportunity through this incentive, and guided by their 
own needs and priorities, to cooperate in the reform and the EU integration. 
The aim is that RCC is not a replica of the previous mechanisms for 
autonomous, dynamically oriented cooperation model of immediate benefit to 
the region of South Eastern Europe. 
South Eastern European Military Intelligence Chiefs – SEEMIC; On 
the incentive of the RCC, on an annual basis, under the auspices of the Director 
                                                 
11  Regional Cooperation Council. http://www.rcc.int/pages/2/overview, retrieved on 25th 
September 2014 
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of the Military Intelligence headquarters of the EU since 2009, held a 
conference of heads of the military and intelligence agencies and institutions 
of the countries of South East Europe (SEEMIC), members of the RCC. The 
aim of these activities is the development and improvement of military 
cooperation and intelligence services and institutions, countries of South 
Eastern Europe, RCC members, and through dialogue, to build a common 
understanding of the ways and modalities of coordination of activities in the 
prevention and countering modern security threats, challenges and risks.  
 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
 
Regional and sub-regional organizations have proliferated since 1945 
and many of them have had the overt or existential mission of security and 
confidence building. There has, however, been a few new generic analyses of 
the role of the region in relation to security, while the established analytical 
models - the alliance, the collective security system, the security regime and 
the security community - often fail to capture either the discourse actually 
used, or the work done, by today’s real-life groupings. A new analysis in terms 
of security functionality points to at least four sets of achivements that a 
regional security group can perform (often concurrently). 
The most basic is the security dialogue and conflict management, 
aimed at establishing or maintaining peace within the region. Regional 
organizations have explicit conflict prevention and management instruments 
to this end and the EU is the most ambitious in seeking to extend its influence 
for the purpose worldwide. Second, regional incentives can develop systems 
of military cooperation based on mutual restraint - to reduce dangers from 
military activity (like the confidence building measures)12 or on shared 
capacity building for older-style defence and new-style peace missions, which 
is now a key ambition for the African Union as well as the NATO and the EU. 
Third, regional organizations can expressly promote democratic standards in 
government, and respect for human rights, as ways of bolstering peaceful and 
secure conditions as well as being ends in themselves. This ambition has been 
a main feature of the European organizations but has faced greater cultural and 
practical obstacles in other. Fourth, regional cooperation could promote 
security by advances in purely economic fields and by cooperative approaches 
to the functional risks and challenges including those presented by the new 
threats. 
Regional security cooperation can also be examined from the 
viewpoint of normative quality and effectiveness. Relevant criteria are 
                                                 
12 Developed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE. 
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whether the cooperation is free and democratically conducted, or coerced and 
hegemonic. Whether it takes a zero-sum approach or it is rigidly framed or 
shows ability to grow and adapt or it gives an appropriate return on the efforts 
invested. It is difficult to say what conditions make such cooperation possible 
or impossible: some groups have worked well even with one member much 
bigger than the others, in regions with a great diversity of states, among states 
of different material levels of development and even in face of severe cultural 
and historical differences. The regional security cooperation has become well 
entrenched across much of the globe and continues to spread. Critics may 
dispute its usefulness in face of the toughest security challenges and it is true 
that even the strongest regional groups have imperfect records and could not 
pretend to master all such challenges on their own. Their strength lies rather 
in finding non-conflictual paths to difference resolution and peace-building 
and in exploring the added value of multi-state cooperation for new as well as 
old security tasks. In principle, their security achievements can be of more 
general value so long as they work within the framework of the UN and other 
global norms but much remains unclear about their impact on practical global 
politics. Further objective research into the regional security phenomenon 
would be useful from this viewpoint and also for discovering the best ways to 
help those regions most obviously bereft of its benefits. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Maintaining regional security cooperation is one of the most important 
interests of the Balkan countries. It is an important factor for creating political 
stability, security and economic prosperity. The regional security cooperation 
is instrumental in addressing key security challenges, such as organized crime, 
corruption, border management, and illegal migration. Security cooperation 
among Balkan countries could be considered the most relevant indicator of the 
stabilization in the region since it requires cooperation precisely among those 
parts of the Balkan societies which were most active in the recent 
wars. Regional security cooperation is not new for the Balkan countries; these 
are already members of various regional groupings. The external pressure for 
regional cooperation is an additional factor which fosters the security 
cooperation between the states. 
Regional security cooperation is a necessity in the Balkans in order to 
tackle issues of key security challenges, attracting foreign investments to the 
region, and strengthening disaster preparedness. Fostering cooperation is also 
one of the criteria of EU membership, as this organization takes in only those 
countries that show maturity in the relations with their neighbors. 
Nevertheless, regional cooperation should not be mistaken for a substitute for 
EU integration but rather as important preparation for EU membership. 
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The Balkan countries have made significant progress in improving the 
regional security. Despite all positive developments in the regional security 
cooperation, there are still security challenges which require attention from 
all. Advancements in the combating organized crime, political extremism and 
radical structures are crucial for the Balkan countries in order to achieve long 
term security and stability. There has been a significant decline in ordinary 
crime in the Balkans but organized crime and corruption are still present. 
These activities are facilitated by poor law enforcement. 
There are also several challenges which the Balkan countries must face 
in the near future. The organized crime networks contribute to the proliferation 
of extremism in the countries of the region and the exports of illicit products 
to the EU. In addition, the Balkan countries need to suppress arms trafficking 
and other forms of organized crime. The necessary measures to tackle these 
threats are in place but they are not always implemented. This is due to the 
weakened state institutions, political and criminal interests and the lack of 
human and financial resources. In order to reduce the risk of escalating 
outbursts of violence, more attention should be given to education and 
training. Though already relatively well-functioning, control and oversight 
mechanisms should be strengthened. Accountability, currently the weakest 
element in the security sector governance in the Balkan countries, needs 
further support.  
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Abstract 
   Seen through a comparative perspective, it can be concluded that in 
the administrative and legal theory and in practice as well, are differentiated 
two systems of selection: spoils system and political recruiting of meritocracy 
system. The core of the first system lays in the political patronage and 
sponsorship, while the core of the other lays in the professional skills and 
competences. These two dichotomous concepts come to the fore and the 
creation of personnel policy within the security institutions. 
   In countries with groggy and insufficient security forces that are still 
wandering through the labyrinths of obscure transitional tunnels and where the 
democratic political system is in a rudimentary stage of development, and 
values and morals are twisted and folded at the bottom of the social pyramid 
and where the virus has devastating epidemic politicization effect, there are 
still present symptoms of decadent spoils system in all aspects of the security 
system. 
   In contrast, in crystallized state law works with functional 
institutional structures, the merit system is built as a major substrate in the 
security architecture. They are constituted by the real values and professional 
standards where in the mindset of the staff permanently circulates the sense to 
meet the public interest. 
   The spoils system causes atrophy of the vital organs of the security 
body, but also generates decadence of the overall security infrastructure. In 
order to work effectively, the multidimensional and far-reaching adverse 
implications produced by the spoils system are in need of consistent political 
will and mobilizing mass action in which the participants would be all relevant 
stakeholders. Also a wide range of systematic, institutional, complementary 
and interdependent measures are required instead of empty declarative 
floccules-coiffed demagogic statements. 
   In my article the accent is put on the commitment to unconditional 
and urgent depolitization, as condition sine qua non for creating efficient and 
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effective security apparatus. So the intention is installation of the meritocracy 
values in the cells of the security system without any compromise.  
   The security services need real professionals, people who will feel 
the spirit and the rhythm of these services, people who will know well the 
complex of their issues and will have the capacity of independent and creative 
thinking. Only the officers with this background will have the potential to cope 
with the many social-security risks, challenges and temptations. 
   Key words: security authorities, selection, officers, spoils system, 
merit system. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
    
   Security services are qualitatively differentiated institutional entities 
that make up the central core of the state apparatus and whose fundamental 
mission is to create and deliver community. In other words, the mission is to 
help those people who need to do something but they cannot do it at all, or 
cannot do it so well with their separate capacities.  
   Metaphorically speaking, the function of the security authorities 
within the state “organism” can be compared with the function of the white 
blood cells in the human organism. 
Persons in security authorities (Ministry of Interior, Office of Security 
and Intelligence, Ministry of Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) have the 
status of civil servants and fall under the regime of public law. Furthermore 
they perform analytical work, normative – legal work, executive, 
administrative, supervisory and informational work and record keeping, 
professional–operative, technical and operational work, information-
technology, office and archival work, legal issues related to decision-making, 
as well as work that covers human resources. 
These people as a substantial element of the national - security 
mechanism and its main cell perform authoritative activities whose power 
vivify and provide the leadership role of the state in society. 
The choice of the people, their deployment on additional jobs and 
determining their duties and powers in the process of work, represent leading 
a personnel policy whose essence is summarized in the motto “The right man 
in the right place" (Vitanski 2014, 110). Accordingly, it includes a set of 
activities to ensure that the right people are in the right place at the right time 
in order to carry out the planned activities and projects so that the security 
authorities will quicken their strategic goals. 
   Comparative practice has detected more criteria which are used for selection 
of the staff in different countries. Remarkable is the fact that in some countries 
the relapses of spoils system are still nested in their institutional womb, besides 
the fact that the regulatory framework and declarative floccules of the state 
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representative are in the direction of expertise and competence. On the other 
hand, in practice, by using sophisticated mechanisms, the ruling political 
parties have the primacy of employment. In contrast, in contemporary, modern 
design and functional democratically indoctrinated established systems, the 
criteria for selection of personnel can be both their training and expertise for 
certain positions or their general competence and intellectual capacity. In the 
background of this choice by personal qualities lies the assumption that the 
service should be able to choose the best possible staff and the employment 
based on quality is a logical way to fill the positions with the most qualified 
personnel (Peters 2009, 99). Because of the fact that the security institutions 
constitute the core of the authoritarian state mechanism, systematic selection 
and promotion which are immanent for the overall administration have a 
strong reflection on the engineering personnel within the security system.  
   Consequently, in the essence of the administrative security architecture can 
be embedded attributes of the meritocratic system on one hand, or the 
immanent elements of the dilettante-political spoils system can dominate, on 
the other hand. 
 
2 PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT OF SECURITY 
AUTHORITIES 
 
   All security services, namely, all the clerical positions are available 
to all the citizens equally who fulfill the explicitly specified and legally 
prescribed conditions. This expresses the fundamental constitutional principle 
of equality of citizens before the law. Both stated constitutional rules which 
constitute a symbiosis are: 1) The clerical position should not be limited 
according to the citizen ethnicity, race, religion, etc. and 2) the acquisition of 
these positions can not be based on any privileges by birth, property and 
inheritance similarities. 
   The principle of equal access does not mean that personal 
qualifications would have no meaning in recruitment in the security services, 
and that people who have qualifications and those who do not have ones would 
be treated equally. On the other hand, the principle of equitable access to 
services degrades if vacancies are filled in secret, i.e. they are known only by 
privileged candidates. Therefore, clerical places should be filled on the basis 
of competition, which to some extent will quicken the principle of equal 
access, and it will allow the body that sets broad selection to choose the best 
candidate among multiple ones.  
   Parsons and Shils use the terms achievement and assignment to 
describe how different social systems implement the hiring process. 
According to them, in societies which are inclined to pursue, the place an 
individual occupies depends on his skills. Progress also depends on what he is 
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able to do, not on the conditions at his birth. In other societies, however, hiring 
is based on the criterion of assignment: class, status, race, language, caste, 
gender, so the position of the individual depends on a “fatal determinant ", the 
fact that he is in a “fatalistic” position and can not avoid the impact of the 
conditions and preferences at birth (Peters 2009, 62). 
   Individualism and equality should constitute the core of the decisions 
about who will be employed. Valuable premises of individualism prompt 
establishment of a competitive recruitment process. This implies that the best 
qualified person for a given position will be recruited. The concept of equality, 
on the other hand, requires personnel policies to ensure equal opportunity and 
access to employment in institutions of all relevant groups in society (Magor 
2009.95). 
    The concept of equal opportunities in employment has political, 
cultural and emotional overtones. It is a set of procedures and practices that 
effectively protects a person from being excluded from the opportunity for 
employment because of his race, color, sex, religion, age, national origin or 
other factors. Namely, according to the law the above mentioned factors 
should not be taken in consideration in the screening of the candidates. 
    At the heart of discrimination stands intolerance in the workplace 
towards those who are different. Consequently, there is a failure in the 
treatment of equality. Any action which has the effect of limiting the 
opportunities for employment and advancement because of one's sex, race, 
color of skin, age, national origin, religion, physical disability, etc., whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, means discrimination-which is illegal. 
    
3 SYSTEMS FOR SELECTION OF OFFICERS IN SECURITY 
AUTHORITIES 
 
 3.1 Spoils System 
   In the genesis of the spoils system are engraved political criteria for 
selection of officers. 
    Spoils system is best known system of political patronage and 
favoritism, which in the United States ruled from 1829 to 1883. This was first 
recorded attempt to create an ideological basis for a system of patronage, and 
it is proclaimed to be the only possible one in a democratic political system. 
    Initially, the patronage was seen as a mechanism which provided 
political sympathy with the needs of the working and middle classes, who had 
just acquired the right to vote. This patronage gave a greater opportunity and 
employment in the authorities to these kinds of groups (Magor 2009, 96). 
   The term spoils actually means that the winning party or a coalition 
grabs the overall grip of administrative posts, which afterwards are given to 
its members and supporters. Spoils system was officially explained in 1832, 
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but it was practiced during the reign of the Presidents Adams and Jefferson. 
Thus, during his tenure, President Adams filled the administration places 
mostly with his friends and party trainees. Jefferson had followed the same 
path. He was severely pressed by his party supporters to remove federal 
officers’ positions and to put Republican followers in their place. Initially, 
Jefferson did not plan to fire officials only because of their political 
background. He believed that only “wrong working is the basis to resolve 
somebody from their position, not because they have a different political 
opinion" (Shafric, DZH.M Russell, ev, and Boriko, K. P 2009, 555). However, 
later, Jefferson deviated from his consistent principle and fired a number of 
federal officials and put activists of the Republican Party in their place. He 
had done this because of two reasons. Firstly, according to his belief, most of 
the federal officials were not sufficiently agile and zealous in carrying 
Republican politics, and secondly because of the intense pressures on him by 
the members of his party to offer them jobs in the state apparatus. 
   One of the protagonists of this system, US President Andrew 
Jackson, sought to show that rotating in the services was a basic democratic 
principle which would prevent the emergence of a professional anti-
democratic bureaucracy. He started from this point of view, like Lenin did one 
hundred years later: 
   “Civil service is considered a kind of property, and the government 
as a means to promote individual interests and not as instrument created in the 
service of the people.  Corruption does not allow the government to achieve 
goals, and it turns into a machine to support the wishes of a few, to the 
detriment of the majority. The duties of public officials can be made so simple, 
that intelligent people without higher qualifications will be able to successfully 
pursue them. It is my firm belief that it is a bigger loss from their long stay in 
the service, than the gain they are getting with their experience. 
   In a country where public services are created solely for the benefit 
of the people, no individual has more right than any other in the official 
position. These services should not provide support to certain persons at public 
expense. Therefore, Jackson suggests duration of the service to be limited to a 
period of four years, as the tenure of the Congress and the President. In case 
of victory of the other party, the officer is discharged, and in their place is 
received supporter of the winning party.    Jackson maintains that such 
dismissals do not make any individual injustice, because as he says, neither 
receiving the service or dismissal from it, is not a subject of rights. According 
to him, “a person who became a clerk to the public good, and when the public 
good requires his dismissal, it can not be sacrificed for his private interests.” 
This system would destroy the idea of ownership, which today is very related 
to the official position, and although sometimes inconvenience could occur for 
some  individuals, leading to rotation which is a guiding principle of 
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republican belief , it would infuse healthy activity throughout clerical system" 
(Vitanski 2008, 247-259; White, LD 1955, 309). However, the results did not 
meet Jackson’s expectations. Amateur institutions in the United States since 
that time, have not only created conditions for mass participation of citizens 
in the exercise of their functions, but have also turned into a corrupt and 
incompetent set of dominant political settings, namely, they turned into the 
Achilles heel of the US political system. 
    And today, as in the time of Andrew Jackson, the patronage in some 
countries vegetate successfully as reward system to the party members. 
    Some ruling elites endeavor to hire their party supporters in the state 
apparatus, even in the security institutions in order to satisfy their party’s 
ideological matrices. Such tendencies are usually found in economic atrophied 
societies, where the private sector is collapsed and unable to absorb the 
available labor force, wherein the state employment is seen as the only source 
of permanent and secure existence (Vitanski 2012, 103). 
    Generally, spoils system has two significant negative effects. 
Firstly, it appoints to public functions some people who are not competent or 
not the most competent. These people are elected by party line, without 
respecting the standard prescribed criteria such as professionalism and 
expertise. Secondly, the spoils system weakens formal organization that is 
based on law on the one hand and strengthens the power (informal) political 
machineries on the other, which allows the operation and control of the system 
to be brought under the baton of political potentates. 
    A clear demarcation line should be drawn between officials which 
include ministers or directors of the security authorities who are political staff 
and fall under the spoils system and professional civil servants or career 
officials who should fall under the merit system. 
    Such legal and functional structure of officials and civil servants in 
the hierarchical structure of the bodies, allows a distinction between political 
and professional security services, namely distinction between expert and 
professional staff and politically appointed staff. 
 
3.2 Merit system 
 
The US Congress passed the Civil Service Act (Act Pendleton) in 1883 
as a reaction to a corruption, which was accompanying element of patron’s 
system in the eighties of the nineteenth century, and because of the 
assassination of President James A. Garfield in 1881 by a disappointed party 
candidate for public office. This Act established the first Civil Service 
Commission as a legal and institutional weapon used by the President for 
management of the employees. Initially, the Commission did not develop as 
an independent entity, contrary to the ideological concept and declarative 
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commitments, but as a kind of executive agency, which was subject to 
administrative discretion of the President. Although the “Act of regulation and 
improvement in the civil service of the United States" and merit systems were 
installed in several state and local jurisdictions, many years after their adoption 
they have not yielded the expected effects. However, it is ungrateful to ignore 
the fact that the Act of Pendlton formally acknowledged the supremacy of the 
principles of merit on the practice of political appointments and it was 
established as a cornerstone in the contours of meritocratic civil service. 
    In the United States, the roots of today's Board for the Protection of 
the merit system, come back to the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who, 
in turn, during the administration of President Benjamin Harrison served as a 
representative or trustee of public services (Civil Service Commissioner). In 
fact, US President Roosevelt is considered as the father of establishing the 
concept of merit system in the United States.  
    The need for skilled and professional staff  in modern designed and  
functional systems is a catalyst for the adoption of  the system of values 
(meritocracy), as the most democratic mode of election of officers.   
    Merit system means recruiting officers according to their merits and 
abilities, regardless of their political orientation. The term merit implies the 
willingness of the individual to get a job based on his ability to work 
competently and professionally in his working position. The purpose is to 
establish a professional service based on competitive examinations for 
positions, in other words the service will be “neutral" or free of political 
constraints. Merit system envisages establishment of independent 
commissions for the civil service which observe personnel policies and care 
process to remain neutral. Merit system implies establishment of independent 
commissions for the civil service, which are observed by the personnel 
policies who care for the process to remain neutral. 
    The merit system will provide the following qualities of the security 
system: 
- Professionalism and expertise that will be revived if the positions are 
taken by the most capable, intelligent and trained candidate through public 
competition 
- Neutrality, which means that the officer should implement the policy 
of the authorities properly and effectively, without any prejudice against its 
reliability or value 
- Equal opportunities to every candidate who competes, in other words 
the employment should be available to all qualified citizens "(Simon, 
Smithburg, and Thompson 1973, 315). 
    Merit systems usually are based on the following key principles: 
- Open recruiting and promoting to all qualified applicants based on 
criteria related to work; 
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- Fair treatment in all personnel matters, regardless of politics, race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age or disability; 
 - Equal salary for work of equal value; 
- High standards of integrity, conduct and concern for the public 
interest; 
- Successful and efficient use of labor; 
- Retention of employees that work well, fixing the work of those 
whose work is inadequate and allocation of those who are unable or unwilling 
to meet the required standards; 
- Improved performance through effective education and training; 
- Protection for the employees from arbitrary actions, personal 
favoritism or political coercion; 
- Protection for the employees from retaliation for lawful disclosure of 
information, etc. (Magor 2009, 96). 
    The original indigenous theoretical model of the merit system is 
hard to find anywhere in the world.  In many countries the tendency of 
politicization of the highest positions in the service is present, so one can say 
that in practice the merit system works in combination with the spoils system 
in the highest segments.  
    Removing the spoils system and introducing stronger formal and 
legal guarantees for the application of the merit system is a tendency 
worldwide. In this context, all former socialist countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, without exception, seek to ensure the functioning of the merit system 
in its security services. However, the process of recruiting staff according to 
their abilities in these countries is difficult and slow, if we take into 
consideration the previous regime which was based on the one-party principle. 
Membership in the ruling party only meant priority in employment in the 
security bodies and in all state bodies and institutions. Also, the professional 
ability and creativity were not required for carrier advancement, but the 
political orientation and the loyalty towards the party’s ideology.  In addition, 
the culture, tradition, customs and mentality, as national characteristics, have 
a major impact on the practical implementation of standardized legal merit 
system. 
    For the jobs within the scope of the security institutions to work 
qualitatively, it is necessary to establish the merit system. The system 
foundation consists of people with high qualifications and specializations, who 
are free from the burden of the daily political combinations. 
    Depoliticization, as a constitutional principle and democratic 
civilization benefit is crucial for professional and efficient operation of the 
security apparatus. 
    One of the substantive elements in the portfolio of officers should 
be political neutrality, which includes professional implementation of the 
 186 
guidelines and directives of a ruling nomenclature incorporated in the laws 
and other legal acts, regardless of its political and ideological matrix. 
Politically neutral officials, as professionals and moving force in national-
security apparatus, should provide the general interest and continuity in the 
functioning of the state. In line with this concept, the security system should 
be staffed with permanent and neutral officials, led and motivated solely by 
the public interest. Furthermore their work will be professional in the mandate 
of each ruling party, it will not be directly involved in policy-making, but it 
will participate in its administration and implementation. 
  
4 PROMOTION SYSTEMS IN THE SECURITY BODIES 
     
    The term advancement means movement of officers up the vertical 
scale of the titles, in other words transition to more complex and more 
responsible jobs in the hierarchical pyramid.   
    On the one hand, the purpose of the promotion system is to 
encourage employees to greater engagement and productivity and on the other 
hand it is to provide security in terms of their advancement in service. 
    Depending on the method of filling in clerical positions in the 
security bodies and the way forward, there are two systems: the system of 
career and system of jobs. 
    The system of carrier reflects the following elements: full 
employment in youth, prospects of making a career in the security system and 
hierarchical advancement under terms and conditions prescribed by law.   
Within this system, which is also called closed system, officials are employed 
in the lowest jobs that match their educational qualifications. Moreover, 
during the following service they automatically make further progress in the 
hierarchy, which means if there are vacant places in the corps, they are filled 
by the service or the existing staff. 
    So, the system of career is filled by itself from the bottom to the top. 
This progress in the hierarchy is a kind of motivation to the existing employees 
in order to work qualitatively and efficiently and to make progress from lower 
to higher positions. 
    A properly established career means the advancement of higher 
titles to be made on the basis of objective criteria through internal 
competitions, in other words the system should be closed and unable to 
infiltrate “outsiders” without any experience or professional experience 
acquired in the appropriate service. 
    In the system of jobs, however, there is more competition in 
completing the clerical positions, which means one can send people out of 
office if they have the right skills and qualifications to perform the required 
work. In this system enhancement is not done by default. The career is not 
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guaranteed, but it is still possible since the officer will have changed several 
different jobs, and the only advancement is actually a re-employment of new 
jobs. 
    To summarize, the main attributes of  “the model of career" are: 
employment based on public law “Service”, lifelong employment; selection of 
starting points in one’s career, promotions reserved for insiders; emphasis on 
formal diplomas and certificates; remuneration by law, with elements of work 
experience; focus on loyalty, objectivity and processes; special schemes for 
retirement. 
    The basic tenets that make up the essence of “the model of Jobs'are 
: employment based on private law “employment”; no guaranteed lifetime 
employment; selecting for specific positions, all positions are open for the 
external competition; all experience and qualifications are taken into account; 
remuneration governed by contracts, without any elements of work 
experience; focus on achievements and performance; same retirement as the 
schemes for private sector employees (Challenges for the management of 
human resources in government at many levels, Directorate of Public 
Administration and territorial progress, the employees in the private sector,  
(challenges for the management of human resources in government at many 
levels, Committee on public service)). 
The system of advancement allows a person who is already engaged in 
the security service to get the job-the one who possesses knowledge and has 
gained experience through successful work, which is not the case with a person 
who comes from outside and who will need  to be trained and educated by the 
person mentioned afore. 
    However, this standpoint should not be generalized and glorified in 
absolute terms, because the length of time spent in the service is not a 
guarantee of a greater expertise officer.   Also, an officer who has efficiently 
performed tasks in the lower position, does not mean that he will possess the 
right skills and knowledge to meet the challenges they will face in the senior 
title. 
    The automatic system is much simpler in terms of technology and 
ethic. Above all, this system excludes the subjectivism and voluntarism in 
assessing the capabilities and the expertise of officials. 
On the other hand, the open system undoubtedly has more selective 
and stimulating power, but in it the subjective assessment of the authorized 
person can come to the core and therefore should strive to choose the 
appropriate methods of assessment. In order to achieve greater objectivity, the 
evaluation must be based on objective criteria and free from arbitrariness and 
subjectivism. The possibilities of functioning of the spoils system and the 
repetition of it should be eliminated in terms of selection and promotion by 
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introducing stronger formal and legal guarantees for the application of the 
merit system. 
    It will inevitably lead to decline of professional standards in the 
operation, if the progress is made on the basis of kinship and friendship, or the 
personal performance and professional achievements are neglected. If this 
happens, it will negatively affect the reputation and productivity of the 
organization, and will inflame interpersonal tensions. 
    In the process of advancement it is necessary to establish certain 
principles and standards, which will favor the promotion of the most agile and 
most competent officers, so this policy will stir the creative energy of the 
officers in the direction of more and more successful commitment and 
efficiency of their jobs. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
   By entering amateur dilettantism, the spoils system generate failure 
and paralysis of the national-security body. This system prospers successfully 
in atrophied and dysfunctional states, which are sunk into the abyss of groggy 
and endemic corruption. In these countries, de-politicization is the Achilles 
heel of the ruling nomenclatures which are guided by their own narrow self-
centered interests and do not manifest consistency for the removal of the 
security organs of political claws. These systems, whose functions are 
inhibited, establish tools that should rehabilitate the long agony and 
metamorphosed in functional service-oriented entities. 
       Because of this, there is an imminent need for uncompromising 
implanting merit system in all aspects of the security tissue. Fundamentals and 
substantial element of the security system should comprise professional and 
value crystal clear footage, i.e. people with higher qualifications, personal 
reputation and specialized upgrades, immune to the devastating effects of the 
political virus. This constructed model of a civil servant who is professional, 
politically neutral, ethical qualitatively mature and service-oriented, will have 
the potential, capacity and credibility to be put into operation on overcoming 
challenges and achieving the objectives of the security system.  
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Abstract 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, composed of China, Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, was founded in 2001 as 
a regional organization for resolving economical, political and  security issues, 
specifically regarding counterterrorism and drug trafficking. In 2012 
Afghanistan, among some other countries such as India, Mongolia, Iran, 
Pakistan, Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey, was granted an observer state status 
by permanent members of SCO. The most important permanent body for 
terrorism issues is the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). The 
expansion of SCO comes at the time of rising tension between USA, NATO 
and the EU with Russia over their policies towards Ukraine. Also, tension 
between Russia and NATO member states is increasing for the “security 
vacuum” that will be created when U.S. troops leave Afghanistan in 2016. 
Russia has several reasons to expand power over Afghanistan, mostly because 
this country has been affected with increased drug trafficking since 2001, 
when the USA established presence in this Asian region. Suspended 
cooperation between Russia and the Western states because of the political 
situation in Ukraine provides great opportunity for EU and NATO state 
members to improve and strengthen cooperation with SCO and to keep the 
position of power over Afghanistan, the epicenter of terrorism and drug 
production in this part of the world. General consideration of inter-state 
relations must be objectively evaluated by scientific judgment which will 
interpret security interest of the stakeholders in the fight against terrorism and 
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other security threats coming from Afghanistan, especially regarding threats 
that come from militant groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) and many others. Methodology used for this research is based on 
content analysis from available resources (conference’s reports, books, 
articles, etc.). Also, the comparative method will be used in order to interpret 
security questions in the frame of SCO relations with other subjects of 
international politics, alongside with the hypothetical deductive method which 
is commonly used in social sciences. 
Key words: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, terrorism, security, 
Afghanistan, powerful states. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the terrorist attacks that happened in the USA in September2011, 
contemporary terrorism was identified as the biggest threat to security, peace, 
human rights, and stability by all democratic governments in the world. 
Governments and international organization all over the world realized that 
the existing counter-terrorism measures were no longer sufficient to prevent 
terrorists and their activities. Due to this, numerous resolutions and laws were 
passed in order to prevent terrorism as one of the biggest threats to 
international security and human rights. 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created in 2001 among 
Eurasian countries in order to increase stability and security in this part of the 
world. New security challenges, risks, and threats came to focus of this 
intergovernmental regional organization, especially in the light of the so-
called Kabul process.1 Political tensions regarding US troops withdrawal from 
Afghanistan announced for 2016, drugs production and trafficking, terrorist 
threats in China (Xinjiang province) and Russian policy towards Ukraine and 
the Western states, created a complex security situation with a possible 
spillover effect. SCO created counter-terrorist mechanisms in a form of 
normative acts, practices, policies, and cooperation among the member states. 
The SCO influence is expansive and increasing since it was established by 
China and Russia, two permanent UN Security Council members and nuclear 
weapon countries with strong economies. The SCO - Afghanistan Contact 
Group was established in 2005; it consists of Afghan diplomats and SCO 
representatives with the aim of supporting mutual political, security, and 
economical cooperation in order to prevent security threats that come from 
                                                 
1  “A path to an economically sustainable, socially vibrant and stable Afghanistan, led by 
Afghans for Afghans, supported by the International Community”, 
http://www.thekabulprocess.gov.af/ Jan 5th 2015 
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Afghanistan and other SCO affiliated states. Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization held numerous conferences on the situation in Afghanistan.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION AND THE ROLE OF THE REGIONAL ANTI-
TERRORIST STRUCTURE (RATS) 
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization began as informal grouping of 
initial state members except Uzbekistan, called “Shanghai Five”, gathered 
1996 to resolve border disputes and to improve neighborhood interstate 
relations. Formally, Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) was established 
in Shanghai on June 15th 2001 by six countries (the People’s Republic of 
China, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) as a 
regional organization for cooperation in political and security affairs and 
strengthening the relation between the member states in the area of trade and 
economics, energy, environmental protection, transportation, tourism, etc. 
State members cover the area of 30 million km2 (3/5 of Eurasia) with 
population over 1,5 billion people (approximately 1/4 of world population). 
Working languages of the SCO are Russian and Chinese and the headquarter 
is based in Beijing. 
 
Table 1.: The territory of SCO state members:2 
 
 
In 2002 heads of the member states signed in St. Petersburg the SCO Charter 
which established its structure, principles and purposes, and forms of external 
                                                 
2 “GMFUS: Central Asia’s long term questions remain unanswered” 
http://foreignpolicyreview.org/tag/central-asia/ (accessed on December 25th 2014) 
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and internal operation and cooperation. The Council of heads of states (CHS) 
is the SCO’s most important decision-making body. The second decision 
making body is the Council of heads of government (prime ministers council 
– CHG). 
 
Table 2. : The structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:3 
 
 
The SCO has two permanent organs based in Beijing and Tashkent – 
the Secretariat and the Regional anti-terrorist structure (RATS). Security 
concept based on mutual trust, benefits, equality and cooperation is 
implemented in all structural parts of SCO. Considering the fact that the main 
purpose of SCO is maintaining security and stability in the member states’ 
region, RATS was given the role of main organ for “counteracting terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism in all their manifestations.”4 The Regional anti-
terrorist structure has its Council and an Executive Committee, and branches 
responsible for activities related to counterterrorism. The RATS Council is 
composed of heads of the member states national security services who gather 
annually, while the Executive Committee is responsible for data exchange 
among the member states and for assisting in detection of terrorist attacks.5 
RATS’ activities depend on SCO’s main financial contributors – Russia, 
China. 
                                                 
3 “GMFUS: Central Asia’s long term questions remain unanswered”  
http://foreignpolicyreview.org/tag/central-asia/ (accessed on December 25th 2014) 
4 Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Kazakhstan A 
Parallel NGO Submission by Human Rights in China June 3, 2011  
5 Ibid. 
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The Convention of Privileges and Immunities of SCO signed in 2005 
equalized the representatives of SCO to the diplomats. They are not the 
subjects of criminal liability committed during their duty and they have 
immunity from detention or arrest. The RATS’ property and documents have 
immunity from interference, regardless of the location. 
Numerous documents were signed within SCO in order to improve 
cooperation between the member states regarding security risks and threats 
including terrorism as one of the major forms of political violence: 
 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and 
Extremism signed in 2001, according to the Chinese “Three evils” 
doctrine6 puts terrorism, extremism, and separatism in the same 
framework of threats that undermine security of the whole region of 
the SCO member states. The same Convention emphasizes the 
importance of intelligence data exchange about individuals or groups 
involved in criminal or terrorist activities. 
 Agreement Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure 2002 and 
Agreement on the Database of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2004 were significant in the 
light of forming databases of all terrorist activities (methods of action, 
leaders, members and persons affiliated with such activities) in the 
territories of SCO member states. 
 SCO Convention on Counter-Terrorism: was signed in 2009 with 
intention to provide legal basis for agents of member states to enter the 
territory of other member state in pursuit for suspects or to exchange 
information upon request or on their initiative. 
According to the mentioned Conventions and agreements, the member 
states are engaged in a lot of counterterrorist activities such as forcible returns 
of unwanted citizens, extraditions, denials of asylum for persons that are under 
suspicion for committing terrorism, separatism and / or extremism. Some 
records say that RATS has a black list of more than 40 terrorist organizations 
with more than 1000 members.7 Since 2002, SCO members established a new 
practice through joint military exercises in ethnical areas in order to 
demonstrate and simulate government response to potential civil riots. 
The SCO got an observer status in the United Nations in December 
2004. Also, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the SCO 
Secretariat and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific. Great acknowledgement for SCO as a regional security organization 
                                                 
6 Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Kazakhstan A 
Parallel NGO Submission by Human Rights in China June 3, 2011 
7 Ibid. 
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came through the General Assembly of the UN resolutions in 2009 and 2010. 
The SCO was described in those resolutions as “an essential forum for 
addressing security in the region in all its dimensions”.8 The same 
observations were given by the Secretary General Ban Ki - Moon regarding 
the signed Joint Declaration on SCO-UN Secretariat Cooperation in 2010. 
Last but not least form of cooperation between SCO and the UN exists through 
connections that link RATS and the Security Council Counterterrorism 
Executive Directorate. 
 
EXPANSION OF SCO IN THE LIGHT OF NEW SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
 
The influential strategic grouping within SCO has a lot of benefits for 
its member states. The economic power of SCO members has a lot of influence 
on SCO’s reputation as a growing regional organization for cooperation. This 
reason among others as well encouraged states such as India, Iran, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Turkey to become observers, 
dialogue partners, and guests in order to achieve potential for gaining status of 
permanent members.9 
Due to many reasons, SCO member states decided to make new 
categories of external association with other states that applied for permanent 
membership status. During the SCO Annual Summit in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) 
in 2010, leaders of SCO member states signed Regulations on the Procedure 
for Admitting New Members to the SCO. In this document it was explicitly 
declared that countries under UN sanctions will not be allowed to become 
permanent members. Also, SCO states agreed that some minimum eligibility 
criteria must be fulfilled for entering countries as an observer membership 
status, Eurasia location and maintaining good diplomatic relations with the 
existing SCO members.10 Initial state members have huge differences in the 
political systems, population, economical, and military power which caused 
careful consideration of accepting new member states because of possible 
deepening of the already existing differences among the states of SCO. 
Membership expansion regarding countries that possess nuclear weapons 
(India, Pakistan) could create problems because of general SCO 
nonproliferation policy. On the other side, despite of wishes of the permanent 
                                                 
8 Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Kazakhstan A 
Parallel NGO Submission by Human Rights in China June 3, 2011 
9 “Russia is counting on SCO and BRICKS” http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Rusija-
racuna-na-SOS-i-Briks.sr.html (accessed on December 23, 2014) 
10 “Shanghai Cooperation Organization opens to India and Pakistan, not Iran,” Asia News, 
http://www.speroforum.com/a/34725/Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization-opens-to-India-
and-Pakistannot-Iran. (accessed on June 12, 2010) 
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members, the energy rich Turkmenistan did not show interest to become a 
member of SCO. Possible expansion of SCO comes at the time of rising 
tensions between Russia and NATO, the EU states and USA over Ukraine. 
Also, special attention will be paid in the following years over security issues 
in Afghanistan for many reasons. Russia has an interest in strengthening its 
position of power in Afghanistan (one of observer states and a future 
permanent member of SCO) because security vacuum will be made when 
USA troops leave Afghanistan in 2016. This country has been epicenter for 
drug production and trafficking, as well as training center for numerous 
terrorist organizations. Russia has been affected the most by the increased drug 
trafficking which came from Afghanistan since 2001 when the USA 
established military presence in that Asian country. The American interests in 
this part of the world are not in accordance with the policies of the Asian 
countries. Therefore, the SCO was created as counterbalance to the NATO 
presence and its members’ interest in the Asian region. Stability in 
Afghanistan is vital for all member states of SCO and it also represents the 
key of cooperation with the Western countries and NATO in the fight against 
terrorism and drug trafficking. The so-called “Kabul process”11 was the main 
topic during the International Conference on Afghanistan held in June 2010 
with participation of dozens of world and international organization’s 
leaders.12 The SCO representatives declared that “continuing escalation of 
confrontation in Afghanistan, terrorism, drugs trafficking, and transnational 
organized crime rooted from this country, remain a big source of threats in the 
region. Achieving peace and stability in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
is a crucial factor in ensuring   security that promotes sustainable social and 
economic development of the region.”13  
 
THE SCO AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
 
The complex political and security situation in the Eurasian region is 
one of the reasons for SCO genesis. Due to globalization impacts and chain 
reaction among different dimensions of globalization (political, social, 
economical, environmental, military etc.), unresolved issues among the 
neighboring countries, and terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime 
became destabilizing factors which threaten to jeopardize global security. The 
                                                 
11 Process of Afghanistan transition into independent state with legitimate authorities 
12 “Draft Communiqué Sets 2014 as Target for Afghan Military to Lead,” New York Times,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
(accessed on July 20th, 2010) 
13 Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=225. (accessed on June 11th, 2010) 
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SCO counterterrorism doctrine is based on the so-called “three evils” 
(terrorism, separatism, and extremism), with a lot of influence of the Chinese 
domestic approach to counterterrorism. The main principle and starlight for 
all SCO members is mutual recognition. On that basis, the SCO member states 
practice resolving regional security issues, especially fight against terrorism. 
The situations in Afghanistan and in the Chinese autonomous province of 
Xinjiang are the most substantial security difficulties that SCO is coping with 
since it was established in 2001. 
Western military forces announced their withdrawal from Afghanistan 
in 2016. Suspended cooperation between Russia and the Western states 
because of the tense political situation in Ukraine could create “security 
vacuum” in the already fragile situation in Afghanistan. The possible security 
threat caused by the US troops’ withdrawal could be prevented through 
strengthening cooperation between SCO member states and Afghanistan 
authorities. Considering the fact that neighboring countries of Afghanistan are 
SCO member states, it is in their interest to be in charge for security and 
democratization process in this Asian region. Monitoring security 
environment can be done in several ways, through implementation of 
resolutions or via military influence. Since the SCO as organization is not 
military oriented as it is NATO and does not have military capacities, its 
activities are focused mainly on normative framework focused on the fight 
against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations as well as drug production 
and trafficking. The impact of the suspended NATO relations with the Russian 
Federation due to the crisis in Ukraine will be noticeable since the mentioned 
actors have had joint counter narcotic trainings of Afghan the personnel and 
technicians.14 The problem of “security gap” when the US troops leave 
Afghanistan could be solved if NATO include SCO in training Afghan law 
enforcement and military personnel, as well as the border police. The SCO 
personnel could be included in other aspects of recovering Afghanistan society 
such as building democracy, government institutions, and rebuilding 
infrastructure. The problem of the Chinese autonomous province Xinjiang has 
several dimensions. Energy potential of this region and mostly Muslim 
population made this a hotspot of regional politics. It is estimated that 
approximately 75 % of oil reserves and mineral wealth can be found in this 
part of the People’s Republic of China.15 Islamic groups (composed of Uyghur 
people) receive support from the Afghan Taliban and therefore represent a 
constant threat to the security in China and the neighboring countries. Strong 
                                                 
14 “EU and NATO engagement with the SCO: Afghanistan as a pilot” 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/eu-and-nato-engagement-shanghai-cooperation-
organization-afghanistan-pilot?lang=nl,(accessed on January 16th 2015) 
15 Justin J., Rudelson (1997) Oasis Identities. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 35 
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cooperation among SCO members can be a facilitating factor in the fight 
against terrorism in Xinjiang province. 
Possible spillover of terrorism or any kind of instability from 
Afghanistan after the announced US troops’ withdrawal in 2016 could create 
major security problems for the whole Asian region. Counter-terrorism 
activities, strengthening border security and joint counter-narcotic activities 
among SCO members are a prerequisite for stabile democratic transition of the 
authorities in Afghanistan. Since economic development is the core of 
terrorism and drug trafficking prevention, cooperation between SCO member 
states and the Afghan government should be directed and based on trade and 
improving of the social and economic situation of Afghanistan people. 
Numerous declarations have been signed between SCO and Afghanistan, but 
unfortunately most of them remained unimplemented in practice. Besides the 
problem with terrorism, Afghanistan was faced with increased opium 
production since the arrival of foreign troops in 2001. Opium as a main raw 
material for heroin production was used for drug production and then exported 
to Russia and other countries in the world. Since the US arrival, approximately 
2 500 soldiers have died and 7 000 people die annually from heroin overdose 
in Russia.16 
Table.3: The United Nation’s Office of Drug and Crimes (UNODC) 2013 World 
Drug Report 
 
 
 
The withdrawal of the foreign military troops in 2016 could cause new 
security threats such as strengthening the terrorist organization and increasing 
                                                 
16 “Why Putin Might Blame the U.S. for Russia’s Drugs Problem” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-14/afghan-opium-crop-inflames-u-s-tensions-
with-russia.html, (accessed on January 22nd 2015) 
 199 
of the poppy production, but it also provides a chance for SCO to improve its 
security cooperation mechanisms and develop new in order to replace NATO 
and become stability factor in the Eurasian region. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Terrorism and drug trafficking are one of the biggest security problems 
in the world. Afghanistan has been the headquarter for many terrorist 
organizations as well as the main source of exporting heroin all over the world. 
Neighboring countries are affected the most, so the regional security is their 
highest priority. 
The Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) was founded in 2001 as 
a Eurasian regional organization for security cooperation. The regional anti-
terrorist structure (RATS) is permanent SCO organ headquartered in Tashkent 
in charge of promoting cooperation among the member states in the fight 
against terrorism and other security threats. Many declarations have been 
signed between the SCO and Afghanistan but they remained theoretical, 
without practical implementation. Announced withdrawal of foreign troops 
from the region will leave “security vacuum” and a possibility for SCO to 
prove the role in preventing security threats through intensive cooperation 
among the member states. Sharing information, experience, law, and border 
personnel training could be the initial step in decreasing possibility of terrorist 
attacks. Unfortunately, the lack of trust between member states and their 
opposite interests are slowing down security cooperation within SCO. Joint 
infrastructure projects could improve decrepit Afghanistan’s economy and 
redirect manpower from poppy fields to building roads, railways etc.  
The main weakness of SCO in the efforts to fight against contemporary 
terrorism is the lack of mechanisms for implementation of the SCO 
declarations. More practical approach to terrorism and drug trafficking should 
be adopted by SCO in order to use the full potential and experience of the 
member states, especially of the two essential pillars of this organization – 
China and Russia. Bilateral conflicts among SCO members (border disputes, 
economic issues, etc.) and observer states are one more lock for successful 
security cooperation. National states members of SCO should raise awareness 
of anti-terrorism declarations implementation and work on mutual trust when 
it comes to sharing intelligence information with other countries. A great 
chance will be given to the SCO as an organization after the US troops’ 
withdrawal to prove strength and determination in the fight against terrorism 
and other contemporary security challenges. All countries in the world are 
threatened by terrorism and drugs that is coming from Afghanistan, but 
neighboring countries have more reasons to be scared because of the direct 
exposure to security threats from this Asian country. The suspension of NATO 
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- Russia cooperation because of the situation in Ukraine could turn Russia into 
stronger partnership with China within the SCO so this organization could 
swap in the role of American presence in this region. Afghanistan’s fragile 
security situation is desperately craving for mechanisms that could provide 
long term stability and prosperity. NATO state members need to change the 
attitude towards SCO role in Eurasian region, especially when it comes to the 
situation in Afghanistan, and to provide help to SCO personnel to join training 
of Afghan border police and law enforcement. China and Russia through SCO 
have a chance to improve their socioeconomic cooperation with Afghanistan. 
Security cooperation foundations have to be laid as soon as possible 
between the SCO members regarding Afghanistan in order to preserve 
regional and global security. Years to come will prove the strength of the SCO 
and its members as guarantors of security and stability in Eurasian region. 
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Abstract 
In today’s global world, where many companies do business, their 
facilities are threatened by different kinds of threats inside and outside the 
company. With the growing role and technology dependency, threats to the 
corporation have never been higher. This paper will present information 
related to threats, vulnerabilities and risks, with accent of the security 
manager’s role, the skills that any security manager needs to dispose with, 
what kind of profile is needed for this activity and where is the position of 
safety within corporation. 
The new era offers increased challenges for security manager who 
must develop and manage cost-effective program for facilities protection. For 
successful achieving this aim, security manager must know and understand the 
threats, vulnerabilities and risks of corporate assets. These risks must be 
managed cost-effectively, securing minimum amount of funds for protection 
in the case of accepted risks. 
Nowadays, security service is shaped by many influences. Specific 
company’s needs, worries, and vulnerabilities capabilities of its security team 
and management perception and security value as well, are upholding the 
organization structure. Even businesses have directed downwards trends 
impact on the role of security. Because of the decreasing effects of all aspects 
of the business, the security needs to learn to function in stringier environment 
and with higher expectations and demands, and in the same time the work will 
be performed in higher threats and risks environment. Challenges of security 
manager and security personal are in continuous rise. In big corporations 
security services are generally structured as independent departments 
composed from professional security workers1. General security profile is 
prevention based. In small companies, security often presents obligation of 
human resources or legal department. Small private security departments 
consisted by few security workers, generally rely to security professionals, 
often engaged by big companies. Today, many corporations of different sizes 
                                                 
1 Gerald L.Kowacich, Edward P.Halibozek, the managers handbook for corporate Security – 
Establishing and amaging a successful asset protection program, Butterworth Heinemann, 
2003, p. 67 
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are using security services from companies specialized in that direction2. They 
include security functions by obvious (physical security) till the less obvious 
(for ex.: investigations and information system’s security. Many corporations 
are doing it because they looking up for safety, because they figured out that 
security companies save money, because the corporate management must have 
insights on security costs. It is expected this trend to continue, more companies 
to do aggressive competition between themselves, and therefore inevitably 
will come the rise of quantity level of the provided services.  
Keywords: corporate security, corporate security manager, 
corporation, threats, security. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From the aspect of private security, in accordance with today's needs 
and operating conditions, corporate security is a term in the business known 
as Business Intelligence, which is difficult precisely to translate into 
Macedonian. Its essence refers to possessing business information in order to 
ensure security while operating, above all to protect and establish superiority 
regarding competitive enterprise, and consequently enabling making the right 
decisions by their top management. It means the ability to collect, process 
(analyze) and use collected information which represent a key resource in 
nowadays new operating environment. The process consists of data collection, 
analysis, perception of the situation, risk assessment, and support in decision 
making. The types of collecting data and information are related with 
application of Business Intelligence, and sources for use are: analysis of the 
situation in the industry (the energy sector), market, industrial espionage, 
environment scanning, marketing research, competition analysis, analysis of 
mentality of the users of the services or products, security estimation, 
assessment of the possible and potential risks etc. The term corporate 
(business) security or protection is inextricably linked with the term of unfair 
competition. Business protection involves undertaking of complex adequate 
measures and activities by the company, for prevention, detection and 
elimination of certain types of danger and threats. 
Corporate (business) protection is an integral system consisting of 
subsystems for data collection and protection of their information and internal 
security. Protection of their own information and gathering information 
intends to perform protection of information of special interest, disloyalty of 
its own employees, checking candidates for specific security areas, control of 
persons for employment admission, protection from insider infiltrated persons, 
checking solvency of companies, detecting “moles”. Protection of its own 
                                                 
2 By performing security services 
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information must not be autonomously organized; it should also be only 
specialized tool within the corporate office (business) protection. The 
subsystem of internal security should also be realized within the single system 
of protection business, whose main purpose is to oppose any action that is 
directed towards its own employees, facilities and clients that come in and 
come out for any reason. Practically, company’s corporate protection should 
not be security’s subordinate position. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE SECURITY MANAGER 
 
The role of the corporate security manager is to analyze the 
organizational structure and to find its weaknesses and deficiencies that might 
jeopardize the corporation’s or organization’s projected goals3. Organization 
and procedures in working, present, above all, prevention measures in so-
called operation risks, those problems that might jeopardize the organization’s 
functioning and are related to the performance of basic activities. Formulation, 
management and control of specific organizational units dealing with safety is 
the basic task of security management. 
As very common practice is hiring companies by working units, that 
are dealing with providing security services. But hiring these firms should not 
exclude the necessity of own security management. Company that deals with 
providing security services mainly is consisted of the physical - technical 
security, while all other security management activities are performed by 
managers in their company or organization. They should prepare plans, 
analysis, to give reports, to collect and process the collected data, to control 
the implementation of security measures and procedures, to control the 
operation of the physical - technical provision provided by hired company. 
Security managers are part of the organization they work in, their career is 
related with the success of the company or organization they belong in, as part 
of the management they are familiar with the working process in their 
company or organization, have clear operational and organization’s strategic 
goals in whose defining participate themselves, and according to some rule 
they should have a very important influence in defining the strategy of the 
company or organization, and importantly, their loyalty should never be 
questioned4. 
                                                 
3 Gerald L. Kowacich, Edward P. Halibozek, The Managers handbook for Corporate Security 
– Establishing and managing a successful assets protection program, Butterworth Heinemann, 
2003, p. 67 - 68 
4 For more of this see the thesis of the author of the paper, methods of making the assessment 
forms of threats, risks and threats as a function of the security management in enterprises, 
27/11/2012 
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Corporate security manager as a protective role: protection of people, 
information and physical assets belonging to any corporation. It is more than 
a list of duties that need paying attention or duties to be performed.  Providing 
safe and secure working environment, presents obligation of employees and 
corporate management as well. A secure and safe working environment 
reduces the chances of breaking into the business. Intrusions (which can occur 
in many forms), security fissures and loss of information or physical assets 
may degrade the working environment quality and have negative influence 
over corporation’s profitability. Security manager has primacy in this 
protective role. Security professionals are enabling their skills and efforts to 
have production processes support. Security managers should be involved in 
all processes of one corporation, they should be well aware about the 
corporation, employee morality, corporate projects and problems in various 
departments. They must know what is going on in the corporation. Actually, 
security personnel, if really interested in the corporation as it should be, 
suppose to have better understanding of corporation’s condition than anyone 
else in the corporation. All managers should listen and obey the orders and 
instructions of the security manager. Security personnel is the one that sees 
and hears what are doing about the work, give instructions, suggest 
weaknesses in order to get to improving of a certain condition. Security 
personnel are responsible for the security situation within the corporation. 
Security personnel can provide insecurity assistance of other alternative 
departments. For example, if someone is dealing with a problem and trying to 
solve it somehow, a security member may find out that someone has a problem 
and help solving it. Providing with information to those who have a problem, 
allows contact to the rest of the personal and discuss how is best to solve it. 
Providing these intermediary communication services, the security personnel 
not only that helps to the others but also helps the corporation to have progress. 
Such acts of attention, will allow employees to return them when they need 
help or service. If security managers don’t recognize corporate assets threats, 
defense weaknesses and assets protection and the potential for something or 
someone to abuse weaknesses, they cannot effectively protect those assets. 
Protection should be cost-effective for effectively protection of corporate 
profits and the possibility effectively to be competent in the global market. 
Security manager should offer solution in order to reduce costs and help the 
corporation to be more competitive and hereafter to help to ensure the 
resilience of the corporation. 
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SKILLS THAT CORPORATE SECURITY MANAGER NEEDS 
TO DISPOSE WITH 
 
Protecting corporate information, physical assets and people, is not a 
simple task. A few years ago, only one night guard was sufficient to guard the 
door to ensure that no one or nothing will be damaged or injured without 
proper authorization. The skills needed for this task were minimal. Much more 
is expected of today's security personal, because today's business environment 
that is more global, more competitive and more complex. There are many 
significant qualities that a security manager should have to be effective, such 
as: 
 Proficiency with technology and computer skills, 
 Dispose of communication skills - written and verbal, 
 To have a good knowledge of how the business works, 
 To have an understanding of the global business environment, 
 To posses University degree in the field of security, 
 Must have strong analytical skills, 
 To practice teamwork, 
 Take different roles and responsibilities, 
 To have international experience, preferably in the business area, 
 Must have experience or knowledge of other cultures and languages. 
 
PERSONALITY PROFILE OF SECURITY MANAGER 
 
In a time of drastic change, learners are inheritors of the future. 
Educated usually find themselves living in a world that no longer exists. The 
corporation must be capable to provide an interesting and attractive 
environment according the needs and demands of the most professional 
people, to attract them to work for it. To keep them, they must receive 
challenging work assignments complemented by competent compensation. As 
part of the company, the top management should provide security personnel 
with continuous and relevant training and opportunities for professional 
growth. Trust is from particular importance for security professionals. 
Security professionals are obligated to "take care" of the things. Since they are 
in a position of trust, the potential damage they can do is extensive. Security 
professionals are responsible for company’s protecting and its information, 
people and physical assets. They contribute to the company’s continuity and 
overall performance and success. They must be trustworthy, competent and 
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capable to provide protection5. They must understand the security fundamental 
tenets. It can only be achieved by constantly learning, and with learning we 
increase our capacity to create. 
To achieve, manage and survive, a constant upgrade is necessary, so 
security professionals must also be students. In a world that is constantly 
changing, the ability and willingness to learn is essential. Successful 
companies learn and change so that can maintain competitiveness in the 
market. Security professionals protecting them, do the same. If they do not so, 
their performance would be degraded. More than that, the offered value to the 
corporation will be less than needed. Without continuous learning they cannot 
be considered only as employed in the security sector who have jobs, but as 
professionals with a career in security. How would you know that prospective 
employees are willing to learn? Were they bothered about learning activities? 
Does not a simple determination about this exist? Security managers should 
discuss learning with all prospective security professionals and to maintain 
interest and support their learning goals after engaged in work, but above all 
they should motivate them. To get and keep the best professionals for security, 
you will need to treat them like other highly educated professionals. They may 
not be involved in product development or product design, but their protective 
role is equally important and requires constant training and skills. 
Compensation must be comparable to that of professionals in the organization. 
If not, most accomplished security professionals will emigrate to new 
opportunities or other companies. 
Global market, the uniqueness of the product, the differences in the 
workforce, consumers and rapidly changing technological environments make 
the security task more complex. Understanding how the business function is 
needed, but is sufficient to ensure an adequate protection level. It covers more 
than understanding of the business for developing and implementing a 
successful program for assets protection. Also, understanding fundamental 
security principles is necessary. Therefore, the security professionals need to 
ensure assets protection in any company. Executive management should not 
see superficially and disparaging the role of security, because literally it can 
cost lives and jobs. The solution should be sought in educating employees, 
creating a dynamic attitude and involving all available resources6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Gerald L. Kowacich, Edward P. Halibozek, The Managers handbook for Corporate Security 
– Establishing and managing a successful assets protection program, Butterworth Heinemann, 
2003, p. 69 
6 Stajic, Lj, Mihajlovic, S and Stanojevic, S., Security Culture, Belgrade, 2004, p. 101 
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THE PLACE OF THE SAFETY IN THE CORPORATION 
 
Some suggest that the security is agreeable function and needs to be 
part of a larger agreeable company as audit or legal department. Others 
suggest, security role to be closely attributed to people and considering it to 
be part of the organization's human resources. Some members of the 
management suggest security to be integral to the continuity of the 
corporation. Effective arguments can be made for security to belong to any of 
these functions and a few others. Regardless of its location in the corporate 
structure, security manager must have direct access to most of the executive 
directors of the corporation7. Finally, the general safety profile of any 
corporation is responsibility of each superior management. The incapability to 
adequately protect people, physical assets and information has a negative 
influence on corporate profitability. Profitability is a clear concern of every 
management. This does not mean that superb management should be involved 
in daily management of safeguarding assets. This role has the security 
manager and security professionals. Although the importance of the safety 
function has a direct correlation with the number and value of corporate assets, 
many superior management does not see it as an important safety feature. 
Also, some security managers rather discontinue contact with the corporate 
executive management than to try to become involved in relationship with 
them through the channels of formal and informal communication. Some look 
to the discussion with corporate management as the conversation with God. 
A security manager who fell so low is on the wrong position. Security 
manager must determine the purpose for active and consider reformulation 
good reasons to communicate with top management and executive 
management, because without their support security would be considered only 
as a few corporate guards. The approach to executive directors must be done 
carefully, because security managers without doubt would been engaged in 
this contact. Security managers, above all, must gain the confidence of their 
managers meetings between them and the top management, and other 
corporate executives so that they could not run into a problem. In the future, 
the changes will be constant. Security manager should be trustworthy and 
skilled in the discipline of protecting assets, have a good understanding of how 
business functions and be able to adapt to any changes and to manage change. 
The global market is bigger, highly competitive, complex and possibly 
dangerous. With less resources will be expected more. Technology is a 
                                                 
7 Gerald L. Kowacich, Edward P. Halibozek, The Managers handbook for Corporate Security 
– Establishing and managing a successful assets protection program, Butterworth Heinemann, 
2003, p. 71 
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blessing and a curse. Protective technology requires some understanding about 
it, and protective measures i.e. how they are applied. Using technology for 
protective purposes also requires technology knowledge. Security 
professional must constantly learn. 
 
MEASURES THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE 
SECURITY IN ANY ORGANIZATION, INSTITUTION OR 
TRADING COMPANIES 
 
Based on past practical experience in the field of security in the private 
sector to achieve quality management, the author of this paper came to 
conclusion that the following basic conditions must be fulfilled. 
 Hiring suitable trained professional security manager in all 
organizations and institutions, especially those who are legally obliged 
to have ensuring. 
 Quality and appropriate ranking in classification in the organizations, 
institutions and trading companies of security services. 
 Establishing and strict adherence to safety procedures, especially by 
the top management. 
 Obligatory providing separate budget for security departments within 
organizations, institutions or enterprises. 
 Engaging specially selected security professional staff where specific 
and decisive will be security managers in any organization, institution 
or company. 
 Bigger engagement by the Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for 
private security in order to get the quality during organizing and 
granting licenses and identification cards. 
 The chamber of Macedonia for private security to pay special attention 
and to enable appropriate education in the area of managing 
themselves in private security agencies, by private security experts. 
 Bigger commitment of the security managers in order of creating a 
greater safety culture within their professional activities. 
 Giving real and practical support from the top management of security 
managers. 
 Adequate motivation to security workers within the working 
environment in which they operate. 
 Ensuring and integrated security system in all labor organizations, 
institutions and companies, especially at those who are legally obliged 
to have security. 
 In the private security law with annex to be introduced compulsory 
continuous training for security workers, because neither in the old law 
 210 
for protecting people and property, neither in the new law on private 
security, in any one article was not mentioned anything like that, 
although it means reading the integral whole law.  
 
1. CONCLUSION 
 
The ability of corporation’s security to respond to the threats is a 
priority of the security service. The most important segment in service 
organization for appropriate response belongs to the management, and the 
entire management process. Timely and true recognition of the risks and 
hazards and appropriate response in such situations will make the corporation 
employees feel safer and more secure, and it will gain more confidence in the 
security service. Critical situations, the risks, threats, and dangers are 
constantly “nearby” and that is why they require a greater coordination and 
joint undertaking of preventive and proactive measures of all segments of the 
corporation, especially by security service which is in a need of greater support 
from senior management. For this aim, consider reformulation, by all 
employees of the corporation, finding and adopting new quality standards in 
benefit of prevention and early recognition of all possible risks and threats 
towards corporation. If leadership is hesitant or dissatisfied, employees will 
abuse it and the number of incrimination will increase. Most important is all 
procedures to apply to all, and towards all to be consistently implemented, 
regardless of the position and status of individuals. It’s very important not to 
make categorization, to someone to allow behavior that is not consistent with 
the adopted procedures. An important precondition that allows respecting 
protective procedures is that management has to respect the rules prescribed 
by them. Giving personal example to other employees needs to show that the 
rules of operation in the terms of security are equally obligated for all 
employees. Management behavior should come to expression, not the talking. 
Bad management covers the real problems and does not solve the crises 
of which the corporation or organization fails to find reasonable solutions, 
which ultimately leads to the organization or corporation collapse as a result 
of the inability to perform basic functions, or to find a sustainable option. 
Good management, above all, searches proactive approach, i.e. 
predicting the problems and timely preparation for their resolving. Forecast or 
estimation is the main content of planning 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Security  is  like  oxygen:  you  tend  not  to  notice  it  until  you  lose  
it.’  The  simile  that  Joseph Nye, a renowned scholar from Harvard, presented 
in a study to the Pentagon  after  the  September  11  and  during  the  invasion  
of  Iraq  in  2003,  highlights  an interesting point  on  how we think  security: 
many of our  thoughts about security  are in  fact  shaped  by  its  antithesis,  
and  our  attempts  to  define  it  are  in  fact  ways  to achieve it. However,  the  
concept  of  security,  and  therefore  of  insecurity,  have  been  changing. The 
answers to the questions ‘security for whom?’, ‘of what values?’, ‘of which 
threats?’, and ‘by what means?’,  have proved to be different according to the 
focus, the  values  at  risk  and  the  sources  of  the  threat.  Indeed,  since  the  
mid-twentieth century,  more  precisely  in  the  late  80s,  there  has  been  a  
profound  change  in  how security is studied and practiced in the International 
Relations (IR) discipline, as well as in the way it is conceptualized and 
designed by strategic culture and  praxis of the States. One of the concepts 
associated with this new approach is Human Security (HS). Even if  a  
common  definition  has  not  yet  been  mainstreamed  for  member  states  or 
International  Organizations  external  action,  it  is  a  core  concept  of  the  
current academic  debate  within  critical  security  studies,  privileging  
individuals  and communities. This approach reflects, on the one hand, the 
concept of comprehensive security  of  the  Copenhagen  school,  and  on  the  
other,  the  concern  with  the individual’s empowerment promoted by the 
Frankfurt doctrine. 
Therefore,  this  paper  will  first  attempt  to  establish  the  concept  of  
HS  –  a  concept which  has  in  recent  years  induced  the  academic  literature  
to  focus  more  on  the individual and  community and less on the State  –  and  
understand in what extent  the Copenhagen and Frankfurt schools has inspired 
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researchers  from different disciplines and with different agendas to think on 
the necessary conditions of universal freedom. 
We will focus on the role of postmodernist approach, also known as 
‘Critical Human Security’ by arguing that the state should no longer be 
regarded as the only provider and security beneficiary.  We  will  reflect  on  
the  way  Critical  Human  Security approaches not only intend to challenge 
the ways in which security was conceived in traditional  terms  and  its  
objectives  and  priorities,  but  specially  expand  and  deepen the concept as 
such. 
We  will  conclude  that  human  security  is  a  valid  concept  that  has  
found  its implementation  through  the  UN  and  the  European  Union  and  
is  increasingly  present (although in different perspectives) in the external 
relations of states such as Canada or  Japan  but  two  major  theoretical  
dilemmas  remain:  how  do  we  recognize  it  when we  see  Human  Security?  
And  where  is  the  new  wine  in  the  new  bottles?  Our last thought is to 
recognize that we must return to some realistic assumptions to accept that 
States are not over as security players. 
 
1. FROM STATE SECURITY TO HUMAN SECURITY: NEW 
AGENDA, NEW REFERENCES, NEW PERSPECTIVES 
 
Since the mid-twentieth century and in particular since the late 1980s 
there has been a profound change in how security is studied and practiced in 
the International Relations (IR) discipline. New ‘gusts of fresh air’ aimed to 
usher a new era of research and overcome the ‘endemic failures and excesses 
of self-restraint (Vasquez, 1995: 118) that the classic realism approach had 
failed to prevent. For those theories, security is primarily defined in relation 
to the state, its territorial integrity and against direct threats from other states. 
Security is defended through force (used unilaterally for the security of the 
state) and achieved throughout civilian instruments along with military 
capabilities. Cooperation is regarded with suspicion, as is the interference of 
international standards and / or multilateral institutions. With the collapse of 
the bipolar confrontation between capitalism and communism and between the 
US and the Soviet Union, the traditional approach of state security was 
severely questioned, as the end of the Cold War made it less clear who the 
enemy of the state security was. 
Globalization also had a major role in transforming the perception of 
security concerns in the last decades of the twentieth century. Therefore, new 
subjects and new threats emerged as the object of study. The aims remained 
the same as those of the classic security studies, that is, identifying the causes 
of war/insecurity and the conditions of peace/security, but now the focus was 
on exploring ‘[t]he possibility, rather than the impossibility [...] the 
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empowerment more than power’ (Krause and Williams, 1997: 111). In other 
words, new topics, new threats, new players and new challenges questioned 
the realism perspective’s assumption that the sovereign states were the 
guardians of individuals’ security. Thus, as the new threats and the new 
enemies concerned individuals directly, security started to be understood as a 
condition that citizens are entitled to enjoy as members of the society in which 
they operate and, after all, as members of Humanity. 
Consequently, the security and survival of people as the ultimate goal 
of human security emerged on the international scene only in the last decade 
of the twentieth century. The prevailing objective became the development of 
special measures to defend not only states and their territorial integrity against 
external threats, but also individuals, regardless of the will of the governments 
concerned. Thus, the security of individuals ceased to be seen as a natural 
prerogative of the sovereign nation state and started to be considered a 
potential responsibility of the international community as a whole. This 
approach reflects, on the one hand, the Copenhagen’s concept of 
comprehensive security,1 and on the other, the concern with the individual’s 
empowerment promoted by the Frankfurt school.2 The concept of 
empowerment is indeed crucial. Drawn from a line of thought that finds its 
origins in the Enlightenment, it leads us to the underlying philosophy behind 
the concept of human security. It expresses the notion of freedom of 
individuals as freedom from various kinds of constraints, whether social, 
economic or political, physical or psychological. The objective is, then, the 
protection of people exposed to threats or critical situations, and the restoring 
of rules, procedures and institutions in order to overcome insecurity and 
achieve the freedom to live without fears or needs. Thus, empowerment aims 
to break with past forms of injustice to achieve the necessary conditions of 
universal freedom. The postmodernist approach, also known as ‘Critical 
Human Security’ is another important security approach that argues that the 
state should no longer be regarded as the only provider and security 
beneficiary: 
The State may be the major agent that acts for security, but that does 
not necessarily require its own security to be prioritised by the analyst (a 
                                                 
1 Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (2001) are the most representative of a structural neorealist 
approach also known as ‘new security’. They admit that the Cold War discussion on Security 
was reductive, but they conclude that the most important and efficient supplier of safety must 
remain the sovereign state as an institution representing human security and the social identity 
preservation. Thus, the Copenhagen School does not deny state security, because security is 
always personal in the release of all threats of the society, people, nation or community. 
2  Bilgin, Booth, Wyn-Jones, Krause and Williams are the most representative authors of this 
school, which focuses primarily on concern for the emancipation of the human being as 
individual and communities. 
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mother is the main agent in terms of the security of her baby, but this does not 
mean that she is the primary referent in the relationship: she practices security 
for her child). (Bilgin, Booth and Wyn-Jones, 1998: 150). Indeed, Critical 
Human Security challenges realism assumption that sovereign states are the 
exclusive security guardians of individuals. The state exists to ensure its 
citizens’ security, but it is not the only agent to perform this function, since 
the global civil society and the international organizations are now also 
security agents. In short, Critical Human Security approaches not only intend 
to challenge the ways in which security was conceived in traditional terms and 
its objectives and priorities, but specially expand and deepen the concept as 
such. This is rather important because what we study today as human security 
is academically inspired by the Copenhagen and Frankfurt schools.  
 
2. HUMAN SECURITY IN PRACTICE 
 
The UNDP report 
When scholars need to trace the origins of the concept of Human 
Security, most of the literature review does not hesitate to recognize the 1994 
Human Development report (HDR) of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) as the founding document of the human security 
doctrine. Hambub Ul Haq, economist and UN consultant, develops in 1994 a 
‘Human Development Index’. In his monograph, entitled New imperatives, the 
author suggests four imperatives to address a broad interpretation of the 
security concept: 
 Development imperative – human security should be synonymous with 
human development that emphasizes equality, sustainability and social 
participation. This thesis may reinforce, however, that human security 
is a precondition for human development. 
 Military Imperative – the enlargement of the human security agenda 
can only be sustained by the peace dividends. 
 North-South Restructuration Imperative – human security is only 
achieved through a new, just and reciprocal partnership between the 
North and the South and equal access in terms of global market 
opportunities. 
 Institutional Imperative – a new global governance framework must be 
accomplished through the reform of the international institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the United 
Nations. Good governance at national and international policy, also 
through diplomacy, tends to prevent and guarantee people’s basic 
needs. 
We should not think, however, that the contribution and commitment 
of the United Nations in relation to the concept of human security is reduced 
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to the UNDP 1994 report. In fact, the collective security actions taken under 
the auspices of the United Nations in the post-Cold War humanitarian 
interventions began to emphasize more and more the peace and security of 
affected populations instead of just state’s survival. 
The most recent update on the Human Security discussion within the 
United Nations relates with the release of the strategic plan of the Human 
Security Unit for 2014 to 2017. This document is rather important as both 
draws on the experiences and lessons learned of the last two decades and sets 
specific goals and objectives to mainstream human security in all the activities 
of the United Nations over next four years.  
  
JAPAN 
The United Nations’ references to human security are not limited to 
the Millennium Report of Kofi Annan or to the resolutions that anticipated the 
Millennium Summit (53/239, 54/254, 54/261, 54/281), but can also be seen in 
the implementation, in September 2004, of a ‘Human Security Unit’. This unit 
was created under the supervision of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which, in turn, 
aims to move human security up to the priority status of United Nations 
activities. OCHA also had the guiding mission of managing the United 
Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), established in 1999 by 
Japan. In that particular year, Keizo Obuchi was the Prime Minister in office 
and he was considered the human security mentor in Japan, associating the 
concept to social development theories. 
Two years later, in June 2001, the United Nations Commission on 
Human Security was launched, co-chaired by the Nobel Prize Amartya Sen 
and former High Refugees Commissioner Sadako Ogata and Yoshiro Mori 
(Japan’s Prime Minister). The objectives of the Commission are mainly two: 
first, to clarify the concept of human security and reach a consensus over the 
different interpretations and perspectives in order to formulate specific 
principles and policy tools; and second, to identify and explore a concrete 
action program to address human security threats. 
The implementation of the concept in Japanese foreign policy was 
highly focused on their own reality: the Asiatic financial crisis of 1997. In this 
context, Japan emphasizes "Human Security" from the perspective of 
strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and 
dignity as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational 
organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of 
refugees and anti-personnel land mines, and has taken various initiatives in 
this context. To ensure "Human freedom and potential," a range of issues 
needs to be addressed from the perspective of "Human Security" focused on 
the individual, requiring cooperation among the various actors in the 
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international community, including governments, international organizations 
and civil society. This definition helps to explain why the Human Security 
Trust Fund, with a budget of $170m in 2002, was focused on humanitarian 
interventions and development assistance from Southeast Asia to Africa. In 
addition, it was thematically centred on UNESCO education campaigns, 
WHO public health projects, UNDP development programmes and UNHCR 
safe return refugees’ policy. 
On 1 May 2003, the Commission submitted to the United Nations 
Secretary-General its final report entitled ‘Human Security Now’3. This report 
is based on two main principles: first, protecting the individuals and assuring 
their rights and freedoms; second, empowering individuals and communities. 
According to the report, these two principles require protection from 
above (top-down) and a empowerment from below (bottom-up), since 
protected individuals can have many choices, empowered individuals can 
make better choices and contribute to improvements in the system of 
protection (Ogata, 2005: 13). The combination of protection and 
empowerment as a key perspective in developing Japan's foreign policy is a 
reflection of the Commission of Human Security’ belief that human security 
complements state security in at least four aspects: Its concern is individual 
and community rather than the state; Menaces include / more than / threats to 
state security; The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone; 
Achieving human security includes empowering people (Galtung, 2003: 6). 
If UNDP and Japan’s perspectives are quite similar in the preference 
for a ‘freedom from want’ approach in protecting the vital core of all human 
lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human accomplishment, they 
sharply contrast with the content and scope of Canada´s security policies, 
which reflect instead a ‘freedom from fear’ perspective. 
 
CANADA 
Canada is often considered by scholars the state that most supported 
the doctrine of human security at the governmental level4. In particular, 
Canada has been striving to refuse what Keith Krause calls a ‘shopping list’ 
approach (2004: 51), that is, an understanding of human security with so many 
aims,  it would lose its that it loses validity, utility and operability as a political 
tool. Thus, in order to limit the scope of the concept, Canada´s Human Security 
action guide can be summarized in five major areas: protection of civilians, 
support peace operations, conflict prevention, good governance and public 
safety. Taking into account all these elements, Canada’s human security 
                                                 
3 Please see http://www.unocha.org/humansecurity/chs/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf 
4 Please see a balance of 15 years of the canadian Human Security Network in 
http://cips.uottawa.ca/the-human-security-network-fifteen-years-on/ 
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agenda seems more action-oriented, less wide-ranging and more methodical 
than the UNDP in listing the operational practicalities of a human security 
agenda. In parallel, Canada has developed the concept of responsibility to 
protect (also known by its acronym R2P).5 This concept can briefly be 
described as a duty to protect those who need support and are in situations of 
compelling need for humanitarian protection. Protect is thus a broader 
normative concept that goes further than any intervention, because it prevents, 
reacts and reconstructs.  
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BARCELONA AND 
MADRID REPORTS 
 
It is the European Security Strategy (ESS) that truly represents the 
beginning of a strategic security doctrine shared by the Member States and a 
first step in a human security narrative. Even though the ESS does not 
explicitly address human security (referring only to the safety of people and 
communities), the 2008 implementation report mentions it twice (European 
Council, 2008: 2, 10). Moreover, both the 2003 text and the 2008 amendment 
make several references to the components associated with a human security 
agenda. In fact, the ESS has quickly affirmed itself as a kind of manifesto for 
a vision of the Union as a producer and promoter of norms and values 
exportable both to its neighbourhood, and to the rest of the world. We may 
also recall that the added value of the strategy lies in establishing the EU as a 
global actor by clarifying the contribution and potential of the EU, and by 
making it more active, more coherent and more capable «it would contribute 
to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united 
world. (European Council, 2003: 14). 
In addition, perhaps the most significant sign of the incorporation of 
the human security concept in the strategy is the belief that security is a 
precondition for development. In turn, poverty, disease and ignorance are 
considered potential causes of insecurity. The identified threats are terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states 
and organized crime. Therefore, and because «conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early» (European Council 2003: 7), the strategy 
argues that the EU and its Member States must not neglect regional conflicts, 
good governance and the reconstruction of civil administration. 
                                                 
5 The Responsibility to Protect report by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty is available on http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. This 
concept was enshrined in the Final Document of the UN Summit in September 2005, where 
member states committed to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
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However, despite expressing a broad concept of security, stressing 
prevention and the importance of multilateralism, the EES neither talks about 
human security, nor explains how the Union and the Community institutions 
can implement the strategy in order to explore all the possibilities of a human 
security policy for Europe. 
Thus, Solana challenges thirteen researchers representing the finest 
European expertise on security and defence issues that coordinated by Mary 
Kaldor and presented to Javier Solana on 15 September 2004 in the Barcelona 
report under the title ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.’ The doctrine 
that this working group developed and presented less than a year after the 
strategy was never officially adopted, neither by the Community institutions 
nor by the Member States. However, this does not diminish the fact that this 
report presents a detailed study of the current capacity of European security, 
concluding that Europe needs to be equipped with military forces. However, 
these forces must be configured in new ways and adapted to new environments 
if Solana’s aim of making the EU a global player is to be achieved. Adopting 
a broad concept of human security geared towards protecting individuals from 
the insecurities arising from human rights violations, this report recommends 
that a human security doctrine should be developed into three interdependent 
levels. The first level is constituted by a set of seven guiding principles that 
identify the objectives that should govern the implementation of a human 
security policy and outline human capabilities and the cultural, technological, 
legal and organizational requirements for the pursuit of these principles.6The 
seven principles for human security are: primacy of human rights; 
establishment of a legitimate political authority in command and in control of 
missions and promotion of political solutions through diplomacy, sanctions, 
humanitarian aid and consultations with civil society; multilateralism; 
perspective from below; regional approach; use of legal instruments; and 
appropriate and legitimate use of force, framed by Chapters VI and VII of the 
UN Charter in order to protect civilians and lessen collateral damages. 
According to the authors, however, in order to implement a human 
security policy rooted in those seven principles, the Union needs to provide a 
second and third level of action. The second level relates to the proposal to 
build a Human Security Response Force (HSRF) composed of 15,000 
elements, a third of them civilians. In addition, the Barcelona report also 
highlights a legal framework that will govern the intervention decisions and 
coordinate field operations. In order to strengthen the arguments of the 2004 
report and take stock of the proposals, the Study Group on Human Security 
                                                 
6 Because the line between the different phases of a crisis or conflict is extremely tenuous, the 
authors consider that these principles should be applied to a continuum, from prevention to 
reconstruction. 
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presents the Madrid report on 8 November 2007. The report, composed of a 
proposal and a background report, proposes a Protocol or a Declaration to 
promote human security in CFSP/ESDP, stressing that human security is the 
most appropriate security strategy for the EU. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In its essence, human security can be defined as a practical guide for 
action to free the individual from all fears and needs which gives priority to a 
collaborative and cooperative multilateralism. In this sense, the 
implementation of human security requires a double hierarchy. The first one 
is top-down intervention from states, multilateral organizations and the 
international community as a whole. The second is a bottom-up action from 
NGOs and work on the ground from international organizations such as the 
OSCE or the EU to eliminate the roots of conflicts and achieve the minimum 
guarantees of survival. The two approaches are certainly complementary. 
Thus, despite the different angles of analysis that a broader or narrower human 
security agenda may suggest, it is fair to say that: human security is first of all 
an attitude. Rather than a programme, it is an attitude, a way of being, a way 
of viewing the world, of viewing international relations, of viewing the 
interaction between economics and politics, between politics and culture, 
between culture and society, and so forth. It is a stance. Military security was 
not a stance; it was a budget, and it was a policy. Human security is a way of 
being and a way of fitting into the international system. (Badie, 2000: 41) 
In the following, we will discuss some of the problems of such a lose 
understanding of ‘human security’. The first set of questions arises from the 
fact that the UNDP defines human security in a negative way. For the UNDP, 
human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job 
that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident 
who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons-it is a 
concern with human life and dignity. (UNDP, 1994:22) The fact that the 
UNDP defines human security in a negative way illustrates immediately one 
of the greatest weaknesses of the concept: it is neither noticeable nor 
measurable or newsworthy; it does not cover anything in particular and is too 
broad; it does not fix anything in concrete so that its effectiveness can be 
assessed; we do not know if it really exists, if we miss it, if someone suffers 
from human insecurity or what the therapy is the for such an uncertain 
diagnosis. In other words, how can we recognise it when we see it? Moreover, 
the human security narrative tends to seem more like a panacea for all 
problems of and threats to individuals and communities: it promises freedom 
from all insecurities and aspirations to all forms of happiness. Therefore, the 
concept of human security (in the form of philosophy or moral code) has  like 
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all ‘sexy’ narratives inspired by the philosophy of ideas, they can be 
manipulated to justify new protectorates or international interventions under 
the umbrella of other concepts, such as the ‘responsibility to protect’. 
By linking security and development and focusing on collective 
responses to new threats, human security has thus gradually become a topic 
on the agenda of the United Nations, Canada, Japan and even the European 
Union. Among the different definitions and perspectives that we could 
distinguish here, two trends have dominated in the last few years. They lie in 
the opposition between a comprehensive approach focused on ‘freedom from 
need’ and a narrow approach focused on ‘freedom from fear’. Therefore, the 
concept of human security suggests that autonomy and empowerment are the 
key for ensuring that people achieve the freedom to act in their own interest 
and following their aspirations, to participate in decision making and to create 
systems that give people the rights of survival, dignity and livelihood. But are 
all the people willing to engage in this process? That is for sure one of the 
never-ending challenges that human security faces. Moreover, we should not 
forget that human security is a Western approach to protection and 
empowerment, and that there might be other useful approaches to assure 
democracy in an ongoing state. It is no wonder that for most scholars, concepts 
like human security are useless if we do not see them implemented in practice, 
denying, for instance, that “our model fits all”. Indeed, if there is a concept 
that seems to raise more questions than it provides answers, and that tends to 
divide researchers all over the world is most certainly the one of human 
security. However, one aspect that all authors seem to agree is that human 
security is concerned with the physical and material security of individuals 
and communities, rather than that of states. But if we look carefully to today’s 
main conflicts the state is not only “the” security player but also that territorial 
integrity remains the key value of international relations both to map securities 
and insecurities. 
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1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The object of this important Conference – Researching Security: 
Approaches, Concepts and Policies – is very well expressed in its presentation 
and, among several aspects, contents, exigencies and instruments for the 
protection of security (or, at least, for guaranteeing a higher level of security), 
it is generally underlined that security is a complex phenomenon and a 
controversial notion not well defined over the years; in the same way, it has 
been correctly pointed out that any research in the field of security is 
necessarily connected to the different circumstances and categories as, for 
example, the physical security which guaranties the survival, the absence of a 
structural violence, and the peace and stability. Specifically, within the 
international relations, security is identified in several ways and frequently in 
the literature concerning international relations at different levels, as the one 
concerning the international law; the notion of security is pointed out in 
different ways, as mentioned, without a shared definition of any unitary 
notion. On political grounds in general, the notion of security is clearly and 
prejudicially a necessary condition for the existence of the individual and the 
social groups, and it is clearly identified in the absence of threats and in the 
protection from the threats. 
Therefore, as clearly evident, the implication of security reflexes the 
primordial interest of every individual and social entity as specifically, for 
what concerns in this paper, the Nation and the State with respect to which the 
analysis of the international system is directly implicated even and mostly in 
its normative expressions in order to measure the existing level of security in 
the relations between States, being this the specific point of view and the 
object of the present paper. 
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It is about a specific and well identified way of addressing the notion 
of security in the mentioned contexts, as the international one, beside the other 
different contexts with respect to which, the problem or the exigency of 
guaranteeing a minimum standard of security is rightly posed. 
 
2. GLOBALIZATION, EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NEW EXIGENCIES 
AND CONTENTS OF SECURITY 
 
We could not avoid to agree on the fact that in recent times, the 
evolution of the international relations, the economic interests, even the 
religious disputes, the new and rapid communication and mobilization means, 
in a larger context of globalization, have determined not only the new 
exigencies of security but a different content of the security notion itself. Just 
to recall, for this purpose are used the non-conventional armed conflicts (the 
so-called “asymmetric”) as well as the broadening phenomenon of national 
and international terrorism. This evolution has subsequently determined the 
necessity to reconsider the concept of security within the national limits but 
even and mostly within the international ones. If it is true that the modalities 
and forms of security at international level underline their substantial 
continuity in the historical retrospective and perspective, it is about to evaluate 
if these forms and modalities of the international security system have been 
changed and in what way these changes are nowadays represented; keeping 
always in mind, however, that the international security is necessarily related 
to the State and its way of being. Thus, the consequence deriving from the fact 
according to which, in the presence of the above mentioned global changes, a 
credible standard of international security would not abstract from a situation 
of internal peace within the State which means an orderly and pacific life of 
inter-individual relationship, but also and very often, it implies to a condition 
of freedom from any kind of threat and a condition of innate exigency of 
defense from external threats which may threaten the sovereignty of the State 
in terms of political independence as well as in terms of territorial integrity. 
This aspect comes to evidence as a central element of the notion of 
security only if we observe how, most frequently, the sovereignty of the State 
in the indicated terms is threatened or compromised through the external 
organization of seditious or subversive phenomena and even through the 
instrument of terrorism. This happens, mostly, in those state realities 
characterized by weaker national identity and social cohesion which can be 
easily jeopardized from internal seditions provoked by outside aiming towards 
the achievement of socio-economic contrasts. The recent case of Ukraine 
where a real coup d’état was promoted and organized from the outside 
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demonstrates what is sustained above. This is also with regard to the minorities 
existing within the State, as well as with regard to the ethic realities whose 
enormous dimensions do not permit to talk in the real sense of “minority” with 
respect to which the necessary standard of security moves from well different 
starting points and should be achieved by the means of particular measures 
which are surely not those traditional guaranties granted by the conventional 
or general international law in favor of minorities traditionally intended. 
An aspect conveniently highlighted with regard to the object of the 
present Conference, is that without an adequate standard of security there is 
no room for effective freedom. Therefore, there is a strict relation between the 
notion of security and the minimal exigencies of individual and collective 
freedom. 
In the level of international relations (more exactly, in the level of the 
inter-state relations), in conformity of the general and conventional 
international law, the idea of the necessarily collective freedom, intended as a 
freedom of the people (of the Nation, in terms politically correct), should not 
avoid to signify specifically that political independence and territorial integrity 
that can only be guaranteed by thorough political and legal instruments apt to 
assure the appropriate protection. According to the prospective and 
considerations herein followed, the ample phenomena of emigration - 
immigration almost uncontrolled, as often happens to the European Union 
member States, comes certainly into appearance as a potential element of 
threat with regard to the way of being of the State even in terms of proper 
effective capacity to regulate the phenomenon and self-determinate in an 
independent way. The aspect of being of a State moves from a specific identity 
that is manifested in terms of common history, shared values, internal political 
organization as well as in terms of cultural and political planning finally 
intended with specific attention to the regulation of the individual relations 
and among the different social entities living in the State and belonging to the 
State, as well as, even in religious terms as important composing parts of the 
cultural and historical model. 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ORDER 
 
The Great Mustafà Kemal Ataturk used to sustain: “Peace at Home, 
Peace in the World”. On this reflection of the founder of the modern Turkey 
any consideration becomes necessary in order to underline how the peace 
internally intended should necessarily mean an orderly and equal regulation of 
the social relations and a correct balance point between the political and the 
civil rights and liberties and the fundamental rights of the person of an 
economic and social nature as well as a balance point between the rights and 
duties of the individual and the rights and duties of the State as such. We can 
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say that what is above addressed, concerns the complex problem of 
recognition and protection of the human rights and liberties as a minimal 
requirement of the internal security of the State and the security intended 
within inter-state relations. 
With regard to the first aspect of the argument, we should add that it 
would be mystifying to guarantee only, and only formally, civil and political 
rights without guaranteeing in real and concrete way social and economic 
rights (that is the right to life and to a dignified life which has its essential 
premise ,the right to access to a paid labor activity which  could only guarantee 
freedom and dignity to the person) which constitutes the elementary premise 
for the use of effective civil and political rights and liberties. Again the 
President Mustafà Kemal Ataturk used to say: “we need only one thing: to 
work”. As it could be even less consistent, recognizing individual rights of 
freedom if the State would not be effectively free from external conditioning 
of general collectivity living within the State, which is the State, and is 
organized in the forms and modalities of the State itself, as freely decided. In 
other terms, talking about individual liberties within the membership in a 
social community would seem to be misleading. 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC 
AFFAIRS OF THE STATE 
 
It seems that the international legal scholars, for several reasons, do not 
show interest about the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
the State. Among these reasons is probably the one according to which the 
attention of the international legal scholars is almost exclusively concentrated 
to the questions concerning the fundamental human rights and liberties of the 
individual. As to say that international law has only this interest in the sense 
if discipline, among all the fields of inter-state relations, only this sector. 
Probably it is an effect or an unconditioned reflection of the “globalization” 
with respect to which the question of the international protection of 
fundamental human rights and liberties, which itself transcends the national 
borders of the State, appears specifically coherent. The other reason, certainly 
unrelated to any problem connected to the way of being of the international 
legal order and its systematic correlation, is represented by the objective fact 
of the predominant and decisive role played in the present historical moment 
of the international relations by the so-called occidental representative 
democracies of traditional liberal inspiration which, as seen and happening in 
many cases (Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt and, recently, Ukraine 
and Syria, without mentioning other cases belonging to state entities 
concerning the western hemisphere and the African continent), as a 
consequence of their expansive foreign policies, pervading and aggressive, led 
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by the United States, actuated to achieve strategic and economic goals that do 
not have anything to do with the international protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms, by assuming the latter as an excuse and justification for proper 
aggression towards the domestic order, towards the political independence and 
the territorial sovereignty of the States object of even armed attacks, modestly 
called “humanitarian intervention” or actions of “international police”. 
Even this happens on the grounds of a self-justification in the name of 
an already allegedly irrevocable and unavoidable “globalization”, which is 
intended to be extended even in the field of domestic jurisdiction, which is the 
internal political organization of any State. With any consequence, as it seems 
to be evident, involving the internal security of the State as well as the 
international security which finds its main fundament in a correct application 
of inter-state relations in full conformity with the norms and general principles 
– normative and structural – of the general international law. 
 
PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF 
THE STATE, RIGHT TO INTERVENE AND INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY 
 
The pretended predominance of the mentioned humanitarian 
exigencies and the necessity of the even “preventive” wars aiming the 
“exportation of democracy”, as announced by the US President Bush 
(although justifiable for the inadequacy of his covered function), has brought 
to forget that the international political legal order is grounded in a primordial 
way. This is done on the balance meeting-point between the principle that 
prohibits any interference in the domestic affairs of a State and the principle 
that permits or rather imposes, but however always legitimates, an – even 
armed – intervention towards any State if the latter is considered responsible 
for a serious and continuous prejudice for the fundamental interests and values 
that in a certain historical moment are considered worthy of absolute 
protection by the international Community of the States. In these values and 
interests, though in its historical relativism, its reason of being is recognized, 
as well as its essential finality (addressed to the preservation of the 
international public order as historically intended in a certain moment). And 
even this is an unavoidable element for pursuing the goal of the internal 
security of a State and the international security in the inter-state relations. 
As it was mentioned above, nobody talks about the principle that 
prohibits the interference in the domestic affairs of the State and what assumes 
a greater importance is the exclusive and uncritical protection of the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms which, beyond the fact that, as seen, 
are assumed as a justifying pretext for proper aggression against the internal 
order, the political independence and territorial integrity of the States, are 
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represented nowadays not as an expression of any legal norm or principle 
accepted by the generality of the States, but rather as a reflection of an 
ideology or even, as it often happens, of contingent policies aiming, from 
outside, the legitimating of internal revolutions within the States or, repeating 
again, proper and explicit armed aggressions against these States. 
Preliminarily, we should remember that even for the international law the 
internal way of being of the State does not matter but the element of interest 
is represented in the manner the State acts in the field of inter-state relations 
and if, in other words, acts or not in compliance with the customary and 
conventional norms or with the general principles of the proper legal order of 
the international community. 
It does not pertain to the international law and even less to any State, 
though economically or military powerful, to evaluate the democracy level of 
other States grounding, in this way, the assumption – which is an illicit 
pretention – on the fact that the internal political organization of the State 
should be democratic. Thus, ignoring the fact that a unique form of democratic 
organization of any collectivity represented in the State does not exist, and 
with this underlining again that the pretension of the above mentioned 
occidental democracies consists in legitimization of only internal political 
organization of the State in conformity with the methods and contents of the 
representative democracy of the old liberal State which – to be said – does not 
represent any more the effective popular will. 
 
PARAMETER OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE 
PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
OF THE STATE AND RIGHT TO INTERVENE. THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
The problem of the individuation of any political and legal measure of 
compatibility between the principle of non interference in the domestic affairs 
of the State and the principle of humanitarian intervention for the protection 
of rights considered superior, as the protection of the fundamental human 
rights and freedoms and the democracy, was preannounced by the then UN 
Secretary General Kofì Annan. Replying to the solicitation of the UN 
Secretary General (and only few States followed this example) the 
Government of Canada established a special Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty. The assigned task was, therefore, to evaluate contents, 
premises and limits of military intervention in relation to the protection of the 
State sovereignty, and thus on the base of what premises and according to what 
criteria and time the intervention against the domestic affairs of the State was 
legitimate, to the detriment of the equal political and legal range principle of 
non interference in the domestic affairs of the same State, as well as of the 
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equality of the member subjects of the international Community. The result of 
the work of the mentioned Commission did not bring to the adequate 
clarification of the premises and the limits of the even armed intervention, 
failing thus in the exigency to determinate the balance point between the 
opposite principles, that is when humanitarian exigencies should or would 
have prevailed over the respect of the exclusive competence of the State on 
the issues of the domestic jurisdiction. To this purpose, more concrete results 
by the substantial and systematic point of view were achieved by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which, by the 
means of a special Resolution clarified that an action of intervention used to 
find legitimacy on the grounds of international law and even with regard to 
the UN Charter (with specific concern to art. 51), only if the State object of 
intervention had been practicing (and continued to do so) a policy of massive, 
grave and systematic violations against the fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. To be added that, in effect, the work done by the Canadian 
Commission provoked the result to misbalance even more the relations 
between the prohibition of interference in the domestic affairs of the State and 
the right to humanitarian intervention, establishing as a duty of the State a new 
and singular “responsibility to protect” (R2P). In other terms, if any State, 
because of its internal political weakness or even for other external reasons, 
would not be able to guarantee and protect properly the citizens and residents 
of its territory, the circumstances could justify the legitimacy of any action of 
collective or individual intervention even through the use of military force. 
The assertion, in itself maybe even sharable, has become, in fact, 
pretension of real interventions or acts of aggression against the political 
independence and territorial integrity of some States (aggression, therefore, to 
the sovereignty of the State which is itself a general principle of the structure 
and organization of the international Community), if only we take under exam 
the aberrant applications in the practice. The emblematic case regards Libya 
where the legitimate government (and, again, legitimate should not necessarily 
signify democratic according to the meanings and the concepts in use in the 
occidental liberal-democracies) of Colonel Muammar Khadafy was found 
responsible for not protecting the Libyan tumultuous gangs that, armed and 
sustained from France and England, and then by the whole offensive system 
of the NATO, used to fight in order to depose the legitimate government. A 
similar situation was verified in Ukraine (but here we are in presence of simple 
and vulgar mystification) where the President Yanukovych, democratically 
elected, was accused for not protecting the population demonstrating in Kiev, 
in Maidan Square, and which were shot by instigators belonging to the same 
demonstrators. 
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POLITICAL ASPECTS AND MYSTIFICATION: THE 
CONSEQUENCES ON THE INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL 
SECURITY 
 
It is very difficult to legally analyze the relation between the two main 
structural principles of the international Community of the States herein 
considered, if the facts, the happenings, or the events are not evaluated for how 
they effectively were verified, beyond any mystification or propaganda, even 
through television or newspapers, to the benefit of economic or geo-strategic 
interests of the so-called occidental liberal-democracies that still today 
continue to persist in the traditional actions of foreign policy of subjugation 
and disintegration of the territorial and political sovereignty of the States. 
How much this compromises not only the internal security but even 
and especially the international security is shown emblematically in the cases 
of Ukraine and Syria. It is about situations not resolved yet, in the first case, 
because of the secession of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of the 
resistance of the Eastern regions of the Country which still contrast the effects 
of the vulgar coup d’état perpetrated in Kiev by the occidental democracies; 
and, in the second case, because of the ongoing resistance of the President 
Bashar Al Assad who still effectively contrasts the insurgents, 85% of which 
are not Syrian but come from other Arab Countries, as Qatar, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia or Libya, for competition exigencies internal to the Arab Nation, or 
armed or trained from non-Arab Countries, headed obviously by the United 
States: to a certain extent it seems that the situation within the Arab Nation is 
still the one the Colonel Lawrence of Arabia knew; but the most important is 
that about the effective situations and events happening in these Countries 
nothing is documented by the means of information, exclusively dedicated to 
mystifying and propaganda operations – except particular cases as Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung – to the benefit of the economic and geo-strategic interests 
of those States which intentionally caused these situations. 
The situation summarily highlighted shows how the falsified and 
intentionally predestined use of the instrument of humanitarian intervention 
(that unavoidably brings situation of real war which continues to be falsely 
qualified, for its pretended legitimacy, as humanitarian), instead of 
guaranteeing the security of the individuals, of the populations or parts of it, 
compromises it irremediably with additional and unavoidable consequences 
of reaction phenomena increasingly vast and bloody of terroristic nature 
whose responsibility is attributable firstly to the foreign policy actions of the 
occidental liberal-democracies, which nowadays constitute the most relevant 
and diffused cause generating individual and collective insecurity in the 
Southern region, as well as in the so-called occidental States and the African 
Continent. 
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THE ROLE AND THE ACTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
It should also be underlined that, in order to maintain a minimum 
standard of collective and / or individual security, the action of the foreign 
policy of the European Union as such, is substantially inexistent for the simple 
reason that in the facts, in reality, it does not exist any European Union foreign 
policy. Even from this point of view it has been rightly observed that the 
European Union is a political dwarf: now, given the substantial economic 
situation of stagnation of the EU in its entirety, we can easily sustain that it is 
also an economic dwarf.  The irrelevance of the EU in the field of the foreign 
policy, unable to conduct an effective common foreign policy and to establish 
a proper common military instrument, depends on several reasons and among 
these mainly the fact that almost all the member States of the EU are also NATO 
members (organization that nowadays, in terms of aggressiveness, is 
considered as a more relevant and dangerous entity) to which the States of the 
EU are conditioned in their actions due to the dispositions provided for in the 
Lisbon Treaty of 2009; and it is known that the operative decisions within the 
NATO are taken from the US government and its President. The other reason, 
not less relevant, is that some member States of the European Union, and 
among these the Great Britain, France and the same Germany, pursue 
individual economic and geo-strategic interests at international scale and 
conduct absolutely different actions of foreign policy and even in contrast with 
those of other member States of the EU because, exactly, of different 
economic and geo-strategic interests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Guaranteeing or, better, recovering a more reliable standard of internal 
and international security of States , without furthermore reducing the level of 
protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms which only within the 
State and by the mean of its action could be effectively recognized and 
protected (not certainly at international level), as also it is implicitly derivable 
from the finalities (though not sincere) of the individual or collective armed 
interventions aiming the alteration of the internal way of being of States in 
conformity with the necessity of protection of the fundamental human rights 
and liberties, implicates a not only theoretical but even practical, 
reaffirmation, in the context of the inter-state relation life, of the principle of 
non interference in the domestic affairs of the State, and in the context of the 
general international Community of the States. 
Paradoxically, this principle was better guaranteed during the period 
of the cold war but later ceased the so-called contrast between the “blocks” 
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due to the ideological, economic and political decline of the Union of the 
Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and of the Central-Eastern Europe States 
ruled by similar regimes, with the consequence of the prevalence of the liberal-
democratic States of the Occident headed by the USA, the principle of non 
interference in the domestic affairs of the State has been almost abandoned or 
however omitted for the reason above mentioned. Nowadays, with the 
emerging of the relevant function and role of the Russian Federation in the 
international politics even within the UN, certainly non negligible for its 
economic and military potential, seems that, as facts demonstrate, with regard, 
for example to Ukraine and Syria, new balances are being established that 
objectively in the practice facilitate an operative recovery (therefore, not 
merely announced) of the principle of non interference in the domestic affairs 
of the State, unless its containment is legitimately justified from superior 
necessities and interests of the international Community of the States as such, 
and with this recovering, as sustained, a higher and effective standard of 
internal and international security. Actually, to this concern, to be observed 
that, according to an opposite apparently consequentiality the international 
security fosters undoubtedly a higher level of internal security for what regards 
the fundamental human rights and freedoms since it favors a more incisive and 
inclusive dialogue between the governments and relative populations within 
proper territories. 
The international Community of States, in the field of armed 
interventions and “humanitarian wars” which have provoked disastrous effects 
in terms of security, could and should facilitate this dialogue short of any 
external interference and in respect of the sovereignty of every State in its 
significance of political independence and territorial integrity. The 
international Community of States, as such, should operate by guaranteeing 
every State (in its expressions of government and population) the right to 
decide freely on the relative choices concerning the proper future and the 
proper internal dimension even in terms of human security. 
 
 
 
UDK: 338.23:336.74]:336.71.078.3(497.7) 
REDEFINITION OF MACROECONOMIC AND 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND BASEL III 
CONCEPT 
Danche Nikolovska Vrateovska, PhD 
Ministry of Finance of R. Macedonia, Public Revenue Office 
E-mail: nikolovska_dance@yahoo.com 
Snezana Mojsoska, PhD 
Faculty of Security-Skopje, UKLO 
E-mail: smojsoska@gmail.com 
Aleksandra Angelovska, MA 
Local Municipality of Shtip 
E-mail: aangelovska86@yahoo.com 
 
ABSTRACT  
 As an essential tool proceeding  the objective function in the 
period before the global economic crisis (2008), the focus of central banks and 
monetary policy has been to provide price stability over the policy interest 
rate. This led to emphasizing the role of the credit channel on monetary policy 
impact of the economy through the quantity of reserves and return-bank credit 
to the real sector. The exception to this rule was the policy of double pillar of 
the ECB, which paid special attention to the amount of credit in the economy. 
The regulation and supervision that were focused on individual financial 
institutions and markets as well as measuring their impact on the funding 
stability, were largely ignored. Given the enthusiasm for financial 
deregulation, the usage of prudential regulation for countercyclical purposes 
was considered improper interference in the functioning of credit markets. 
Simultaneously, with the positions of sharp political limitations, the power of 
the impact on fiscal policy was substantially underestimated. The global 
economic crisis has imposed the need of reshaping the macroeconomic policy. 
According to the determined objectives of macro-prudential regulators, 
macroprudential elements which are infiltrated  in BASEL 3 concept are 
necessary to be fully implemented by the end of 2019. This paper, through the 
methods of induction and deduction, historical analysis and the comparative 
method, provides an overview of the latest developments in macroeconomic 
and redefined macroprudential policy, offers proposed measures and tools for 
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operating the criteria of Basel 3, and illustrates the case of Republic of 
Macedonia in compliance with the aspect of the banking sector with the new 
capital standards of Basel 3.  
 Key words: global economic crisis, central banks, monetary 
policy, fiscal policy, regulation, supervision, interest rates, credit channel.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic thought, within numerous panel discussions, theoretical and 
empirical analysis, underscores that pro-cyclical behavior of financial 
institutions is recorded, especially the banks. In fact, financial institutions take 
greater risk during economic booms and later, in periods of economic 
downturns become too aversive to risk, which displays their pro-cyclical 
impact. The existence of moral hazard and simultaneously the idea that some 
financial institutions are too big to fail, and the recorded failure of the 
institutions to recognize the broader negative externalities of their behavior, 
do not lead to the need to redefine the macroprudential and macroeconomic 
policy. In the past six years, macroprudential policy is trying to deal with the 
definition of the level of capital rates that financial institutions will have to 
keep in their reserves, as well as other capital requirements aimed at financial 
institutions that take too much risk; with the challenge to co-ordinate 
traditional politics and the available regulatory tools in the best possible way; 
and with the need to design better automatic stabilizers. And still the ultimate 
goals are in direction of achieving stable output gap inflation (Blanchard et al., 
“Macroeconomic Policy”). ECB recently launched Macroprudential Research 
Network (MARS) aimed at establishing a conceptual framework, models 
and   tools that will improve the macroprudential supervision in the EU. 
 
2.DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVES OF 
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 
Most of the macroprudential tools are related to the regulation of 
banks' capital but it is important to highlight the fact that most of short-term 
debt in the obligations of the banks has been identified as a major source of 
vulnerability. (Brunnenmeier et al. “Financial Regulation”). The main 
objective of macroprudential policy is limiting systematic financial risk 
through analysis of the financial system as a whole and its interactions with 
the real economy and managing a set of prudential tools and instruments that 
are specifically assigned to the macroprudential authorities. Two goals for 
macro prudential framework can be distinguished: 1) to increase the resilience 
of the financial system and   2) to limit the growth of financial cycles. To 
achieve the first objective, it is necessary during the boom to build buffers that 
would be put into operation during recessions. For achieving the second 
objective it is necessary that the created buffers act automatically for limitation 
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of the amount of credit and price boom in the expansion as well as their 
increase during the recession. Observations are that the capital created buffers 
will have to increase significantly before they can refrain from credit 
expansion, because the capital is plentiful and cheap in good time, i.e. in the 
period of economic expansion and   vice versa. During the period of boom, the 
financial system can miss the chance to build up enough capital and   liquidity 
buffers, although during this period it is an easier and less expensive thing to 
do. For this purpose, macroprudential strategy will have to rely on the 
strengthening of existing policies and   instruments, in order that they can 
effectively and sustainably limit credit growth and asset price boom. For this 
purpose it is necessary that monetary and fiscal policy complementary and 
proactively play their role. 
 
3. THE ROLE OF MACROECONOMIC POLICIES ON 
MACROFINANCIAL AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
Historical analysis suggests that during the credit boom and pricing 
boom, fiscal positions seem unrealistically pink. In fiscal policy it is necessary 
to apply the same principles that apply to macroprudential framework: to build 
buffers i.e. budget surplus in good times and budget deficits in times of 
economic recession. Before crisis, in the most advanced economies the ratio 
between financial and monetary stability was seen as a fairly simple 
interaction and they started with basic postulates that price stability is 
sufficient to ensure macroeconomic stability and the monetary stability should 
be achieved by an independent central bank closely determined by a two-year 
inflation target. Recent global recession has shown that this paradigm is too 
narrow. The crisis has imposed the need for serious consideration of the role 
of monetary policy in dealing with price bubbles as its further order. The 
following conclusions on the implementation of this policy are included 
(Filipovski, “Financial Regulation”): 
 • There are inherent difficulties to identify bubbles in the price of 
assets because many of the leading indicators can create false signals. It is 
therefore necessary to establish a comprehensive analysis of their cause; 
• It is expected that the concerns about macrofinancial stability will 
withdraw the need from the monetary policy to expand its mandate to 
introduce policies in order to deal with bubbles in the prices of resources; 
• The uncertainties associated with identification of the bubbles 
indicates the immoderate respond to interest rate i.e. of monetary policy, as 
well as the avoidance of answers based on a strict rule; 
• To avoid triggering the moral hazard, responses of monetary policy 
to prevent the bubbles should be symmetrical: focused on cracking of the 
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bubbles and their generators and to do this in cooperation with 
macroprudential policy; 
• When it is possible to determine that the bubbles of the price of assets 
are endogenous, i.e., are generated by monetary policy, then the generator 
itself can shoot the bubbles; 
• On methodological level, there is a need to build a model that will 
include several variables: monetary (monetary aggregates, nominal interest 
rates), financial (credit growth, stock parameters, domestic investment) as well 
real variables (real GDP growth per capita, state of payment balance, labor 
productivity, demographic structure). 
Regarding their thinking of macroprudential policy, two key causes of 
the regulators were: how to deal with the problem “too large financial 
institutions to fail” (Too-Big-To-Fail) and how to overcome the pro-cyclic 
“before the crisis” regulation. Macroprudential regulation takes a broad view 
and is concerned not only with the system important banks but also with non-
banking financial institutions. Possible regulatory measures which would 
prevent the creation of “too large to fail’ institutions include: 
• Higher capital and liquidity requirements that will build stronger 
buffers; 
• Taxes and duties that will internalize the costs associated with 
systemic risk; 
• Restrictions on the size and scope of banking activities by limiting 
combination of traditional banking with riskier activities like proprietary 
trading in securities and activities typical of the private equity and investment 
funds; 
• drafting so-called wills or plans for proper cushioning in case of 
insolvency, which would discourage excessively complex business models 
and internalize the costs of possible failure of the institution. 
To counteract the problem of procyclic reglation, regulatory response 
is focused on several areas: 
• Countercyclical design of capital requirements including taxation of 
financial institutions more in boom times and less during the economic 
downturn; 
• Correction of the loss that will be included in the expected credit 
losses, when determining the profits; 
• Reduction of the pro-cyclical impact level on bookkeeping value for 
financial institutions (especially when market liquidity is changing 
dramatically); 
• The introduction of corporate governance which will include 
compensation schemes for managers of financial institutions which create 
excessive risks and favoring short-term versus long-term profitability. 
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When it comes to interaction of macroprudential policy over policy 
interest rates, expectations are that the mitigation cycle of the interest rates 
will depend on the success of macroprudential policy in restricting the credit 
boom and price: interest rates will increase more during boom and will decline 
less in recession. Example of the necessity of complementary action of 
macroprudential policy with other macroeconomic policies is the situation 
with capital inflows. Namely, capital inflows into emerging market economies 
can create strong upward pressure on domestic inflation and credit ranking and 
rise in the prices of assets. In this situation, the implementation of 
macroeconomic policies is essential, including monetary, fiscal and foreign 
policy in order to protect the domestic financial stability. In such conditions, 
the role of macroprudential policy would be to prevent excessive risk-taking 
by the domestic financial system. However, the use of macroprudential policy 
should not mean delayed tightening of monetary policy. On the measures of 
capital, controls are required to be seen as the last resort and as a safety valve 
in extraordinary circumstances. The longer the controls are left in place; the 
greater are the chances of side effects. One of the new offered macroprudential 
tools is taxation of international lending (Korinek, “Hot Money”). 
 
 4.SUGGESTED MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY 
In order to comprehensively and radically create and deploy macro-
prudential strategy that will be complementary to other macroeconomic 
policies, there is a possibility that a policymaker in one area can have veto 
power on other policies; or members of the body for creating and deploying 
monetary and macroprudential policy could have folded membership. 
Analogously, requests for consultation can be channeled; there are also 
requirements to notify other authorities before the final decision-making, 
requirements for providing information and opinions, signing of MoUs or 
similar instruments. Because of the need for independence from political 
cycles, central banks have a central role in this part (Caruana, “SAARC 
Finance”). There is no consensus in literature about whether monetary policy, 
banking regulation, and supervisory functions should be combined with one 
central bank or whether individual institutions can do it. Some researchers 
(Blanchard et al., “Macroeconomic Policy”) argue that there are three main 
reasons which favor the idea that the current trend of separation of decision 
making for these two policies may have to be canceled. The advantage of 
monitoring the macroeconomic trends makes central banks obvious candidates 
for macroprudential regulators. The centralization of macroprudential 
responsibilities within the central bank will avoid problems of coordination of 
activities. One different view of the funding stability starts from the view that 
the origin of financial instability lies not so much in the infection but the 
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exposure to systemic risk through time, which is closely linked to the business 
cycle (Borio, “Macroprudential Framework”). According to this view, the risk 
is fundamentally endogenous and reflects the interaction between the financial 
system and the real economy. While exploring the systemic risk arising from 
the financial system two directions have developed, one of which focuses on 
measuring the systemic risk, while the second is to assess the systemic 
importance of individual financial institutions. Here are some tools for 
quantifying the financial instability and systemic risk: indicators of financial 
distress based on the balance condition, market indicators; early warning 
indicators (tend to predict events that will happen in the very near future), 
indicators based on vector autoregression -vars models (these are flexible tools 
for predicting and monitoring the transmission of shocks in the economy, 
describing the dynamics of the financial system as well feedback to 
macroeconomics) and macro stress tests (used to define the answer to the 
financial system of unusually large exogenous shocks). Regarding the analysis 
of systemic importance of individual financial institutions, a group of 
researchers (Acharya et al., “Financial Markets”) considered that the 
contribution of individual financial institution is commensurate with its size 
and the percentage of loss. They suggested introducing of taxes that will be 
designed for each financial institution and will be determined by the expected 
marginal deficiency (EMD) of each institution.  EMD of a financial institution 
can be interpreted as a contribution to that institution for a dollar systemic risk. 
Lo, in “Systemic Risk” proposes establishment of a new independent agency 
to collect data about market prices, balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets 
and liabilities of US financial institutions, including the banking sector in the 
shade, in order to monitor liquidity and capital coverage of the banking system 
in the United States; also to carry out correlation of asset prices and measure 
the sensitivity of portfolio investment to changes in economic conditions. 
Sibert in 2010 indicates that similar agency in the euro area is necessary to 
collect similar data. He also points out that such data will have limited use 
because it will more allow measuring of the symptoms rather than the causes 
of financial distress since that systemic risk is not well understood and that 
would cause difficulties in the interpretation and measurement of the 
interconnectedness of network effects. To ensure proper database which 
would enable researchers and regulators to analyze systemic risk, 
Brunnermeier 2009 offers regular (quarterly) data collection for the risk of 
partial equilibrium, sensitivity of the risk market and sensitivity of liquidity 
regulated financial institutions. A group of researchers (Gauthier et al., “UK 
Mortgage Debt” 2010) found that macroprudential capital allocation 
mechanisms have reduced probabilities of individual banks as well as 
likelihood of a systemic crisis by about 25%, which indicates that the 
macroprudential capital buffers significantly improve financial stability. 
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Research (Gertler and Karadi, “Unconventional Monetary Policy”, 2009) 
found a way how the use of macro-prudential tools may affect the conduct of 
monetary policy within the new Keynesian adapted DSGE model. As a 
macroprudential tool they take lump-sum taxation and / or subsidy to the 
banking sector, which can be used to affect the amount of capital banks in 
order (as required) to stimulate or inhibit the national credit growth (Galati 
and Moessner, “Macro prudential policy”). 
 
MACROPRUDENTIAL  THREAD OF BASEL 3 
Basel 3 represents primary strengthening, and in some cases a radical 
change in the global capital standards. That, together with the introduction of 
global liquidity standards, will determine the essence of the global financial-
reform agenda (Nikolovska Vrateovska, “Macroeconomic and financial 
stability”). N'Diaye in “Countercyclical macroprudential policies” found that 
the binding countercyclical prudential regulation will affect the reduction of 
production fluctuations; reducing the risk of instability and financial risk of 
the system; and will provide the monetary authorities to achieve anti-inflation 
targets with smaller adjustments to interest rates. New measures and 
instruments (BIS, “Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms”) 
framed in Basel 3 areas that cover: capital, liquidity and large financial 
institutions are: 
 
I.  Capital 
 
Pillar 1 
 Capital 
 Quality and level of capital: Greater focus on common equity. The minimum 
will be raised to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets, after deductions; 
Capital loss absorption at the point of non-viability: Contractual terms of 
capital instruments will include a clause thet al.ows–at the discretion of the 
relevant authority–write-off or conversion to common shares if the bank is 
judged to be non-viable. This principle increases the contribution of the private 
sector to resolving future banking crises and thereby reduces moral hazard; 
Capital conservation buffer: Common equity comprising 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets, bringing the total common equity standard to 7%. Constraint 
on bank’s discretionary distributions will be imposed when banks fall into the 
buffer range; 
Countercyclical buffer: Imposed within a range of 0-2.5% comprising 
common equity, when authorities judge that credit growth is resulting in an 
unacceptable build-up of systematic risk. 
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 Risk coverage 
 Securitizations: Strengthens the capital treatment for certain complex 
securitizations. Requires banks to conduct more rigorous credit analyzes of 
externally rated securitization exposures;  
Trading book: Provides significantly higher capital for trading and derivatives 
activities, as well as complex securitizations held in the trading book; 
introduction of a stressed value-at-risk framework to help mitigate 
procyclicality. A capital charge for incremental risk that estimates the default 
and migration risks of unsecuritized credit products and takes liquidity into 
account; 
Counterparty credit risk: Substantial strengthening of the counterparty credit 
risk framework. It includes more stringent requirements for measuring 
exposure; capital incentives for banks to use central counterparties for 
derivatives and higher capital for inter-financial sector exposures; 
Bank exposures to central counterparties (CCPs): The Committee has 
proposed that trade exposures to a qualifying CCP will receive a 2% risk 
weight and default fund exposures to a qualifying CCP will be capitalised 
according to a risk-based method that consistently and simply estimates risk 
arising from such default fund. 
 Containing leverage 
 Leverage ratio: A non-risk-based leverage ratio that includes off-balance 
sheet exposures will serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital requirement. 
Also helps to contain system wide build up of leverage. 
Pillar 2 
 Risk management and supervision 
 Supplemental Pillar 2 requirements-Address firm-wide governance and risk 
management; capturing the risk of off-balance sheet exposures and 
securitisation activities; managing risk concentrations; providing incentives 
for banks to better manage risk and returns over the long term; sound 
compensation practices; valuation practices; stress testing; accounting 
standards for financial instruments; corporate governance; and supervisory 
colleges. 
Pillar3 
  Market Discipline 
 Revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements: The requirements introduced relate 
to securitization exposures and sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles. 
Enhanced disclosures on the detail of the components of regulatory capital and 
their reconciliation to the reported accounts will be required, including a 
comprehensive explanation of how a bank calculates its regulatory capital 
ratios. 
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II. Liquidity 
 Global liquidity standard and supervisory monitoring 
 Liquidity coverage ratio 
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will require banks to have sufficient high-
quality liquid assets to withstand a 30-day stressed funding scenario that is 
specified by supervisors. 
Net stable funding ratio 
The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is a longer-term structural ratio designed 
to address liquidity mismatches. It covers the entire balance sheet and provides 
incentives for banks to use stable sources of funding. 
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision 
The Committee’s 2008 guidance Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision takes account of lessons learned during the 
crisis and is based on a fundamental review of sound practices for managing 
liquidity risk in banking organisations.  
Supervisory monitoring 
The liquidity framework includes a common set of monitoring metrics 
to assist supervisors in identifying and analysing liquidity risk trends at both 
bank and system-wide level.  
 
III. SIFIs 
 
 In addition to meeting the Basel III requirements, global systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) must have higher loss absorbency 
capacity to reflect the greater risks that they pose to the financial system. The 
Committee has developed a methodology that includes both quantitative 
indicators and qualitative elements to identify global systemically important 
banks (SIBs). The additional loss absorbency requirements are to be met with 
a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging 
from 1% to 2.5%, depending on a bank’s systemic importance. For banks 
facing the highest SIB surcharge, an additional loss absorbency of 1% could 
be applied as a disincentive to increase materially their global systemic 
importance in the future. A consultative document was published in 
cooperation with the Financial Stability Board, which is coordinating the 
overall set of measures to reduce the moral hazard posed by global SIFIs.1 
European Central Bank was designed to help policy makers in 
operationalization of macroprudential policy, which is based on: a) the ability 
to determine the appropriate timing for activation or deactivation of the 
instrument; b) the effectiveness of the instrument to achieve the stated political 
                                                 
1 BIS (2013)- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms-BASEL 3, BIS, 2013 
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goal and c) the performance of the instrument in terms of analysis and cost-
benefits.      
The underdevelopment of the Macedonian financial system and 
conservativeness and traditionalism of Macedonian banks (as dominant in the 
total assets of the financial system with participation of high 85.5% in 2012 
(НБРМ ,,Финансиска стабилност”)) were the main pillar of defense crisis. 
In the sources of funds for Macedonian banks dominated deposits of the 
natives while the level of capital adequacy in the last decade has continually 
been over the 8% minimum from the adopted Basel capital requirements. 
Although the deadline for implementation of the new international capital 
standards imposed by Basel 3 was initially in 2019 and announced that it will 
move in 2016, inclusive June 2010, all banks in Republic of Macedonia 
comply with the new capital standards. In this section banks have capital 
adequacy over 10.5% at all times and only six banks had rates of capital 
adequacy ratio above 30%.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To overcome the negative international spillover of bank failures 
international regulatory framework is required that will treat this matter and 
distinguish the role of regulation of the host country and the regulations of the 
country of origin of the capital and patterns of bank resolutions. New ideas in 
terms of locating the regulatory responsibility in international banking relate 
to reallocing the responsibility of the host country to the country of origin, and 
abandoning the practice of opening a branch (branches) and on its place to 
introduce mandatory subsidiarization (opening bank branches in the host 
country, whose activities will be regulated by the host). In trying to 
operationalize the criteria of Basel 3, a number of practical tools have been 
proposed, exposing stylized scenarios, application of alternative approaches 
that seek to connect systemic risk analysis and selection of instruments and 
the use of "transfer maps" - astylized presentations how changes in the 
macroprudential tools are expected to contribute to the goals of 
macroprudential policy. Redefining macroprudent and macroeconomic  policy 
as a reaction positive action to global policy makers, once again the thesis that 
the current regulations and macroeconomic strategies are unjustifiably 
marginalized is confirmed. Financial statements have impact on institutions 
on macroeconomic and financial stability. Thus, remains the need for closely 
monetarysing respect and implementation of the new Basel 3 requirements 
and standards, the need for regional networking and regional exchange of 
information by national regulators, harmonization and unification of fiscal 
policies among member states of the European Monetary Union, as well as 
providing complementarity between macroprudential, macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy at the level of national economies. 
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Abstract 
Nearly a decade and a half after the end of the conflict in the region, 
the Western Balkans failed to transform in the zone of complete stability. On 
the contrary, numerous unresolved bilateral issues in the Western Balkans 
have been further deepened, by continuing poor economic trends and 
parameters, evident gradual neglect of the region by the European Union and 
the potential strengthening of the new wave of ethnic nationalism in certain 
Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, North 
Kosovo, etc.). 
This instability could also be additionally strengthened by insufficient 
orientation of the Western Balkan countries in connection with the fight 
against corruption, organized crime, religious fanaticism and radical 
manifestation of ethnic nationalism. This raises the question whether the 
Western Balkan countries are ready to deal with these issues individually, or 
regional response is required. Existing forms of regional cooperation, 
primarily the Regional Cooperation Council, should have more active and 
meaningful role. However, the author concludes that the fight against the 
latent security challenges in the Western Balkans, primarily radical ethno-
nationalism and economic crisis, must take place in the countries individually, 
rather than regionally. 
Keywords: Western Balkans, security, latent instability, security 
challenges, ethno-nationalism, economic crisis, regional cooperation, 
corruption, organized crime. 
 
                                                 
* The paper has been carried out within the project Serbia in the contemporary international 
integration processes — foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects of 
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, 
No. OI 179023 for the period from 2011 to 2015. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the period after the Cold War, the Balkans, unlike the rest of the 
continent that has entered an era of new political and security architecture, has 
bypassed the necessary transformation from a socialist to a modern liberal 
society due to the strengthening of local ethno-nationalisms. (Đukanović 
2014a: p. 103 – 118) On the contrary, armed conflicts that have marked the 
disappearance of the second Yugoslav federation contributed to the substantial 
and deep rootedness of organized crime, corruption, radical ethno-nationalism 
and religious fundamentalism. (Uljanov, Jović, Đukanović 2014: p. 58 – 72) 
However, it is important to note, some of these forms of socially undesirable 
and unacceptable phenomena did not stop at the state level, but gained, and 
still have, pan (western) Balkan outlines. These newly emerged countries in 
the Western Balkans have not managed to deal with the above-mentioned 
issues due to their underdeveloped institutional capacities, and occasionally 
due to the absence of the actual will of the political elites. The Western Balkan 
countries, then still in the formation stage, in the early 1990s were primarily 
dealing with their own set of identity issues, restructuring and internal ethno-
national homogenization, while the internal and regional instability was 
strengthening. (Đukanović 2008: p. 418 – 430) All these were complemented 
with further armed conflicts, which have essentially redesigned the ethnic 
structure of the Western Balkans and strengthened the internal division of the 
dominant ethnic communities and new minorities (a new “South Slavic“ 
minority, as well as former “nationalities“ in SFR Yugoslavia). (Ibidem: p. 
418 – 430) Thus, the new countries, by dealing with facade outlines of their 
own identities, disregarded the safety of their citizens. The above-mentioned 
process was followed, when viewed from the regional standpoint, by 
unsuccessful privatization of a large number of enterprises that during the 
existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were publicly 
owned. In this way, the most important economic entities in all emerging 
countries were devastated, and a very narrow circle of the new rich was created 
– individuals who owned big capital, mostly earned from financial 
speculations. (Minić, Đukanović, Kronja 2014: p. 3) On the sidelines of the 
same process, a large number of citizens remained who, instead of the former, 
often illusory social security, remained without previous quality standard of 
living, and later with almost completely endangered existence. 
On the other hand, the Western Balkan societies have dealt with 
internal homogenization, not taking into account the origin and genesis of the 
new security challenges, risks and threats. In this sense, in the past decade, in 
which all newly created Western Balkan countries included the priority of 
Euro (Atlantic) integration in their foreign policy agendas, internal problems, 
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primarily corruption and organized crime, remained neglected. (Đukanović 
2014b: p. 9 – 40) Constant feeding of the public with ethno-nationalism, and 
sometimes strengthening of the role of otherwise dominant religious 
communities, has resulted in inter-ethnic incidents or ethnically motivated 
violence, as well as the strengthening of certain forms of religious 
fundamentalism. The young generations in the Western Balkans, due to family 
upbringing and later socialization process, and primarily through educational 
systems, were educated to follow sharp distancing from neighbouring nations 
and countries and high ethnic distance.1 The period of cohabitation of South 
Slavic peoples (from 1918 to 1941 and from 1945 to 1991) was subjected to a 
comprehensive historical revision and a completely different interpretation in 
relation to the previous socialist period, and the new neighbours have become 
permanent hegemons, destroyers of others’ national interest, and disturbing 
factors in the historical context. (Kišjuhas 2008: p. 99 – 102) This was 
followed by finding of their historical, heraldic, vexilologic and other 
traditions related predominantly to the XIX century, and / or previous history. 
(Đukanović 2014a: p. 103 – 118) Thus, the entire Western Balkan was 
suddenly “brought back” in the earlier history, and all “civilization 
progresses” that were achieved during the socialist Yugoslavia became 
threatened. In all countries of the region, possibility of free education, health 
care, and other social services, gradually disappeared.  
 
THE WESTERN BALKANS “IN THE CLUTCHES” OF NEW 
ETHNO-NATIONALISMS AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
Even today, despite the evident period of internal pacification and 
stabilization, the Western Balkans is a rather unstable area. The European 
Union, which during the last decade was using strong mechanisms of 
“conditionality policy“, managed to carry out direct and indirect pressures on 
political and economic elites of the region, and to gradually introduce certain 
standards in the fight against corruption and organized crime. However, all 
previous efforts require deeper interiorization of the regulations of European 
legislation in the above-mentioned area. Therefore, in the context of European 
integration, the Western Balkans will be expected to join serious fight against 
organized crime and corruption, which will not be based only on the 
exaggerated examples from the “top” of the political or economic pyramid of 
power in these countries. (Liberation 2013) 
                                                 
1 See documentary series “Perspective” produced by the Radio Free Europe (Balkans Service) 
and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) during 2014 — 
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/media/video/serijal-rse-perspektiva-treca-epizoda-
mostar/26861554.html.  
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Secondly, it is very important to emphasize that most of the Western 
Balkan countries are faced with certain internal and latent challenges to 
otherwise very fragile internal stability. “Neuralgic” points of the Western 
Balkans in terms of potential new escalation of ethnic intolerance are 
numerous. Starting from the north of the region, certainly significant potential 
basis for new interethnic tensions is found in a very complex situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the first place, this refers to inadequately defined 
status of Croats in one of the Bosnia and Herzegovinian entities — Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Blic 2014) Specifically, all the leading actors of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats insist on redefining of their status through the 
introduction of a separate territorial unit (entity, region or federal unit), which 
would include areas predominantly inhabited by Croats in Herzegovina and 
central Bosnia, as well as in the far north of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Posavina). (Resolution of the European Parliament 2014) There are constant 
tensions not only between the Croatian and Bosnian political elites in the de 
facto ethnically deeply and systematically divided Federation, but also 
between the Serbian and Bosnian elite in connection with the exaggerated 
efforts of the Republic of Srpska to significantly distance itself from the 
central (state) government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This unresolved 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina can affect the additional instability, not 
only in this country, but also in the wider region. (Đukanović, Jovanović 2014: 
p. 69 – 80) After the victory of the candidate of the right-wing Croatian 
Democratic Union on presidential elections in Croatia in January 2015, Ms. 
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, the rhetoric about the inequality of Bosnian Croats 
and the urgent necessity of changing their status, re-emerged. (Klix.ba 2015) 
The same was underlined when it comes to the status of Croats in Serbia and 
Montenegro. On the other hand, Serbia insists on the policy of necessary 
internal consensus between representatives of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in relation to its internal reorganization and 
further path towards European, and Euro-Atlantic integration. (Radio Free 
Europe - Balkan service 2015) Unlike Croatia, which in a certain way can 
(mis)use the fact that it is a member of the European Union, and thus impose 
the principle of “ethno-federalism” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia does 
not have that kind of capacity to influence the internal situation in the 
neighbouring country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also threatened by other 
challenges, such as the strengthening of religious fundamentalism, given the 
fact that the influence of the three dominant religious communities (Islamic 
Religious Community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic 
Church) over the past two and half decades strengthened, and that the 
differences between the spiritual and secular spheres of life were almost 
completely deleted. (Imamović 2008) Strengthening of religious extremism in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the coming period may represent one of the most 
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acute security issues. It may cause a potential series and spiral of inter-ethnic 
violence and it may take this country back to the period before the outbreak of 
armed conflicts in 1992.2 It was also evident that the authorities of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 2014 were not able to 
suppress the social unrest in Sarajevo and other cities of this entity, which has 
threatened to grasp the whole country. (Đukanović, Jovanović 2014: 69–80) 
However, it would not be correct to put Bosnia and Herzegovina on a 
front place of potential crises in the Western Balkans. Other parts of the region 
may also be threatened by the same issues of strengthening of (inter)ethnic 
tensions. In Serbia, they can occur between the Bosnian minority in Sandžak 
and the central government, and also through the strengthening of local radical 
elements in the Islamic religious community, as well as occasional aspirations 
and announcements of a particular type of special status, which implies 
territorial autonomy. (Joksimović, Đukanović, Šećeragić, Novaković, Goati 
2012: p. 12 – 27) Occasional strengthening of extremist religious movements, 
especially Wahhabi, is also visible in Sandžak. (Ibidem: p. 41 – 45) 
Requests of official Romania to “transfer” the local Vlachs in eastern 
Serbia from indigenous Vlach into Romanian ethnic corpus, could also in the 
future affect inter-ethnic relations in this part of Serbia. (Chiriac, Andrić: 
2012) At the same time, attempts of further reduction of the autonomy of 
Vojvodina, achieved after 2009, may threaten not only the situation in Serbia, 
but also its foreign policy position, bearing in mind that this issue is included 
in the negotiating framework with the European Union, and that certain 
Member States of the Union insist on this issue. (European Commission 2013: 
p. 7 – 8) 
In Montenegro, as a multi-ethnic country, the inter-ethnic situation is 
very good and favourable. This country has managed, which represents 
specificum in the post-Yugoslav region, to preserve inter-ethnic and inter-
religious harmony in spite of some minor problems that arise from time to time 
when it comes to the status of the Albanian minority or the local Serbs. 
(Đukanović 2014c: p. 395 – 422) On the other hand, inter-ethnic relations in 
Kosovo, especially given the large number of Serbian enclaves in central and 
eastern parts of the entity, may also be potential zones of uncertainty if, 
modelled on the March 2004 attacks, intimidation and mass expulsion of the 
remaining local Serbian population repeats. Similar is the situation with 
northern Kosovo, which is inhabited predominantly by Serbs, and whose full 
integration into the constitutional and political system of Kosovo is difficult 
despite reaching the first agreement on the principles of normalization of 
relations between the authorities in Belgrade and Priština. (Đukanović 2013: 
                                                 
2 See “Al Kai’da u Bosni i Hercegovini: Mit ili stvarna opasnost?“ (editor Vlado Azinović) 
—  http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/specials/al_kaida/index.htm. 
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p. 365 – 385) The Kosovo’s institutions in the recent years have been 
announcing the possibility of violent integration of the northern parts of this 
entity, which would include the use of police units. Such potential scenario 
would cause new regional instability, because it is unlikely that in this case 
Serbia would remain indifferent to the developments in northern Kosovo. 
(Đukanović 2013b: p. 313 – 334) 
Macedonia, in addition to the complex internal political situation, is 
also faced with inter-ethnic problems and latent intolerances. Despite the 
Ohrid Agreement (2001), the Albanian community in this country is not 
satisfied with the current status, which according to many analysts of the 
situation in the Balkans, is unfavourable compared to all non-dominant ethnic 
communities in this area. (Bieber 2004) There are repeated requests of the 
Albanian political parties and leaders for the formation of double ethno-
federation at the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, but this would not 
contribute to the improvement of the local situation, but on the contrary, to 
new strengthening of the inter-ethnic tensions. Moreover, ethnically motivated 
terrorist attacks (such as the attack on the Macedonian young men on 
Smilevsko Lake, on April 12, 2012) can lead to a drastic endangering of the 
security of the country and the new cycle of inter-ethnic intolerance and 
incidents. (Fazlagić 2012) In the case of Macedonia, same as in the above-
outlined case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union should play a 
more important role, not leaving these two countries on the periphery of events 
in the context of its policy towards the Western Balkans. Therefore, it is 
necessary to further strengthen support to the political leaders of these 
countries, in order to actually unblock the process of European integration and 
stabilize the internal situation between the government and the opposition, as 
well as the inter-ethnic relations. It should also be noted that some pan-
Albanian ideas that appear in the discourse of Albania could contribute to the 
instability of the Western Balkans, primarily its neighbours. Insufficiently 
clear distancing of official Tirana from the ideas of “natural“ and / or 
“autochthonous“ Albania, which would bring together areas predominantly 
inhabited by Albanians in the region of the entire Balkan territory (Greece, 
Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro), also carries the potentials for instability. 
(Kurir 2015) 
Additional issue that can affect the safety of the countries and the entire 
Western Balkan region is related to the economic crisis (since 2008). It has 
only further “devastated” the economies of the countries already devastated 
by the transition, and reduced their capacities. Unemployment in all countries 
of the region has increased rapidly, the level of fixed investment rapidly 
decreased from year to year, and public debt of countries has increased 
enormously in the recent years. The depth and intensity of further economic 
decline of the Western Balkan countries will also affect other phenomena — 
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corruption, organized crime, inter-ethnic distance and intolerance, and 
certainly lagging behind in the process of European integration. 
The unsuccessful privatization and de-industrialization of the entire 
region of the Western Balkan influenced the eruption of still peaceful social 
protests. Certainly, last year’s social protests in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (February 2014) showed that revolts of this kind may be un-
channelled, unpredictable, violent, and eruptive. It is quite likely that similar 
protests could soon be repeated in other parts of the Western Balkans, and that 
they could also “merge” with latent inter-ethnic tensions. (Đukanović, 
Jovanović 2014: p. 69 – 80) 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WESTERN BALKANS – 
FREQUENT POWERLESSNESS OF A VERY POWERFUL 
STAKEHOLDER 
 
The European Union lags in providing concrete support to the 
countries of the Western Balkans on their path towards full membership. This 
became evident in the recent years, especially after the European Parliament 
elections, which were held in 2014. The European Union cannot provide 
adequate answers to “difficult” regional issues, such as the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Moreover, it shows, for the umpteenth time, 
its own powerlessness towards this part of the Balkans. (Đukanović 2011: p. 
225 – 227) Despite the Stabilisation and Association Process, which was 
introduced in 1999, the region is now in a “halfway” situation with very 
uncertain outcome – the crowning of this process with full membership of all 
countries in the region in the European Union. Often mentioned “fatigue” from 
the enlargement of the European Union, among the Union itself, but also 
among its Member States, will now be supplemented with fatigue from the 
“Euro-integration” process of the Western Balkan countries. This will involve 
gradual focusing of the countries on their internal problems (dominantly socio-
economic), and less on a series of conditions for full membership in the 
European Union. 
Therefore, in the coming period, one should expect that the evident 
policy of “neglect” of the Western Balkan region will continue, and the 
situation may further get more complicated with the victory of Euro-sceptic 
and radical leftist SYRIZ in Greece and the announcement of a boycott of 
certain specific activities of the EU institutions by that country. (BBC News 
2015) The relationship of the European Union, primarily the Federal Republic 
of Germany towards Bulgaria and Romania, which evidently failed to timely 
meet the required criteria for membership but still joined the Union, is 
extremely rigid lately. (Novite.com 2014) Everything that is requested from 
the leaderships of these countries truly transcends the potentials of the local 
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political elites. In addition, the local public, especially in Bulgaria, is 
becoming quite reserved under constant conditions and requirements that 
come from Brussels. Therefore, the question of access and / or policy of the 
European Union will soon emerge, no longer only towards the Western 
Balkans, whose countries are not members of this organization, but also 
towards the Balkans as a whole. These countries, in spite of the fact that they 
are on the edge or extreme periphery of the European continent, but also of 
the European Union, will soon face numerous economic, political, security 
and other challenges. 
 
THE LATENT THREATS TO THE STABILITY OF THE 
WESTERN BALKANS AND POTENTIAL REGIONAL 
RESPONSES 
 
Previously analyzed latent threats to the regional stability in Western 
Balkans have been additionally strengthened by numerous unresolved issues 
in the bilateral relations between the countries in this region. Certainly, these 
are in the first place related to the period of the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia 
(the state border, succession of common assets of the former state, the status 
of refugees, etc.), that is, the 1990s. (Đukanović 2014d: p. 111 – 127) 
However, it should be noted that there are certain specifics from country to 
country in their mutual relations. During the last ten years (after 2005), due to 
a kind of network of bilateral agreements between the countries of the region, 
cooperation in the area of internal affairs, primarily in the fight against 
organized crime and corruption, has been improved a lot. Almost all countries 
have mutually concluded very similar agreements, which gave a certain kind 
of positive results. In addition, multilateral cooperation in the field of justice 
in the Western Balkans, as well as in South-East Europe, has also been 
strengthened. At the same time, especially after 2008, the mechanisms of 
regional cooperation in the Western Balkans which should reinforce a 
particular type of joint responses in relation to organized crime, corruption, 
and terrorism, have also been strengthened. In this context, the affirmative and 
positive role of the Regional Cooperation Council should be highlighted, 
which as of February 2008 brought together a number of previous incentives, 
in the field of internal affairs, migration, asylum, and justice.3 Of course, 
multilateral cooperation in this field did not provide some “huge“ results that 
have fundamentally changed the inter-state cooperation in the field of justice 
and home affairs, but it should be noted that to some extent, it has unburdened 
certain distrust between the authorities of the Western Balkan countries. 
                                                 
3 See Regional Cooperation Council official web site – www.rcc.int. 
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Therefore, in the future we should expect strengthening of the existing 
capacities of regional cooperation in the area of prevention of phenomenal 
forms of endangering the security of the region, primarily through 
strengthening of the role and position of the Regional Cooperation Council. 
However, it should not be expected that these regional frameworks prove to 
be effective in fighting many latent challenges to the regional stability. (Minić, 
Đukanović, Kronja 2014: p. 3 – 19) These challenges (possible new waves of 
ethnic nationalism and / or potential social revolts) will not have primarily 
regional, but dominantly individual (national / state) responses. On the other 
hand, it should be emphasized that their consequences may affect the situation 
and security of the entire Western Balkans, beyond any doubt. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Western Balkan countries are facing the current transnational 
security challenges, of which certainly the most important are corruption, 
organized crime and terrorism. There are also human trafficking, migrant 
smuggling and drug trafficking, money laundering, organized robbery and car 
theft. Trade in counterfeit products (piracy, smuggling of cigarettes and other 
excise goods, etc.) can be included in a new group of security challenges in 
the Western Balkans. (Uljanov, Jović, Đukanović 2014: p. 58 – 72) 
However, it is evident that after a decade and a half since the end of 
the conflict in the Western Balkans, there are certain latent inter-ethnic 
tensions, which could destabilize not only the countries of the Western 
Balkans, but also the entire region. In this sense, constant “reheating” of the 
ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans can only result in new tensions and, 
potentially, the emergence of a spiral of ethnically motivated incidents, and 
potential violence. Although it seems that the Western Balkans managed to 
successfully “heal” its legacy in connection to the Yugoslav conflict, the entire 
current “architecture” of the Western Balkans does not give us the right to 
draw such a conclusion. Specifically, the distance between certain ethnic 
groups in the Western Balkan countries deepens from time to time, as 
evidenced by the periodic surveys of public opinion. This is particularly 
present among young people in the Western Balkans. (Puhalo: 2003 p. 141 – 
156) Therefore, it is necessary to somehow differentiate the current and our 
own, in a certain way “embellished” representation of reality that we currently 
have of the Western Balkans and, above all, extremely complex local realities. 
The consequences of the economic crisis may also contribute to the 
further strengthening of ethno-nationalisms in the Western Balkans, as well as 
socioeconomic revolt and strengthening of radical left political options (such 
as the one in Greece). It is expected that the European Union will continue a 
rather ineffective policy towards the integration of the entire Western Balkans, 
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which is supposed to ultimately result in the full stability of the region. On the 
contrary, the Union, despite the announcement that it has only temporarily 
“closed” its doors for the admission of new members (i.e. 5 years as 
announced), evidently decided that this would apply on entire decades. (Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2014) The existing and very important aspects of 
multilateral regional cooperation in the western part of the Balkans, which are 
related to cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, might not be 
adequate frameworks with new or latent security challenges in the region, if 
there is a new eruption of ethnic nationalism followed by intolerance and 
violence, or some broader social protests. 
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Abstract 
Violence among peers is a growing social phenomenon, which is 
becoming more brutal from year to year and directly threatens children's 
human rights. There is an entire range of unacceptable behavior among young 
people, from threats, giving derogatory names, gossiping, ignoring, 
depreciation to physical violence which, not rarely, lead to serious physical 
injury. Aggressive behavior of young people towards their peers is a serious 
violation of human rights and represents every act that causes physical, 
psychological or sexual injury, suffering or social harm. Peer violence has 
been constantly increasing in the recent years, with a high probability to 
become a delinquent criminal behavior. Aggression among peers is only one 
of the developing phases of aggression and violence toward others. Violators 
towards peers become delinquents, in a considerable number, who use 
violence in committing criminal acts and achieving criminal aims. 
When studying the problem of peer violence, this must be taken into 
account: socio-political, socio-cultural, family, educational and individual 
factors. The responsibility is on everyone and without reviewing all the aspects 
of the problem, it is realistic to expect drastic forms of violence among peers 
in which life itself does not represent any value. What kind of contents and 
negative influences young people face with, is perhaps the best described in 
the words of Dušan Kovačević: “Children are born and grew up watching live 
broadcasts of death”, or “enduring the terror of mad parents at home, because 
of politics, or because of sorrow and misery, detonate these days, weeks, years, 
kill those close to themselves, known and unknown”1. 
Keywords: peer violence, verbal violence, psychological violence, 
physical violence, aggression, delinquency. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Kovačević, D. (2008), 20 Serbian divisions (Srbs to Srbs), NN and Novosti, Belgrade, p. 
192 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Peer violence is a phenomenon which is has been seriously examined 
only since the last decades of the twentieth century in the world, and only in 
the last few years in Serbia, so it is not surprising that there is no a single 
universally accepted definition of peer violence. Although peer violence is not 
a new social phenomenon, it is still quite aside from scientific studies and 
social responses. Violence among peers is characterized by permanent 
transformations, both in character and by the forms and extent of occurrence. 
Peer violence has been constantly increasing in the recent years, with a high 
probability to become a delinquent criminal behavior which happens not in a 
small number of cases. Today, this phenomenon is actualized and great efforts 
are made to protect children from violence. The problem of the peer violence 
has been also expressed in Serbia, but only after 2000, an active coping with 
this issue has begun. The Subcommittee on Children's Rights and the Council 
for Prevention of the Ministry of Education are formed as a result of that effort. 
The UNICEF project “School without violence” was realized, such as many 
other activities at the community level. A significant effort has been made by 
all these activities in the overall perception of violence among peers. The 
project “School without Violence” achieved a great success, which was 
launched in 2005 in only four schools in Serbia, and 120 schools were included 
later, with approximately 70,000 pupils, 7,000 employees and over 70 trained 
mentors. But all these projects and actions have ended in the conclusion that 
it is necessary to adopt a national strategy on violence in schools and ensure 
its implementation, which would, along with other forms of prevention, give 
serious and concrete results2. Problems of violence, in terms of the adopted 
models of behavior, are often linked to the problem of identity in the literature, 
because the identity could simplest and most easily be determined through a 
model which is build, approved, or transmitted by an individual. In cultural 
terms, the identity can be defined as commonality, by which a being is 
identical to itself, means specific to some beliefs, values, and expectations. 
The psychological interpretation of the concept of violence is linked to the 
extreme, hyperactive behavior of young people. Sociological determination of 
violence is based on a social change and community, as basic factors where 
the elements of violence are sought. From an anthropological point of view, 
man is a violent being, not only by nature but also because violence is an act 
of learning, acquired in the process of socialization in a particular social and 
cultural context. 
Violent behavior among peers is a specific form of aggressive 
behavior, a process that can lead to serious and far-reaching consequences of 
                                                 
2 Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the National Strategy for Youth in 2008 
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every participant of physical as well as of the social and emotional life. It is 
considered as the most frequent form of unacceptable behavior of children in 
school, which can escalate into an extremely serious forms of antisocial and 
delinquent behavior. This form of violent behavior is a base of many problems 
associated with the violence among people. Participation in bullying among 
peers could be an important step in violent behavior, which is a combination 
of power and aggression, which can be manifested as: sexual violence, 
violence in relationships, violence in the workplace, spousal abuse, child, adult 
abuse, and other. Therefore, it is important to identify the elements of this form 
of deviant behavior and the factors that may be crucial in its formation and 
also work to prevent them. 
 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM AND ETIOLOGY OF PEER 
VIOLENCE 
 
Violence is a complex, multidimensional, and dynamic phenomenon 
and necessarily requires a comparative approach. Definitions of violence 
range from a narrow definition in terms of equalizing with some of its forms - 
for example, physical violence, to the broader definition, which inclines of 
verbal violence toward incivility. Violence is presented in a wide range of 
human relationships - between parents and children, teachers and students, 
students and other students, violence in politics, economy, sports, etc. One of 
the key concepts associated with the term violence is the concept of power. In 
the widest sense, it can be defined as the ability to achieve the desired intent. 
Aggressive behavior includes a wide range of specific behaviors which, based 
on different criteria, can be divided into physical, psychological, and social. 
Physical and verbal aggression belongs to the direct forms of aggression, and 
the social to indirect aggression. Anyway, violence is a special form of 
aggression, whereby the dominant individual (the abuser) continuously 
behave aggressively towards the less dominant individual (the victim) for a 
long time. 
Peer violence implies any physical or psychological violent behavior 
focused on children3 on the part of their peers, and which was done with the 
intention of injuring. It reflects the unequal balance of power, whose 
characteristics are: a stronger person against a weaker person or a group 
against an individual. Bullying as a form of violent behavior of children aims 
to inflict harm to other child, and suffering and fear are the features of the 
victim. Study of the problem of violent behavior among young people from 
the viewpoint of different theoretical approaches enabled the understanding of 
the complex nature of the phenomenon of violent behavior but, at the same 
                                                 
3 According to the UN Convention any person younger than 18 is considered a child 
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time, contributed to the creation of terminological and conceptual confusion 
in the determination of the peer violation. The complexity in understanding 
the problem of peer violence is reflected in the various definitions and terms 
used for its determination. Today, violence is a particular challenge of 
theoretical and empirical studies of various sciences and disciplines, and this 
diversity causes methodological and theoretical outlines and specific 
conceptual definitions. Violence is a conscious and deliberate hostile activity 
with the purpose to hurt and cause a fear through threats or continuous severe 
aggression. Although violence may seem like a chaotic process, it always 
contains a few basic elements. The following elements are parts of bullying: 
 disproportional power of the abuser who may be older, stronger, more 
popular, richer, etc. than the victim, 
 the number of children who participate together in the abuse shows 
that bullying does not always involve a conflict of two children of 
equal power, 
 the intent of injury - the abuser wants to inflict an emotional or physical 
pain. Violence implies a desire for harming other person, 
 continuing threat of bullying - the abuser and the victim knows that 
violence will probably repeat, 
 fright, fear - occurs as a result of violence, which is used to intimidate 
others and maintain the dominance of the abuser. 
Forms and types of violence are different, according to the contexts in 
which they are manifested. 
Passive (neglect) and active violence (physical, psychological, or 
sexual) could be considered. There is also individual or collective violence, 
and organized (gangs, groups), etc. The most common forms of the peer 
violence are: verbal aggression, threat of beatings, money extortion, 
”racketeering”, physical injury, even armed and sexual violence. In all of this, 
based on previous research, the school environment does not provide 
protection from peer violence, in the opinion of a large number of students, 
teachers and parents. Violence is a behavior that reflects the short-term and 
long-term effects of socialization and whose expression varies depending on 
the social context and circumstances. The perception of violence is also 
socially conditioned. The way in which individuals and groups perceive 
violence and its severity is subjected to change and is influenced by the 
cultural and social norms on what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable 
behavior (Levine & Rosich, 1996: 3)4. 
At least two types of factors affect a significant range of violente 
behavior among peers. One is the psychological and emotional structure of 
personality of an adolescent, and the other is the social environment. Both of 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 16 - 17 
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these factors can not be considered truly separately, because socialization of 
personality depends on the impact of the micro and macro environment, and 
the personal features are the main base for socialization5. Psychosocial 
explanations emphasize that violence and aggression are learned kind of 
behavior in response to frustration, to serve for achieving the objectives, and 
used as a means of violent behavior. Also, these theories indicate the cognitive 
learning abilities, personality factors, early child development, socialization, 
but also wider cultural and social factors that influence the peer aggression. 
The literature emphasizes the role of personal and situational factors in the 
explanation of the peer violation. Erick Fromm in his book “Anatomy of 
human destructiveness” indicates that aggression is not a unique occurrence 
and distinguishes its two kinds: 
 benign, which is biologically adaptive and serves to life; and 
 malign, which is biologically non-adaptive. 
The first is a response to the threat of vital interests, it is reactive and 
defensive. It is common to human and animals and solves the problem of the 
threat by removing the one who causes this condition. In contrast, the malign 
aggressiveness, i.e. destructiveness and cruelty, is related only to the human 
race and is manifested in the life through violence of all forms and intensity6. 
The essential question is why children and adolescents become 
aggressive? What is that in their nature, or better, in their nature modeled by 
the social circumstances which motivates them to aggressive behavior? These 
issues are dealt with numerous psychological theories and different theoretical 
models, including various aspects and factors of formation and maintenance 
of aggression among children and adolescents. It is considered that many 
psychosocial factors in the interaction contribute to the creation and 
manifestation of peer violence: individual characteristics (gender, history of 
parenting, temperament, personality, emotional intelligence, etc.), situational 
factors (peer group dynamics, social norms, school) but also dysfunctional 
patterns in family (corporal punishment and violent emotional outbursts by 
parents, presence to domestic violence, conflict between parents, etc.). Parents 
play a very important role in creating the capacity of their children to establish 
healthy relations with others, and with peers. As a significant figure to which 
the children are linked, parents provide a secure base which allows the children 
to trust the others and to cope with stress. As a figure of authority, parents 
teach their children to appropriate social behavior and set limits for 
inappropriate behavior. Parents are the model of different roles to the children: 
                                                 
5 Prelić, Lj. ( 2012 ) Causes of increase of peer violence among minors, Compilation: Juvenile 
legislation in the Republic of Serbia, p. 31 - 32 
6 Ignjatović, Đ. (2011) Concept and etiology of violent behaviour, CRIMEN (II) No. 2., 
Belgrade, p. 181 
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wife, mother, father, employee, etc., and teach children of social skills and 
values by their behavior and attitudes, non-violent resolution of marital and 
other conflicts through assertive communication, relating to others with 
respect, establishing self-control, tolerance of differences, feeling of justice 
and fair play. Regarding the risk factors specific for the occurrence of violence 
among children, numerous studies have dealt with precisely the influence of 
family functionality. 
The research indicates that families affect the occurrence of violence 
among children via four factors. The first factor relates to a parental 
commitment. Children who are low on the scale of parental commitment, 
parents who are emotionally insensitive to the child's needs and provide little 
emotional support, attention and interest in the child, are more frequently 
disobedient, aggressive and have behavioral problems. The lack of warmth 
and care, especially in the youngest age, increases the risk of subsequent 
violence of boys and their hostility toward others. Basic emotional relationship 
between parents is extremely important. Basically, negative emotional 
approach which is marked by a lack of warmth and care, clearly increases the 
risk of later children's violence and hostility towards others, who also become 
violent delinquents in a considerable number of cases. Boldri believes that 
poor care for children and neglect of their feelings could be significant risk 
factors for the development and manifestation of the peer violence. Growing 
up in such a family environment leads to the development of a low level of 
empathy in the child towards other children7. 
Another dimension of parental style is a parental supervision, and the 
degree to which the child is supervised, disciplined, and directed. Parents who 
do not establish clear limits in relation to the violent behavior of their children 
towards peers and adults, or parent who are permissive for expression of 
aggression, will increase child's aggression, and thus increase the risk of later 
delinquent behavior. A greater number of researchers suggests that if 
manifested aggressive behavior is not sanctioned, then the child reinforces 
aggressive responses to the failure to adopt mechanisms of inhibition of 
aggression. To corroborate aggression in any form, inaction, wrong response, 
or consideration of violence as a child mischief, children enhance their 
aggressiveness and violence to the scope of a violent crime. 
Third important factor that increases the level of the child violence is 
a corporal punishment and violent emotional outbursts by parents. The 
research results8 show that children who behave violently towards their peers 
at school, as well as those who are victims, grew up in families where parents 
                                                 
7 Baldry, A.C. (2003) Bullying in schools and exposure to domestic violence, Child Abuse 
and Neglect, 27 (7), p. 713 – 732 
8 Baldry, A.C. (2003) Ibid,  p. 723 
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tend to be violent towards each other or towards children. In these families, 
violent behavior of children and adolescents is explained as a learned 
behavior. There is less probability for development of children antisocial 
behavior in cohesive families. 
Apart from the child abuse, witnessing domestic violence is a risk 
factor for the expression of aggressive behavior, and rogether with it, violence 
among peers. This standpoint is supported by the results of numerous studies. 
The study results of the Canadian National Longitudinal Survey of Children 
and Youth (Baldry, 2003) indicate that children who witness home violence 
often abuse their peers directly or indirectly. 
The fourth risk factor for expression of violence among children, 
which relates to education, is, by Olweus, the temper of the child. Specifically, 
the researchers (Vasta, Haith, & Miller, 1998) state that ”difficult to bring up” 
children have more behavioral problems. Some authors use the term ”difficult 
temperament”, which is defined as frequent and intensive expression of 
negative emotions since the earliest age. Children who are estimated to have a 
difficult temper at the age of 6 months, show behavioral problem at the age of 
3 to 6, and tend to be aggressive at the age of 6 to 7. Caspi (2000) believes that 
the most important dimension of children's temper, which is out of control 
(restlessness, impulsiveness, poor attention, etc.), is what represents a 
predictor of aggression and delinquency at a later age9. However, the results 
show that there is no direct correlation between temperament and the antisocial 
behavior, but the connection where the mediating variable is the relationship 
of parents and children. There is an increased risk that these “difficult to bring 
up” children develop an insecure commitment in the interaction with 
insufficiently sensitive, insufficiently patient, insufficiently persistent and 
insufficiently stable parents, and that parents respond aggressively to the 
child's behavior. Thus, even when we talk about the role of temperament, we 
should rather consider the interaction of temperament of the child, and the 
parents’ relationship to the child, rather than the isolated effect of a 
temperament. It is interesting to note that studies have not found a correlation 
between the peer violence and educated parents, economic standards, and 
social status10. Socio-economic conditions in the family (parents' educational 
level, income and housing standards, etc.) based on the research results, are 
not associated with the level of bullying. There are violent (and nonviolent) 
students in all social strata, and the same is true for the students who are 
                                                 
9 Caspi A. (2000) The child is a father of the man: Personality continuities to adulthood, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: p. 158 - 172 
10 Olweus, D. (1978) Aggression in the schools: bullies and whipping boys. Washington, DC: 
Hemisphere 
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victims11. Identifying the causes that lead to manifested violence involves 
research of the social factors, decoding of latent and symbolic elements that 
call for violence, which are inherent in different social and cultural discourses. 
The final aim is to define recommendations for effective social interventions 
at different levels (educational policy, employment policy, cultural policy) 
that will prevent the activation of violence on the scale when it is no longer 
possible to control. We should bear in mind that the nature and source of 
violence are complex, dynamic, and that the actors of violence often change 
their social and ideological roles and positions. 
The condition of social crisis is what precedes and coincides with 
violence as a social-psychological phenomenon. The crisis can be defined as 
a conflict situation that has the potential to change, and sometimes violence 
appears as a mode of its removal and possible return in a stable condition. 
However, the crisis may become a permanent condition that persists with 
smoldering hotspots whose removal is not certain because there is no potential 
for radical twists, but represents a generator of constant frustration and a 
source of aggression and violence12. 
 
CONSEQUENCES FROM THE PEER VIOLENCE 
 
Violence is behavior which reflects the short-term and long-term 
effects of socialization, whose expression varies depending on the social 
context and circumstances. The perception of violence is also socially 
conditioned. The way in which individuals and groups perceive violence and 
its severity is a subject of change and it is influenced by cultural and social 
norms of what represents an acceptable or unacceptable behavior (Levine & 
Rosich, 1996: 3), i.e. at different social systems and cultures. Violence is 
understood and defined differently, which refers to the approach to the 
problem and the effects of violence prevention. Thus, the acceptability or the 
legitimacy of violence directly or indirectly addresses the prevalence and 
forms in a social system13. From a psychological point of view, the study of 
this phenomenon is significant because the aggressiveness in the early period 
is the basis for the development of aggression in adulthood, and because the 
quality of childhood and personality development largely depends on the 
expression and inhibition of aggressive behavior. Peer violence can have 
                                                 
11 Batić, D. (2013) Psycho-social factors of the risksin the etiology of peer violence, Peer 
violence (etiology, phenomenology, solutions and comparative experiences), Compilation of 
works 
12 Pavićević, O. & Kron. L.& Simeunović - Patić,B. (2013) Violence as a response: social and 
psychological implications of crisis, Institute for criminologic and social researches, Belgrade, 
p. 11 - 12 
13  Ibid, p. 16 - 17 
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numerous negative psychosocial consequences as well as consequences on the 
mental health, both for the victims and the perpetrators of violence. For these 
reasons, to violence in general, and specifically to peer violence we can not 
and should not be neutral, but engaged and active in the prevention of this 
phenomenon. Numerous studies indicate that children’s aggressive behavior 
undoubtedly leads to increasingly intense aggression and violence during 
adolescence, which is typically put in the function of criminal behavior. A 
very high percentage of juvenile offenders who commit crimes with elements 
of violence had expressed the aggression to peers and younger children in 
childhood. 
 
PREVALENCE OF PEER VIOLENCE 
 
The severity of peer violation is confirmed by a research conducted on 
26,628 pupils from third to eighth grade in 50 primary schools across Serbia 
in the spring of 2006. The results show that, according to their statements, 
65.3% of the students have experienced some form of bullying in the period 
of three months (the percentage varies from the range of 48% to 80%). The 
results of the repeated violence show that 20.7% of the pupils are classified as 
victims, 3.8% are abusers and 3.6% are victims / abusers. Adult violence was 
reported by 35.7% of the pupils and 42% have witnessed verbal aggression of 
other pupils to teachers. The most common forms of peer violence were insults 
(45.6%) and machinations (32.6%). Boys were declared as abusers slightly 
more often than girls and some were more often exposed to violence by the 
peers and adults. Older pupils were violent more often and also more often 
complained of adult violence, while the age differences in exposure to 
violence were minimal14. Surveys conducted by the Health Behaviour in 
School-aged Children (HBSC) study in 35 countries to more than 120,000 
pupils aged 11, 13, and 15 showed a worrying level of school violence - about 
34% of the pupils have been subjected to violence at least once. The 
percentage of those who have been once exposed to violence varies, depending 
on the country and region, among eleven-year-old children: 14% - 63%; 
among thirteen-year-old children: 17% - 69%; among fifteen-year old young 
people: 12% - 61%. The results show that 11% of them were exposed to 
violence at least two or three times a month. The percentage of frequent 
exposure to violence varies depending on the country and region: 4% - 28% 
among eleven-year-olds, 6% - 36% among thirteen-year-olds and 2% - 32% 
among fifteen-year-olds. It was concluded that exposure to violence decreases 
with age, and that differences between the two sexes are relatively small. The 
                                                 
14 Popadić, D.& Plut, D. (2007) Violence in primary schools in Serbia: forms and frequency, 
psychology, Vol. 40 (2), p. 309 
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percentage of the pupils who admit that they bullied others is worrying. This 
percentage is 35% of the overall number of respondents. There were 
significantly more boys than girls among the abusers15. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Aggressive behavior of schoolchildren is one of the most common 
forms of human rights violations of the modern age. As much as it seems like 
an internal problem at the first glance, stronger forms of peer violence are 
closely connected with the forms and causes of family violence, and among 
peers, in the surroundings of schools, in the city or in the society as a whole. 
Aggression as a form of peer violence among children is an intriguing topic, 
because it opens the question of the relationship among the children, away 
from parental supervision. It is certain that the patterns of behavior, especially 
aggressive, were learnt from the parent behavior models, but the question is 
how parents can help to ensure that their child does not become an abuser or 
a victim. The causes of peer violence among schoolchildren are numerous and 
they can be classified into those of individual-endogenous and social-
exogenous nature. Although there are different theoretical approaches to 
explain the peer aggression, none of these theoretical concepts can 
independently and fully interpret such a form of violence. Only by an 
integrative approach it is possible to explain and understand the aggression of 
young people in a significant form. The appearance of some forms of 
aggressive behavior in an early period of growth, in certain cultures, is 
considered as “normative”, i.e. it is not considered as a deviation from 
“normal” growth and development of the children. In certain societies and 
cultures, some forms of behavior, which are a form of violence among school 
children by definition, are considered as a harmless and acceptable model of 
behavior. Such a form of “education” certainly confuses the child, and causes 
confusion in the adoption of a real moral values later. To a more significant 
elimination of aggressive behavior in the school environment, it is necessary 
to create the conditions that will encourage the thinking and problem solving 
through such a model of behavior and communication that leads to 
understanding and respect. Non-violence as a model that seeks and provides 
the trust is the need and necessity of every person, above all, the young. 
 
                                                 
15 Popadić, D.& Plut, D. (2007) Ibid, p. 313. according to: Craig, W. M. & Harel, Y. (2004), 
Bullying, physical fighting, and victimization. In: C. Currie, C. Roberts, A. Morgan, R. Smith, 
W. Settertobulte, O. Samdal, & V. Barnekow Rasmussen (Eds.) Young people’s health in 
context. Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study: international report from 
the 2001 / 2002 survey, WHO Policy Series: Health policy for Children and Adolescents, No. 
4. Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe. 
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Abstract 
 
In mankind’s history there are some years of miracles during which 
events of major importance took place. The year of 1989 is one of them 
because of many crucial and quick events happened in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which led to the collapse of many socialist regimes and finally 
to the end of the traditional Cold War. Among these changes we can 
find peaceful (see Hungary) and bloody (for example Romania) ones too, 
but as a common ground we can confirm that security considerations played 
extremely important factors in the blow of events. 
In this article we are providing a comprehensive historical background of 
contemporary Hungarian security policy thinking, focusing on different 
security dimensions such as military,  economy, politics, society and 
environment. 
We emphasize the most important influencing factors, with a special view of 
the Hungarian People’s Army (later named as Hungarian Defense Forces), 
which played a stabilizing role in these times. 
It will be highlighted also the role and attitudes among the political and 
military elites taking into consideration that Hungary was still the member 
of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance (with 
Western terms: Warsaw Pact) and Soviet troops were stationed still in the 
country (they left in the Mid of 1991). 
Finally, differences and similarities will be demonstrated in security 
considerations through the emerging party movements, which formed the 
so called “Opposition Roundtable” in the mid of 1989, which goal was to 
provide the adequate legal and formal basements for peaceful changes 
supposed to be achieved through the first democratic elections in the spring 
of 1990. 
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As a conclusion we try strengthen or deny the starting hypothesis: namely, 
that various basic security needs and considerations could be channelized 
via joint political and social efforts into a peaceful and remarkable stable 
regime change procedure. 
We will use the methods of historical deduction, of complex security policy 
approach, of statistical data and of SWOT analyzes. 
 
Key words: security policy, Hungary, regime change 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the history of the mankind, there are some years of miracles during 
which events of major importance took place. The year of 1989 is one of them 
because many crucial and quick events happened in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which led to the collapse of many socialist regimes and finally to the 
end of the (traditional) Cold War. Among these changes we can find peaceful 
(see Hungary), and bloody ones too (for example Romania), but as a common 
ground we can confirm that security considerations played extremely 
important factors in the blow of events. Some experts are arguing that in the 
cases of the Eastern Block regime changes in 1989 and 1990 there were 
experienced transitions through: 
 regime defeat (the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German 
Democratic Republic); 
 transaction (Romania); 
 or extrication (Poland and Hungary).1 
What is common in the above mentioned transition forms, is handling 
the power from the old ruling elites to (more or less) new political leadership. 
What is different is the role of military, which has had direct or indirect 
influence on the contemporary events. From legal and administrative aspects, 
the regime change in Hungary took almost a year: the so called “Opposition 
Roundtable Talks” (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal) started in March of 1989 and the 
first democratic elections happened in spring, 1990. However, we have to 
emphasize that changes in politics, in society, as well as in military started 
long before (some of them have not finished yet). As an initial framework for 
better understanding in the forthcoming paragraphs, the international and 
domestic background will be shortly described. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Simon: NATO and Hungary: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Oxford, Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers INC, 2003, 1 
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INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC BACKGROUND 
 
Based on Hungarian historian Ferenc Fischer’s explanations, there are 
eight different Cold War periods from 1941 to 1991. When we arrived to the 
’80s, we experienced years of “small Cold War” (from 1979 to 1985) and 
years of transition – “third antagonist cooperation” (from 1985 to 1989).2 
In the above mentioned period Gorbachev3 introduced a way of “new 
thinking" and famous terms like “perestroika” and “glasnost”4 were expressed 
by him in 1985, when the Warsaw Treaty was extended by 10 more years, 
meanwhile it celebrated 30 years of its anniversary.5 
Map 1. Eastern Bloc members between 1948 and 1990 
 
Source: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/57/EasternBloc_BasicMe
mbersOnly.svg/404px-EasternBloc_BasicMembersOnly.svg.png, downloaded on 
14 February 2015 
 
It means that in the mid of the ’80s, the Eastern Bloc countries were 
considered still as security zone and possible war theatre, especially taken into 
                                                 
2 Fischer Ferenc: A megosztott világ: A Kelet-Nyugat, Észak-Dél nemzetközi kapcsolatok fő 
vonásai 1941-1991 (Divided world: main characteristics of Eastern-Western and Northern-
Southern international relations in 1941-1991). Pécs, IKVA-JPTE PSZMP, 1996, v-vi. 
3 Mikhail Gorbachev (1931- ), Soviet official, the general secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991 and president of the Soviet Union in 1990 – 91. Read 
more about him: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/238982/Mikhail-Gorbachev, 
downloaded on 14 February 2015 
4 Economical and social restructuring and political openness 
5 Serfőző László and Sterl István: Védőpajzs (Shield of Defense), Ifjúsági Lap és Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 1985, 291. 
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account of such unavoidable influencing factors as the Soviet imperial 
thinking (see the contemporary war in Afghanistan) and the balancing of the 
new arms race (this was basically the so called Strategic Defense Initiative – 
SDI) launched (or restarted) by the American president Ronald Reagan in 
1983. In 1987 in his book titled “Socialism, Peace and Democracy” 
Gorbachev expressed the famous “common European house” notion and later 
the so called “Sinatra My Way Doctrine” was added to his comprehensive 
security policy perception. This last term was a clear message in 1989 for 
many Eastern European countries: they can go their own way, and they can 
decide independently which road to choose. 6 
In generally we can determine that the Soviet imperial thinking 
significantly changed by the end of the ’80s and gained the characteristics of: 
 rejection of nuclear war; 
 complex understanding of the security; 
 devaluation of the military force, 
 identify and promotion of the mutual nature of security, 
 primacy of human values; 
 and streamlining international relations.7 
Regarding to the Hungarian domestic situation in the ’80s, we can 
confirm that Kadar8 regime was losing its legitimacy. It means that the trust 
of the Hungarian society decreased slowly in kadarism: by the mid of the ’80s, 
the social acceptance of the ongoing system was shaken and by the end of that 
decade it shrunk to minimum.9 These changes were occurred decisively by 
economic reasons such as: 
 By the early 1980s, the source of new labour force depleted, which is 
a prerequisite for rapid (and extensive) economic growth. Contributory 
factors were poor performance indicators as well. (Do not forget that 
“competition” was missing or existed just in a very limited way in 
communist systems.) 
                                                 
6 'Sinatra Doctrine' at Work in Warsaw Pact, Soviet Says. Los Angeles Times, 1989 October 
25, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-10-25/news/mn-745_1_warsaw-pact, downloaded on 14 
February 2015 
7 Iratok a magyar Külügyminisztérium történetéhez 1985 - 1993 I. (Records to the history of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary). Edited by Sáringer János, Balassi Kiadó, Budapest, 
2014, 16 
8 János Kádár (1912-1989), premier of Hungary (1956–58, 1961–65) and first secretary 
(1956–88) of Hungary’s Communist Party. Read more about him: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/309432/Janos-Kadar, downloaded on 15 
February 2015 
9 Romsics Ignác: A Kádár-rendszer legitimitásvesztése az 1980-as években (Legitimacy loss 
of Kadar regime in ‘80s). In: 
http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/a_kadar_rendszer_legitimitasvesztese_az_1980_as_e
vekben/, downloaded 22 December 2014 
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 External economic changes in the '70s (in particular, the rise of the oil 
prices and the Hungarian economic energy dependence of the Soviet 
Union) led to significant price increases. For the maintenance of the 
"happiest barrack" atmosphere wages (salaries) were increased, which 
contributed largely to the high budget deficit. As a substitute, the state 
took up a significant amount of loans. (Romsics expressed: between 
1970 and 1980 amounts spent on consumption and investment were in 
yearly average of 2,2% higher as the economy produced.)10 
 In order to avoid bankruptcy, Hungary joined the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1982. This step did not 
present fiscal emergency relief only, but meant also that Hungary 
became the second communist member state – after Romania – of the 
Bretton Woods system. From the view of security policy this step 
included the acceptance of strict financial rules, which was a “hard 
tool” for the Western countries. On the other hand, it gave the 
possibility for the Hungarian foreign policy to set up new external 
relations. 
 The average incomes grew until 1987, and then began to decline, 
which – of course – affected the mood of the society. The political 
leadership tried to counterbalance this sensitive situation by reduced 
workload and improved personal and political manoeuvre possibilities. 
(We have to mention also, that by that time in Hungary there were not 
such bloody demonstrations as they happened in Romania or in 
Poland. Hungarians organized sympathy movements to express 
solidarity and support for those who were killed and beaten in the 
above mentioned countries). 
 However, intellectuals, who realized the strategic inoperability of the 
existing system, started to be more organized and declared themselves 
"oppositionist". Romsics argues that – based on a century long division 
– this intellectual opposition parted into two main branches: for the so-
called “urbanists or human rights representatives” and for the “national 
or folk” groups.11 In addition to these groups first certain university 
student movements and different platforms, even meetings appeared, 
of which the so called "meeting in Monor"12 stands out, organized in 
June, 1985. 
 In the following years, the oppositionists have created a variety of 
programs and initiated movements in different organizational forms 
                                                 
10 Ibidem 
11 Ibidem 
12 An illegal meeting held by 45 Hungarian intellectuals at a park in a Hungarian city called 
„Monor”.  
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(see: forum, alliance, union, etc.). Parallel, they set up single and 
united actions too (for example in the spring of 1988 they established 
the Network of Free Initiatives). 
 The changes markedly altered the internal conditions of the state party 
(Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party - HSWP) and also intensified the 
struggle between the different groups. This resulted not only in a 
relative fall of the old Janos Kadar by May of 1988, but the emerging 
of "reformists", who have had to focus – for the time being – their 
power for struggle with the "old ones” (or technocrats). 
 Through 1988 the Central Committee of HSWP accepted such kind of 
decisions, which – from one hand – made irreversible the collapse of 
the social ownership, from the other hand they opened the possibility 
for private property and economic development based on the rules of 
market and competition. At the same time, it has become increasingly 
accepted and claimed the earlier demand that the National Assembly 
should be the real decision-making rather than the state party. Thus the 
main question became: how will it take place? Within the framework 
of single or multi-party system? 
 The question above was decided on 17 February 1989, since the HSWP 
took the view that the multi-party system is the only correct answer 
and solution.  
From then, events rapidly spin and deep changes took place in 
Hungary: the so called “Roundtable Talks” started to evolve and created a 
semi-half democratic sphere; on 23 October 1989 Hungary became a 
“Republic” and spring elections happened in March and April, 1990. 
 
THE ROAD TO REORGANIZE THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE’S 
ARMY: QUICK OVERVIEW 
 
The Cold War history of the Hungarian armed forces is very similar to 
other Eastern and Central European countries after the Second World War; 
however there are some important differences as well. Among these we need 
to mention: 
 the Hungarian armed forces became heavily influenced by the Soviets, 
especially through the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact, WP) established 
in 1955. Soviets practiced power through this organization and 
provided political and military framework and content for each 
member country regarding security issues. Hungarian People’s Army 
(HPA) was under direct party leadership and control. 
 After the dramatic revolution happened in 1956, the Hungarian 
communist government reshaped and reorganized many things in 
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Hungary, including HPA, which supported the freedom fighters 
earlier. (As a remarkable result and because of the trust lost in armed 
forces, the so called “Munkásőrség – Worker’s Guard” as a parallel 
interior militia was established in 1957). 
 When the Warsaw Pact started to function, it did not appear, that there 
would be so many tensions among the partners, however Hungary, for 
instance, tried to use every opportunity to oppose, or at least to reduce 
the heavy military investment pressure arriving from the Soviet – 
imperial level minded – party politicians and generals.13 
 By the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s, the Hungarian People’s Army reached the 
level and characteristics of a “mass army”: too high peacetime 
strength; using obsolete and new military equipment at the same time; 
spent high level costs for weapon systems, materiel and service 
members because the country had to follow WP (the Soviet) military 
doctrine; and seasonal tasks to support the national economy.14 
 One of the most remarkable military changes was visible in manpower 
and budget reduction, which is shown on the following table: 
Table 1. Manpower reduction and military spending of the 
Hungarian Defence Forces between 1989 and 1993 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Manpower (including 
conscripts) 
155700 143200 121000 104000 100000 
Reduction related to 1989 - 8% 22% 33% 36% 
GDP% 3,8 3,1 2,4 2,3 2,1 
Source: Szántó Mihály, 2002., p. 26. and World Bank, in: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?page=4,  
downloaded: 30 January 2015 
 
 The high level military spending put a lot of pressure on the already 
suffering Hungarian economy and as a result the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party decided to launch a military reform in order to build a 
more adequate military force on the economic realities, the country’s 
geographical location, the “real” role of Hungary in the Warsaw Pact 
and the quick and crucial changes that had happened in the military 
technology.15 
                                                 
13 Kárpáti Ferenc: Puskalövés nélkül (Without Rifle Shooting). Duna International, 2011, 51 
– 112 
14 Szántó Mihály: A Magyar Honvédség a rendszerváltástól a NATO tagságig, 1989 – 1999 
(The Hungarian Defence Forces: from the political changes to the NATO membership, 1989 
- 1999), egyetemi jegyzet (university textbook), Budapest, Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi 
Egyetem, 2002, 6 
15 Ibidem 
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The reorganization of the Hungarian People’s Army – under the code 
name “RUBIN” – came into force on 1 March 1987, and the division-regiment 
structure was replaced by brigade organizations commended directly by the 
Army HQs. The new unit structure was different from the existing Soviet 
military structure; they expressed their revulsion but they did not refuse it. At 
this moment, it is crucial to mention that this “peaceful” approach was related 
more to the Gorbachev launched politics called “glasnost” and “perestroika”, 
than to the “kindness” of the Soviet generals.  
 
ADDITIONAL CHANGES 
 
The earlier mentioned Gorbachev’s “openness” led also to the 
breakthrough in 1989, when the Warsaw Pact forces started sharing openly 
their force power strength: in the case of Hungary the Armed Forces consisted 
of 155.700 persons (including civilians) in peace time.16 In January 1989 – as 
a result of the changes in the contemporary international relations – it was 
announced that the Hungarian People’s Army would undergo a reduction 
through 1989 and 1990 by 9%.17 The changes were supposed to be executed 
in three steps: the first to be made at the end of 1989, when the political and 
governmental and the command and control tasks of the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) were separated: a small civilian Ministry of Defence was designed for 
the political functions the direct command and control of the Forces was given 
to the independent Command of the Hungarian People’s Army led by the 
Commander of the Forces. 
The planned second step was overridden by many unexpected 
international and social changes, because in November 1989 the Prime 
Minister Miklós Németh declared more radical cuts in the force structure 
beyond the earlier planned 9%. The new reform goals were more: 20 – 25% 
cut in manpower and the transforming of the Hungarian Military into the new, 
nation-defending role. However, some experts were arguing that this step was 
more related to the expectations that the armed forces needed to compare with 
the neighbouring countries. The political decision was more ‘driven’ by the 
upcoming, democratic elections (1990), and it served to support the 
Communist Party’s political campaign efforts.18 The above mentioned events 
and procedures significantly affected the Hungarian Defence Forces and 
resulted in many additional changes too. From the mid of the ’80s the military 
leadership started to look adequate answers for the evolving economic and 
social crisis and as a result they were new measures introduced, such as: 
                                                 
16 Ibidem 
17 Ibidem 
18 Jeffrey Simon: NATO and Hungary: Problems in Civil-Military Relations. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers INC, 2003, 2 
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 transformation of cadre and HR work; 
 instead of the official communist address "comrade" (elvtárs) they 
reactivated the old term  "brother in arms" (bajtárs); 
 elimination of party work and organizations in the armed forces; 
 introduction of the military (civilian) service without arms; 
 national tricolour on the Buda Castle; 
 establishment of the Hungarian Defence Forces Command; 
 disarmament of the Workers Guard (Munkásőrség); 
 solving the question of the Soviet nuclear weapons stationing in the 
Bakony mountains (it was denied for many decades, just a few people 
knew about this among the highest leadership); 
 Hungarian political leaders initiated the Soviet troop withdrawal which 
ended at the end of June 1991; 
 the Hungarian Armed Forces gave assistance and support to the 
refugees escaping from Ceausescu-led Romania; 
 at a domestically and internationally crucial moment – in May and 
June 1989 – Hungary lifted the so called “Iron Curtain” in her western 
border, and in September opened it to many Eastern-German citizens, 
which basically gave a huge boost to the upcoming changes, such as 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall (November 1989); 
 on 1 March 1990, the Hungarian People’s Army got back its old name: 
“Hungarian Defence Forces” (Magyar Honvédség).  
Beyond the above mentioned fields and events we need to point out 
some additional issues. One of the most important question was for many 
people and oppositionists, how to avoid any possible violent intervention from 
any side (including police, workers guard, armed forces, etc.), which could 
turn back the started procedures. By others words, what kind of measures and 
balances are needed to finish peacefully the regime change procedures started 
in the mid of the ’80s? It is a historical fact that regime change in Hungary 
happened in a very calm and peaceful manner, however, after a quarter decade 
there is a need to analyse and evaluate the most important influencing factors. 
The main characteristics of the relationship between the new political elite 
elected in the spring 1990 and military leadership is still an open issue. Last, 
but not least we need to mention the possible role of HDF in the “taxi 
blockade” happened in October, 1990, which basically resulted in a harsh 
political debate and judgement of the Constitutional Court. 
As we look back to this year, we can have a sense of “euphoria”, but 
we should not forget that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact still existed 
in that time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
If we take into consideration how rapidly and unexpectedly communist 
systems collapsed in Central in Eastern Europe in 1989, then the term “annus 
mirabilis” describes this years in a very visual and plastic way. However, in 
the case of the Hungarian regime change we can find long time existing and 
evolved social, economic and political challenges which were depending on 
the main international trends of “new ways” too. There were many influencing 
factors, by which the transition went through peacefully and among them the 
Hungarian Defense Forces played an important role especially by accepting 
the necessity of crucial changes.  
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Abstract: 
Security systems in transition countries have experienced tumultuous 
and dramatic changes in the last twenty years. The changes concerning their 
civil control are especially important. Control and monitoring of the 
functioning and operation of the police and the security services are imperative 
of any democratic society because of their importance but also power. It was 
thought that the problem of control was solved by adopting relevant laws and 
accompanying by-laws in the countries in transition. But was it? 
Due to the possibility of their interference with the rights and freedoms 
of the citizens, the problem of controlling these entities requires a very broad 
and comprehensive approach and constant review. Thus, for example, in the 
control process there is an entire spectrum of 'controllers' each of which has 
its own objectives, using its own methods of control and has its own staff for 
control. Control is equally implemented by legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. However, there are also other independent civil entities such as non-
governmental organizations, ombudsmen, commissioners, and other public 
subjects. 
It is clear, from the above mentioned, that the problem of control is not 
approached in a unique way and with unique goal, nor are the interests of 
controllers identical. In this sense, control although having a positive sign of 
democracy, may have some negative connotations and create some problems. 
This paper will analyse precisely the control problems from theoretical-
professional standpoint i.e. it will provide theoretical basis in the approach to 
more effective control. They are primarily related to issues such as: the 
principles of control, politicization, selection of a controller, time control, 
control objectives, safeguarding of classified information and the like. 
Keywords: control, police, security services, security system. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The beginning of this century was marked by new security tendencies 
in the world. Today, security is spreading from mostly military sphere into 
other areas, predominantly economic, energy, social and ecological security, 
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unifying the safety of an individual and that of a country into one whole. It is 
well-known that the world has become a 'global village'. It could be freely said 
that there is no country that for some reason is not endangered, regardless of 
the degree of development. Events such as: armed rebellion, terrorism, 
expansion of organised crime, corruption, national and religious extremism, 
drug abuse, destructive activities of religious sects and many others – are just 
some of the phenomena that endanger democratic and constitutional order of 
a country, thus disrupting its safety and the safety of its citizen. In order to 
reduce these phenomena, each country organises its system of national 
security. 
In contrast to other social subsystems, the system of national security 
is characterised by the possibility of implementing special authorities and 
measures that can violate human rights and freedoms. This is the reason why 
there is an interest in each democratic society to legitimately, transparently 
and in an organised way control its own holders of force, i.e. to make force be 
in service of the law, not vice versa. 
The main precondition of democracy is to adopt systematic laws in the 
field of security. These are predominantly laws which, in accordance with the 
constitution, establish security services, lay down the scope and competences 
of security bodies and services, and lay down the work control, management, 
responsibilities and such. This raises the sensitive issue of protection of human 
rights. The protection of human rights is a civilisation value, base of national 
security and measure of democratic character of a society or a country. 
The special focus in this paper is given to the problem of civil control 
of the entire system, and especially of the police and security services. 
Namely, taking into account the importance and power, but also the problems 
of the police and security services, control and monitoring over the work and 
function of these subjects are imperative of a democratic society. By adopting 
appropriate laws and by-laws in the countries in transition, the process of 
regulation of authorities, organisation, functioning and control of the security 
sector is somewhat finished. This is the reason why the problem of control was 
approached in a very wide, comprehensive and democratic way, in accordance 
with solutions that are applied in almost all developed countries. Therefore, in 
the process of control and monitoring, there is an entire spectrum of 
'controllers' with various goals, which starts with the highest authorities. It can 
be seen that all forms of control that exists in other democratic countries are 
present. After careful analysis, it can be concluded that almost all subjects and 
activities are subject to control. The control includes everything from the 
choice and responsibility of managers in security service, ways and methods 
of work, especially when implementing special measures and activities, to 
financial operations. 
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ABOUT CONTROL 
 
Each activity implies that there is a possibility for a mistake, and this 
is especially true for security services whose law-driven and thorough work is 
of crucial importance for the security of a country and its citizens. Therefore, 
the control is performed precisely because of the assumption that mistakes are 
possible. Having in mind that security services are individual and specific 
services of public administration, it is necessary to become acquainted with 
several general facts about the notion of control of the public administration 
and about the notion of control as a function of managing the security sector 
and managing the police and security services. 
The control is a conscious human activity that consists of comparing 
the achieved results with the planned ones, i.e. expected ones. In this sense, 
the control consists of monitoring and assessing other people's activities 
according to previously defined criteria, after which, if it is determined that 
there are certain discrepancies, there can be certain intervention that is of 
corrective character, focused on remedying deficiencies. However, the result 
of control, due to the nature of things, sometimes cannot be corrective, but 
only repressive. In this situation, the identified deficiency cannot be corrected. 
The only thing that can be done is to apply certain sanctions on the 
administration organ, i.e. on persons responsible in the given organ. Of course, 
it is possible that the result of the control is combined intervention: elimination 
of identified discrepancy and implementation of a sanction.1 If the control is 
perceived as a process of comparing the real with the intended, then this 
process can be seen as a whole that passes through four phases: 
 identifying what the situation is; 
 identifying what the situation should be; 
 identifying discrepancies between what the situation is and what it 
should be; 
 assessment of discrepancies and possible intervention.2 
As it can be seen, the control always includes the relation between two 
different subjects, which for the sake of discussion could be divided into active 
and passive. The terms activity and passivity are used to explain the position 
of certain subjects in the control process. In order to implement control 
efficiently, it is necessary to clearly define the following elements: 
 the one who implements control (the controller); 
 the controlled subject (the one who is subject to control); 
 procedure and manner of implementation; 
                                                 
1  Dragan Milkov, Administrative Law III – Control of Administration, (Novi Sad: Faculty of 
Law in Novi Sad, 2010), p. 8  
2 Ibid, p. 9 
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 what is controlled; 
 control authorities; 
 the purpose (the goal) of the control; 
 sanctions.3 
Furthermore, in order for the control to be successful, certain 
assumptions must be met. Firstly, this is the competency of the controller. 
Namely, the subject that implements the control must be an expert, because 
only in this way it can be expected that the controller performs his / her task 
in a high quality way. The next assumption relates to how informed the 
controller is. A controller must have all the necessary data and information on 
the given subject of the control. It cannot be expected that the control will be 
efficient if all relevant data and information on the given subject of the control 
are not provided. Diligence and accuracy when implementing control include 
comprehensive and careful examination of all elements relevant to assessment 
of other person's work. Impartiality of a controller is also a crucial condition 
for a successful control, and it consists of personal disinterest, which enables 
critical stance in relation to the subject of the control.4 It is necessary to 
mention that the control also has an important preventive effect, because it 
affects the consciousness of controlled subjects, which, knowing that there is 
a possibility of control and possible negative consequences, strive to adjust 
their work with envisaged expectations.5 
The main purpose of the control of the police and security services is 
to secure protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens on one hand, 
and to protect the objective law on the other. It can be concluded from this that 
the control does not end simply by stating that something happened in the past, 
but it also focuses on the future in order to ensure rights of citizens and 
lawfulness, i.e. regularity of work. One should also be aware that, although it 
is not good to disregard the control, it is also not good to exaggerate with it. 
Each exaggeration hinders the incentive and actions of the administration 
bodies, and creates distrust. 
 
TYPES AND FORMS OF CONTROL 
 
The control process can be divided into certain types and forms of the 
control. In this respect, criteria for classification can be different, therefore 
                                                 
3 Compare: Zoran Tomić, “Normative starting points for civil control of the Army and the 
Police”, in: Miroslav Hadžić, Democratic control of the Army and the Police (Beograd: Center 
for civil and military relations, 2001); and Dragan Milkov, Administrative Law III – Control 
of Administration, (Novi Sad: Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, 2010), p. 28. 
4  Dragan Milkov, Administrative Law III – Control of Administration, (Novi Sad: Faculty of 
Law in Novi Sad, 2010), p. 9 - 10 
5 Ibid, p. 9 
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there are different classifications. Depending on whether the controller is 
within the security system or outside it, the control can be divided into: 
 internal control and external control.  
Taking into consideration whether the control is implemented 
according to legal or political criteria, the control can be divided into:  
 legal control and political control. 
According to the authorities that a controller possesses, the control can 
be divided into: 
 the control implemented according to procedural authorities and 
meritorious control. 
Taking subject into consideration, the control of the administration can 
be divided into:  
 the control of acts and the control of work in general. 
According to what is in a controller's focus, the control can be 
classified into: 
 the control of law and the control of expediency. 
According to the time of implementation, the control can be: 
 prior and subsequent.6 
 There are many ways and forms of the control, and the 
commonly used are: 
 oral briefing, 
 reporting (written and oral), 
 meetings and conferences, 
 monitoring of work (observation, supervision, indirect monitoring 
through video devices and means of communication), 
 visits and presence at work place, 
 inspections, technical meetings and reviews, 
 exercises (mobilisation, tactic, staff exercises in hierarchical systems 
like military and some parts of the police), 
 checking knowledge and skills (knowledge of regulations or physical 
competence), 
 insight into documentation and records, 
 having discussion and collecting notification in some other way (from 
the management, workers, citizens). 
The choice of the form of the control depends on multiple factors: level 
of management, available time, the nature of control, organisation structure, 
needs, and similar factors. Each of the above mentioned forms has its 
advantages and disadvantages. The best results are achieved with combination 
of certain above listed forms. 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 11 - 14 
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CONTROL OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES 
 
Understanding of the notion of the police has not changed just in 
functional, but also in organisational sense. In the initial phase of development 
of countries, same bodies performed different administrative, political and 
judicial tasks, but with differentiation of state functions individual bodies 
emerged that performed primarily police tasks. The word 'police' today has 
several meanings, but it is mostly used to denote the state service, i.e. a body 
of a public administration in charge of keeping the public peace, the existing 
regulations and order, as well as of protecting personal security and property 
of citizens. 
The police and security services can be defined as 'individual 
organisational units within public administration, the scope of which are 
certain actions that relate to the security of a country and its citizens and the 
organisation, activities and control of which, due to their character, is subject 
to additional ('special') legal regime when compared to legal regime ('general') 
that is applied to other bodies of a public administration'.7 By performing 
police tasks, the police provide protection of rights and freedoms to all. This 
stance has a foothold in the general principle of non-discrimination 
(prohibition of discrimination) and this is also the constitutional principle in 
all democratic countries. When providing protection to the citizens and the 
state the police and security services can limit certain rights and freedoms only 
under conditions and in the manner laid down in the Constitution and laws. 
These limitations are possible only if this is explicitly stipulated in the 
Constitution or if it is necessary for the exercise of a specific right owing to its 
nature, whereby the law may not, under any circumstance, influence the 
essence of the relevant guaranteed right. In this respect, they are obliged to 
take into consideration the essence of the right that is being limited, the 
importance of the purpose of limitation, the nature and extent of limitation, the 
relation between limitation and the purpose of limitation and whether there is 
a way to achieve the purpose of limitation with less limitation of the right 
(principle of subsidiarity). 
The need for establishing the control system for the police is also 
necessary for gaining and strengthening trust of the citizens in the police, 
which will reflect their willingness to cooperate and help the police during 
realisation of its very important function. The existence of the control, which 
also means openness of the police towards the public, affects legitimacy of the 
police, which further contributes to establishing 'partnership' with the citizens. 
                                                 
7 Slobodan Miletić, Law on Internal Affairs, (Belgrade: Criminalistics and Police Academy, 
2009), p. 23 
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This is important, because research has shown that the public is irritated by 
excessive secrecy of the police. Secrecy, as the first obstacle, means 
unavailability.8 
The next important question is related to control of the police; it is the 
choice between external and internal control. It was mentioned that external 
control is conducted by expert bodies that are not part of the subject whose 
work is controlled. External control can reflect certain doubt in the institution 
of police. According to policemen's beliefs, this offends their honour and 
dignity, and even downgrades their profession. This attitude creates specific 
subculture of policemen, which can lead to obstruction of work of external 
control bodies. 
This is primarily done by 'covering' mistakes of colleagues. This 
further causes lack of discipline and waning confidence of the public in the 
efficiency of internal control, thus initiating the need for further strengthening 
of external control. The success of internal control inevitably depends on 
strengthening professionalism, training system, and especially on education of 
the police forces. Permanent education leads to correct attitude towards work 
and citizens, creates consciousness about the necessity of lawful actions, 
respect of human rights and decreases influence of negative elements of the 
above mentioned police subculture.9 It can be concluded that the optimal, and 
thus the most efficient control system is the one that is created by combining 
mechanisms of internal and external control. Mechanism of external control 
should act together with internal control, i.e. to lean on the processes of self-
control and mechanisms of maintaining internal discipline.10 
 
 
RESTRICTION WHEN DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF 
CONTROL 
 
One of the basic principles of the work of security services is the 
principle of comprehensiveness in work. By being comprehensive in work, 
intelligence services strive to cover all areas of life and work of individuals, 
groups and countries that are interesting in security sense. In this way, they 
want to collect the most important and useful data on the state, position and 
circumstances in the country and abroad. 
                                                 
8  Ostoja Krstić, Applied Criminalistics, (Belgrade: Institute for Students’ Books and 
Didactical Means, 1997), p. 208 
9 For more detail about security culture of members of the police see: Ljubomir Stajić, Saša 
Mijalković, and Svetlana Stanarević, Security Culture, (Novi Sad: Faculty of Law in Novi 
Sad, 2013), p. 159 - 163 
10 Ištván Feješ, “The problem of the Police in the legal state – problem of control of the 
Police”, Compilation of works of the Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, No. 1 - 3 (2002), p. 264 
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It is seen, from this definition, that the nature of activities of 
intelligence services is the collection and analysis of certain data, by using 
specific methods and means. Intelligence service predominantly collects those 
data that are specially kept and are not available to wider public. These 
activities require high degree of secrecy in the work and use of specific 
methods and means. Activities of these services are covered in veil of secrecy 
for citizens, which is in principle contrary to the goals of the open democratic 
societies. Having this in mind, there is fear that data collected in secret could 
be misused. 
Therefore, there is need for clear democratic monitoring, which would 
be able to 'reconcile' the demand for efficient work by the security services 
and imperative that collected data are not misused, above all to violate rights 
and freedoms of the citizens, and not to compromise certain actions that are in 
progress and operatives that participate in them. Therefore, many laws state 
that certain data cannot be given to a control body, and most often these are: 
identity of current and former workers in the service, information about 
authorised personnel of the service that take certain measures, information 
about members of the service with undercover identity, about the actions that 
are in progress, about the manner of preparation of certain actions and 
measures, etc. 
Taking into consideration the basic principles of work, force and 
means, as well as the form and method of work of the intelligence services,11 
there are certain data that have to be presented to the public, and these are:  
 documents of strategic importance, like the strategy of national 
security; 
 data on multilateral and bilateral agreements from the field of security; 
 data on budget investments in the security sector; 
 communications on all important Assembly discussions, decisions, 
laws and other that relates to the security sector; 
 publications on the Assembly (committee) investigations on security 
issues; 
 the annual Assembly report of work of all security services; 
 reports by the ombudsman about the security sector; 
 laws on the freedom of information. 
 
The supervising the work of security services is based on the following 
principles: 
 subordination and accountability of security services to the authorities; 
                                                 
11  For more information about the topic see sections from: Ljubomir Stajić, Bases of the 
System of Security – with bases of researches of the security phenomena, (Novi Sad: Faculty 
of Law in Novi Sad, 2013), p. 232 - 243 
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 political, ideological, and interest neutrality; 
 obligation to inform the public on the execution of their tasks, in 
accordance with the Law; 
 obligation of entities exercising supervision to inform the public of the 
results of the supervision; 
 professional responsibility and operational independence of security 
service members in performing the assigned tasks; and 
 accountability of heads of security services for the work of the 
services.12 
 
PROBLEMS OF CONTROL OF THE POLICE AND 
SECURITY SERVICES 
 
When it comes to problems of controls of the police and security 
services and, in general, the holders of legitimate force in a country, problems 
of control that is exercised by the Parliament somehow always come to the 
fore.13 There are many reasons for this. One of them is certainly the fact that 
the Parliament is the highest representative body and that in it all interests of 
a society deflect, at the same time in it are the representatives of the majority, 
who regulate the work and control of the services, and representatives of the 
minority who are interested in regulating the work of services in a way in 
which there is no abuse of their power by the government. The second reason 
is the fact that the control by the Parliament is a proof of democracy of a 
society and guarantee of equality for all participants in the political life of a 
country. The third reason is the fact that in this way supremacy of 
parliamentary authority over the executive one is achieved. The forth reason 
is the fact that the Parliament (among other things) is a keeper and guarantor 
of human rights and freedoms, but also of interests of the majority of citizens, 
and a protector of the society values guaranteed by the Constitution. 
In that sense, the problems are: 
The problem of selection of direct and indirect control - both options 
have advantages and disadvantages. Issues that need to be solved when 
making this selection: Which form gives faster, and which one more quality 
and expert control? Which form interferes less with the principle of secrecy of 
the work of security services? Which form protects human rights and freedoms 
more? Which form protects state and other secrets more? There are numerous 
                                                 
12 Law on Foundations for the Regulation of Security Services, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Serbia, No. 116 / 2007 and 72 / 2012, Article 15 
13 See Nenad Radivojević, “Parliamentary control of the Security and Information Agency 
from the Aspect of the Security Culture – state and problems”, Compilation of Works of the 
Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, No. 3 (2013): p. 485 - 491 
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other issues. The next problem that can be perceived is which control should 
be given preference - legal or political. Most answers would certainly be: both. 
However, the practice shows that there is no equal distribution of control of 
influence among these two forms. One always has supremacy over the other, 
i.e. legal control often depends on the political one. The ideal solution would 
be optimisation of both types of control. 
The special problem is the focus of control. Namely, the choice of what 
is to be controlled and to what extent (how detailed) can also increase or 
decrease the influence of control on achieving the goals of control and creating 
democratic society. Each society controls its services, even non-democratic 
ones. The only question is who controls, what is controlled and for what 
purpose. That is, for the same control two controllers can conclude different 
things, depending on their goals and what they want to achieve. There are 
examples of control that are conducted in order to mask the truth and the facts, 
and in this case the control is turned into its opposite. 
Acquiring proper political instructions for democratic control is a 
separate issue. There is no need to mention that opposition often desires one 
type of control and in that sense it advocates transparent political instructions 
regarding control, and when it comes to power acts completely opposite to that 
which it demanded as opposition, trying to put work of security services under 
the control of executive authorities. This issue can be also defined as a degree 
of formality of control of security services, which can span from completely 
formal to very serious and expert, which certainly depends on political 
instructions. 
The next issue is the problem of time that is available for control. 
Namely, it is clear that the work of security services is non-stop and of high 
intensity. This means that during their work there are more activities and 
events that can violate human rights and freedoms. The amount of time that 
can be given to control is a key issue for quality, purposeful, timely and proper 
control. Little time means superficial control, which turns into formality and 
in time, it can lose its purpose. 
An individual issue that should be mentioned here is who has the 
power, i.e. the authority to place people as managers of security services, but 
also those who will control security services. If people are placed by the ones 
in the Government, both work and control will be directed according to 
political instructions of the Government. It is obvious that the purpose of 
democratic control is the opposite - that all interested representatives of 
citizens participate in the control, which is why there are numerous forms of 
external control, where the importance of the media, the non-governmental 
sector and other subjects is significantly higher. 
The last problem that will be mentioned is making the obtained 
information a political issue. Intelligence is information that we collect by 
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security services based on the request of authorities, which meet the needs of 
the authorities in order to govern internal and external politics of a country. 
They are collected, processed and summarised in order to meet these needs. 
This information cannot be politicised, which means that they are formulated 
in a way so that they cannot be used against political opponents or for the 
purposes of political struggle within a country. According to H. Born, such a 
phenomenon of intelligence will probably occur: 
 when intelligence serves politics instead of making political decisions 
(e.g. if warnings about immediate threat are used to support 
governmental fear campaign during elections); 
 if administration can change intelligence; 
 if intelligence is formulated for certain political purposes; 
 if intelligence agents and their directors are selected according to 
political background; 
 if the system for checking and balancing different governmental 
branches is poorly conceived or contains some deficiencies, which 
leads to situation in which one governmental branch could dominate 
over the intelligence service. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the democratic transformations in the countries of Eastern 
Europe, the old legal solutions for the base of functioning of the police and 
security services proved to be unsustainable. The subjects of state force that 
figured as pillars of the previous regime were completely weakened at the very 
beginning of changes by personal and structural reconstruction. The above 
mentioned led to mass, non-critical and non-systematic copying of the legal 
provisions of more developed democratic European countries and the USA. 
Such circumstances could not provide optimal legal base for work of the police 
and security services in the countries in transition, which especially affected 
the mechanism of democratic legal control over these state institutions.14 
Many authors think that it is wrong to perceive legality in work and 
efficiency of the police and security service in solving new security problems 
as two inversely proportional principles. They should be perceived as variable 
characteristics, and in a way that both of them can be made better. In short-
term, the ability to conduct monitoring over a terrorist or a terrorist group will 
be lessened by the need to respect procedures that protect privacy of the 
ordinary citizen, but in long-term these procedures are necessary to each 
                                                 
14  See more about this in: Valery Zorkin, Comments on democratic oversight of special 
services in Eastern Europe, (Strasbourg: European Commission for democracy through law - 
Venice Commission), 2006.  
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society that wants to be called democratic. The procedures should be devised 
in a way that violation of privacy is proportional to the alleged threat. 
Moreover, the procedures should prevent violation in case of a wrong person 
or in a way that could escalate in intimidation of citizens. It stems, from the 
above mentioned, that positive legal norms can also contribute both to 
efficiency and to respect of legality in work. Of course, in search for a better 
public control of the police and security services, improvement of positive 
legal norms can be insufficient. The new laws may also become just symbolic 
changes. Problems occur in the process of implementing regulations, because 
if greater efforts are not made to implement these laws, little can actually be 
changed. Despite the new laws, without adequate implementation of the 
activities, the manner of work of security services could also remain basically 
unchanged. Reaching cultural changes in services, which had a complete 
autonomy from external control or influence for a long period, is a long-term 
project, which demands greater political will. 
In that sense, it is important to define some key forms of control. The 
control relates to managing the police and security services and can be 
conducted on different levels. If the Parliament adopts a law that would 
regulate mandate and authorities, then it can be said that there is a legally 
prescribed control. Executive or political control exists if the Government can 
issue directives to a service in accordance with the democratic principles. In 
the service there could be an acting administrative (internal) control by 
management, which includes adopting internal regulations and instructions. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Born, H. Towards, Effective Democratic Oversight of Intelligence 
Services: Lessons Learned from Comparing National Practices, PfPC – 
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies 
Institutes, 2005 
Feješ, Ištvan. “The problem of the Police in the legal state – problem 
of control of the Police”, Compilation of works of the Faculty of Law in Novi 
Sad, No. 1 – 3 / 2002, p. 251 - 271 
Krstić, Ostoja. Applied Criminalistics, (Belgrade: Institute for 
Students’ Books and Didactical Means, 1997. 
Slobodan Miletić, Law on Internal Affairs, Belgrade: Criminalistics 
and Police Academy, 2009. 
Milkov, Dragan. Administrative Law III – Control of Administration: 
Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, 2010.  
Radivojević, Nenad. “ Parliamentary control of the Security and 
Information Agency from the Aspect of the Security Culture – state and 
 291 
problems”, Compilation of Works of the Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, No. 3 
(2013) p.  475 - 792 
Bases of the System of Security – with bases of researches of the 
security phenomena, (Novi Sad: Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, 2013 
Stajić, Ljubomir, Mijalković Saša i Stanarević Svetlana. Security 
Culture. Novi Sad: Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, 2013.  
Zoran Tomić, “Normative starting points for civil control of the Army 
and the Police”, in: Miroslav Hadžić, Democratic control of the Army and the 
Police, Beograd: Center for civil and military relations, 2001 
Zorkin, Valery. Comments on democratic oversight of special services 
in Eastern Europe. (Strasbourg: European Commission for democracy 
through law – Venice Commission), 2006. 
Law on the bases of Management of the service of security, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 116 / 2007 and 72 / 2012 
 
 
 
UDK: 351.74:351.746.5].072.3(497.11) 
POLICE AND PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN 
SERBIA – FROM COMPETITION TO 
COOPERATION 
Nenad Radivojević, MA 
Faculty of Law Novi Sad, University of Novi Sad 
 
 
Abstract: 
The development of the private security sector in the last few decades 
has become a topic of much discussion. This development is not taking place 
in the same way in all countries. Unlike the developed Western countries, this 
process in the countries in transition was led with heavy and painful problems. 
These problems came from the general social, political and economic 
developments in these countries, which has created an unfavorable climate for 
the development of such sector which aims to integrate into the national 
security system. 
The so called process of "privatization of the security affairs" was 
primarily caused by the overload of the national budgets as well as certain 
organizational and professional difficulties faced by the authority of internal 
affairs. The current process has led to overlapping of the police jurisdiction 
and the private security sector, and therefore mutual competition. Thus, both 
sectors saw themselves and their competence as unique and exclusive, and not 
as a sub-system of a larger system. In the last twenty years, the private security 
sector in the Republic of Serbia has been burdened with numerous problems 
that have significantly influenced the development of relations with the police. 
Unfortunately, these problems still exist despite the reform changes made after 
2000. These problems are particularly evident in practice when establishing 
the relationship between the private security sector and the police, and they 
caused these two entities to see each other as competition.  
Despite this, the Republic of Serbia is adapting European and 
international standards in terms of organization and achieving cooperation 
between the two sectors. The adoption of the Law on Private Security in 2013 
is only the first step on this path. In the following period there is the adoption 
of the following accompanying by-laws which should create conditions for the 
realization of efficient and effective cooperation. In this regard, the paper will 
provide a review of the development of relations between the private security 
sector and police in the Republic of Serbia in the last twenty years. 
Furthermore, it will try to point out some problems that hinder mutual 
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cooperation, as well as possible solutions for the improvement of mutual 
cooperation in the future. 
Keywords: police, private security sector, competition, cooperation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a trend in almost all countries of the world, according to which 
the country is no longer the exclusive provider of security and therefore non-
governmental (private) security sector has an increasingly important role in 
offering security services. This phenomenon is primarily caused by the 
overload of national budgets as well as certain difficulties faced by the 
authority of internal affairs which were unprepared to adequately respond to 
the modern security problems. This led to the so-called "privatization of 
security affairs" phenomenon by which police affairs were slowly narrowed 
while at same time the affairs as well as the responsibility of the private 
security sector broadened. 
One of the basic tendencies and developments in the field of internal 
security in the past few decades is to establish closer cooperation between the 
police and the private security sector. This is primarily due to the mutual 
benefit arising from this cooperation. Of course, it should be noted that this 
cooperation is not established and developed on the same grounds in all 
countries. A long tradition of relations between the police and the private 
security sector is found primarily in the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom and Australia. In the last twenty years, the establishing and 
development of the private security sector in the Republic of Serbia has been 
burdened with numerous problems that have significantly influenced the 
development of relations with the police. Unfortunately, some of these 
problems are still present despite the reforms made after 2000. The problems 
are particularly evident in practice when establishing an interaction between 
the private security sector and the police, and they have influenced the model 
of relation that exists between the two sectors. 
 
DEVELOPEMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
 
Despite the existence of archival material on the creation and 
functioning of the private security sector in Serbia at the beginning of the 20th 
century,1 it must be said that it started developing more intensely in the late 
                                                 
1 See: Momčilo Talijan, “First Institutes of Private Security (of the Police) in Serbia”, First 
International Conference “Private Security – State and Perspectives”, (Novi Sad: Faculty of 
Law and Business Studies, 2008): p. 40 - 63 
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eighties and early nineties of the 20th century. Some of the first companies 
that were providing certain security services on a commercial basis have 
opened then. These companies have operated in accordance with the Law on 
Social Self-Protection that was passed in 1986, which had regulated this area 
relatively well by expert evaluation.  
The further development of the private security sector in this period 
was significantly influenced by the socio-political, social and economic 
circumstances in the country and the region. The civil war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the sanctions of the UN imposed on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia led to an enormous increase of grey and black economy. The civil 
war has caused the emergence of a large number of paramilitary and para-
police forces. When the war ended, due to weakened economy and lack of 
jobs, many of these people have found a job in the private security sector. The 
culmination of everything was putting the Law on the Social Self-Protection 
out of force in 1993. Practically, since that moment until 2013, when the Law 
on Private Security was passed (Hereinafter referred to as: the Law),2 this field 
was not systematically regulated. This has led to many problems, 
predominantly those regarding security, which led to violation of the human 
rights and freedoms. A negative image was therefore created in public and the 
police, which reflected their mutual relations. Great intolerance and even open 
hostility between the two sectors were common. The period after 2000 was 
characterized by the intensification of the privatization process, which 
included "privatization of security affairs". Then, a great number of foreign 
companies emerged on the market, which gave additional incentive to the 
development of the entire sector. In this period there has been an 
intensification of activities in relation to the adoption of an "umbrella" law that 
would systematically regulate the field of private security. In addition to the 
Ministry of the Interior, some vocational and non-governmental organizations 
also participated in this process. 
 
PROBLEMS AND MODELS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
POLICE AND THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN 
SERBIA 
 
In the last ten years, the scientific and professional community 
continuously pointed to the necessity of passing laws in the field of private 
security, which would be a condition sine qua non for overcoming of the 
problems that have occurred in practice so far. By adopting the Law on Private 
Security it was expected that legally defined responsibilities, organization, 
tasks, powers and control of private security would eliminate many problems 
                                                 
2 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 104 / 2013 
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that existed in this area in the past two decades. Some of the most important 
problems indicated in our professional literature were: 
 the absence of a permanent, organized, and legally based cooperation 
with the state security sector; 
 the absence of effective mechanisms for external control of the private 
security agencies; 
 inadequate market regulation of private security; 
 extremely high rates of work in the grey economy, which led to 
budgetary losses; 
 the absence of national and international standards in the field of 
private security which would be applied;  
 unfair competition between the public and the private sectors; 
 the existence of informal connections between agencies, political 
parties, and competent authorities; 
 the possibility of an agency being opened by a person from criminal 
environment; 
 hiring people with criminal past to perform certain security jobs; 
 uninstructed and under-equipped personnel dealing with management 
and executive security tasks; 
 engaging in dubious and risky affairs which illegally interfered with 
human rights and freedoms; 
 low level of security culture in the majority of agencies and their 
employees, and more.3 
 
Legal regulation of private security should have, among other things, 
facilitated the institutionalization of cooperation with the police. The existing 
"cooperation" is still at an extremely low level. With the adoption of the Law 
in 2013, conditions that would enable the convergence of the two sectors, as 
well as their in-depth cooperation have not been created. This is evident from 
the problems that have occurred or will occur only when it is applied. When 
we talk about the relation between the police and the private security sector, 
the main shortcomings of the law in this regard are:  
 normative, organizational and other requirements have not been 
fulfilled for the implementation of the Law (non-compliance of the 
existing legal regulations with the Law, etc.); 
 organizational requirements for achieving cooperation between the 
two sectors have not been fulfilled; 
                                                 
3 Ljubomir Stajić and Goran J. Mandić, "Some controversies of the Law on private security”, 
Compilation of works of the Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, No. 2 (2014): p. 147 - 148 
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 the methods (mechanisms) of achieving cooperation or 
communication have not been regulated; 
 the private security sector is still at a disadvantage when compared to 
the police; 
 the legislator did not recognize the necessity of having two (equal) 
components of internal security (public and private sector) as it is done 
in the National Security Strategy; 
 in some cases, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is given too much and 
apparently unfounded power in terms of control over agencies; 
 questions which by their nature should be regulated by the law, are to 
be regulated by by-laws. 
 
Competition as a model relation 
The process of privatization of the security affairs has led to 
overlapping of the police jurisdiction and the private security sector, and 
therefore mutual competition. Thus, both sectors see themselves and their 
competence as unique and exclusive, and not as a sub-system of a larger 
system. Police often sees the private security sector as a separate and inferior 
occupation, which poses a threat to their (police) status.4 
Police today, in an attempt to regain their former positions, enters the 
market of security services. The police take the stand that anyone who has a 
certain commercial gain from police engagement, should pay for it. For 
example, developed countries have introduced regulations that financially 
penalize companies that provide electronic security services via alarm 
systems, in case the police respond to false alarms is more than a particular 
number of times. Also, fees are being charged for the provision of security 
services at concerts, professional sporting events and various festivals. In 
some cities some companies have even joined and hired additional police 
patrols in order to get the protection they think they should.5 In North America, 
the police not only provide security on a commercial basis, but allow their 
members to be hired as private security officers (i.e. moonlighting). Thus, the 
American officers regularly have two jobs in which they are engaged by the 
state and by a private company. This process is also considered as an 
additional source of income for police officers. This has advantages for the 
private security sector itself. Namely, the private company gets trained 
                                                 
4 Bruce Swanton “Police & Private Security: Possible Directions”, Australian Institute of 
Criminology, No. 42 (February 1993): p. 6 
5 David H. Bayley and Clifford Shearing, "The Future of Policing", Law & Society Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996): p. 589 - 590 
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personnel which, despite of being hired for part-time private purposes, retains 
its legal authority as a police officer.6 
It should be said, however, that such involvement of police officers for 
private purposes can produce numerous problems related to the following 
issues: 1) to whom does the police officer answer for his operation, the police 
organization or a private employer; 2) whom is going to be responsible in case 
of an offence at their private work; 3) who will pay for the police officer who 
is on sick leave due to injuries sustained on their private work; 4) if in the 
course of performing private work the police officer notices criminal activity 
that is taking place outside the area he is protecting, should he in this case act 
as a police officer who is required by law or continue to protect the space and 
the object for which he is engaged; 5) will the police officer be psychologically 
and physically ready for performing police tasks if he is engaged privately in 
his free time; 6) what if he is engaged in the affairs of protecting persons with 
criminal backgrounds, etc.7 In order to avoid these problems, most European 
countries have incorporated a provision that police officers cannot perform 
activities that could lead to a conflict of interests in their legislation, and a 
private security job certainly could. In the Republic of Serbia, despite the 
adopted National Security Strategy and the Law, competition between the two 
sectors continues. Key reasons for this which are mentioned are the issues of 
politicization, conducting training, unfair competition and the process of 
employees moving from one sector to the other. The problem of politicization 
is still one of the biggest problems in the work of the police, and then indirectly 
in the work of the private security sector. It is not rare that former or current 
members of the police appear on the market as intermediaries in providing 
security services and use their connections with the political elite to achieve 
more favorable conditions. 
Regarding the conduction of training, the Law provides the possibility 
for the training to be conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs or a specific 
natural or legal person with the approval of the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, 
there has been a serious concern in the professional and scientific community 
that the political elite abuses this situation, and that in order to create another 
source of financing for their activities, it started lobbying for the license for 
conducting training to be issued to various "expert groups", "education 
centers" or other forms of organizing supporters.8 This issue was one of the 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 590 
7 Zoran Kesić, Private sector in the control of criminality, (Belgrade: Dosije studio, 2009), 72 
and Robert J. Fischer, Edward Halibozek and Gion Green, Introduction to Security, (Oxford: 
Elsevier Inc., 2008), 61. 
8 Dušan Davidović and Želimir Kešetović, "Professionalization and partnership of the public 
and the private security sector in Serbia – assumptions and obstacles", Science – security - 
police, No. 3 (2007): p. 25 
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key points of contention between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
professional associations when preparing the draft Law. 
One of the key problems that the private security sector states is the 
issue of unfair competition, which is systematically and economically 
conditioned.9 Systematically unfair competition for the private security sector 
is the Ministry of Internal Affairs which is allowed to commercialize some of 
its services,10 which puts the private sector in an unequal competitive position 
in the market. Namely, among other things, the Rulebook on the types of 
services by which the Ministry of Interior achieves additional resources11 
envisages that the Ministry of Interior can achieve additional resources by 
providing the following services: official escort and transport of hazardous 
materials, weapons, money, securities, precious metals and other valuables, 
art and other objects and heritage of the Republic, for the purposes of the 
National Bank of Serbia, commercial banks, institutions and other 
organizations and other legal entities; securing of sporting events and other 
public events in accordance with the law (Article 2 (1) 3) and 4)). One may 
ask whether the police officers still retain their full powers as authorized 
officers of the police while providing these services or act in accordance with 
the Law on private security. On the basis of the Law on the Prevention of 
Violence and Misbehavior at Sports Events12 police can sign a contract with 
the event organizer for the performance of certain tasks of securing sporting 
events and the implementation of specific measures for the prevention of 
violence and misbehavior of spectators, which are not part of the regular tasks 
of maintaining public order and peace (Article 19). By law, mandatory 
cooperation of the organizers of sports events with the police is also provided 
for, which is de facto reduced to the implementation of orders issued to the 
monitorial service by the police department. It can be seen in Article 9 (1) on 
the basis of which the organizer is obliged to cooperate with the Ministry, in 
order to implement measures and orders relating to maintaining of public 
order and peace. It is logical that these measures and orders will be instructed 
by the police. 
                                                 
9 Milan Milošević, "The influence of the private security sector", in: Private Security 
Companies – friends or threats? (Belgrade: Center for civil and military relations, 2008) p. 
62 and 63 
10 See: Regulation on fees for services provided by the Ministry of Interior, Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Serbia, No. 126/2014, Rulebook on the types of services by which the 
Ministry of Interior achieves additional resources, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
No. 64/2006, 71/2007, 14/2008, 8/2013 and 119/2014 and Instruction on official escort of 
special transport in road traffic, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 68/2013, 
96/2013 and 1/2015. 
11 Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, No 64/2006, 71/2007, 14/2008. 
12 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 7/2003, 101/2005 - other law, 90/2007, 
72/2009 - other law, 111/2009 and 104/2013 - other law 
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Economic aspect is the second element of unfair competition. 
Associations of former or retired police officers who bid their services on 
tenders under the economically viable labour costs may appear on the market. 
This is because providing security services is an additional source of income 
for them, apart from their regular job or pension incomes. This certainly does 
not contribute to the professionalization of the private security sector and 
establishment of trust and cooperation with the police. A number of countries 
have solved this problem in the way that the law provides for a certain period 
of time that should elapse before former or retired police officers could deal 
with matters of private security. 
The trend of police officers moving to the private security sector is 
mostly conditioned by the financial aspect, and in our country it was at its peak 
in the mid 1990s, when wages in private agencies were up to ten times higher 
than the salaries of the police. Today, the Law on Police (Article 133) provides 
that a police officer and other employees in the police cannot carry out 
independent economic or professional activity which is incompatible with the 
affairs of a police officer. Despite of the above mentioned, in practice police 
officers often work part-time as security officers in nightclubs or as security 
guards. This only discredits the work of the police in general and complicates 
the process of professionalization of the private security sector. 
 
Cooperation as a model relation 
The idea of this model lies in mutual cooperation, which basically 
implies that one party provides support to the other, thus reinforcing the power 
of both sectors.13 As such, cooperation implies joint action and is set out in the 
regulations as a basic principle of operation of both sectors. 
Cooperation should be organized and permanent, and it is mostly based 
on timely exchange of information. Therefore, the establishment of an 
effective cooperation can shorten the time required for reaction. The police 
often, by doing their preventive and repressive function, can obtain certain 
knowledge in the sense of vulnerability of certain persons, property or 
business. Furthermore, the police can determine certain failures in the security 
of certain companies, and they will notify managers of agencies for private 
security about that and offer help to eliminate these failures. Apart from these 
preventive activities, cooperation is also based in repressive domain in 
situations after certain crimes had been committed (capturing perpetrators, 
                                                 
13 Zoran Kesić, Private Security and Control of the Criminality, (Belgrade: Dosije studio, 
2009), p. 73 
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securing sites, offering relevant information to shed light on cases, testimony 
at court, etc.).14 
According to a research conducted in Slovenia in 2006 and 2007, 
cooperation between the two sectors mostly takes place in the following areas: 
public gatherings (e.g., football matches and other sporting events, concerts, 
rallies, fairs); transport of money; taking over perpetrators; joint involvement 
during the activation of alarm systems and information exchange. The data 
indicate that the forms of cooperation are primarily related to the tactical and 
operational level, while cooperation at the strategic level is not documented.15 
This indicates that there is still room and areas in which it is possible to achieve 
cooperation. Areas where it is also possible to achieve cooperation for mutual 
benefit, are related to the following activities: establishment of joint databases; 
organizing joint trainings; common initiation on adopting new and amending 
existing legislation in the field of operation; implementation of joint projects 
related to crime prevention (prevention of violence at sports events, school, 
etc.); adoption of plans of joint action in emergencies (earthquakes, fires, 
floods, technological accidents, etc.) and others. Cooperation between the two 
sectors in the Republic of Serbia is still regulated only by regulations 
governing the work of the police. Namely, the Law on Police and the Code of 
Police Ethics establish that the police cooperates with non-state (non-
governmental) entities. Police Code of Ethics provides that police sets their 
internal organization and improves it in a way that promotes good relations 
between the police and the citizens, and where appropriate, effective 
cooperation with other authorities, agencies, local communities, NGOs and 
other citizens' organizations, including ethnic minority groups.16 In order to 
achieve mutual cooperation or partnership, the Minister of Interior may, in 
agreement with the state authorities and non-state entities, adopt certain acts 
on cooperation and establish coordinating bodies of importance for the 
prevention and detection of torts and the perpetrators and to exercise other 
security goals.17 There was a chance to reaffirm this cooperation by the Law 
and raise it to a higher level, which would lead to clearly defined areas and 
models of cooperation. 
                                                 
14 Nenad Radivojević, “Safety Culture in the Private Security Sector,“ Human Security: 
Twenty Years of Human Security Y20HS (Belgrade: Faculty of Security Studies, 2014): p. 
117 
15 Andrej Soltar and Gorazd Meško, "The relationship between the public and the private 
security sector in Slovenia – from Coexistence towards Partnership," Varstvoslovje, Year 11, 
No. 2 (2009): p. 281 - 282 
16 Code of Police Ethics, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 101/2005, Article 10 
17 The Law on Police, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 101/2005, 63/2009 – 
decision of Constitutional Court and 92/2011, Article 6 paragraph 188 
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It should be said, however, that Article 75 of the Law authorized the 
Minister of the Interior to make a decision to establish a special working 
group, in accordance with the regulations governing the state administration - 
Expert Council for the promotion of private security and public-private 
partnerships in the security sector. The aim of this Council is to establish 
cooperation with associations of legal entities and entrepreneurs for activities 
of private security and security officers and monitoring the field of private 
security and submitting an incentive to improve the performance of operations 
in that area in accordance with the new standards. It is envisaged that 
registered associations of legal entities and entrepreneurs and security officers 
will propose to the Minister a candidate for a member of the Expert Council 
from their ranks. It remains unclear, however, why the legislator has not fully 
regulated this question. It is unclear who else, besides the delegated 
Representative of a professional association, becomes a member of the 
Council, what is the length of their mandate, which are the responsibilities of 
the Council, what is the decision making procedure, etc. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The development of the private security sector in the last few decades 
has become the topic of many discussions, both in the world and in our 
country. This development is not taking place in the same way in all countries. 
Unlike the developed Western countries, this process in the countries in 
transition was led with heavy and painful problems. These problems came 
from the general social, political and economic developments in these 
countries. This has created an unfavorable climate for the development of such 
an important sector of the society. The increasing role and importance of the 
private security sector in the Republic of Serbia led to some confusion about 
the very justification for their existence. This has especially come from police 
circles who questioned the justification and necessity of transferring to private 
sector affairs, which were under the inviolable jurisdiction of the police. The 
police was initially explicitly against it arguing that private agencies and their 
officers, unlike police officers, are not sufficiently qualified to provide 
security services. Such attitude of the police is certainly contributed by the 
lack of legal regulations and standards, which represent constituent elements 
on the path towards professionalization. Despite the above, the process of 
expansion of the private security sector has continued. The failure of the police 
to adequately respond to the growing and sophisticated threats to the security 
of citizens, corporations and their assets and operations, has certainly 
contributed to the expansion. 
When we talk about the relations between the police and the private 
security sector, it should be noted that they are necessarily conditioned by the 
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new status, role, and function of the private security sector. The existing legal 
regulations still reflect the competitive relations between the two sectors. The 
adoption of the Law on private security is entirely commendable; however, it 
is necessary to take into account the views of certain scientific circles about 
the shortcomings of the Law. Also, it is necessary to make certain amendments 
to other legislation adopted before the Law itself, which, as we have seen, still 
do not allow the realization of cooperation at full capacity. By fulfilling these 
requirements, the Republic of Serbia will be included in the trend of 
development of cooperation between the public and the private security sector, 
with the ultimate goal of achieving the so called public-private partnerships. 
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SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE IN QUEST OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND EURO-ATLANTIC 
INTEGRATION 
Olga Brusylovska 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper highlights the problem of national security that has been a 
subject of extensive debates in the South-Eastern Europe since 1989. After the 
collapse of the USSR in late 90’s, the most Eastern European states have 
decided to join Western institutions. The main questions of the integration are: 
Which new national security concepts do emerge in the region of SEE? How 
were challenges for security defined in these concepts? How did Bosnian 
tragedy influence on the improving of security concepts? Will NATO be 
considered only as the military power or as organization able to accelerate 
economic modernization in South-Eastern Europe? When will NATO 
countries accept the idea of enlargement? Which are the basic requirements 
for the candidate states? How did NATO enlargement influence on NATO 
transformation? Does NATO Membership Action Plan have any new 
peculiarities? 
The theoretical frames of this article are based on the Regional Security 
Complex Theory. RSCT demonstrates why particularly the security 
determines the development of all other spheres of social and political life in 
the peripheral (unstable) regions. The security of each actor in the region 
interacts with the security of the other ones. There is strong security 
interdependence within the region, but not among regions. This feature has an 
impact on the region and makes the regional security an interesting area of 
study. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the process and results of 
formulation of the new security agenda in South-Eastern Europe. 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF EASTERN 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH NATO 
 
The economic and political priorities of the Eastern European countries 
were clearly related to the purpose of joining the EU, while the problem of 
national security has been the subject of extensive debate. It was not a 
coincidence, as during the Soviet times, the countries of this region did not 
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have their own national security concepts; all of them were defined by the 
Soviet Union. 
The most efficient in creating of the new concept of the national 
security were the Polish military analysts and the experts in international 
relations. This can be explained by the fact that Poland has the longest border 
with the former Soviet Republics, where according to the Polish estimations 
of 90’s were 76 regions of potential ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, Russia has 
been permanently unstable and unpredictable (Koval, 1999). The only way 
out, which the new political elite of the Republic of Poland saw, was the quick 
location under NATO “umbrella”. 
The other concepts of national security of states in this region do not 
talk about “the threat from the East”, but the possible local conflicts in the 
former socialist countries, and in particular, on the territory of SFRY, are 
considered as the main challenge. But the real threat was in the internal 
security challenges: the growth of nationalism, which was deliberately stoking 
and using by the populist leaders in the struggle for power; an insecure status 
of the national minorities and the beginning of their struggle for equal rights; 
worries about the revision of the post-war borders, etc. 
The negotiations with NATO were begun by the Czech President 
Václav Havel, who during the speech at NATO headquarters in Brussels in 
March 1991, openly demanded from NATO to provide the new European 
states with the security guarantees. In three months after the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact (October 1991), was held the meeting of the Ministers of foreign 
affairs of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These three states officially 
expressed their desire to join NATO (Michta, 1992). Their aspirations to join 
NATO provoked a sharp reaction of the USSR. Someone considered that “The 
Visegrad Group” would benefit from the permanent East-West confrontation 
as the only way to ensure its own raison d'etre; that their accentuating and 
sometimes excessive politico-military loyalty to the West, was the key 
strategic resource, the main “export product” of the region (Bojcova, 2004). 
The rejection of NATO expansion to the East by the Soviet Union perturbed 
even the conservative circles in the Eastern Europe. Now the renouncement of 
the idea of joining NATO would have meant the recognition of Russia's right 
to put a veto on their decisions and the actual limitation of sovereignty. 
The concernment in cooperation with NATO was stoking by the 
numerous failed attempts to fill the security vacuum through the creation of 
the new multilateral structures within the Visegrad Group, “Pentagonal” 
(“Geksagonal”), CEI in the early 90's. The ideas such as the “belt of neutral 
states” (the idea of the head of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus Stanislav 
Shushkevich), the “safety zone” (the idea of the President of Ukraine Leonid 
Kravchuk), and “NATO-bis” (the idea of the Polish President Lech Walesa) 
were also promoted, but have never been implemented. The most longstanding 
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was an attempt to establish close cooperation between the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland within the framework of the Visegrad Group. 
The official statement about the contract termination has not still been adopted 
despite the fact that the membership in NATO and the EU allows that. The 
primary goal of the Visegrad Group was the mutual support in order to join 
the EU and NATO as soon as possible. So, from the very beginning, the union 
was considered as temporary by its members. It is hardly a surprise that after 
joining the EU and NATO, the Visegrad Cooperation has not almost been 
mentioned. 
At first, 16 NATO countries led by the U.S. expressed the temperate 
enthusiasm in regard to the idea of enlargement. At the first stage, the main 
deterrent was the position of the Soviet Union. Its claims were based on the 
“Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany”, the Article 5, which 
prohibited the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on territories of 
the East Germany. The Soviet elite broadly interpreted the article as a general 
ban for NATO to extend its influence in the East (Rahmaninov, 1997). 
The task to transform NATO within the framework of the "new 
security structure" was put forward after the long-term discussions at NATO 
Summit (Rome, November 1991). NATO, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), the EU, the WEU, and the European Council 
should complement each other. Thereafter, in order to revive the dialogue 
between the former opponents was created the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), opened to all European states. In 1992, it has already 
included 37 countries (Koval 1999). However, in May 1993, the Minister of 
Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany Volker Rühe at the parliamentary 
session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Berlin advocated for accession of 
the CEE states to NATO (Rahmaninov, 1997). Despite the fact that it was not 
the incentive of U.S., but the main reasons for changing of NATO position 
was to use the weakness of Russia and to maintain NATO as a tool of 
leadership in Europe and other continents. 
In autumn 1993 Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the U.S. President for 
National Security Affairs conceived the “enlargement strategy”, where he laid 
the emphasis on providing the assistance to the states, which took the path of 
democracy and market economy. The other version of this concept was 
submitted to the Congress by the President Bill Clinton as the “National 
Security Strategy of the United States (1994 - 1995), engagement and 
enlargement”. The stress was laid not on the promotion of democracy and 
market, but particularly on the security issues. On October 13, 1993 in Prague, 
the President Clinton stated that “it is not referred to the problem whether 
NATO should admit the new members, but to the question - when and how”. 
The U.S. State Department also announced that this issue would be only under 
the NATO consideration, and it should not be a matter of dispute for the other 
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OSCE’s participants (Rahmaninov, 1997). This statement was not coordinated 
with the U.S. allies in NATO, including the United Kingdom and France, 
which at that time did not share the American opinion about the NATO 
enlargement. France proposed own “Stability Pact” project, and its approval 
would make meaningless the vision of CEE states as a "gray area" of the 
potential danger. In January 1994 at the meeting of NATO member states in 
Brussels, an official statement about the launching of the new program 
“Partnership for Peace” was made. Its key requirements were: 1) the 
democratic control over the military forces; 2) NATO’s access to the process 
of national defense planning and funding; 3) participation in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations of the UN and the OSCE; 4) interaction with NATO 
member-states in peacekeeping missions with military component, in field 
training exercises, etc. The first states which joined the Partnership for Peace 
were Romania, Lithuania and Poland (Brusylovska, 2007). 
On the one hand, the Partnership for Peace can be regarded as a 
transitional form of the cooperation just before the full NATO membership. 
On the other hand, the idea of NATO transformation from military-political 
alliance to an instrument of peace and security safeguarding, was still on the 
agenda. 
 
THE NEGOTIATIONS: STAGE 2.  
 
The radical change in NATO position took place in 1995. In the U.S. 
policy emerged the formula of the “intensive dialogue” with the candidate 
states. The reason for this apparent policy revision was a fear of the U.S that 
the weakening of NATO will lead to a discredit of the American leadership in 
the world. In turn, Germany was waiting for the repeal of Article 5 of the 
“Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” if NATO expands 
eastward. But the most radical changes underwent the French position. 
According to its calculations, it would be better if the CEE countries joined 
NATO now, and only over a certain period of time became the member of the 
EU. The desire of the military-industrial complexes of NATO member-states 
was an important motive to create the new trade areas for their products 
(Maksimichev, 1996). Actually for the United States there was no 
considerable economic interest, unlike for Germany and other developed 
economies of Europe, which regarded the Eastern European region as the 
potential “gold mine”. The American politicians and experts also pointed at 
the importance of geo-strategic factor in the process of NATO enlargement. 
Jeffrey Simon (Washington Institute for National Strategic Studies) said: 
“Today, the geostrategic role of the candidate states is taking into account 
more than ever. Slovakia and Slovenia appear as the “bridge” to Hungary; 
Romania and Bulgaria “restrain” Serbia and “stabilize” Macedonia, at the 
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same time bind Hungary, Greece, and Turkey” (Simon, 2004). Further it 
should be pointed out that Poland and the Baltic States “restrain” Russia. All 
this has of a great importance in the context of an explicit gravity of NATO 
toward the Caspian region and the Middle East – the sources of energy. 
Brussels also understood that the accession to NATO membership can be used 
as one of the main tools of control over the general processes in post-
communist Eastern Europe. In Hungary and Poland, the attractiveness of 
NATO helped to achieve national consent in implementation of the radical 
political and economic reforms. Not only the former communists, but also 
liberals and conservatives in the government and in the opposition, understood 
the necessity to meet all the requirements of NATO. The achieved social 
consensus without doubt contributed to the success of democracy in the 
region. 
In order to become a potential candidate for NATO membership, states 
had to demonstrate the significant progress in a settlement of conflicts with 
their neighbors by peaceful means and their loyalty to the idea of the 
multiethnic democracy. For example, in the mid-90s it was the starting point 
of the rapprochement between Hungary and Slovakia. In the speech to the 
Parliament the Prime Minister of Hungary Gyula Horn, claimed: “What do the 
EU and NATO want from us? They have firmly declared that we should adjust 
the relations with our neighbors. Neither the EU nor NATO is going to admit 
the states with unsettled border disputes or problems, connected with the 
minority rights” (Iden, 1995). In 1995 Hungary and Slovakia have signed an 
agreement under which they agreed to respect the existing boundaries. The 
similar agreement was reached between Hungary and Romania: the borders 
were recognized inviolable, and at the same time the rights to the Hungarian 
minority in Transylvania were guaranteed. 
The Bosnian tragedy, ended with the Dayton accords in 1995, was an 
additional argument for the states in this region. It showed the weakness of the 
OSCE and the fact that NATO remained the most powerful military force in 
Europe without any alternative. Despite all the shortcomings of the 
organization, only NATO membership could ensure that a conflict like the one 
in Bosnia would not occur within the territory of these states. 
The nation’s leadership of the Eastern Europe hoped that the accession 
to NATO would accelerate the economic modernization and strengthen their 
position in the international economic arena. The membership in the strongest 
military organization had to become an important factor in attraction of the 
foreign investment. 
At that point in time, NATO had already finished the formulation of 
terms for the Eastern European states, which wanted to join the Alliance. 
Warren Christopher announced the basic requirements at the meeting of 
NATO foreign ministers in December 1994: 1) completed and unwavering 
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loyalty to the principles and structures of NATO; 2) ensuring of parliamentary 
control over the military sphere, appointment of civilians to heading positions 
in this field; 3) the armed forces must be professional, apolitical and strictly 
perform the function of deterrence and defense; 4) abidance of the democratic 
and international conduct standards by a candidate state. New members had to 
adhere to the basic principles of the UN Charter, to promote democracy, 
individual freedoms and rule of law (Brusylovska, 2007). Thus, along with the 
specific requirements for the reform of army, the candidate countries should 
achieve a certain stage of the democratic state system, but this purpose was 
rather generally formulated. 
There were long fierce debates on the need to change the NATO’s role 
in the post-bipolar world, which in turn determined the need of its 
transformation with laying an emphasis on the political structure, and less on 
the military one. Despite this, it was finally decided to perform the next NATO 
enlargement. If to take into consideration the critical basis for this decision, it 
is clear that it requires the further explanation. From the point of view of the 
U.S, such solution was optimal. The U.S. has always viewed NATO as its 
main tool of the European policy. NATO in its current form - as a military and 
political organization - completely satisfied the American elites. Such a shift 
in emphasis of its activities could only cause damage to the interests of the 
U.S. It is not so easy to explain the position of the Western European allies of 
the U.S. At first, they were opposed to the enlargement, in favor of 
transformation, especially France, which even had not joined the NATO 
military structure. But then the Western Europeans let themselves to be 
persuaded. The main purpose of this change was the priority of the EU 
enlargement issue for the European great powers. First of all, the accession to 
NATO membership of the Eastern European states on an individual case basis 
could be considered by the Europeans: 1) as a “litmus test” of their actual 
situation at that point in time; 2) as an opportunity to acquaint the United States 
with the cost shifting for the accomplishment of the post-communist 
transformation. 
In July 1997 at Madrid Summit, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland were invited to the negotiations  with the purpose to join NATO in 
1999 (the 50th anniversary of the Alliance). Slovakia, another member of the 
Visegrad Group, was not invited to the talks; the main reason was the pro-
Russian policy of Vladimír Mečiar and signing of the Slovak-Russian 
agreement for military-technical cooperation on the eve of Madrid Summit. 
But in Madrid was announced that other countries, regardless of their 
geographic location, might be eligible for membership in the future according 
to “their evolving” toward democratic government and the market economy 
(Molnar, 1998). 
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THE NATO ENLARGEMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
On December 16, 1998 in Brussels, the foreign ministers of Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, and Poland signed a protocol of accession to the Alliance. 
On March 12, 1999 in Independence (Missouri, USA) after the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs have deposited "instruments of accession", Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic officially became NATO members. The goal of 
further reformation of the armed forces until 2006 was set. The program 
consisted of about 200 goals and more than 100 tasks related not only to the 
changes of the main standards of the material resources, but also to the 
structural and personnel modernization. The funding was provided primarily 
from the state budget and secondly from NATO (Brusylovska, 2007). 
Because of the Kosovo crisis, in 1999 at the NATO summit in 
Washington was announced not only the new approach to local conflicts and 
enlargement of the traditional area of its responsibility, but also, in general, to 
the European security in the context of NATO – EU relations. This approach 
was named “European Security and Defense Identity” (ESDI). The Alliance 
activated the creation of the new European security architecture, which was 
aimed at complementarity of the functions and roles of NATO, the OSCE, the 
EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe, and others. 
Also, in 1999 the governments of NATO states ratified the decision to 
increase the flexibility of the structures of the Alliance through the use of the 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). According to this new mechanism, 
NATO member states are not obliged to participate in separate missions, if 
they feel that their vital interests are not affected, but they cannot prevent other 
members from participation in operations. In 1999 these decisions marked the 
beginning of a new era in the history of NATO. 
At Washington Summit 1999 nine more candidate states were named: 
Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, and 
Albania (Croatia, perhaps, supposed to be the tenth). There substantive 
divergences were over the issue of one or another candidate state. Thus, 
Albania and Macedonia did not look as more stable than Serbia or Bosnia; 
however, some of them became candidates, while others did not. The stand of 
Germany, France, and England on a matter of the further enlargement was 
quite restrained. But the new members supported the U.S., whose position 
within the Alliance has become much stronger. The reasons of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic were quite clear: due to the expansion to the 
East these states would not be on the last defense line any more. Besides, they 
were counting on the U.S. support in the matter of their early entry into the 
EU, but putting it mildly, the major European states did not hurry with that. 
The certain fears of the Czechs and Poles were also related to the German 
factor, but the influence of the U.S. had to prevent that. 
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NATO membership has been quite clearly associated in the minds of 
the Eastern Europeans with the need of the preliminary implementation of the 
radical internal reforms. For example, Peter Weiss, the leader of the Socialist 
Party of Slovakia, declared: “Although our country was named as one of the 
first candidate states for NATO membership, first of all we should meet a 
number of conditions, including: compliance with the rules of democracy, 
which are the norm in the participating countries; progress in the development 
of market economy; enforcement of human and civil rights and freedoms of 
Mass Media. We must admit openly the fact that our partners consider the 
Slovak democracy as unstable, this cannot meet our interests” (Brusylovska, 
2007). The similar arguments are adduced in the report of Anthony G. Brown 
independent group: NATO enlargement will help the Central and Eastern 
European countries to consolidate the reforms, ensure their protection from 
the internal instability and external aggression. In turn, only by means of  
enlargement, NATO can complete its transformation from a military alliance 
since the Cold War times to more political entity and integrated military 
structure for crisis management, and, in general, for joint actions in the Wider 
Europe (Is the enlargement of NATO necessary?). 
The famous American researcher Michael Mandelbaum sticks to a 
different point of view. He has quite unexpectedly remarked: the foreseen 
extension is not sufficiently wide, if the new NATO mission is the promotion 
of democracy. Exactly these states, which are touched upon, can implement 
the successful transition to democracy and market economy much better than 
others even without NATO. Another factor - the possible revival of the 
Russian imperial policy - also does not explain the choice of NATO. From the 
viewpoint of West, Ukraine is under the greatest threat of the revival of 
aggressive Russia. However, no one proposes Ukraine to join NATO. 
Consequently, the expansion in the form in which it was planned, is counter-
productive and will work only towards a new division of Europe and to the 
renewal of the “Cold War” atmosphere (Mandelbaum, 1995). 
Each of these positions was well reasoned, it was obviously that the 
chosen by NATO officials form of the expansion was far from being the best. 
But the events on September 11, 2001 significantly accelerated the growth of 
the number of supporters of NATO enlargement to the East. The process of 
searching for strategic partners became the global task for all states. Therefore, 
considering the possible candidates for the accession, their internal 
characteristics became less important than the external, connected with the 
international system factor. 
In March and April 2004, just a month before the EU enlargement, 
there was another NATO enlargement - the affiliation of seven new member 
states: Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
It is evident that the new NATO members did not have sufficient political 
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experience of harmonization of the Atlantic partnership with their own 
national interests. The governments of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
consented to deploy the American military installations on their territories. We 
understand the motivation of Romania and Bulgaria: they rely heavily on the 
American lobbying of their interests in the EU, but we should not forget about 
the negative experience of Turkey. It is NATO member since 1952, but for 
almost 20 years it has been trying and failed to obtain a membership in the 
EU. Poland, which considers itself as the main partner of the U.S. in the 
Eastern Europe, must bear even a more crippling burden of cooperation than 
it is provided by the formal agreements. For example, Poland played an active 
role in the reformation of NATO. In September 2002, when NATO came up 
with an idea to create the rapid reaction forces, Poland initiated the foundation 
of Warsaw Response Forces of NATO. In the report of this group in 2004, 
special attention was paid to the need of strengthening the ties between the 
U.S. and the EU (Brusylovska, 2007). 
The new NATO members become an outpost in combating 
international terrorism; therefore, the threat of terrorism is potentially 
increased for these states. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London have 
shown that NATO's military operations contain a threat to the civilian 
population of the European states and they become a hostage at this struggle. 
Such problems as refugees, military expenditures for carrying out of missions, 
in areas which previously were not in NATO’s responsibility zone 
(Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq), are intensifying. The necessity to 
increase defense expenditures, especially for the candidate states before their 
accession to the Alliance, became another negative consequence related to 
NATO joining. Thus, in 2003, Romania increased its military budget by 20% 
- to 1.2 billion dollars, while the standard of living remained one of the lowest 
in Europe. For the transition economies, the need to reduce severely the size 
of armies was troublesome. From 1993 to 1999 the Czech Republic reduced 
the armed forces posture from 93 to 53 thousand people, thus it had an impact 
on the unemployment rate (8.5%) and the social tensions heightened (Serfaty, 
1999). Other states of the region followed the "Polish scenario": they decided 
to rearm their troops through the purchasing of military equipment in the U.S. 
Now they depend on the US companies (e.g. “Lockheed Martin”) in such 
matters as maintenance and repairing of new military equipment 
(Brusylovska, 2007). And, in global sense - their defensive ability totally 
depends on the U.S. 
Comparing the defense budget size of the U.S. and the European 
countries, it seems that they are not members of one block (pact). In 2003 the 
USA increased their defense spending by 48 billion dollars – it is more than 
the total defense budget of any European state. In 2003, the defense spending 
of all European NATO member states accounted for a half of the U.S. 
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spending. It is obviously that even the economic leaders of Europe cannot 
compete with the U.S. in the military sphere (Brusylovska, 2007). So, what 
we can say about the newcomers is that their contribution to the modernization 
of weapons and the transformation of arm forces is minimal, but it imposes an 
additional burden on the national budgets. 
The attempts of certain countries to reduce the defense spending after 
joining NATO caused a sharp reaction of the NATO leadership. For example, 
in 2004 in Brussels Hungary was officially reproached that its military budget 
was not answerable to the minimum, which the Alliance determined. In order 
to temper the criticism, the Hungarian leadership had to make the concessions 
on the more important for the United States Iraq issue. At the end of 2004 in 
accordance with the decision of the Parliament the Hungarian military units 
left Iraq, but the Government immediately decided to continue the 
participation in the settlement of the situation in Iraq and sent there 150 experts 
for training of staff from the local defense and law enforcement departments 
and agencies (Brusylovska, 2007). 
On the other hand, the example of Poland shows that the incentive in 
NATO is encouraged. According to the data of 2003, the Alliance became the 
most significant investor in the economy of the state. The share of Poland in 
NATO budget is 78 million dollars per year, while at the same time, NATO 
investments in Poland are estimated at about 700 million dollars per year. Until 
2008 the Alliance planned to invest more than 2 billion zloty in the expansion 
of the military infrastructure of Poland (modernization and construction of 
ports, airports, oil storage tanks, control systems). The projects that have 
already been carried out include the construction of the supply systems of sea 
ports in Gdynia, laying of the landing strips in Malbork near Gdansk. In 2005 
was signed the agreement for building of the training center for NATO joint 
forces in Bydgoszcz (the project was estimated at 33 million euro) 
(Brusylovska, 2007). All this goes to prove that in the new NATO, Poland 
holds a key and advantageous position of integrator. 
After analysis of the potential threats and benefits from joining NATO, 
the other countries of South-Eastern Europe gave the precedence over the 
advantages. We can understand them: the difficulties were mainly determined 
by the transition period collisions, and the task of the national security 
assurance was always up to date; so very slight doubts remained in relation to 
the effectiveness of NATO.  
In 2004 the Alliance complimented Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia 
on their progress as the candidate states, as participants of “NATO 
Membership Action Plan” (MAP). Since the very beginning in 1999 Albania 
and Macedonia took part in it, Croatia - since 2002. In 2003, they also signed 
the Adriatic Charter with the U.S., according to which the United States should 
support their prompt accession to the NATO membership. 
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Current participants in the MAP are the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, which has been participating in the MAP since 1999, and 
Montenegro, which was invited to join in December 2009. A welcoming 
progress was made in its reform efforts in April 2010 when the Allies formally 
invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP. However, the North Atlantic 
Council will only accept the country’s first Annual National Programme when 
the immovable property issue had been resolved. Allied leaders agreed to 
invite Macedonia to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable 
solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece. 
Each participating country chooses those component parts of the MAP, 
which are best of all consistent with its requirements, and sets its own planned 
targets and timelines. NATO representatives constantly keep watch over the 
implementation of the MAP. The advisers get to the heart of all matters related 
to the key aspects of future membership of candidates: politics, economy, 
defense, resources, information, security, and law. First of all, the candidates 
sent troops for participation in NATO operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic 
region (Iraq, Afghanistan). As the partners they also participate in many types 
of NATO activities (military servants from these countries serve in NATO 
headquarters and commanding units, study at NATO Schools in the West 
European states). 
On April 1, 2009 Albania and Croatia joined in the sixth enlargement. 
So, since 2009 NATO is an Alliance that consists of 28 independent member 
countries. Albania is in favor of the extending cooperation with the other 
countries in the region - Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must 
help to break with the old stereotypes - considering the Balkans as the 
“Tinderbox of Europe”. So, the idea of accession of all Eastern European 
countries to NATO is getting more and more real. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the turn of the Millennium, NATO looked like anachronism; the 
organization was interesting neither for the USA nor for the Western Europe. 
The USA tried to help their allies in the maintenance of the organization, and 
began to embody the idea of collective security and collective responsibility. 
According to G. W. Bush, it meant that the EU had to provide its own safety 
and to find the means to reequip their military forces with new technologies. 
To some extent the political leaders of the European Union continued to dream 
of the impossible - to keep the presence of the U.S. in the Old World, but under 
the EU control. However, in 2004 NATO's position strengthened with its 
transformation from the Euro-Atlantic organization to the global politico-
military structure. The Eastern European states, which wanted to be placed 
under the NATO’s “umbrella”, were engulfed in conflicts "necessary" for the 
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U.S., but all members had to bear the responsibility for the actions of NATO 
on equal terms with Washington. To a greater extent the Western Europeans 
lost the confidence to create their own center of power that would extend its 
influence far beyond the Europe. Thus, the strengthening of NATO 
strengthens primarily the American power, but in the longer term, it does not 
mean that the U.S. partners “have lost”. 
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Rape must not be a weapon of war. 
“The use of rape during wartime as a weapon 
is the worst possible form of warfare.” 
 
INTRODUCTION – WAR AND CRIMINALITY 
 
At times of war, the regular functioning of the system is disrupted; that 
is to say, warfare gives rise to social disorganization accompanied by 
inadequate, passive and non-objective work of the police and the judicial 
organs. Such conditions result in increased possibilities and circumstances for 
higher levels of criminality, primarily due to the existence of objective lack of 
control over the competent institutions and lack of respect for the public order 
and the established rules of conduct. Such circumstances encourage primitive 
urges among individuals, including punitive actions. In the case of members 
of armed forces, such behavior is even more strongly expressed, as a result of 
the position and power they have. Social disorientation generally encourages 
people with past criminal inclinations to continue committing criminal acts 
and to be even more brutal and greedier in such situations; it also encourages 
criminal activities among citizens who used to be model and law-abiding ones 
before the war. There are views that these people only “naturally” adapt to the 
circumstances of disorganization, as this is the only way to survive. All of this 
contributes to temporary changes in the scope, structure and features of the 
criminal conduct in the warring states; thus, various forms of criminal 
activities usually take place, starting with the conventional ones and all the 
way up to organized and war crimes. 
The situation regarding the practice of reporting criminal acts is also 
unfavorable, since a substantial portion of such acts is not reported. What 
about the sexual violence under conditions of war, which is the subject matter 
of our paper? Incomplete records of criminal acts primarily as a consequence 
of the failure of the institutions of the system to function, the fear among 
victims to report criminal acts, and the lack of confidence in the institutions, 
all lead to underreporting sexual crimes, with the dark number of this type of 
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criminality being at the same time on the increase. Yet, under the 
circumstances of the modern – so-called new – wars, this is changed due to 
the significant role of the media and their contribution in making the victims 
of sexual crimes visible, as well as due to the rising number of non-
government organizations involved in monitoring the phenomenon and in 
aiding the victims. The example of Bosnia - where the number of victims of 
sexual violence was even unrealistically augmented –illustrates another type 
of phenomena when the media place themselves at the service of politics and 
the authorities.1 
The rise of criminality in the course of a war may also be explained 
with the theory of learning and the theory of anomy. People primarily acquire 
criminal motives through the general social beliefs. Once violence becomes 
accepted as a legitimate means for conflict resolution, people tend to start 
believing that they, too, just like their leaders should resolve their mutual 
conflicts by the use of violence. This form of learning criminal conduct is 
especially typical of young people; hence, juvenile delinquency escalates. In 
the process of learning, the role of the media is of a particular importance. The 
theory of anomy, on the other hand, is based on the explanation of a warring 
society as a typical society of anomies in which not even the elementary rules 
of conduct are adhered to and which is characterized by a crisis of the 
institutions, along with a crisis in the values, i.e. disorientation in the system 
of values. 
Still, when discussing war, one may not avoid the post-war period, 
mostly because of the consequences of war and the manner in which society 
is to cope with them. “Following a war, society is faced with the consequences 
of it, with the most serious ones certainly including widely spread 
criminalization and victimization, as well as disappearance of the clear 
boundaries between what is and what is not allowed in terms of behavior. 
Furthermore, this also leads to one of the warring parties denying its own 
crimes and simultaneously exaggerating the ones done by the other party. The 
response to war crimes includes retributive and restorative forms of 
response.”2 
                                                 
1 These are simplified perceptions of the victims and aggressors and the forms of suffering to 
which the victims – predominantly women – were exposed to in the war; such perceptions 
were created by the media and this was used for political and military goals, but caused 
considerable damage to the victims themselves in the first place, on whose behalf and for 
whose benefit this was allegedly done. This was a result of the negative - as opposed to the 
indisputably positive – role that the media played during this war. In fact, the role of the media 
in this war deserves attention in itself and ought to be studied separately.  
2On the relation between war and criminality, see more in Konstantinović-Vilić, S., Nikolić-
Ristanović, V., Kostić, M. (2009), Criminology, Pelikan Print, Niš, pp. 357 - 359. 
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This paper’s aspiration to debate on the victims of sexual violence at 
times of war comes as a result of several circumstances: until one decade ago 
(when it comes to our legislation), crimes related to sexual violence were not 
recognized as crimes against humanity and some of the forms of sexual 
violence were not granted the status of war crimes; then, because of the 
seriousness and long duration of the consequences caused by such crimes, as 
well as for the purpose of overcoming certain stereotypes when it comes to the 
application of the principle of incrimination (e.g., that they should be a part of 
ethnic cleansing). The same significance may also be assigned to the 
expansion of the notion of sexual violence, which is not determined merely as 
rape and forced prostitution under the latest legal definitions (the latter having 
their basis in the international documents). This is also true because of the high 
incidence of the phenomenon. Namely, according to UN data, between 
100,000 and 250,000 women were raped in the course of the 1994 war and 
genocide in Rwanda. The same source tells us that about 60,000 women were 
raped during the Sierra Leone civil war (1991 – 2001), more than 40,000 in 
Liberia (1989 – 2003), around 60,000 in the countries of former Yugoslavia 
(1991 – 1995), of which the majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and close to 
200,000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (since 1998).3 
 
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS CONCERNING VICTIMS 
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONDITIONS OF WAR 
 
The issue of the position of victims of sexual violence was raised 
following World War II (with regard to the famous Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials), but was given special attention during and following the wars in former 
Yugoslavia and in other parts of the world (for instance, in Rwanda). The 
establishment of the ad hoc Tribunal in Hague and the charges brought by it 
had an impact not only on the perfection of the international documents4, but 
also on the search for solutions for the practical problems related to the 
consistent implementation of such documents. 
This is why this section of the paper turns to the Statute and Rules of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (also known as 
the Hague Tribunal), the Statute of the existing International Criminal Court, 
as well as to the UN Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in 
Conflict (adopted in 2013). In this, we will devote special attention to the 
protection of victims of sexual violence in warfare. At the same time, it is 
                                                 
3ttp://www.bportal.ba/index.php?option=com_content&id=22411%3Ageneralna-skuptina-
un-a-usvojena-deklaracija-o-eliminaciji-seksualnog-nasilja-u 
ratu&Itemid=60#sthash.xt90UOrO.dpuf (accessed on 27.04. 2014) 
4 In this sense, improvement of the status of the victims of sexual violence may already be 
observed in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  
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worth noting that the international protection against sexual violence is made 
part of a wider context in terms of the achievement of justice and recovery of 
the victims and society as a whole by means of establishing long-lasting peace 
in the specific country and in the entire region. We underline that the notion 
of sexual violence or – as it is otherwise referred to – sexual abuses is not 
defined merely as rape. Namely, “sexual abuses of women in war, in addition 
to rape – also include threat of intimidation with rape, various forms of sexual 
harassment and sexual blackmail, sexual slavery in the sense of forced 
concubinage, as well as forced prostitution (in brothels for soldiers and as a 
survival strategy)”5 This understanding is, therefore, owed to the theoreticians. 
It was later also accepted in the international documents. The novelties in our 
Criminal Code (primarily the one in 2004 about which we will speak in more 
details later on) are also along the lines of such an understanding of sexual 
violence. 
Taken as a whole, the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (known as the Hague Tribunal) constitutes progress 
at the international level when it comes to human rights related to the 
protection of the rights of victims. On the other hand, the shortcoming of the 
Statute is the fact that rape is explicitly treated as crime against humanity 
(Article 5 of the Statute), but only when it is systematic and widely spread 
against the civil population. In other words, rape is treated as a crime against 
humanity only when committed as part of an ethnic cleansing strategy, but not 
when it involves individual and even group acts of rape… Rape is not 
explicitly mentioned in the Statute of the Hague Tribunal as a serious violation 
of the Geneva Convention, but was – on the basis of the interpretation of 
feminist lawyers – additionally classified as a serious offence under “inhuman 
treatment”, with the possibility to also classify it under two other serious 
offences – that of “torture” and that of “willfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health” (Article 2).6 
                                                 
5 Nikolić-Ristanović, V. et al. (1995) Women, Violence and War, Criminological and 
Sociological Research Institute, Belgrade, p. 37.  
6 Nikolić-Ristanović, V. (1998) Victims of Rape in Armed Conflict and the International 
Tribunal in Hague, “Temida”, p. 13. Upon insistence of the feminist lawyers, the American 
State Department determined that rape constitutes grave breach of the Geneva Conventions 
and this was subsequently treated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia as a war crime, more precisely as “willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health”, “torture”, or “inhuman treatment” (grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions), as well as a violation of the law and customs of war. Namely, in 1998, Hazim 
Delic (Chelebichi case) was sentenced to 20 years in prison and this was the first-ever ruling 
of the Tribunal on rape as an instrument of torture. (Nikolić-Ristanović, V. 2000, Sexual 
Violence in War: From Nuremberg to the International Criminal Court, ,”Temida”, vol. 3 - 4, 
p. 37).  
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Regardless of such imperfections, it must be emphasized that the 
Hague Tribunal will go down in the history of international punitive law and 
judiciary as the first-ever international tribunal to have initiated proceedings 
against perpetrators of wartime sexual violence. It needs to be especially 
stressed that, as reported by Nerma Jelashic, spokeswoman of the Hague 
Tribunal, sexual violence charges were also brought against almost half of the 
161 individuals accused by the Tribunal. 
The benefits for the position of the victims arising out of the solutions 
in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: the Rome 
Statute), which postulates forced prostitution as a crime against humanity and 
rape and sexual slavery as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. It 
is of particular importance that this was the first time in the history of the 
international (and not only of the international) criminal law that forced 
pregnancy was incriminated as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. 
Enforced sterilization and any other form of sexual abuse of such or similar 
nature in terms of the other explicitly postulated crimes against humanity 
involving sexual violence also constitute crimes against humanity, but are not 
war crimes. However, the provision of the Statute related to genocide remains 
unchanged, but - in the light with the previous practice – it may be expected 
that it will be construed in such a way that it will also include rape as a 
powerful genocide instrument.7 
The advancement made by the Rome Statute in comparison with the 
Hague Tribunal one is that the former treats rape as crime even when not a 
part of a wider ethnic cleansing. Under the Rome Statute, sexual violence is 
treated as a war crime and is classified in the group of serious offences of the 
law and customs applicable in the international armed conflicts (Article 8, 
paragraph 2 b) XXII) and in armed conflicts that are not of an international 
character (Article 8, paragraph 2 d) VI). The difference between the two is that 
the first case refers to serious violations of the Geneva Conventions in general, 
and the second one to grave breaches of Article 3, which is common to all four 
Geneva Conventions.8 Pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Court shall act in 
respect of war crimes, in particular when those crimes are committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commitment of such crimes 
(Article 8 paragraph 1). In accordance with the Statute, the crimes that shall 
be treated as sexual violence related war crimes include rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other 
form of sexual violence constituting a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions (Article 8 b) and e)). 
                                                 
7 Nikolić-Ristanović, V. (2000) Sexual Violence in War: From Nuremberg to the International 
Criminal Court, ,”Temida”, vol. 3 - 4, p. 38 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Macedonia” no. 12/2002).  
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In addition to doing so by acceptance of the international documents, 
our substantive criminal legislation (especially under the 2004 Novelty of the 
Criminal Code) also accepts the list of acts related to sexual violence, and the 
forms of such violence, thus treating them both as crimes against humanity 
and as war crimes. 
Both incriminations treat the issue of sexual abuse of individuals of 
both genders in armed conflicts, namely: Article 403-a (crime against 
humanity) introduced by the 2004 Novelty and Article 404 (War crimes 
against civilians), also amended in 2004 (“Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Macedonia” no. 19/2004) and – on top of the already existing acts of forced 
prostitution and rape – also added the following: sexual exploitation or slavery 
or causing forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of grave 
sexual violence (Article 403-a), while Article 404 speaks only of any other 
form (without the qualification “grave”) of sexual violence. In this context, let 
us also mention yet another international document adopted recently (2013), 
which has been especially relevant and present in the public discourse as of 
lately9; a document that has already been accepted by 137 countries worldwide 
(or 70% of the UN Member States) – “The Declaration of Commitment to 
End Sexual Violence in Conflict".10 
Among other things, the Declaration calls for: 
 Adequate funding for sexual violence prevention and response efforts; 
 Comprehensive, improved, and timely medical and psychosocial care 
for survivors; 
 Exclusion of crimes of sexual violence from amnesty provisions in 
peace accords; 
 Full participation of women in all decision-making processes during 
conflict, post-conflict, and peace time; 
 Strengthened regional efforts to prevent and respond to rape in war; 
 Enhanced support for conflict-affected states for national security and 
justice reform efforts aimed at addressing sexual violence in conflict; 
 Military and police training on prevention and protection obligations; 
 Improved collection and access to data and evidence of sexual violence 
during conflict; 
                                                 
9 The relevance of the document is due to the fact that the commitments to its affirmation and 
consistent implementation (visiting in the process specific states infamous for the large-scale 
sufferings of the victims of sexual violence) include British Foreign Secretary William Hague 
and the world-renowned actress Angelina Jolie.  
10The Declaration was adopted on September 24, 2013. The integral text of the Declaration is 
available at  
https://www.gov.uk/.../A_DECLARATION_OF_CO... (accessed on 30.04.2014) 
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 Support and protect of the civil society's efforts to document cases of 
rape in war; and 
 The development of an International Protocol on the documentation 
and investigation of sexual violence in conflict 
It may be concluded most precisely that this is a document aimed at 
improving the care for and protection of victims of sexual violence in conflict. 
 
Procedural Provisions Related to the Position of Victims of Rape and 
Other Sexual Crimes  
 
The special Victims and Witnesses Section has a special role in the 
protection of victims of war crimes, including victims of sexual violence. It is 
interesting to note that such an organizational solution was introduced with 
the acts of the Hague Tribunal and was accepted as a good experience in the 
Rome Statute as well. Pursuant to Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (of the Hague Tribunal), the activities of the Victims and Witnesses 
Section shall consist of: 1) recommending protective measures for victims and 
witnesses in accordance with the Statute; and 2) providing counseling and 
support for the victims and witnesses. In this, the provision particularly 
underlines that the Section will provide the counseling and support “in 
particular in cases of rape and sexual assault”, and that “due consideration 
shall be given… to the employment of qualified women” in the appointment 
of staff. According to the interpretation by Niarchos, while there is no special 
provision to that effect, it may be assumed that the last note suggests the 
creation of a special unit composed mostly of women, which – in the way that 
proved to be useful at a national level in many countries – would deal with 
cases of rape and other sexual abuse. 
Another provision of the Rules is of special significance for the victims 
of rape and other sexual crimes. Namely, Rule 75 postulates that the court 
shall, whenever necessary, control the manner of questioning to avoid any 
harassment or intimidation. With regard to this, the provision contained in 
Rule 96, the intention of which is precisely the protection of such victims, is 
of particular importance. In this sense, additional evidence shall be required to 
corroborate the victim’s testimony, examination of the victim’s prior sexual 
life shall not be acceptable and – in case the defense claims that there was 
consent on part of the victim, the court is to consider factors that may have 
influenced such consent, including physical violence and moral and 
psychological limitations. This includes not only threats and pressures to the 
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victim, but also to other individuals that are close to the victim or that the latter 
cares for.11 
Under the Rome Statute that the Republic of Macedonia ratified by the 
Law Ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia” no. 12/2002), the Court shall undertake 
certain measures to protect the physical and psychological integrity, dignity, 
and privacy of the victims and witnesses. The Court shall take into 
consideration all relevant circumstances of the case in question, including the 
age of the victims and witnesses, their gender in the sense of Article 7 
paragraph 3, their health condition, and the nature of the crime committed. 
This the Court does particularly, but not exclusively when the specific criminal 
act involves acts of sexual abuse and abuse of children. Notwithstanding the 
principle of public hearing regulated in Article 67 of the Statute, the Court 
may – for the purpose of protecting the victim, witness or accused – conduct 
certain procedural activities involving the presence of the stated parties to the 
proceedings in a special court room (in camera) or may allow the evidence to 
be produced by electronic or other similar means, in particular when a child 
appears in the capacity of a victim or witness. The Victims and Witnesses Unit 
of the Court is authorized to propose to the Prosecutor the application of 
appropriate measures of protection of the stated categories of persons, 
appropriate arrangements guaranteeing the safety of such persons, counseling 
for victims and witnesses, as well as other forms of assistance, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 42 paragraph 6. 
Namely, pursuant to the above stated Article 43 paragraph 6, the 
Secretary shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry. In 
consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, this Unit provides the 
application of protective and security measures and other appropriate 
assistance for the witnesses and victims appearing before the Court, as well as 
for others who appear before the Court. What is even more significant for the 
subject matter of this paper is the provision under which the Unit shall include 
psychotherapists, including ones specializing in providing assistance to 
victims of sexual abuse, which in itself evidences the need of specialized 
assistance for this category of victims, having in mind their position and the 
consequences arising out of these crimes for such victims. In cases when - 
pursuant to the provisions in this Statute - the production of evidence and 
admittance of information may result in jeopardizing the safety of the witness 
or their family, the Prosecutor is authorized not to disclose the type of evidence 
                                                 
11 On these and all other procedural provisions contained in the Hague Tribunal Statute and 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence related to victims in general, including victims of rape, 
see more in my article (2001): Rights of Victims – Prerequisite for Successful Cooperation of 
the Republic of Macedonia with the Hague Tribunal, Macedonian Magazine on Criminal Law 
and Criminology, vol. 1 - 2, pp. 103 - 106.  
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and information in question and instead only to present a brief report, for the 
purpose of conducting procedural actions preceding the proceedings itself. 
These measures… (Article 67 paragraph 5). 
In compliance with the Statute and under procedures of their national 
law, State Parties are obliged when so requested by the Court to provide legal 
assistance in the investigation, pre-trial and trial stages, among other things 
also to the protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence 
(Article 93 paragraph 1 j)). The significance of this provision lies in the fact 
that it overcomes the previously observed weakness of the international legal 
solutions when it comes to the protection of victims and witnesses, which was 
reduced to the trial stage only. In this context, the provision would have been 
complete had it also included the protection of victims and witnesses 
following the completion of the trial as well, particularly if they are to return 
to the places of their previous residence. 
 
FEATURES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE INCONDITIONS OF 
WARWITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON RAPES 
 
Under war conditions various forms of sexual violence are present, 
primarily such that are aimed at civilians and specifically at women as the 
most frequent victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. “…Women 
have been sexually abused in regions affected by military actions, as well as 
in regions not under directthreat of a war, in which the various ethnic groups 
still live together. Women have been subjected to sexual violence in various 
situations: during house searches, arrests, escape, in camps, in special 
premises intended for isolation and rape, etc.12It must be, however, noted that 
rape – as one of the forms of sexual violence in times of war – is by far the 
most frequent or visible one. In fact, papers in this area are much more focused 
on rape. This is not to say that the majority of perceptions related to rape do 
not include other forms of sexual violence as well. Bearing in mind these 
remarks, we will also primarily speak about rape in this study. 
What features of rape may we point to? 
а) Rape is primarily committed by members of armed forces, but also 
by civilians, members of various ethnic groups, and even members of the same 
ethnic group. 
b) Rape is more a result of the imbalance of power and is used as a 
means for the attainment of goals having nothing in common with sexuality; 
just like when committed in peace, rape in armed conflicts is more a result of 
                                                 
12 Nikolić- Ristanović, V. et al(1995) Women, Violence and War, Criminological and 
Sociological Research Institute, Belgrade, p. 37 
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the imbalance of power than it is due to purely sexual motives.13There are 
views that the sexual meaning of rape is of marginal importance during war. 
Under such circumstances, rape is used as a means of vengeance or 
humiliation of the victim of rape who is a civilian, causing enforced pregnancy 
or rape accompanied by enforced prostitution, etc. 
c) Rape is the result of a certain policy and strategy of the warring 
parties and the goal expected to be achieved by the armed forces – conquering 
a territory, the conquerors also acquired the “right to sexual conquer” that over 
time came to be an accepted manner of evaluating manliness, i.e. a manner of 
demonstrating dominance and superiority over women. Still, when the armed 
forces are predominantly consisted of male members, it is the masculine nature 
of war that prevails and the gap between the man possessing power and 
freedom to act as a result of the situation in which he finds himself, on one 
hand, and the woman deprived of power and with no possibility to protect 
herself and to resist the man, on the other hand, becomes larger. Rape in armed 
conflict is not only a matter of incidence where the female victim happened to 
be in the wrong place at the wrong time (Chinkin, 1993).14 
d) One of the features of rape in wartime is the cruelty of the act, i.e. 
the cruelty in treating the victim of rape. This cruelty is mainly due to the 
impact of the circumstance that – in the eyes of the rapist – the victim 
symbolizes the adversary and that the latter is thus harmed and vengeance is 
achieved for certain other actions of the enemy; in such cases, women are also 
considered to be the property of men and the enemy is to be defeated – among 
other things – also by causing disgrace, deprivation of honor, and humiliation; 
in other words, by destroying the woman as the property of the man. The 
women of the adversary combatant are often abducted for the purpose of 
committing group or repeated rapes and enforced prostitution. The ultimate 
symbolic expression of rape in warfare may be treated as humiliation of the 
enemy, since men traditionally perceive rapes of “their own” women as part 
of their own defeat. The myth of the male protector, activated in most of the 
wars, is – as Seifert puts it – nothing but a myth.15 
e) The use of rape as weapon in war – the Conference on Prevention 
of Sexual Violence in Conflicts held in Sarajevo (March 2014) states among 
other things the following: For a long time it has been assumed that rape of 
civilians simply happens in war. However, the use of rape as a weapon of war 
is the worst possible form of fighting. Perpetrators are often aware of their 
doings. They separate families, with men also being victims. Women must no 
longer be afraid to go out in the street to take care of their family, fearing that 
                                                 
13 Ibid, p. 38. 
14 as cited inNikolić- Ristanović, V. et al., ibid, p. 38. 
15 Ibid, pp. 38 - 39 
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they will be raped. Soldier must be educated how to treat women. Sexual abuse 
and raping women must not be usual weapon in the wars worldwide.” 
(Angelina Jolie in Sarajevo, 27 March 2014) 
f) For the victims of sexual violence, the post-conflict period is also a 
traumatic one, which is to say that the victimization continues as a rule: the 
problem of stigmatization and social exclusion of victims of sexual violence 
in war and in the post-war period is yet another example of secondary or 
prolonged victimization the already severely victimized individuals. The 
victims must be integrated back into society and this is the unquestionable task 
of every organized society. The following are important elements in this 
respect: prevention, justice and reintegration (accessed on the internet on 
30.03.2014). 
g) Victims of wartime rape in the post-conflict period “mainly live in 
a dire financial situation, do not have the psycho-social support that they so 
much need, no free legal aid, and usually no job… At the same time, the 
perpetrators of such crimes are still out there living a free life, in some cases 
even in the same place where these women live. They see each other and their 
families know each other. It is a small number of women who decide to initiate 
criminal proceedings against the perpetrator, primarily due to the lack of 
psycho-social assistance that would make it easier for them, but also due to 
fear.”16In this context, the role of the family is rather important; it is the family 
that must demonstrate understanding for the victim and provide the assistance 
and support required for their rehabilitation and reintegration. It is the family 
that must stop the process of prolonged or so-called secondary victimization. 
Secondary victimization is also a serious problem encountered by the victims, 
especially in patriarchal environments. It is in this sense that we suggest that 
work be done with the families as well, as they constitute a significant link in 
this process.  
 
RESOLVING CONFLICTS RELATED TO SEXUAL WARTIME 
VIOLENCE IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD 
 
Sexual violence committed during wars inevitably imposes the need to 
search for possible responses in the post-conflict societies. The conventional 
response to this issue related to the so-called retributive justice will not be the 
focus of our interest on this occasion. We will instead turn our attention to the 
so-called transitional justice, as an alternative of more far-reaching goals than 
bringing the perpetrators to justice. More precisely, its main objectives are tied 
                                                 
16http://www.bportal.ba/index.php?option=com_content&id=22411%3Ageneralna-skuptina-
un-a-usvojena-deklaracija-o-eliminaciji-seksualnog-nasilja-u-
ratu&Itemid=60#sthash.xt90UOrO.dpuf 
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to the efforts to arrive at the truth and at reconciliation, the ultimate goal being 
the establishment of a lasting peace in the specific country and the wider 
region, to prevent the conflicts from “spilling over”. 
Resolving conflicts related to wartime violence in the post-conflict 
period is a process requiring time and numerous efforts on part of the opposing 
parties. The losses suffered and the consequences of the violence and fear gone 
through at times of war make the resolving of conflicts and their consequences 
following the end of the armed conflict painstaking and long-lasting. In this 
context, various forms of resolving violence-related conflicts are used, 
including the possibilities provided by the truth and reconciliation 
commissions as an alternative or complementary form of dealing with 
perpetrators and victims in the post-conflict period. This is about 
implementation of transitional justice in the so-called transitional countries. In 
fact, transitional justice embodies a wide spectrum of truth identification 
mechanisms, such as investigation initiatives and documentation commissions 
and centers.17 
An example of this is the setting up of truth and reconciliation 
commissions (in Rwanda, South Africa or El Salvador). As observed by 
Minow, it is only if we admit that the prosecution is slow, partial and narrow 
that we can realize the value of the independent commissions investigating 
large numbers of crimes and the complex lines of liability and accomplice. 
These commissions combine restorative justice with the search for truth. The 
truth speaks of perpetrators and sexual violence committed, i.e. rape and 
victims suffering consequences of the deed; as a result, the commissions offer 
amnesty to the perpetrators who have committed crimes following orders, i.e. 
for political reasons, in exchange for the truth. Amnesty, however, may and 
must not be granted to all those asking for it. Depending on the crime 
committed, its graveness and consequences, perpetrators are prosecuted 
criminally.18 
In the case of South Africa, the establishment of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission provided a formula – in the words of Bishop 
Desmond Tutu – between “Nuremberg and amnesty”, such that would enable 
the community to head for a more stable peace by facing the truth. The 
Commission reduced the number of processes, but did not grant amnesty en 
bloc. The perpetrators had to publicly admit to their doings and to face the 
victims. Justice is, therefore, understood as collectively facing the truth, 
                                                 
17www.balkaninsight.com/rs/(accessed on 28.04. 2014) 
18More details on the essence of this process, especially through the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, may be found in Nikolić-Ristanović, V., in the section of the 
paper with an inspirational title: What next: justice, healing society or all together?, as part of 
the study entitled Sexual Violence in War: from Nuremberg to the International Criminal 
Court and beyond, “Temida”, Belgrade, 2000 / 3 - 4, pp. 38 -  39 
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publicly admitting/confessing on part of the perpetrator, compensation for the 
victims, aspiring to achieve forgiveness that would lead to 
reconciliation/peace in the community… The objective was social, instead of 
political reconciliation, i.e. justice establishing an inclusive political 
community, sawing back together the social tissue torn, and re-establishing 
individual rights instead of being satisfied merely by legally punishing the 
guilty party.19 
Ii is in the context of such work of the truth and reconciliation 
commissions that we speak of the manners of dealing with the past violations 
of the human rights in the transition societies. Transitional justice is one of the 
most important instruments in the process of democratization led with the 
support of the international organizations, so that it may function as an 
efficient catalyst of the post-conflict reconciliation and stabilization. 
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, the basis 
for the actions of transitional justice include: calling for liability of the 
offenders of human rights in the past by means of criminal prosecution and 
out-of-court forms of investigation (as truth finding mechanisms), reparations 
for the victims and efforts to meet their needs, and transformation of the 
security systems, so that the perpetrators are liable for past violations of human 
rights and so that they are potentially removed from public institutions; also 
reforms of the public institutions to prevent repeated violations of human 
rights from the past. 
Nowadays, transitional justice is often confused with the international 
justice and criminal prosecution. As this project demonstrates, however, 
transitional justice has more far-reaching consequences than simply bringing 
the perpetrators to court. Its main objective is to build sustainable peace and 
assist in the democratization by healing the society and reconciliation.20 
Can we talk of such experiences in our environment? It may be 
concluded that, in addition to the court ones, other truth establishing 
mechanisms have also been initiated in the region, such as national fact finding 
centers, the regional truth identifying commission RECOM and several fact 
finding initiatives in the form of various investigation and documentation 
centers. The regional coalition of non-government organizations (Coalition) 
initiated the formation of a regional truth finding commission (RECOM) in 
2008. The Coalition consists of a network of 1,500 non-government 
organizations, associations and individuals, with some of these organizations 
coming from Macedonia. Still, it may not be said that this initiative has had 
any significant impact in this country. 
                                                 
19Nakarada, R.(2011) Roads to Reconciliation, in the Yearbook of the Faculty of Political 
Science, Belgrade, vol. 5, pp. 368 - 369 
20 www.balkaninsight.com/rs/ (accessed on 28.04.2014)  
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At the very end, it may be concluded that the experiences of the 
Republic of Macedonia when it comes to the application of truth and 
reconciliation processes – thus also of transitional justice – are indeed too 
modest for any relevant conclusions to be deducted. Yet, an encouraging sign 
that things will “get off the ground” is the information that the subject of 
Transitional Justice has been introduced in the latest study program of 
Criminology and Criminal Policy at the Faculty of Security in Skopje that 
started in this academic year (2013/14), with the purpose of studying this 
significant novelty in the implementation of justice on a scientific base.  
 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 
 
Sexual violence in times of war is a type of crime that has been 
unjustifiably neglected and even considered to be a “normal” phenomenon or 
collateral damage wars inflict. Owing to the intensified efforts of the 
international community – and in particular of the feminist movement – this 
crime started to be treated as a war crime and a crime against humanity and its 
definition is being expanded, instead of being brought down to mere rape or 
enforced prostitution. It is of unquestionable importance to study sexual 
violence in armed conflict; in this, any specifics in terms of sexual violence in 
peace are to be especially identified; treatment of this type of violence needs 
to be determined in the international documents; its features need to be 
recognized; and one of the possible ways of resolving it in the post-conflict 
period is to be pointed to (by means of truth and reconciliation). Thence, the 
need arises to study it further and more deeply.  
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Abstract 
Criminologists usually study the crime and deviance under normal 
circumstances. Researches of human behavior during natural, industrial and 
social disasters begun almost a century ago with Samuel Henry Prices and his 
book  “Catastrophe and Social Change, based upon a sociological study of the 
Halifax Disaster” from 1920. When social control is weak or absent, deviant 
behavior emerges, crime rates rise and exploitative behavior spreads. After 
this important study, two forms of crime were determined: property crime 
(looting) and economic crime (market frauds including goods and prices) and 
the belief that these were inevitable companions of disaster and that they were 
criminogenic ipso facto has become rooted. In general, people are considered 
prone to panic and reverting to a more savage, self-centered nature, leading to 
a breakdown of social order and criminal activity. On the other side, extensive 
social science research provides little support to these disaster myths of 
antisocial behavior, suggesting that people affected by a crisis generally 
become focused on loved ones and become extremely creative in dealing with 
the disaster generated problems. Despite these empirical findings, media often 
account focus on concerns of looting and other forms of crime occurring 
during disasters. Whether the crisis or a disaster will be used as a crime 
opportunity depends on the wide range of factors such: as national culture, 
social control, type of crisis, structure of the community and consensus upon 
its basic values. 
Key words: crime, disaster, social disorder, media 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural disasters constitute a major threat to the health, safety, and 
property of human communities. It is very difficult to collect comprehensive 
data, but according to the statistic, in 2013 only, global natural disasters caused 
economic losses of USD192 billion, 4% below the ten year average of 
USD200 billion. The losses were generated by 296 separate events, compared 
to an average of 259. The disasters caused insured losses of USD45 billion, 
22% below the 10-year average of USD58 billion and the lowest total since 
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2009. In a reversal from 2012, when the year’s largest events occurred in the 
United States, the largest global events of 2013 were heavily concentrated in 
Europe and Asia. Notable events during the year in these regions included 
major flooding in Central Europe, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and 
Australia, in addition to Super Typhoon Hainan's landfall in the Philippines. 
Flood represented 35% of all global economic losses during the year, which 
marked its highest percentage of aggregate losses since 2010. Severe drought 
conditions also contributed to billion-dollar (USD) losses in Brazil, China, 
New Zealand, and the U.S. (Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report 
Impact Forecasting, 2013) 
Natural hazards not only cause human casualties and property loss, but 
also disrupt social order and community life. Indeed, Fritz (Fritz, 1961) argues 
that natural disasters present a real world laboratory for testing basic questions 
on how individuals and communities respond and adapt to conditions of loss 
and dispossession. While news media frequently cover natural disasters as 
agents of social disorder, panic, looting, and criminal deviance (Fischer, 
1998), the empirical link between disasters and crime is disputed in mass 
emergency and disaster research. Disagreement among researchers is 
understandable. What research exists on the relationship between natural 
hazards and crime is limited to case studies of single events, small sample 
descriptive analyses, or statistical accounts of behavior in one location during 
a single point in time. As a result, not much can be scientifically concluded 
about the degree to which disasters affect criminal behavior (Zahran et al 
2009). 
There is a widespread belief that looting, violent crimes and other 
antisocial behaviors are common in the emergency time periods of community 
crises created by natural and technological disasters or social unrests. 
Generally, people are considered prone to panic and to reverting to a more 
savage, self-centered nature, leading to a breakdown of social order and 
criminal activity. However, extensive social science research lends little 
support to this disaster myths of antisocial behavior, suggesting that people 
affected by a crisis generally become focused on loved ones and become 
extremely creative in dealing with the disaster generated problems (Kešetović, 
2011). 
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The largest number of criminologists investigated crime and deviance 
under normal circumstances, although Emile Durkheim put the focus of his 
research precisely on the exceptional conditions and circumstances (Dirkem, 
1997). When it comes to exceptional, extraordinary circumstances, the interest 
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of researchers went to the complete dissolution of previously established 
power structures (National Socialism, Bolshevism, and Fascism). 
Regarding the criminological research of human behavior during the 
disasters, they started at the beginning of XX century with a book by Samuel 
Henry Price, Disaster and social change - based on sociological studies of 
disaster in Halifax (Price, 1920). After the explosion, the ship ammunition 
wave that wiped there was a part of the city of Halifax, killing 2000 and 
causing an injury to 6000 Jews. All the usual means of social control were 
disturbed and the disaster led to the expression of two types of crime: property 
crime (looting) and economic crime (fraud with prices, commodities and 
such). After this important study the belief that these two forms of crime are 
inevitable companions of disaster and that the disasters are criminogenic ipso 
facto has become deeply rooted. Robberies occurring in these circumstances 
are usually interpreted as an evidence of human deprivation. In times of natural 
or social chaos we see the rise of the human animal and disappearing social 
control.1 
However, Canton points out that people are generally considered prone 
to panic and reverting to a more savage, self-centered nature, leading to a 
breakdown of social order and criminal activity, particularly looting. Research 
shows, however, that people almost consistently act just the opposite. People 
affected by a crisis generally become focused on the loved ones and neighbors 
and become extremely creative in dealing with the problems generated by a 
disaster. Almost 90 percent of disaster victims are rescued by private 
individuals, not by public agencies. Panic is usually limited to situations where 
there is an immediate, overwhelming threat to life in a confined area and it is 
usually of short duration. (Canton 2007) 
This myth of antisocial behavior was demonstrated during the 
Hurricane Katrina. Despite  extensive media reports  of  looting,  an 
investigation by sociologists from the University of Delaware showed only 
237 actual robbery arrests, which, when compared to the normal crime rate, 
actually represented a decrease in  crime from pre-disaster conditions,  a  
situation  consistent  with  previous research.2 Interviewees stated that pro-
                                                 
1 When people think of disasters, the common image is one of a social breakdown. In contrast, 
researchers have found - at least in the immediate aftermath of disasters - that community 
resilience and unity, strengthening of social ties, self-help, heightened incentive, altruism, and 
pro-social behavior prevail more often (Heide) 
2According to Quarantelli, research has also found that during disasters, standard crimes drop 
as a whole, some substantially below the usual everyday rates, whether in terms of what is 
reported to the police or in terms of arrests made. While a drop could be partly attributed to a 
failure of the police to uphold certain laws during the emergency period (e.g., parking 
violations), this would hardly explain the usual decrease across-the-board. Furthermore, 
survey and other data from affected populations do not indicate that they suddenly become 
major victims of a range of crimes. (Quarantelli, 1994) 
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social behavior (e.g. sharing of supplies, helping neighbors) was more 
prevalent than antisocial behavior and suggested that many involved in looting 
were those likely to commit crimes pre-disaster. There were also suggestions 
that some robberies may have been the product of social inequality resulting 
in behavior normally seen in civil disturbances. While comparison with the 
crime rate does present a problem owing to the difficulty of keeping records 
in a disaster and the discretion given to the police when determining looting 
versus appropriation, it does, nevertheless, seem as if media reports of 
robberies were exaggerated. (Canton 2007) 
The breakdown of social control agencies, loss of power, anonymity 
of collective male groups, and unsafe environment of disaster shelters and 
other temporary housing during the disaster may facilitate sexual assaults on 
women, as it happened in the earlier phases of the Katrina Disaster. However, 
the literature about the sociology of disaster (including works by 
criminologists and disaster researchers) generally offers little empirical 
evidence on the sexual victimization of women during catastrophes. The 
dearth of evidence on this phenomenon impedes the development of key 
policies related to emergency preparedness and planning, which recognize 
women’s vulnerabilities and serve to protect them against violence and sexual 
assaults. 
Dunes and Quarantelli recognized that there are significant differences 
in criminal behavior after natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, tornadoes and after the civil unrest. They, in fact, suggest that the 
occurrence of robbery crimes is much more likely after the social crisis such 
as civil unrest. Also there are differences in the types of goods that are being 
stolen in the wake of natural disasters and during the social disorders. What 
also differs is the public condemnation. Taking someone else’s property 
during social crisis might not be considered as a robbery as it carries an 
important message from deprived parts of the population. These authors also 
stated that cases of looting are considerably less common after natural 
disasters than after civil unrests. (Dunes and Quarantelli, 1968). 
A number of disasters that have later occurred presented the 
opportunity for researchers to deepen their knowledge regarding the links 
between disaster and deviant behavior. However, mainstream criminologists 
have not dealt with this issue more thoroughly. Aside from this, a particular 
problem is to fit scarce empirical insights into the general theoretical 
framework in order to explain the impact of disasters on deviant behavior. 
In an attempt to determine why, despite the empirical data which 
suggest that the robbery crimes after natural disasters are relatively rare, there 
is a widespread perception they are frequent, Dunes and Quarantelli cited four 
factors that prevail in the post-crisis period:  
 misinterpretation of the observed behaviors, 
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 misconceptions about who owns the property, 
 inflated reports on looting, and 
 sensationalist coverage of crisis events by the news media. Reports on 
robberies are often based on misunderstanding of human motives. 
(Canton 2007) 
On the basis of empirical research, Quarantelli claims that robberies 
almost never happen during and after a disaster. And when they occur, 
offenders are usually individuals not from the local community (Tierney, 
1989; Quarantelli, 1993). Officials often take measures to prevent looting, 
even though media reports about them during and after disasters and those 
stories are often spread by aid distributors. 
It is possible that the validity of the presented reports is limited and 
that the phenomenon of antisocial behavior should be observed in the cultural 
context. However, based on the reports of witnesses, during the one of biggest 
industrial disasters caused by emission of toxic gas in Bhopal, India (1984, 
30.000 dead) systematic robbing, and even murders were recorded (Lapierre, 
and Moro, 2001). Similar situation was in Haiti after the devastating 
earthquake in 2010. The opposite example is Japan where there were no 
robbery crime records after the tsunami (Kešetović, Toth, Korajlić, 2013). 
 
REACTION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
Disaster myths have altogether been neglected in legal literature. Yet 
these myths have important implications for the disaster law and policy in 
USA. Belief in the disaster myth of looting and violence may spur legislation 
that serves little purpose, distracts from other disaster legislative priorities, and 
perpetuates the mythology itself. The most prominent examples of such 
legislation are looting laws. Widespread adherence to disaster mythology has 
caused many states, including some of the nation’s most disaster prone, to pass 
laws which address looting during and after natural disasters. These laws are 
premised on the belief that looting will be prevalent during natural disasters, 
just as it is during civil disturbances. Eight states (California, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina) 
currently have laws that create a distinct offense criminalizing looting done by 
civilians in the wake of natural disasters. Another six states (Iowa, Minnesota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin) have a penalty enhancement for 
theft that occurs during a disaster. 
According to Sun there are a number of unfortunate legal consequences 
of this myth, including the deployment of military troops in a law enforcement, 
rather than humanitarian capacity; distortion of response priorities outlined in 
disaster plans; imposition of restrictions on freedom of movement and other 
basic rights. The disaster myth of widespread robbery and violence has 
 336 
engendered a legal and policy structure that frames natural disaster response 
too much as law enforcement, rather than a humanitarian problem. The 
deleterious effects of the myth on disaster laws can best be countered by 
constraining official discretion to overemphasize security risks in immediate-
response decisions, rejecting calls to pass broad looting laws that can reflect 
and perpetuate the myth, and, perhaps, reforming the structure of federal 
disaster agencies by removing the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
from the Department of Homeland Security and reestablishing it as a cabinet-
level agency. (Sun 2010 – 2011) 
Report on the Galveston Hurricane of 1990 spoke of people who were 
executed after having cut off human fingers with rings on them found in their 
pockets. Similarly, after the earthquake in San Francisco in 1996 and the fire 
that followed, the federal troops were killing the robbers who were cutting the 
fingers and ears from corpses in order to steal the jewelry. From calls to 
expand the role of the military in disaster law enforcement, to diversion of 
police from search and rescue missions to looting patrols, to disaster-spurred 
restrictions on movement, to the passage of looting laws, we overemphasize 
law enforcement concerns and security risks at the expense of humanitarian 
efforts to provide the needed aid to disaster survivors, to allow survivors 
themselves to help their neighbors and rebuild their lives, and to mitigate 
harms from future disasters. 
During the Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco 
warned rioters and looting in New Orleans that National Guard troops are 
under her orders to “shoot and kill” to end the rampant violence in the city in 
the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina. Announcing the arrival of 300 
Arkansas National Guard troops in New Orleans fresh from service in Iraq, 
Blanco said, “These troops are battle-tested. They have M-16s and are locked 
and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and I expect they will,” 
she said. (Jouner, 2005) 
On the other hand, however, it appears that any permissibility of 
looting done only for survival needs (food, water, and other survival items) 
exists at the graces of law enforcement officials. While we can hope that police 
officers will use their discretion not to arrest "survival" looting and that 
prosecutors will use their discretion not to pursue criminal charges, those 
arrested and charged with looting need an explicit defense that is subjected to 
their own control. After witnessing the fury and aftermath of the Hurricane 
Katrina, society has seen how looting sometimes serves the larger purpose of 
survival instead of the traditional purpose of greed. In these cases, robbers' 
actions should be justified, and criminal penalties should be waived for their 
otherwise criminal behavior (Hamrick, 2006 - 2007). 
Salgado, Marchione and Gill have reported the results of an ABM 
(agent-based model) to study the emergence of looting behavior after the 
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occurrence of a disaster. The model suggests that, in an absence of any external 
policy, a disaster triggers a deviant behavior escalation in the system. They 
had also analyzed the impact of three different policies that could be 
implemented by government agencies:  
 an increase of the police power, 
 an increase of the information available to the affected population, and 
 a combination of both policies.  
Additionally, they tested the effect of time in the implementation of 
these policies. The results indicate that an early joint intervention successfully 
contained the escalation of deviant behavior. Late interventions were not able 
to restore the artificial society to its initial ordinary state. Moreover, the 
intervention policies taken into account seem to affect two different aspects of 
the artificial society. Whilst applying a social policy would bring about an 
overall decrease of hawks, a police intervention would efficiently protect the 
resources available. Therefore, the outcome of those policies depends 
ultimately upon the timing of their application. Thus, a mixed policy of 
reinforcement of the police forces and a recovery of the communication 
systems that allows people to be informed of their environment early after a 
disaster strikes a population might prevent or thwart the escalation of looting 
behavior (Salgado, Marchione, and Gill, 2010). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Relations between disasters and crime are only coming into the focus 
of interest of sociologists and criminologists as a relevant topic. Although 
significant number of empirical studies has been conducted so far, their results 
are still not integrated into the appropriate theoretical framework. Also, there 
is still no general agreement among academics about the relationship between 
disasters and crime or anti-social behavior, as well as on an adequate response 
of the criminal justice system to crimes committed in the context of disasters. 
The majority of the research was conducted in USA so one must be very 
cautious in extrapolating the data and conclusions to other environment 
because of the social, cultural, economic, and political differences in other 
countries. One should be careful when droving overall conclusions on this 
issue. Whether the crisis or a disaster will be considered and used as a crime 
opportunity depends on the very nature of the concrete disaster and actual 
socio-political circumstances and, also, on a wide range of factors such as 
national culture, social control, type of crisis, community structure and its 
resilience and consensus upon its basic values. Also there are a number of 
conceptual and methodological problems associated with analysis of this 
issue. Important relationships between natural disasters and crime might be 
considered only as a starting point in what should be a more thorough 
empirical investigation of the topic. 
 338 
 
REFERENCES 
Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report Impact Forecasting—
2013 Available on 
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20140113_ab_i
f_annual_climate_catastrophe_report.pdf 
Canton, L.G. 2007, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Concepts and 
Strategies for Effective Programs, Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey 
Dirkem, E. 1997, Suicide. Belgrade: BIGZ 
Dunes, R. and Quarantelli, E.L. (1968) What Looting in civil 
Disturbances Really Means, Trans-action, Vol. 5, Issue 6, p. 9 - 14 
Fischer, HW., III. 1998. Response to Disaster: Fact versus Fiction and 
Its Perpetuation, 2nd ed. New York: University Press of America 
Fritz, Charles E. 1961. “Disaster” p. 651 - 694 in Contemporary Social 
Problems, edited by R. K. Merton and R. A. Nisbet, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and World. 
Hamrick, S. 2006 - 2007. Is looting ever justified? Analysis of looting 
laws and the applicability of the necessity defense during natural disasters and 
states of emergency, 7 Nev. L.J. 182 (2006 - 2007), Available on 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/nevlj7&div=1
2&id=&page= accessed on January 22 2015 
Heide, E. 2004, Common Misconceptions about Disasters: Panic, the 
“Disaster Syndrome,” and Looting in O'Leary, M. (Ed.) the First 72 Hours: A 
Community Approach to Disaster Preparedness. iUniverse Inc. Lincoln. NE  
Jouner, J. 2005. "Katrina: Governor Orders Troops to Shoot and Kill 
Looters" Available on 
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/la_governor_warns_troops_will_/ 
Accessed on May 20 2014 
Kešetović, Ž. 2011, "Crisis, disaster and antisocial behaviour", 11th 
Conference of the European Society of Criminology Rethinking Crime and 
Punishment in Europe - Book of abstracts, Vilnius, 21 - 24 September 2009., 
Vilnius: The European Society of Criminology p.166 - 167 
Kešetović, Ž, Toth, I. and Korajlić, N. (2013), "The Excuse as a 
Strategy in crisis communication – Meaning of the cultural context" forth 
publication 
Mueller, Gerhard O. W. and Freda Adler, 1998, “The Criminology of 
Disasters” p. 161 - 181 in Essays in Honor of Hans Joachim Schneider: 
Criminology on the Threshold of the 21st Century, edited by H. Schwind, E. 
Kube, and H. Kühne. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
Prince, S.H., (1920), Catastrophe and Social Change - Based upon a 
Sociological Study of the Halifax Disaster, New York. 
 339 
Salgado, M., Marchione, E., Gill, A. 2010. The calm after the storm; 
Looting in the context of disasters; 
http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/2325/1/Salgadoetall2010-WCSS.pdf  
Sun, L. G. Disaster mythology and the law 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1131 
(2010 - 2011) Available on 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/clqv96&div=
44&id=&page= accessed on January 15 2015 
Tierney, K. J. (1989), ‘The Social and Community Contexts of 
Disaster,’ Gist, R. Lubin R. (1989) (eds), Psychosocial Aspects of Disaster, 
Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons 
Quarantelli, E.L. (1993), ‘Community Crises: An exploratory 
Comparison of the Characteristics and Consequences of Disasters and Riots’, 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1(2), p. 69. 
Quarantelli, E. L., 1994. Looting and antisocial behavior in disasters, 
preliminary paper No 225, University of Delaware Disaster Research Center, 
available on 
http://dspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/590/PP205.pdf?sequen
ce=1 accessed on January 4, 2015 
Zahran, S., O’Connor Shelley, Peek, L. and Brody, S. D. 2009, 
"Natural Disasters and Social Order: Modeling Crime Outcomes in 
Florida."International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters March 
2009, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 26 – 52. 
 
 
UDK: 327.7:343.228]:340.13(497.11) 
WHEN DOES SELF-PROTECTION END AND 
AUTOCRACY BEGIN? 
Aleksandra Pavicevic 
Faculty of Law, University of Kragujevac, Serbia 
e-mail: apavicevic@jura.kg.ac.rs 
Visnja Randjelovic 
Faculty of Law, University of Kragujevac, Serbia 
e-mail: vmilekic@jura.kg.ac.rs 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
No modern, regulatory state would allow the individual to arbitrarily 
exercise his rights, or the rights he considers is entitled to, according to the 
principle of the prohibition of arbitrary exercise of rights. Not only would the 
authority of state authorities thus be violated, but would the individuals 
themselves decide on the way of exercising these rights, which, in some cases, 
could be accompanied by violence, and therefore the possibility of carrying 
out serious crimes (Stojanovic 2012, 870). It can only be imagined what kind 
of negative consequences could have been caused by arbitrary exercise of 
rights in modern societies. Therefore, all individuals are instructed to exercise 
their rights primarily through the state authorities, in the ways regulated by 
laws and regulations. 
However, the organized protection of subjective civil rights is 
exceptionally present as a form of extra-judicial protection of rights. It is 
determined by law as a subsidiary and complementary form of protection, as 
arbitrary exercise of rights. It is the case of the situations when the help of the 
state authorities cannot be timely received, and the realization of the rights 
would be either impossible or considerably more difficult (Stojanovic / Antic 
2004, 292). The inefficiency of the state authorities and the need to maintain 
procedural economy are often the reasons of unsolicited protection of rights. 
Within the law of the Republic of Serbia the concept of self-defense, as well 
as the forms and general conditions for its exercise, are regulated by the Law 
on Obligations (“Official Gazette of SFRJ”, No. 29/1978, 39/1985, 45/1989, 
57/1989; “Official Gazette of SRJ”, No. 31/1993; “Official Gazette of SCG”, 
No. 1/2003). Special forms of self-defense are also regulated by other laws 
 341 
within the certain civil legal relations, such as Negotiable Instruments Act, the 
Act on the basis of property relations, and others. 
Self-help, especially the right of retention as one of its forms, is 
insufficiently scientifically explained, even though it is always very intriguing 
for professional as well as general public. Historically, the self-help is 
considered to be the oldest form of legal protection, the perception of which it 
is based on the so-called Selbsthilfetheorie: the protection of subjective rights 
solely through private, unregulated self-help. According to Yering’s theory of 
self-help, the right (ius) can only be incurred from the force (vis), and therefore 
the self-help represents "the primal form of law" (Petrak, Critics on the Theory 
of Self-help as a Primal Form of Legal Protection (Selbsthilfetheorie) 2006, 
1249). However, the reasons for creating self-help within the evolution of the 
procedures for protection of the rights through the  history are completely 
different from the reasons for its contemporary application. 
The aim of this paper is to determine the ratio legis of this institute 
today, its legal nature, conditions of permissible exercise, and especially the 
clarification of the relation between permissible self-defense and the felony of 
autocracy. In an attempt to answer these questions, this paper will analyze the 
domestic regulation together with the regulations of the neighboring countries, 
which Serbia has a shared legal tradition with, as well as the views of the 
doctrine and jurisprudence. This issue is particularly important at this time, 
when the preliminary draft of the Civil Code of the Republic of Serbia, which 
embodies the future Serbian law, has been made. Within the General 
provisions of the Code, in section 9, the protection of civil rights is basically 
regulated, but no general provisions on self-protection and self-help are 
determined. The final aim of this paper is to evaluate the expediency of such 
a solution and, possibly, to formulate the adequate proposal de lege ferenda. 
 
CONCEPT OF SELF-PROTECTION 
 
The right to self-protection is granted ex lege to any person as an 
authorization to, with no help of the state authorities, repel the attack upon 
themselves, others, or of certain properties, in order to protect their personality 
or their properties, or in the cases of imminent danger of damage (G. Stankovic 
2003, 119). The following general conditions for its permitted exercise are 
implemented into the legal doctrine: 1) the rightholder must have a liquidity 
right, as the subject to the act of self-defense; 2) judicial protection must be 
unachievable or at least untimely; 3) the manner of its exercise must be 
adequate to the circumstances; 4) counterattack must be necessary and 
proportionate to the attack; 5) there must be a natural will, that is, a factual 
ability for self-protection, not a business one (Stankovic / Vodinelic 2007, pp. 
235 - 237). 
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The legal system, therefore, regulates this mechanism of legal 
protection as well, reducing it to a legally controlled application of force. This 
legal restriction is necessary because the arbitrary protection of someone’s 
own rights could mean the violation of someone else’s. The important legal 
effect of self-defense is the elimination of the obligation to an indemnity 
caused to "attacker" during the action of self-defense. 
 
FORMS OF SELF-PROTECTION 
 
Self-defence 
In the domestic legislation, there are several types of permissible self-
defense. Its basic form is a self-defense, which is regulated by the Article 161 
of the Law on Obligations. Its primary form is a necessary defense, that is, the 
right of an individual to repel the current, simultaneous, unlawful attack upon 
themselves or another person by a man as the attacker. Another form is the 
extreme necessity, that is, the state of emergency as a form of self-defense 
"from things" in which other people's right to smaller values is sacrificed. The 
influence of the criminal law on the theory of civil law is evident through the 
formulation of the conditions for self-defense, considering that the elements 
which are used in defining self-defense within the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Serbia, are also applied in the civil law (Perovic / Stojanovic 1980, 
503). 
The laws of our neighboring countries regulate the mentioned forms of 
self-defense in a similar way, within their Laws on Obligations: the Article 
148 of the Law on Obligations of the Republic of Macedonia; the Article 161 
of the Law on Obligations of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Republika Srpska; the Article 155 of the Law on Obligations of the Republic 
of Montenegro; the Article 1052 of the Obligations Act of the Republic of 
Croatia; the Article 138 of the Code of Obligations of the Republic of 
Slovenia. 
 
Self-help 
The other form of permissible self-protection is self-help, which in the 
domestic law is regulated in a general way in the Article 162 of the Law on 
Obligations. Identical conditions of permissible exercise of self-help are 
regulated by the laws of the mentioned countries: the Article 149 of the Law 
on Obligations of the Republic of Macedonia; the Article 162 of the Law on 
Obligations of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika 
Srpska; the Article 156 of the Law on Obligations of the Republic of 
Montenegro; 1053 of the Obligations Act of the Republic of Croatia; the 
Article 139 of the Code of Obligations of the Republic of Slovenia. Based on 
these, it is possible to make assumptions of permissible self-help within the 
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domestic and the comparative law: 1) the existence of a claim against the 
person whose property is the subject of the claim is necessary; 2) there must 
be a real risk of thwarting or at least considerable procrastination in collecting 
receivables; 3) the protection provided by the competent state authorities is 
untimely; 4) self-help action must be taken by the creditor of claims alone, and 
not by a third party. The fulfillment of the above conditions authorizes the 
creditor to provide their own right, making legally permissible intervention in 
the property rights of another person. This is allowed in the following 
situations: the possessor of things can catch the thief and recover the stolen 
proper, to take the car keys, the creditor can cut the tire on the vehicle to 
prevent the escape of the debtor, the damaged may keep someone else's animal 
that had caused damage to his real estate, etc. (Radishic 2004, 228). The 
optional character of the self-help is reflected in the fact that it is a right, not 
an obligation, for the authorized person who can always have a choice of the 
regular judicial procedure, that is, the court procedure due to a violated right 
(Tour / Schnyder 1986, 567). By analyzing these elements, it is possible to list 
the following forms of permissible self-help in the civil law: the objection to 
the unfulfilled contract (exceptio non adimpleti contractus) in duplex binding 
contracts; unilateral termination of the contract due to non-compliance, 
unilateral compensation, tenure self-help and the right of retention. The last 
two are especially significant, but in the same time, controversial forms of 
self-help, wherefore they are going to be carefully considered in the 
forthcoming part of the paper. Tenure self-help is, within the domestic law, 
regulated in the Article 76 of the Act on the basis of property relations, while 
the right of retention within the Article 286 - 289 of the Law on Obligations. 
 
Self-help in tenure protection 
Self-help as a form of tenure protection in the domestic law which also 
performs a defense of the individual’s rights or the alleged rights with their 
own forces (Simonovic, Right to Self-help in Protection of Possessions 2011, 
p. 210). A holder, or a detentor, is authorized to take the action of self-help 
against those who unauthorizedly disturbe them or their possessions, or who 
take the things away of the possession, under certain conditions. In fact, the 
danger must be immediate, self-help necessary, and the manner of its exercise 
adequate to the circumstances of risk. Exceeding the limits of permissible self-
help (breaking the conditions of proportionality) makes the action taken 
legally impermissible. In legal theory the lawfulness of defensive self-help is 
considered to be indisputable, which is also the prevailing attitude of 
legislators in comparative law. What is disputable, however, is the so called 
offensive self-help, when the attack on the possessions is "remediated" by a 
new attack. Then the holder autocratically returnes the thing previously taken 
away from them, which represents the response to the act of lawlessness, that 
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is, the way of defending possession, and not the felony of autocracy (Orlic, 
Protection of Possessions 1979, 304). It is obvious that the line between self-
defense and felony of autocracy is sometimes hard to be determined, 
essentially as well as terminologically. Thus, in the legal literature certain 
forms of self-help (especially the offensive ones) are mistakenly referred to as 
autocracy. 
It is the fact that the possessory self-help represents a wider aspect than 
a self-help, which is generally refered to as a necessary defence, extreme 
necessity or a self-help in general. Although its exercise is limited in time (as 
opposed to general self-help), tenural self-help in the domestic law is not 
limited to the moment of the attack; it may involve the use of force, but not 
necessarily; nor is the condition of unattainability of judicial protection always 
necessary; it does not even represent the protection of rights but of the factual 
state. It only depends on the requirement of proportionality between the attack 
and the defense. Due to wider rights that are legally recognized to a disturbed 
holder, this modality of self-defense is also called the privileged self-help. In 
the foreign doctrine, this kind of self-help is even considered the "naturally 
given", "self explanatory" and "the most natural form of tenure protection" 
(Vodinelic, Why Possessory Procedure? On the Reasons for Possessory 
Protection of Possessions? 2013, 327). 
 
The right of retention as a form of permissible self-help 
The institute of self-defense, whose legal nature has been the least 
reported of, especially when in function of permissible self-help, is the right 
of retention (ius retentionis),to which we are going to pay special attention. 
This question seems important, because it is an institute which, despite the 
great potential it provides to the creditor, it is not used broadly enough in 
practice. The reason for this is, as legal writers allege, a doubt of an individual 
that as a subject of the private law it can become an instrument for the 
execution of justice, which is, as a rule, in the exclusive domain of public 
authorities (Montessori 1906, 10). Due to the ignorance that a retention 
represents a form of permissible self-help, the parties express an unjustified 
fear that by retaining the debtor's possession they perform a felony of 
autocracy (Lorenc 1966, 4). The right of retention can be defined as the right 
of a creditor to, under certain conditions, keep the debtor’s property which he 
already had in his possession, regardless of the debtor’s will, until the moment 
of payment by the debtor, and even to be reembersed from the property’s value 
if the payment is not made. This definition is derived from the Article 286 
paragraph 1 of the Law on Obligations of the Republic of Serbia, which means 
that the institute representing the form of self-help is regulated ex lege by the 
general norm of the obligation law (and not casuistic, as in some foreign laws). 
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General conditions for the establishment of retention are the following: 
secured claim of any kind must be unpaid (and that is not obsolete), matured 
and enforceable; retained property must be the debtor’s, provided that it is 
possible to cash it by selling; immediate possession of a property must be 
obtained through voluntary submission by the debtor, with the exception of 
contracts on holding or use (Planojevic 2012, 420). By specifying the 
conditions under which the right of retention may be exercised, the limitations 
of its application are being underlined, and the status of a legitimate exception 
to the prohibition of autocratic exercise of rights is being confirmed 
(Stankovic / Vodinelic 2007, p. 234). In the literature, a self-help is often 
reffered to as a form of “primitive justice”, or as a concept of the former 
principle of "retribution and reprisals", a relict of prelegal rights (Petrić 2004, 
17). However, the ratio legis of this institute in contemporary law are 
numerous legal, political and practical reasons which provide the individual 
with legal authority to arbitrarily and autocratically exercise their own right, 
regardless of or against the will of the debtor, by making legally permissible 
intervention in another individual's property. The right of retention therefore 
performs a variety of purposes: 1) first of all, it represents a means of exerting 
psychological pressure on the debtor to fulfill the obligation as soon as 
possible, and in this capacity it has a temporary effect; 2) then, it is potentially 
the means of settlement of claims, as the creditor may be satisfied from selling 
retained properties, when the effect of retention is final; 3) it is the right of the 
creditor to refuse the debtor’s extrajudicial request for the submission of his 
properties; and 4) it is also the response to the owner who is trying to recover 
(vindicate) his properties by judicial means. Various functions that retention 
performs are the causes of various qualifications of its legal nature: a 
complaint, a subjective right – an obligation right, real or mixed right, to a 
"factual state with specific legal effects" (Stipković, The Right to Retention 
and Some Similar Institutes, 1972, p. 290). The determination of retention as 
a so-called "negative right" can even refer that essence of retention is self-
help: passive retaining of the creditor, who is entitled to omission (failure to 
deliver the debtor's belongings). However, without determining legal nature 
of retention, we can conclude that the temporary denial of delivering the 
properties to a debtor represents a specific real means for securing claims, and 
also a legally permissible form of self-protection of the creditor, where social 
effect of retention is reflected. 
By evaluating the importance of general social interests compared to 
individual interests of a negligent debtor, the legislator decides to intervene in 
the debtor - creditor relation (inter partes), authorizing the creditor to establish 
a legal relation with the debtor (erga omnes). This also protects, even favors, 
the legal position of the creditor, the holder of the debtor’s property, but in fact 
this legal authorization has the opposite goal: the establishment of (previously 
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disturbed) equality of contractual relationship. The legitimacy of this form of 
self-help originates from the general principles of civil law, such as the 
principle of equality and proportionate protection of the interests of the parties 
in contractual relations, the equivalence of mutual benefits, the principle of 
fairness (aequitas) and consciences and honesty (bona fides praestare). Only 
these important principles can justify the Interference into the acquired right 
of property of the debtor (the opponent to retention), through a general social 
aspect of this institute, which represents the protection of the rights through 
permissible self-help, and not the autocracy. The advantages which the 
retention provides the creditor with as a means of defensive self-protection, 
eventually led to an expansion of its application into many other areas of law, 
in addition to the obligation and the real laws. The right of retention has a great 
practical use in comparative law within the following areas: commercial, 
maritime, securities law, and potentially wider de lege ferenda. This is in 
accordance with the previously observed "paradoxical" tendency of modern 
legislations where the government deliberately expands the sphere within 
which it gives up on its exclusive jurisdiction (Scapel 1981 / 3, p. 543). This 
seems justified on condition that it is in accordance with the fairness, which 
represents the primal source of retention, with the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of rights and in accordance with the principle of procedural economy. 
Retention, as a form of self-help, authorizes an individual to, by his factual 
action towards the debtor’s property and without filing the charges or judicial 
intervention, protect their violated right quickly, cost-effectively and 
efficiently. In this way, out of court, it is possible to resolve the situation of 
deteriorated contractual relationship, to unilaterally sanction the irrisponsible 
party, to improve one’s own position and achieve the desired goal - payment 
of due receivables. 
It is known that there is no perfect means of securing, since each claim 
holds uncertainty and always carries the risk of collection (Medic, The Right 
of Retention 2013, 529). The right of retention, besides being accessory, is less 
perfect as it is inextricably linked to immediate holding of the retained 
properties. By losing retained property the retention ceases to exist, as well as 
the right to self-help exercise. In addition, it is necessary for all the legal 
requirements to be cumulatively fulfilled as a precondition for its legal 
establishment and execution. Since the basis of retention, as a rule is not the 
contract but the law, and considering it is performed bypassing or against the 
will of the owner of the retained property, no law provided element must be 
omitted. Particularly important is the way of establishing the tenure of the 
holder: with mandatory consent of the debtor. In contrast, viciously acquired 
tenure (vi, clam, precario) exceeds the permissible domain of self-help and 
represents the felony of autocracy. 
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CONCEPT AND FORMS OF THE FELONY OF AUTOCRACY IN 
THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
 
In the criminal legislation of the Republic of Serbia the felony of 
autocracy belongs to the group of crimes against the state authorities, which 
provide protection to undisturbed, lawful and proper functioning of the 
mentioned. Within this group, the felony of autocracy belongs to the subgroup 
of the offenses of appropriation of the functions of the state authorities. The 
basic form of autocracy is performed by the individuals who autocratically 
acquire their own right or the right they believe they are entitled to. Thus, the 
act of commission consists of obtaining rights. However, in order to obtain the 
rights of any criminal offense, it must be performed autocratically, which 
primarily means that a person is not entitled to obtain the right, and that there 
is no legal basis for it. For example, the acquisition will not be performed 
autocratically, if it occurs in the application of an institute of the criminal law 
which excludes unlawfulness, and therefore the existence of a criminal 
offense, such as self-defense or extreme necessity. Also, it is not this criminal 
offense that is the case within permissible self-help, nor within the 
authorization of an individual, based on special regulations, to obtain his own 
right under specific conditions. So, it will not be the case of this offense if 
there are any general or specific grounds for excluding unlawfulness, that is, 
when an individual is authorized to undertake certain activities in order to 
accomplish their rights. For example, it is not a felony of autocracy when a 
robbed individual chases the thief and takes the stolen property away from the 
thief, but it would be a criminal offense if that individual later entered the 
apartment of the thief and forcibly took away his stolen property (Lazarevic 
2011, p. 953). Criminal Court often has to take into account the particular 
institutes of civil rights when deciding whether or not the unlawfulness is 
excluded, that is, whether it is on the basis of a civil law institute that a 
perpetrator is actually authorized to acquire some of his rights bypassing the 
state authorities. For example, in practice it is possible the perpetrator to have 
in his or her possession the properties of the person to whom he has matured 
claims. In this case, the criminal court is required to determine whether the 
defendant really has matured unsettled claims against the perpetrator. If a 
response to this question was positive, there would be a civil institution of "the 
right to retain", which would mean that the defendant is entitled to retain the 
debtor's belongings. Thus, in that case the defendant would keep the property 
on the basis of some legal grounds, and the unlawfulness would then be 
excluded, that is, the felony of autocracy would not exist. There are some 
opinions in judicial practice that the execution of this offense would mean that 
the perpetrator is not in possession of the properties that belong to him or that 
he or she believe they are entitled to. In one criminal case, the defendant was 
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released of charges that he committed the felony of autocracy in a manner that 
he autocratically acquired the right he believed he was entitled to in respect of 
overdue receivables - unpaid salaries by his company, retaining for himself 
the properties entrusted to him during his work (motor vehicle, fax machines). 
In such a situation, the court concluded that a felony of autocracy implies that 
the offender cannot be in detention of his rights (decision of the District Court 
in Subotica Kz. 54/2007 of 23th February 2007). 
For all these grounds, which exclude the unlawfulness of the offense 
of autocracy, it can be said that they represent the ultima ratio, the final means, 
that an individual can apply when he is not able to exercise his rights in another 
way, and when the state cannot provide him with his rights through its bodies 
(Стојановић, Коментар Кривичног законика 2012, 871). It should be 
explained that obtaining the rights in the context of this offense does not mean 
acquiring the rights, but ensuring their exercise. Namely, the offender cannot 
exercise his own right or the right he believes he is entitled to, so bypassing 
the authorities and the regulated procedure he takes his own initiative by 
undertaking certain activities to obtain his rights (Lazarevic 2011, 952). 
Serbian Criminal Code does not specify the manner in which the 
obtaining can be performed, but the practice has shown that this is usually 
done by force, threat, deception, or fraud. In fact, it can be any manner of 
bypassing state authorities and the regulated procedures, which would enable 
the exercise of one’s own or the alleged right, ensuring in the same time not 
to commit the elements of some other criminal offense. In the judiciary 
practice of the Republic of Serbia it has been shown that this criminal offense 
is most often performed when a household autocratically makes a connection 
to the power grid after being disconnected of electricity by the power company 
due to unpaid bills. The subject of the actions of this criminal offense can be 
the right belonging to the offender, or the right he believes he is entitled to. In 
the first case it is the right that really belongs to the perpetrator, and in the 
second case, the right to which the offender mistakenly believes that he is 
entitled to according to some legal grounds or on the basis of an existing 
legislation. It is not the case of this criminal offense if the offender is aware 
that he is not entitled to the right he is obtaining (Stojanovic, Criminal Law – 
a special part, 2013, pp. 280 - 281). Then it would be the case of some other 
criminal offense – theft, the confiscation of the property, etc. In the judiciary 
practice it is considered that this criminal offense does exist even then when 
the offender autocratically obtains the right to which it was determined in court 
he was not entitled, under condition that he still believes he is entitled to that 
right, as long as this belief is based on some objective criteria (the attitude of 
the Supreme Court of Yugoslavia in the judgment Kzz. 91/65). As far as the 
nature of the rights that are obtained is concerned, these can be different rights: 
real, obligation, parental, guardian, hereditary, and other. 
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The criminal act is considered accomplished when the perpetrator 
obtains, that is, begins to exercise the right. It is intention that is considered a 
form of guilt, which has to include the awareness of the offender that he is 
entitled to the right he is obtaining, and the awareness that the obtaining is 
done autocratically, that is, in a manner of bypassing the state authorities and 
the regulated procedure. A special form of this offense is considered when the 
autocracy is carried out for some other person. This means that the right is 
obtained by the person to whom it does not belong but it is performed on behalf 
of another person. Both forms of criminal offenses are punishable with a fine 
or imprisonment up to one year. If the offense is committed at the expense of 
citizens, it shall be prosecuted by private action.  
 
FELONY OF AUTOCRACY IN THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE 
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES 
 
In the Criminal Code of Montenegro the felony of autocracy is 
regulated under the offenses against the state authorities. The basic form of 
autocracy is entirely consistent to the basic form of this criminal offense in the 
Criminal Code of Serbia. A specific form is also regulated in the same way, 
the one which exists when the basic form of autocracy is performed for another 
person. However, the criminal legislation of Montenegro also regulates two 
more severe forms of autocracy. The first severe form is the case of performing 
the basic form with the use of force or threats, while the other severe form 
means that the basic form is performed with the threat of death or serious 
bodily injury. If any of these forms is performed at the expense of citizens, 
prosecution is undertaken by private action. 
In the Criminal Code of Macedonia, the criminal act of autocracy is 
regulated within the group of offenses against the public order. Macedonian 
legislator regulated the basic form of this crime in the same way as other 
countries in the region. The difference is evident in other forms. Thus, it is the 
case of a more severe form when the main form is performed with the use of 
force or serious threat that the life or body will be attacked. A specific form of 
performing the basic or more severe form on behalf of someone else is also 
regulated. Criminal prosecution for the basic form is undertaken by the private 
prosecution and for a specific form according to the proposal. The criminal act 
of autocracy within the Criminal Code of Croatia belonged to the group of 
offenses against the public order and peace. The basic form of this offense was 
regulated in the same way as in the Serbian Criminal Code, that is, this form 
of autocracy was performed by the individual who autocratically obtained his 
own right or the right he believed he was entitled to. The manner of obtaining 
rights was not determined, wherefore there were present all means and 
manners which could be of help to the perpetrator to obtain his rights, but 
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which were not included in regulated procedures, such as the civil or 
administrative procedures. The reason for incrimination was the same as in the 
Criminal Code of Serbia, which was preventing citizens to autocratically and 
illegally obtain their rights, since there were state authorities and courts to do 
so (Pavišić, Grozdanić / Veić 2007, p. 695). The more severe form of 
autocracy was regulated, which was the case when the basic form of this 
offense was committed by an organized group or several criminal groups. By 
some amendments to the Criminal Code of Croatia, the decriminalization of 
autocracy was performed, and since then all cases of autocratic obtaining the 
individual rights are dealt with within the civil proceedings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The procedure for protection of subjective civil rights is, in all modern 
societies, regulated by law and entrusted to the relevant state authorities. In 
this way, the individuals are prevented from conducting autocratic acts of 
endangering public order and legal security. However, the important 
principles of civil law justify deviations from this rule, and civil norms 
exceptionally allow autocratic exercise of rights within certain relations, and 
under the terms set in advance. This type of protection is of complementary 
and subsidiary character, and its ratio legis represents the idea of protection of 
the legal order. These are the cases of the following situations: immediate and 
imminent danger of disturbing personal properties; unavailability or untimely 
performed judicial protection, and inflicting great or irreparable damage. 
Then, the autocratic protection of the rights even the legislator considers to be 
fairer, safer and more cost effective than the legal toleration of unlawful acts 
in anticipation of late, untimely reaction of the state authorities. Permissible 
self-protection is present in the domestic and comparative law in several 
modalities: as self-defense, in the form of necessary defense, extreme 
necessity and as a self-help, especially in the form of tenural self-protection 
and the right of retention. Each of its forms is: 1) legal, as provided by the law; 
2) legitimate, because it justifies the basic principles of the civil rights, among 
which the most important is the principle of justice; 3) meaningful, because it 
serves not only to the economical protection of individual threatened rights, 
but also to protection of the legal system as a whole; and 4) exceptional and 
subsidiary, since self-protection represents a significant deviation from the 
principle of prohibiting autocratic obtainment of rights. 
It can be concluded that the differences between self-defense and 
autocracy are numerous: 1) the regulation within different areas (criminal and 
civil law); 2) the relation between rule (autocracy) and exception (self-
defence); 3) the active role of the perpetrator of felony of autocracy and the 
passive role of the performer of self-help; 4) the element of unlawfulness with 
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autocracy and the legality of self-defense; 5) exceeding the limits of 
permissible force, and proportionate, adapted to the circumstances, use of 
force in self-defense; 6) the intention as a necessary degree of culpability of 
the felony of autocracy, as opposed to the factual capability of performing the 
action of self-defense. 
The similarity between self-protection and autocracy is primarily of 
terminological nature, but also of technical. The individual represents the 
means of the realization of rights (or the alleged rights) in both cases. The 
similarities end here, because the measure of permissible autocratic self-
protection is limited by the terms of substantive civil law. On the contrary, the 
norms of criminal law incriminate the unlawful conduct that does not comply 
with the requirements of exceptional and proportional autocratic performance. 
However, determining the permissible limits in the exercise of self-defense is 
actually the most problematic in practice, and it also represents the evidence 
of its imperfections as a legal means of protecting the violated rights. Despite 
the shortcomings, the self-protection is a useful legal remedy, which should 
be de lege ferenda regulated specifically as a subjective civil right, in a general 
manner, with a single norm. We believe that the General section of the 
preliminary draft of the Civil Code should explicitly regulate the right to self-
defense in general and only afterwards its individual forms. In addition, it is 
also necessary to regulate a self-help, which is not included in the current 
formulation of this law (the Article 212 of the General section of the 
preliminary draft of the Civil Code regulates only the necessary defense and 
the state of necessity). Finally, we believe that this is the proper way to 
contribute to delineating self-protection from autocracy. 
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